On 16 September 2026, the General Court of the European Union handed down one of the most instructive sanctions judgments of the year. In Case T-460/24, brought by Russian singer Polina Sergeevna Gagarina against the Council of the European Union, the Fourth Chamber upheld her initial listing in June 2024 and the first renewal in September 2024, then annulled the two 2025 renewals that had kept her name on the European Union restrictive measures lists. The judgment draws a sharp line that matters far beyond one artist: past participation in state propaganda events can justify a listing, but each renewal must rest on current proof, not on a file of old concerts. For business people, artists, family members and account holders whose funds are frozen in France, the ruling is both a warning and a roadmap. It confirms that the criterion of support for actions undermining the territorial integrity of Ukraine reaches cultural figures who lend their audience to the war effort, and it shows precisely where the Council fails when it renews listings on autopilot. This analysis explains what the Court decided, paragraph by paragraph, and how a person listed or frozen in France can turn that reasoning into an annulment action, an unfreezing request and a practical plan for daily life under sanctions.
I. Can the European Union keep a singer listed for concerts given years ago? The Gagarina answer of 16 September 2026
A. Why did the General Court uphold the 2024 listing of Polina Gagarina over state propaganda concerts?
Ms Gagarina was added to the lists on 24 June 2024 by Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/1738 of 24 June 2024 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1746 of 24 June 2024 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014, under two criteria. The first treats as targeted any person supporting actions or policies which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, within the meaning of Article 2(1)(a) of Decision 2014/145/CFSP and Article 3(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) No 269/2014. The Council stated that she “regularly performs” in “State propaganda events” such as concerts celebrating the unlawful annexation of four Ukrainian regions or the anniversary of the annexation of Crimea. The second criterion described her as benefiting from the Russian Government because frequent participation in state-sponsored events and programmes brought her significant revenue. The September 2024 renewal acts kept her on the lists for the same reasons, and she challenged every act by adapting her action under Article 263 TFEU, the provision that opens the annulment action before the Luxembourg courts.
The Court began with the duty to state reasons and rejected the argument that the statement was almost absent or contradictory. It held that the context was known to the applicant, that the legal basis was stated, and that the reasons identified the actual and specific grounds: she was a singer said regularly to take part in state propaganda events and therefore said to support actions undermining the territorial integrity of Ukraine. She understood the case well enough to contest it in detail, and her argument that performing songs cannot amount to support went to the merits rather than to the statement of reasons. This is classic Luxembourg method. Reasons must let the person understand the allegation and the Court review it, and here that threshold was met even though the wording was short.
On the merits, the Court accepted that the Council had assembled a specific, precise and consistent body of evidence for the 2024 acts. Four events were established. In March 2022 she sang at the Luzhniki Stadium concert marking the anniversary of the annexation of Crimea, in an outfit bearing the letter Z formed from a St George ribbon, performing a patriotic song from a film about the defence of Sevastopol while the Russian President spoke in defence of the invasion. The Court held that her voluntary participation could not be regarded as neutral. The following day she sang for refugees from the self-declared republics in Donetsk and Luhansk, in a concert organised by another singer who had described the invasion as a peacekeeping operation in a post she had publicly liked. In January 2024 she performed at a military hospital before an audience that included soldiers who had taken part in the war of aggression, singing hits including the song from the film about Sevastopol, which in context conveyed a patriotic theme. In March 2024 she sang in Red Square for the tenth anniversary of the annexation of Crimea, at which the President described the annexation of new territories as a major event in the history of the State. Only the alleged September 2023 concert failed for lack of proof, because the article used by the Council said she was scheduled to appear rather than that she did appear, and the video relied upon was incomplete.
