On 2 September 2026, the General Court of the European Union annulled the September 2025 and March 2026 relistings of Galina Pumpyanskaya under the EU Russia sanctions regime, case T-799/25. Seven months earlier, on 11 February 2026, the same Court had gone one step further in the Tokareva case, T-693/25: for the first time in EU sanctions practice, it held expressly that the Council had violated Article 266 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union by putting a name back on the list without fixing the evidentiary defects identified in earlier judgments. These two rulings land in the middle of a paradox that every listed person, every bank compliance officer and every family member with an account in Paris now has to understand. On 22 September 2026, the Council extended its individual Russia listings for a further three years, until September 2029, while quietly removing a handful of famous names from the list. The message is therefore double: sanctions are here for the long run, and at the same time the EU courts are striking down copy-paste relistings one after another.
This article explains what the Pumpyanskaya and Tokareva judgments actually decide, why the new Article 266 TFEU weapon changes the strategy of every sanctions file, and how a person listed in Luxembourg or frozen in France can fight back in practice: annulment before the General Court within a strict two-month deadline, request for delisting before the Council, authorisations to live and to pay lawyers while the freeze lasts, and challenges before the French courts against the banks and administrative measures that enforce the freeze in Paris. The perspective is deliberately that of a French lawyer: most of the practical battle for a listed person living in France, holding assets in France or banking in France is fought in Paris, even though the listing itself can only be annulled in Luxembourg.
I. Luxembourg Punishes Copy-Paste Relistings: the Pumpyanskaya and Tokareva Annulments
Both cases concern the same listing criterion and the same Council habit. Since June 2023, the extended criterion (g) of Decision 2014/145/CFSP allows the Council to list leading businesspersons operating in Russia, their immediate family members and other persons “benefitting from them”, alongside operators in sectors providing substantial revenue to the Russian government. The second limb of that criterion, the benefit derived from a leading businessperson, is the one the Council used against Ms Pumpyanskaya and Ms Tokareva. In both files the Council lost because it relisted without new evidence, and in Tokareva it lost with an additional formal condemnation for disregarding the authority of earlier judgments. The full texts are public: the Pumpyanskaya judgment of 2 September 2026, Eighth Chamber, language of the case English, and the Tokareva judgment of 11 February 2026, Fifth Chamber, language of the case French.
A. Pumpyanskaya Wins Annulment of Her September 2025 and March 2026 Relistings
Galina Pumpyanskaya, a Russian national residing in Dubai, was first listed on 9 March 2022. Her husband is a prominent industrialist formerly at the head of the TMK group and Group Sinara. The Council kept her name on the list at every six-monthly review, but the files did not survive judicial scrutiny. By a judgment of 26 June 2024, Pumpyanskaya v Council, T-737/22, the Court had already annulled the acts of September 2022 and March 2023 concerning her, and by a judgment of 2 April 2025, Pumpyanskaya v Council, T-1108/23, it had annulled the subsequent round of acts, while an earlier action, T-272/22, decided on 6 September 2023, had been dismissed. Undeterred, the Council maintained her name again in Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/1895 of 12 September 2025 with Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1894, and then once more in Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/696 of 14 March 2026 with Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026/695. Those four acts were the contested acts in T-799/25, and the Court annulled all of them in so far as they concerned her, while ordering the Council to bear its own costs and those of the applicant.
The reasoning is a textbook application of the burden of proof in sanctions cases, and it deserves to be read closely by anyone preparing a file. The Court recalls that the benefit test looks generous to the Council at first sight, since it covers any benefit of any kind, not necessarily an improper one, whether financial or non-financial, from donations and transfers of funds to interventions for public contracts, appointments or promotions, provided it is “quantitatively or qualitatively not insignificant”. But the generosity stops there, because the Council must prove that such a benefit actually existed at the date of the contested acts, with a sufficiently solid and consistent body of precise evidence, and it cannot shift that burden onto the listed person, who never has to prove the negative.
