KOHEN AVOCATS FIRM · PARIS 16
She Sang at State Galas. The EU Listed Her. Then the Evidence Went Stale: the 16 September 2026 Gagarina Judgment and How to Unfreeze Assets from France

Hassan KOHEN acts in urgent matters, from the police station to the assize court. Initial strategic analysis: €80 incl. VAT, personal reply within 24 hours.

100% confidential · Legal professional privilege · No obligation

Article generated by artificial intelligence, through a process designed and supervised by the firm

Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

Paris Bar Police custody, investigation, assize court CNB listing avocat.fr
Maître Hassan KOHEN, avocat au Barreau de Paris
Hassan KOHEN
Attorney at the Paris Bar

She Sang at State Galas. The EU Listed Her. Then the Evidence Went Stale: the 16 September 2026 Gagarina Judgment and How to Unfreeze Assets from France

Speak to a lawyer 06 89 11 34 45

On 16 September 2026, the Fourth Chamber of the General Court of the European Union handed down one of the most instructive sanctions judgments of the year. In Case T-460/24, Gagarina v Council, a famous Russian singer asked the Luxembourg judges to wipe out four successive rounds of EU restrictive measures taken against her in 2024 and 2025. She lost on the 2024 listings and won on the 2025 renewals. The Court annulled Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/528, Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/527, Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/1895 and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1894 in so far as they concern Ms Polina Sergeevna Gagarina, and it dismissed the action as to the remainder. That split outcome is precisely what makes the ruling so valuable. It shows, in a single judgment, what kind of evidence is enough to put a performer on the EU sanctions list in the first place, and what kind of evidence the Council must still produce, two years later, to keep her there. For anyone with funds, securities or property frozen in France under the EU Russia sanctions regime, the judgment is a practical toolkit: it explains how listings are reasoned, how renewals can be attacked, and which doors in Paris can be knocked on to obtain the release of frozen assets.

The timing adds urgency. The applicant remains listed under a later measure, Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/696 of 14 March 2026, which is not covered by this action, and the autumn 2026 six-month rollover of the Russia sanctions has just gone through a bruising round of last-minute negotiations between Member States. Every renewal is a new decision, and every new decision is a new opportunity to challenge. This article explains the Gagarina ruling paragraph by paragraph and turns it into an action plan for frozen accounts, blocked securities and stalled enforcement files in France.

I. Why the 2024 Listing Survived: Performing at State Propaganda Events Can Satisfy the EU Listing Criterion

A. What Article 3(1)(a) of Regulation 269/2014 Punishes, and How the Council Is Allowed to Prove It

EU asset freezes do not work the way many account holders imagine. No prosecutor has to charge you, no criminal judge has to convict you, and the Council does not have to show that you personally ordered tanks across a border. Under Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 (OJ L 78, 17.3.2014), Article 3(1) provides that Annex I, the freeze list, shall include natural persons identified by the Council as responsible for actions which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and persons associated with them. Once a name is in Annex I, Article 2 freezes all funds and economic resources belonging to, owned, held or controlled by that person, and forbids making any funds or economic resources available to them. The parallel CFSP act, Decision 2014/145/CFSP (OJ L 78, 17.3.2014), mirrors the freeze and organises the derogations through which national authorities may authorise releases for basic needs, legal fees or pre-existing judicial decisions.

In the Gagarina file, the Council relied on two criteria of the amended Decision: criterion (a), supporting actions undermining Ukrainian territorial integrity, and criterion (d), generating significant revenue through frequent participation in state-sponsored propaganda events and programmes. The stated reasons said the applicant regularly performed in the framework of State propaganda events, for example to celebrate the illegal annexation of four Ukrainian regions or the anniversary of the annexation of Crimea. Those few lines carry the whole case, because EU law surrounds them with a full set of procedural guarantees. The statement of reasons must identify the legal basis and the actual and specific grounds for listing, so that the person concerned can understand the accusation and the Court can review it. The right to effective judicial protection in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union requires that the listed person be able to ascertain those reasons, either from the act itself or by requesting disclosure. The applicant argued the reasoning was almost absent and contradictory. The Court disagreed for the 2024 acts: it found it sufficiently clear that she was listed under criterion (a) because she regularly performed at State propaganda events celebrating annexations, and under criterion (d) because that frequent participation generated significant revenue.