The judgment confirms three evidentiary principles that every future applicant must reckon with. First, the Courts apply unfettered assessment of the evidence and look only at reliability, weighing the origin of each document, the circumstances in which it came into being, the person to whom it was addressed and whether on its face it appears sound and reliable, as recalled from the judgment of 31 May 2018, Kaddour v Council, T-461/16, EU:T:2018:316, paragraph 107. Second, in the absence of investigative powers in third countries, the assessment may rely on publicly available sources, press articles, reports and similar materials, following the judgments of 14 March 2018, Kim and Others v Council and Commission, T-533/15 and T-264/16, EU:T:2018:138, paragraph 107, and of 1 June 2022, Prigozhin v Council, T-723/20, not published, EU:T:2022:317, paragraph 59. The conflict setting makes access to primary sources particularly difficult, a factor the Court expressly weighs, citing the judgment of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T-193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 116. Third, additional evidence produced later may confirm facts alleged in the listing reasons where it supports material the Council already held and relates to events prior to the contested acts, per the judgments of 5 March 2025, Ponomarenko v Council, T-249/22, not published, EU:T:2025:202, paragraph 108, and of 10 September 2025, Yanukovych v Council, T-643/22, not published, EU:T:2025:838, paragraph 31. Applicants who hope that press-based files collapse on their own will be disappointed. The fight must be targeted at what the file actually fails to prove.
Context sealed the 2024 outcome. The Court noted that she had publicly liked a social media post calling the invasion a peacekeeping operation, had publicly declared political loyalty to the President, and belonged to a group of patriotic artists recommended to regional authorities and state enterprises for engagements. From this it concluded that the events aimed to shape public opinion and legitimise the war, and that propaganda and disinformation form part of modern warfare. Because the first criterion of support was substantiated, the Court did not need to examine the second criterion on benefiting from the Government for the 2024 acts. Proportionality and fundamental rights arguments also failed for that period. The measures serve an objective of general interest, less restrictive measures would be less effective, the measures are temporary, reversible and periodically reviewed with exemptions available, and freedom of expression and freedom of the arts under the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union are not absolute and may be limited. The essence of those freedoms remained intact because the acts restrict concerts in European Union territory, which she may not enter or transit, while she remains able to create and share music, including recordings, outside the European Union and to perform and earn income in Russia. The lesson for listed cultural figures is blunt. A stage in front of soldiers or at an annexation anniversary is not treated as a neutral artistic performance. Once the file shows several such appearances plus public alignment with the official narrative, the initial listing survives.
B. Why did the March and September 2025 renewals fall: what does stale evidence mean for your own listing?
The turning point of the Judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) of 16 September 2026 in Case T-460/24, Polina Sergeevna Gagarina v Council of the European Union lies in a single adverb. By Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/528 of 14 March 2025 and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/527 of 14 March 2025, then by Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/1895 of 12 September 2025 and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1894 of 12 September 2025, the Council maintained her name under the first criterion only, repeating that she regularly performs in state propaganda events. The Court held that the word regularly implies repetition at intervals and not a one-off appearance, and that several events between 2022 and 2024 had been enough to use it in 2024. But by March 2025 and September 2025, the Council produced no current material showing that such participation was still regular when those acts were adopted. A record of past conduct, however well documented, cannot by itself carry a renewal eighteen months later. The Council must show that the ground still exists at the date of each renewal, and here it did not.
This is the stale evidence doctrine in its clearest recent form, and it is directly useful for anyone listed since 2022 or 2023 on the basis of concerts, posts, board seats or contracts that have since ended. The Council often renews by copying the previous statement of reasons and adding a recent press cutting of marginal value. After Gagarina, that method is vulnerable wherever the new file contains nothing proving continued conduct. Did the person resign from the board, end the contract, stop performing at official events, divest the shareholding, or publicly disengage? Has the Council simply re-dated old exhibits? The Court upheld the second plea and annulled the four 2025 acts in so far as they concern her, without needing to rule on the remaining pleas. The operative part is unequivocal. The Court annuls Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/528 of 14 March 2025, Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/527 of 14 March 2025, Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/1895 of 12 September 2025 and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1894 of 12 September 2025, “in so far as” they concern Ms Polina Sergeevna Gagarina. It then provides that the Court “Dismisses the action as to the remainder;” and orders each party to bear its own costs.