On the facts, the Council had almost nothing. It relied on the past and present positions of the husband in two organisations, in TMK and in Group Sinara, yet the Court holds that such positions are at most background context for the status of the husband as a leading businessperson and cannot by themselves demonstrate that the wife derives a benefit from him. The Council then pointed to a single public appearance: in July 2024, during a visit of a senior United Nations official to the National Carpet Museum in Baku, Azerbaijan, the applicant was presented on the museum website and on its Instagram account as the Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Sinara Charitable Foundation. The Court rejects the argument dryly: a cultural setting of that kind cannot amount to exposure to business activities, and “a single public appearance” in such a context cannot demonstrate a significant benefit derived from the husband. A photograph at a museum event in Baku is not an economic benefit, and being presented as the head of a charitable foundation does not prove dependence on an industrial group, especially where the Council itself considers that the husband no longer holds his position in that group.
Two further holdings matter enormously for future files. First, the Court refuses to let the Council repair its reasoning after the event. The Council argued that the applicant lives in Dubai but remains married, and that the resources she claims as her own come from the sale of shares in Group Sinara acquired through family and professional ties with her husband. The answer is procedural and strict: those alleged facts were not mentioned in the stated grounds for listing, and unless a substitution of grounds is admitted, the Council cannot rely on them before the judge to establish that the acts were well founded. A listing stands or falls on the reasons communicated to the listed person, not on explanations invented for the courtroom. Second, the Court draws the consequence plainly: the Council failed to discharge the burden of proof incumbent on it, the first plea is therefore upheld, and the contested acts are annulled in so far as they concern her, without any need to examine the other pleas.
One technical detail should not be missed by practitioners: the effects of the March 2026 decision were maintained until the expiry of the appeal period or, if the Council appeals, until dismissal of the appeal, because a gap between the annulment of the decision and that of the implementing regulation would seriously jeopardise legal certainty. An annulment is therefore not an immediate unfreezing where the Council appeals, and the calendar of the appeal must be managed as carefully as the annulment itself. The same request for maintained effects had been made and largely handled the same way in Tokareva, where the Court rejected the Council request concerning the expired September 2025 decision and dealt with the live acts on their own terms.
B. Tokareva Wins the First Express Article 266 TFEU Condemnation of a Relisting
Maya Tokareva is the daughter of Nikolai Tokarev, the head of the Transneft pipeline group. She was listed on the ground that she benefits from a leading businessperson operating in Russia, the same second limb of criterion (g). Her judicial record before 2026 already read like a chronicle of Council stubbornness. By a judgment of 11 September 2024, Tokareva v Council, T-744/22, the Court annulled the acts of September 2022, March 2023 and September 2023 concerning her, while rejecting her damages claim. By a judgment of 26 February 2025, Tokareva v Council, T-269/24, it annulled the acts of March and September 2024 concerning her, again rejecting damages. By an order of 2 September 2025, Tokareva v Council, T-295/25, it annulled the acts of March 2025 concerning her as manifestly well founded. Three annulments, one order, zero new evidence from the Council, and yet the Council relisted her once more in Decision (CFSP) 2025/1895 of 12 September 2025 and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1894 of the same day. That fourth relisting produced T-693/25, decided on 11 February 2026, and this time the Court added a condemnation that sanctions lawyers had been waiting years to see.
The first plea, “error of assessment”, follows the now familiar path. The Court recalls the foundational rule: the competent EU authority must establish that the stated reasons are well founded, and the listed person never has to prove that they are not. The Council does not have to lay every intelligence document on the table, but what it does produce must actually support the stated reasons. Here, the reasons for the September 2025 acts were identical to those of the September 2023, March 2024, September 2024 and March 2025 acts, all previously annulled for insufficient evidence, and the Council produced no new evidence capable of showing that the property of the applicant or her business relations with the Ronin Trust or Ronin Europe structures constituted a benefit derived from her father. The plea therefore succeeds, and the contested acts must be annulled in so far as they concern her.