On the merits, the Council enjoys a broad discretion, but it must prove the facts to the requisite legal standard, and the Court conducts a full review of whether the evidence is specific, precise and consistent. Three evidentiary rules from the judgment deserve attention from practitioners. First, in the absence of investigative powers in third countries, EU authorities may rely on publicly available sources, press articles and reports, a rule confirmed in the Prigozhin and Kim case law and applied here to nine press items published between 2022 and 2024. Second, the Courts apply the principle of unfettered assessment of evidence: what counts is reliability, judged by the origin of the document, the circumstances in which it was created and whether it appears sound. Third, the Council may file additional evidence before the Court to confirm facts alleged in the listing reasons, provided that material supports evidence already available when the acts were adopted and relates to events predating them. The judgment accepts press articles about pre-2024 concerts on exactly that basis. For defence lawyers, the lesson is symmetrical: attack the reliability of each item, show that an event postdates the act or adds nothing to the file, and force the Council to prove disputed participation itself, because the burden of proving the listing facts stays with the Council.

B. The Concerts the Council Proved, and Why the Apolitical Artist Defence Collapsed

The factual core of the 2024 listing is a concert calendar. The Court found that the applicant participated in several propaganda events legitimising Russian military intervention in Ukraine and, thereby, Russia’s annexation of part of Ukrainian territory. The exhibits established performances at the Luzhniki Stadium concert of 18 March 2022 marking the eighth anniversary of the annexation of Crimea, a 19 March 2022 concert for refugees from the self-proclaimed Luhansk and Donetsk republics, a January 2024 performance at the Mandryka central military hospital for soldiers who had taken part in the special military operation, and the 18 March 2024 Red Square concert marking the tenth anniversary of the annexation of Crimea. A further exhibit indicated she was scheduled to perform at the 29 September 2023 Red Square concert for the anniversary of the annexation of four Ukrainian regions, an event she denied attending.

The Luzhniki analysis shows how the Court reads stagecraft as political speech. The event slogan was For a world without Nazism, the head of state told the crowd Russia was combating neo-Nazis in Ukraine, and the applicant sang Cuckoo, a cover from a film about the Soviet defence of Crimea and Sevastopol against Nazi Germany, while wearing a white outfit marked with a capital Z formed from a St George’s ribbon, a symbol that has been used by the Russian Government since March 2022 to express its support for Russia’s military invasion of Ukraine. Voluntarily taking part in such a rally, in such an outfit, singing such a song, cannot be regarded as neutral, and the claim that the performance carried no political message was rejected as unconvincing. The next evening’s charity concert fared no better: organised by a fellow singer who had publicly described the invasion as a peacekeeping operation and self-defence, a post the applicant had publicly liked, the event provided moral support to people received by Russia since the start of the war of aggression and, in the Court’s words, may be regarded as a means of supporting a policy that promotes actions undermining the territorial integrity of Ukraine.

Two nuances matter for future files. On the disputed September 2023 concert, the Court recalled that it is for the Council to prove participation: a listing announcement plus an incomplete video of the event do not establish that the applicant actually sang there. The Council won the 2024 round on the strength of the other four events, not on assumptions. And on the legal characterisation, the judgment is explicit that direct involvement in decisions or policies is irrelevant: the measures were imposed because she actively supported the Russian Government’s policy in Ukraine by participating in propaganda events in her capacity as a famous singer. In the light of all the foregoing factors, the Court concluded that the Council has established, to the requisite legal standard and without infringing the principle of legal certainty, that the applicant had participated regularly in events intended to promote Russian State propaganda, with no error of assessment for the initial 2024 acts, and no error either for the September 2024 renewal adopted less than three months later on the same evidence. Fame is not a shield when the stage is a state podium; but the Council’s victory memo expires fast, as the second half of the judgment demonstrates.