Three limits keep this victory honest, and any serious lawyer must state them before building expectations. First, the annulment covers the listing period from 16 March 2025 to 15 March 2026 only. By Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/696 of 14 March 2026, the Council maintained her name until 15 September 2026, and that act was not the subject of the action, so the annulment does not extend to it. A successful annulment of past periods does not automatically erase the current listing. A fresh action against the newest renewal remains necessary, although the reasoning on stale evidence can be redeployed if the new file is equally thin. Second, the Council’s request to maintain the temporal effects of the annulled decisions was rejected as devoid of purpose precisely because new measures now apply, following by analogy the judgment of 22 October 2025, Gutseriev v Council, T-233/24, not published, EU:T:2025:975, paragraph 95. Third, each party bears its own costs, which shows that partial success does not shift the financial burden. Litigating in Luxembourg costs money win or lose, and budgeting for counsel, translations and possible appeal must be part of the decision.
For readers comparing their own file with this one, the practical test is chronological. List every event the Council cites, date by date. Separate what predates the contested renewal from what is contemporaneous with it. Ask whether the contemporaneous material proves repetition or only a single appearance. Check whether scheduled appearances are presented as actual performances, the exact error that cost the Council the September 2023 concert here. Examine likes, memberships and declarations for dates and authenticity rather than accepting them as timeless proof of alignment. A comparable annulment obtained shortly before, on different facts, is examined in our analysis of the annulment of the September 2024 and 2025 relistings and the challenge strategy from France, which shows how the same method applies beyond cultural figures. Where the file goes quiet after 2024, Gagarina is now the authority that turns that silence into an annulment.
II. Listed in Luxembourg, frozen in Paris: how to challenge European Union sanctions from France
A. How do you bring an annulment action against the Council within the two-month deadline?
The annulment action is the only direct route to removing a name from the European Union lists, and it obeys strict procedural rules. Under Article 263 TFEU, the action must be lodged within two months of notification or publication of each contested act, plus a ten-day extension on account of distance for applicants outside Luxembourg. Each renewal is a separate act with its own deadline, which is why Ms Gagarina adapted her action four times to cover the initial acts, the September 2024 acts, the March 2025 acts and the September 2025 acts. Missing one deadline leaves that period untouchable. Docket discipline therefore comes first. Every publication in the Official Journal must be calendared on the day it appears, and instructions to Luxembourg counsel must go out within days, not weeks, with identity documents, corporate records where relevant, and a first chronology of the facts alleged.
The pleas that work are those the Gagarina file illustrates. Inadequate reasoning attacks short or copy-pasted statements, though applicants should know this plea rarely succeeds alone where the context was known. Error of assessment is the core plea, and after Gagarina it should be pleaded renewal by renewal, event by event, exhibit by exhibit, distinguishing established appearances from scheduled ones, actual repetition from a single concert, and contemporaneous proof from recycled history. Proportionality and fundamental rights pleas invoke the Charter of Fundamental Rights, in particular freedom of expression and freedom of the arts, freedom to conduct a business and the right to property, but applicants must confront the settled answer that these rights may be limited for an objective of general interest where the measures are temporary, reversible and reviewed. Procedural pleas challenge late disclosure of the file or refusal of access to non-confidential material. French litigants often underestimate how document-heavy this litigation is. The Council files evidence in successive tranches, the applicant replies with dated counter-exhibits, and victory goes to the party whose chronology the judges can verify. Contracts of termination, resignation letters, sale deeds, concert calendars, travel records and dated screenshots, each translated and certified, weigh more than general denials.