The second plea is where the judgment makes new law. The applicant argued that Article 266 TFEU required the Council to draw the consequences of the three earlier annulments instead of forcing her to file a fourth action against identical acts. The Court agreed to rule on that plea, and its reasoning will be cited in every relisting file from now on. Annulment judgments of the EU courts enjoy, once final, “l’autorité absolue de la chose jugée”, covering not only the operative part but also the reasoning that necessarily supports it, in so far as that reasoning is indispensable to determine the exact meaning of what was decided. Applied to sanctions, that means the Council must conduct a fresh examination and either relist on new, properly supported reasons or give up the relisting: where it chooses to adopt new listing acts, it must comply with the operative part of the earlier final annulment judgment and with the reasoning necessarily supporting it, and a new act tainted by the same defects as those identified in the annulment judgment cannot survive. Without that obligation, the Court explains, annulment would be deprived of useful effect, because nothing would prevent the repetition in later acts of reasons already held unlawful.
On these facts the breach is characterised without ambiguity. The Court states the only three lawful options the Council had: remove the name from the lists, adopt new acts on the same reasons only with new evidence, or change the reasons. The Council did none of the three. It also rejects the Council fallback argument that the listing had to be maintained to prevent the transfer of funds outside the Union, holding that the risk of funds being moved out of the Union cannot alone justify maintaining a name on the basis of reasons tainted by the same unlawfulness already found by the Court. The conclusion follows in the operative French of the judgment: by ignoring two consecutive final judgments when adopting the contested acts, the Council “a violé l’article 266 TFUE”, perpetuating an unlawfulness capable of harming the legal order of the Union, one of whose characteristics is respect for the rule of law affirmed in Article 2 TEU and given concrete expression in Article 19 TEU. The contested acts are annulled in so far as the name of the applicant was put back on the list, the request to maintain the effects of the September 2025 decision is rejected, and the Council is ordered to bear its own costs and those of the applicant. Legal commentary has described this as the first express Article 266 TFEU finding against a sanctions relisting, and whether or not that primacy survives closer historical debate, the practical effect is certain: every pending and future relisting file now contains a ready-made second plea, and the Council knows it.
II. Listed or Frozen in France: How to Challenge an EU Sanction From Paris
The two judgments are decided in Luxembourg, but for a person living in France, banking in France or holding property in France, the sanctions battle is fought on two fronts at once. The listing itself, the freeze of funds and economic resources, flows from EU regulations that apply directly in every Member State. As the Conseil d’Etat recalled in its decision of 7 April 2023 on the French enforcement of the Russia sanctions, Conseil d’Etat, 9th and 10th chambers combined, 7 April 2023, no. 465879: “Sont gelés tous les fonds et ressources économiques appartenant aux personnes physiques ou à des personnes physiques ou morales, entités ou organismes qui leurs sont associés énumérés à l’annexe I, de même que tous les fonds et ressources économiques que ces personnes physiques ou que ces personnes physiques ou morales, entités ou organismes qui leurs sont associés possèdent, détiennent ou contrôlent.” And the prohibition is total: “Aucuns fonds ni aucune ressource économique ne sont mis, directement ou indirectement, à la disposition des personnes physiques ou morales, entités ou organismes, ou des personnes physiques ou morales, entités ou organismes qui leurs sont associés, énumérés à l’annexe I, ni dégagés à leur profit”. No French decree is needed for a Paris bank to freeze the account of a person named in Annex I of Regulation (EU) No 269/2014, because the regulation is, in the words of the same decision, “obligatoire dans tous ses éléments et directement applicable dans tout État membre, à compter de sa publication au Journal officiel de l’Union européenne, sans qu’aucune mesure nationale ne soit requise”. But the daily consequences, the frozen salary account, the blocked sale of an apartment, the refused transfer, the mortgage instalment that cannot be paid, all materialise in France, under the control of French authorities and French courts for everything that is national enforcement, authorisation and liability. A complete defence therefore runs four tracks in parallel: annulment in Luxembourg against the listing, a delisting request to the Council, French proceedings against national enforcement where available, and authorisation requests plus bank-level work to keep life and business running during the freeze. The September 2026 context makes this method urgent rather than theoretical: with individual listings extended for three more years under the Council decision of 22 September 2026 extending individual listings for a further three years, a person who misses the two-month annulment deadline against a relisting may remain frozen until 2029 with no judge ever examining the merits of the file.