II. Why the 2025 Relistings Fell: Every Renewal Is a New Decision That Demands Current Proof

A. The Continued-Satisfaction Rule: Specific, Precise, Consistent and Current Evidence or Annulment

The most quotable passage of the judgment concerns the March 2025 and September 2025 renewals. EU sanctions listings are time-limited and periodically renewed, and each renewal must independently satisfy the listing criterion on the day it is adopted. Old evidence can still be used, but only under strict conditions restated with unusual clarity. The Council may rely on information predating the renewal where it substantiates the reasons for that act and helps establish that, despite the passage of time and in light of all the circumstances of the case, the person still satisfies the criterion, and the Court of Justice accepted in Shuvalov that past material may demonstrate continuity between the previous situation and the current one. Continuity, however, must be demonstrated, not presumed.

Here the file ran dry. The most recent State propaganda event at which the applicant performed is the concert of 18 March 2024, and the evidence files refer to no other propaganda event involving her after that date. The evidence therefore does not demonstrate that the applicant’s conduct was still of a regular nature at the date of adoption of those acts or, more specifically, that she was continuing to perform regularly at State propaganda events at that date. Nor did the Council show that regular participation between 2022 and 2024 was enough, despite the passage of time, to consider that she was still supporting undermining actions. The conclusion follows in the formula practitioners should memorise: the Council did not present a body of evidence that was sufficiently specific, precise and consistent to establish that the applicant continued to satisfy criterion (a) on the date of adoption of those acts. The March 2025 and September 2025 acts were annulled without any need to examine the remaining pleas, including a fifth plea alleging procedural irregularities in the September 2025 adoption.

The operative part is surgical. It annuls the two 2025 decisions and the two 2025 implementing regulations in so far as they concern Ms Polina Sergeevna Gagarina, and it dismisses the action as to the remainder, with each side bearing its own costs. Three practical consequences follow. First, the annulment covers the listing window from 16 March 2025 to 15 March 2026, which opens the question of compensation and of releases wrongly refused during that period. Second, the Council’s fallback request to keep the annulled decisions alive until replacement regulations take effect was rejected as having become devoid of purpose, since the applicant is now subject to new restrictive measures: by Decision 2026/696 of 14 March 2026 the Council maintained her name until 15 September 2026, and, crucially, that annulment does not, however, extend to Decision 2026/696, to which the present action does not relate. An annulment of past renewals does not automatically delete a current listing adopted under a later act. Third, the September 2024 renewal survived precisely because it came less than three months after the initial listing on identical evidence, while the 2025 renewals died for lack of anything current. The decay curve is now visible: the older the conduct, the more the Council must show it continues, and press clippings from 2022 cannot carry a 2025 freeze by themselves. A comparable relisting logic recently benefited other applicants before the Luxembourg courts, as examined in the analysis of the Tkach annulment and its consequences for assets frozen in France, and Gagarina extends the pattern from oligarch files to performer files.

B. From Luxembourg to Paris: Turning the Ruling Into Released Funds, Unblocked Securities and Paid Lawyers

A Luxembourg annulment does not unfreeze a Paris bank account by itself. EU regulations apply directly in France, so the freeze bites the moment the name is in Annex I: the French bank blocks the account, the custodian blocks the securities chain, the notary refuses to close the sale. The unblocking then runs through French hands. The competent authority to which release and derogation requests are addressed for France sits within the national administration working under the EU regulations, in practice the sanctions units handling asset freezes, and every request must be framed in the language of the regulations themselves. Article 2 of the Decision and of the Regulation states the prohibition in absolute terms: all funds and economic resources belonging to, owned, held or controlled by listed persons shall be frozen, and no funds or economic resources shall be made available to them. The same texts immediately organise the exits. The national authority may authorise releases for basic needs such as food, rent or mortgage, medicines, taxes and insurance, for reasonable professional fees and reimbursement of expenses linked to legal services, for routine holding charges, and for extraordinary expenses notified to the other Member States and the Commission two weeks in advance. A further derogation covers funds subject to an arbitral, judicial or administrative decision, allowing satisfaction of claims secured by such decisions within applicable legal limits.