Interim relief deserves a clear-eyed paragraph because clients ask for it first. Suspension of the listing pending judgment is theoretically available, but the threshold is severe: urgency with serious and irreparable harm plus a prima facie case. The General Court rarely suspends sanctions listings, reasoning that financial harm is in principle reparable and that derogations cover basic needs. The main action therefore remains the decisive battle, with appeal to the Court of Justice on points of law within two months of the General Court judgment. Settlement in the formal sense does not exist, yet files do resolve through delisting at a periodic review where the evidence has gone stale and the applicant has submitted a structured delisting request to the Council in parallel with litigation. The two tracks reinforce each other. The court action pressures the file, and the administrative request gives the Council a face-saving exit at review. Anyone considering this path from Paris should also note the French procedural reflex that does not apply in Luxembourg. The familiar domestic rule that “La juridiction ne peut être saisie que par voie de recours formé contre une décision, et ce, dans les deux mois à partir de la notification ou de la publication” stated in Article R421-1 of the Code de justice administrative governs French administrative courts, while the European Union deadline flows from the Treaty and the Rules of Procedure of the General Court. The two months look alike but run in different orders with different registries, languages and extension rules, and confusing them is a classic and fatal error.
Burden of proof is where Gagarina most clearly helps applicants. The Council must prove the facts it alleges with reliable material, and the Court verifies that material without deference. French lawyers know the parallel domestic maxim that “Celui qui réclame l’exécution d’une obligation doit la prouver.” stated in Article 1353 of the Code civil, and the European Union standard for listings follows the same logic in substance: the authority that restricts must justify the restriction with proof, and stale or scheduled-but-unproven events do not meet that standard. Concretely, this means demanding the Council’s evidence file for each contested act, testing every exhibit for date, source and completeness, and filing counter-evidence that is dated and verifiable rather than rhetorical. An applicant who shows that nothing new happened between the last solid exhibit and the renewal date now litigates with the wind of 16 September 2026 at his back.
B. Bank account frozen in Paris: who freezes, what is banned, and how do you live and pay counsel?
European Union regulations have direct effect in France, so a bank in Paris freezes without waiting for any French decree naming the client individually. The legal chain runs from the European Union list to the French freezing machinery in the Chapter II of Title VI of Book V of the Code monétaire et financier, opened by Article L562-1. For European Union and United Nations designations, the operative national provision is Article L562-3 of the Code monétaire et financier, under which “Le ministre chargé de l’économie peut décider, pour une durée de six mois, renouvelable, le gel des fonds et ressources économiques” belonging to, possessed, held or controlled by persons designated under Chapter VII resolutions or acts adopted pursuant to Article 29 of the Treaty on European Union or Article 75 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The parallel antiterrorist provision in Article L562-2 of the Code monétaire et financier provides that “Le ministre chargé de l’économie et le ministre de l’intérieur peuvent décider, conjointement, pour une durée de six mois, renouvelable, le gel des fonds et ressources économiques” of persons involved in terrorism, and comparison of the two texts helps clients understand which regime freezes them and which authority to address. Banks, insurers, notaries and other holders “Sont tenus d’appliquer sans délai les mesures de gel et les interdictions de mise à disposition ou d’utilisation prévues au présent chapitre” under Article L562-4 of the Code monétaire et financier, and Article L562-5 of the Code monétaire et financier adds that “Il est interdit aux personnes mentionnées à l’article L. 562-4 de mettre à disposition directement ou indirectement” funds or economic resources to listed persons. In practice this means the account stops on the morning of publication, cards are declined, transfers bounce, the notary cannot release sale proceeds, and even well-meaning relatives who route money around the freeze expose themselves to criminal liability.