A. Filing for Annulment Before the General Court Within the Two-Month Deadline
The annulment action is brought under Article 263 TFEU, as both Pumpyanskaya and Tokareva did, and it is subject to a time limit that admits no indulgence: two months from publication of the measure, from its notification to the applicant, or, failing that, from the day it came to the applicant’s knowledge. In sanctions practice the Council communicates its decision, including the grounds for listing, directly where the address is known or through publication of a notice, giving the person an opportunity to present observations. The two-month clock then starts, extended by the standard ten-day period on account of distance, and every six-monthly review that maintains the name is a new act that must be challenged separately if the earlier action has not yet produced effects covering it. The Pumpyanskaya file illustrates the discipline required: separate actions across 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025 and 2026, each aimed at the precise round of acts in force, because a victory against the September 2023 acts does not automatically kill the March 2024 acts. Clients must understand this from the first meeting: sanctions litigation is a rolling practice, not a single case, and the budget and the evidence must be organised accordingly.
The pleas that win are now mapped with unusual precision. First, error of assessment and insufficient evidence: force the Council to prove the benefit with a solid and consistent body of precise material existing at the date of the contested acts, attack each exhibit one by one, and show that family ties, old shareholdings, charitable titles or cultural appearances do not amount to a significant benefit. Pumpyanskaya shows that even where the test of benefit is interpreted broadly, the evidence must still connect the benefit to the listed person at the relevant date. Second, and now with Tokareva as authority, violation of Article 266 TFEU wherever the relisting reproduces reasons already annulled without new evidence or new reasons: the institution whose act has been declared void is required to take the “necessary measures to comply with the judgment”. The plea should be raised systematically where the file contains a prior final annulment, because it transforms the case from a debate about facts into a debate about respect for judgments, a ground on which the Council has just been found in breach. Third, procedural pleas remain available: failure to communicate the grounds, insufficient reasoning, breach of the rights of the defence and of the right to effective judicial protection, and manifest errors in the file references. Fourth, where observations are submitted or substantial new evidence is presented, the Council must review its decision and inform the person accordingly. A reasoned delisting submission, with documentary exhibits proving independent resources, separation of assets, resignation from structures, or sale of shareholdings at arm length, is therefore not a mere formality: it creates the record on which the Court will later judge whether the Council did its job, and the list itself must be reviewed at regular intervals and at least every twelve months.
Three practical warnings complete the Luxembourg picture. First, interim relief is theoretically available but rarely granted in sanctions cases, because the judge requires urgency and a prima facie case, and the Council invariably invokes the reversibility of economic harm and the public interest in the effectiveness of restrictive measures; the file must therefore be built for the main action, not for a quick suspension. Second, damages actions against the Council for unlawful listing remain extremely difficult: both Pumpyanskaya and Tokareva saw their compensation claims rejected even as their annulment claims succeeded, and only a sufficiently serious breach of a rule conferring rights on individuals opens the way to liability. Annulment first, damages only in exceptional constellations. Third, the appeal calendar matters after victory: as Pumpyanskaya shows, the effects of a still-current decision can be maintained until the expiry of the appeal period, so the freeze may continue for weeks after the judgment while the Council decides whether to appeal, and any transaction planned on the strength of the annulment must wait for that period to lapse or for dismissal of the appeal. Counsel in Paris should diary the appeal deadline on the day of the judgment and advise banks in writing only once the position is stabilised.