France adds a national layer that files must not confuse with the EU layer. Alongside directly applicable EU freezes, French law provides complementary national freezing tools decided by the executive for renewable six-month periods and published in the national register. Article L562-3 of the Monetary and Financial Code empowers the Minister for the Economy to freeze funds belonging to, held or controlled by persons designated under United Nations Chapter VII resolutions or acts adopted under Article 29 of the Treaty on European Union or Article 75 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, as well as entities owned or controlled by them or acting knowingly on their behalf. Article L562-1 of the same Code defines the scope of the chapter, while Article L562-2 organises a parallel joint freeze by the Ministers for the Economy and the Interior in terrorism matters. Identifying whether the block on a given account rests on the EU regulation, on a national complementary measure, or on an over-cautious bank applying both, determines the competent interlocutor, the form of the request and the judge who can order release. Property is protected at the highest level while the freeze lasts: Article 17 of the Charter protects the right to property subject to proportionate restrictions in the general interest, and Article 544 of the Civil Code defines ownership as the most absolute enjoyment and disposal of things within the limits of the laws. A freeze is a temporary restriction, not a confiscation, and every refusal of release must survive proportionality review, a point the General Court has pressed on national authorities handling requests from non-listed customers of listed intermediaries.

French banks and custodians have no discretion to wait and see. Article L562-4 of the Monetary and Financial Code requires every person on national territory to apply freeze measures and making-available prohibitions without delay and to inform the Minister for the Economy immediately, while Article L562-5 forbids making funds or economic resources available, directly or indirectly, to frozen persons, and Article R562-1 forces institutions to maintain internal procedures capable of applying those freezes at once. Over-compliance is therefore structural, and refusals must be fought, not merely regretted. A refusal of release is an administrative decision that can be challenged before the administrative court, which under Article R421-1 of the Code of Administrative Justice must be seized within two months of notification or publication, and whose interim judge may under Article L521-1 suspend execution where urgency justifies it and a plea raises serious doubt about legality in the current state of the file. A Gagarina-style annulment of the underlying EU renewal is exactly the kind of plea that creates such doubt.

The Gagarina method for a French file has four steps. First, date-stamp the Council’s evidence: list every item by event date, separate proven participation from scheduled or disputed appearances, and mark the most recent proven conduct, because after Gagarina the Council must show regularity at the date of each renewal. Cessation evidence is now premium material: cancelled tours, ended state contracts, public distancing, and a clean twelve-month record can do what apologies cannot. Second, calendar the two-month action deadline under Article 263 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union against every new listing or renewal act, including the autumn 2026 rollover measures, since Gagarina shows that even a lost challenge to the initial listing sharpens the later challenge to stale renewals. Third, run the national track in parallel: file reasoned release requests for living costs and legal fees, invoke pre-existing judicial decisions where enforcement files predate the listing, and bring refusals before the national judge with the Charter proportionality case law attached, because Luxembourg has expressly left that door open for affected persons. Fourth, quantify the annulment window: for periods where the listing is judicially erased, document refused transfers, missed settlements at European depositories and blocked corporate actions, since those losses frame both settlement leverage with the administration and any subsequent damages discussion. The autumn 2026 context makes speed rational rather than hasty: with the six-month Russia package renewal delayed by disputes over individual designations and transactional delisting debates reported across Brussels, each file must be ready before the next renewal act is published, not after. The Council’s evidence goes stale; files that prove it go first.

Conclusion

Gagarina v Council will not be remembered as the judgment that cleared a singer. It will be remembered as the judgment that dated every piece of evidence in an EU sanctions file. Performing at state galas celebrating annexations can lawfully ground an initial listing, and the Court upheld the 2024 measures on detailed, event-by-event findings that rejected the apolitical-artist narrative. But a freeze is not a monument to past concerts. For the March 2025 and September 2025 renewals the Council offered the same old calendar, the Court asked what she had done lately, and the answer was nothing on the record, so the renewals were annulled. The listing continues under the March 2026 measure, which this action does not touch, and that is exactly where the next challenge must aim. For holders of frozen accounts and blocked securities in France, the instruction is concrete: separate the EU freeze from any national complementary measure, file derogation requests in the language of the regulations, calendar the two-month challenge deadline for each renewal, build cessation evidence from the day the music stops, and quantify every loss inside annulled windows. Sanctions files age in dog years. Gagarina teaches that the Council must keep proving, and that a well-kept file can make stale proof fatal.

📄 Official circular