Daily life under a freeze is therefore a matter of authorisations, not improvisation. European Union regulations provide derogations for basic needs, legal fees, maintenance of frozen assets and, in defined cases, release of funds under prior contracts, each requiring prior approval by the competent national authority, in France the Directorate General of the Treasury. Article L562-11 of the Code monétaire et financier reflects the same logic domestically where it states that “Le ministre chargé de l’économie et le ministre de l’intérieur peuvent conjointement autoriser le déblocage et la mise à disposition d’une partie des fonds” in defined circumstances, and applications must document every euro: rent and utilities, food and medical costs, school fees, insurance premiums, payroll where a company is affected, and itemised counsel fees for the Luxembourg action itself. Files that succeed are granular and boring in the best sense. Bank statements, leases, invoices, tax notices, employment contracts and fee agreements, translated where needed, with a monthly budget table the administration can verify line by line. Files that fail ask for lump sums, mix personal and corporate needs, or omit the paper trail between the frozen account and the claimed expense. Holders who apply the freeze in good faith are protected, since Article L562-13 of the Code monétaire et financier provides that “L’Etat est responsable des conséquences dommageables de la mise en œuvre de bonne foi, par les personnes mentionnées à l’article L. 562-4” of the freezing measures, which channels damages claims toward the State rather than the bank and explains why banks freeze first and ask questions later.
The Paris and Ile-de-France dimension is practical rather than doctrinal. Jurisdiction for the annulment action lies exclusively in Luxembourg, but the evidence, the frozen assets and the daily-life file are built in Paris. Most affected clients bank within the Paris region, instruct counsel there, and need a French-law memorandum to present to their bank’s compliance department alongside the European Union texts, distinguishing the European Union freeze from any domestic tax or criminal seizure that may run in parallel. Enforcement of leases, mortgages and employment obligations continues while incoming funds are blocked, so the Paris file must coordinate the sanctions derogation request with ordinary creditor negotiations, enforcement judges and, where companies are concerned, commercial courts. Where the listing criterion touches cultural or business activity in France, such as cancelled concerts, closed distribution channels or terminated partnerships, those French documents become counter-exhibits in Luxembourg proving that the conduct has ceased. Generalist litigation courts in the Paris region are the judges of the ordinary consequences of the freeze under domestic law, as recalled by the allocation of first-instance administrative and civil jurisdiction in provisions such as Article L311-1 of the Code de justice administrative, while only the Luxembourg courts can annul the European Union listing itself. Keeping those two tracks distinct avoids wasted motions in the wrong forum.
Timing ties the two tracks together. Because each renewal restarts the two-month Luxembourg clock while the French freeze continues without interruption, the winning method is to litigate each renewal on its freshness from Luxembourg while extracting living and defence funds through derogations from Paris. Gagarina shows that a thin 2025 file can fall even where a solid 2024 file survived, and the same logic will be tested against the 2026 renewals now in force. Clients should therefore commission, at each renewal, a dated freshness audit of the Council file, a parallel delisting submission, and an updated derogation budget, rather than treating the freeze as a single static event. That discipline converts a judgment about a singer’s concerts into leverage for any file where the Council has stopped gathering proof and started recycling it.
Conclusion
The Gagarina judgment of 16 September 2026 will be cited less for upholding a 2024 listing than for annulling its 2025 renewals. It confirms that performing at annexation celebrations and military venues can amount to support for actions undermining the territorial integrity of Ukraine, assessed through reliable press and public material with contextual evidence of alignment, and limited in its restriction to European Union territory under a proportionate, temporary and reviewable regime. It holds with equal clarity that the adverb regularly demands proof of repetition at the date of each renewal, and that a file with nothing new since 2024 cannot carry listings into 2025 and 2026. The annulment runs from 16 March 2025 to 15 March 2026, leaves the September 2024 acts intact, does not touch the March 2026 renewal that now applies, and leaves each side with its own costs. For anyone listed or frozen in France, the message is operational. Calendar every renewal, demand each evidence file, date every exhibit, prove what has ceased, plead staleness renewal by renewal, and fund daily life and the defence itself through documented derogation requests while Luxembourg decides. Old concerts fade as legal proof. Current files win cases.