B. Unfreezing Daily Life in France: Banks, Authorisations and French Courts
While Luxembourg decides on the listing, France enforces the freeze through its banks, its administration and its criminal law, and French law provides the tools to live with the freeze and to contest its national edges. The starting point is that every person on French territory must apply EU freezes immediately. Article L. 562-4 of the French Monetary and Financial Code provides: “Sont tenus d’appliquer sans délai les mesures de gel et les interdictions de mise à disposition ou d’utilisation prévues au présent chapitre et aux articles L. 712-4 et L. 712-10 et d’en informer immédiatement le ministre chargé de l’économie”. The circle of obliged persons is very wide: any natural person on national territory, the financial institutions covered by Article L. 562-4-1, whose internal organisation and procedures must allow the freeze to be applied without delay under Article R. 562-1, and any legal person formed under French law or carrying out an operation in France. In practice this means the Paris bank freezes on the day the name appears in the Official Journal, files a report to the minister for the economy, and blocks not only outgoing transfers but any making available of funds or economic resources, which covers rents collected, dividends paid, and even the use of a frozen account to pay an electricity bill. The definitions in Article L. 562-1 are deliberately exhaustive, treating as funds cash, claims, deposits, savings products and asset management contracts, and as economic resources any tangible or intangible assets that can be used to obtain funds, goods or services. Clients are regularly surprised by the breadth: the freeze does not seize the property, it paralyses its use, and a sale of frozen real estate requires a prior authorisation, failing which the notary will refuse to complete.
The second French layer is the national freeze machinery, which runs alongside the EU regime and can survive an EU delisting. The ministers for the economy and for the interior may jointly order, for six months renewable, the freezing of funds and resources of persons involved in terrorism, as Article L. 562-2 states: “Le ministre chargé de l’économie et le ministre de l’intérieur peuvent décider, conjointement, pour une durée de six mois, renouvelable, le gel des fonds et ressources économiques”. The minister for the economy alone may do the same in further configurations defined by Article L. 562-3. A national register of frozen persons held by the minister for the economy organises the circulation of the information under Article R. 562-2. The reporting duties are precise and continuous: obliged persons inform the minister of frozen funds, of any credit to a frozen account, including, in the words of Article R. 562-3, “Toute opération portée au crédit d’un compte dont les fonds sont gelés”, of any transaction suspected of circumventing the freeze, and of the actual implementation of any release authorisation. For counsel, these provisions are double-edged: they explain why the bank will not move without written instructions from the Treasury, and they identify the exact administrative interlocutor, the sanctions unit of the Directorate General of the Treasury, to which authorisation requests must be addressed with full documentary support.
The third layer, and the most immediately useful for clients, is authorisations. EU law itself provides that national competent authorities may release frozen funds for basic needs, from foodstuffs, rent or mortgage, medicines and medical treatment to taxes, insurance premiums and public utility charges, and for legal fees, namely sums intended exclusively for reasonable professional fees and reimbursement of expenses linked to legal services. Pre-existing contracts can also be honoured under strict conditions. French law mirrors this logic for national freezes: the ministers may authorise the release and making available of part of frozen funds where compatible with public order and with the decisions behind the freeze, since, in the words of Article L. 562-11, “Le ministre chargé de l’économie et le ministre de l’intérieur peuvent conjointement autoriser le déblocage et la mise à disposition d’une partie des fonds ou ressources économiques faisant l’objet d’une mesure de gel”. Such authorisations may be granted on the ministers’ own initiative or at the request of the targeted person or of any third party with a right over the frozen assets. In a Paris file this means concrete monthly work: application for living expenses with rent receipts, tax notices, insurance and school fees; application for counsel fees so the Luxembourg action can be funded from frozen resources, which the regulation expressly contemplates; application for mortgage instalments to prevent the forced sale of the frozen apartment at a loss; and negotiation with the bank, in writing, for each authorised payment, because branch officers will otherwise default to refusal. Files that succeed are files where the authorisation calendar is managed as seriously as the court calendar.
Finally, French courts are not powerless, even though they cannot annul an EU listing. The Conseil d’Etat already tested the boundary in the spring of 2023, when three property companies challenged the decree publishing the names of legal persons owning real estate frozen under Regulation No 269/2014. The outcome delimits exactly what can and cannot be obtained in Paris. First, a national publication measure does not widen the freeze: the decree “n’a en tout état de cause pas pour effet, contrairement à ce qui est soutenu, d’étendre le champ de la mesure de gel à de nouvelles personnes morales”. Second, the freeze itself needs no national relay and changes nothing in its legal nature: it is, in the words of the Court, “Une telle mesure restrictive ne présente pas le caractère d’une sanction mais d’une mesure conservatoire”, and a decree that merely organises publication “ne présente en tout état de cause pas le caractère d’une sanction et n’institue pas un régime de sanction”. Third, and most usefully, what the national measure does not itself order cannot be attacked through it: “le décret attaqué ne comporte par lui-même aucune mesure de gel de fonds ou de ressources économiques”, so complaints about the absence of a prior adversarial procedure or about an unlimited duration, framed against the decree, were set aside as inoperative. The full reasoning is public in Conseil d’Etat, 9th and 10th chambers combined, 7 April 2023, no. 465879, ECLI:FR:CECHR:2023:465879.20230407, and the action was dismissed. The lesson for counsel is precise: challenge national administrative measures taken under Articles L. 562-2 or L. 562-3 before the administrative courts where such measures exist, bring disputes with a bank over the scope of a freeze, the refusal to execute an authorised payment, or liability for abusive blocking before the civil courts, and map criminal exposure in advance, because circumventing a freeze, making funds available to a listed person, or structuring operations to evade the measures can lead to prosecution in France. The method that emerges from the 2026 case law is therefore cumulative and disciplined: calendar the two-month Article 263 deadline from the Official Journal and file in Luxembourg with evidence rebutting each stated reason, because family proximity is not proof of benefit since Pumpyanskaya and Tokareva; plead Article 266 TFEU wherever a prior final annulment exists, because repetition without new evidence is now an autonomous breach; keep the household and the defence alive through basic-needs and legal-fees authorisations in Paris; and audit every jurisdiction, since an EU annulment does not erase American, British or Swiss designations and a maintained-effects order can keep the freeze alive during the appeal window. With listings extended until 2029, the files that win will be those that treat Luxembourg litigation, Council delisting requests, Treasury authorisations and French court protection as a single coordinated case.
Conclusion
The General Court has just given listed persons and their counsel the two most useful judgments of the decade on Russia sanctions. Pumpyanskaya, decided on 2 September 2026, shows that the benefit criterion cannot be satisfied by status, marriage, old share certificates or a photograph at a cultural event in Baku: the Council must prove, with precise evidence existing at the date of the acts, that the person actually derived a significant benefit from a leading businessperson, and arguments invented after the event cannot save the listing. Tokareva, decided on 11 February 2026, adds the systemic sanction: where the Council relists on identical reasons already annulled by final judgments, without new evidence and without new reasons, it violates Article 266 TFEU, and no invocation of legal certainty or of the risk of asset flight can cure that breach. Together, the two rulings draw a clear line for the three-year extension period that began on 22 September 2026: the Council may keep the regime alive until 2029, but it may not keep individuals on the list by administrative routine. For persons frozen in France, the practical consequence is a four-track defence run from Paris and Luxembourg together: annulment within two months, reasoned delisting requests, monthly authorisations for living costs and legal fees, and French proceedings wherever national enforcement oversteps. Sanctions files are won the way these two were won, by attacking every exhibit, by holding the Council to its burden of proof, and by forcing it to respect the judgments it has already lost.