On 24 September 2026, the aircraft of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu crossed French airspace on its way to the United Nations General Assembly in New York. The flight was tracked live, and the reaction was immediate: how could a State party to the Rome Statute let pass a man under an International Criminal Court arrest warrant issued on 21 November 2024 for suspected crimes against humanity and war crimes? Paris answered the same day, as reported by Reuters, that the clearance fully complied with international law: according to Foreign Ministry spokesperson Pascal Confavreux, the Rome Statute creates no obligation concerning the overflight of French territory by a State aircraft carrying a passenger targeted by an arrest warrant. Le Monde counted this as the ninth such overflight of France since the warrant was issued, with Greece, Italy and Canada also on the route, and cited international judge Gilbert Bitti noting that the ICC had never asked States to arrest a suspect in flight. Human rights groups, led by the International Federation for Human Rights, called the French position a lie about immunity. This article gives the insider French-procedure answer: what the Rome Statute truly obliges France to do, what would happen the minute the wheels touched French tarmac, and what the Cour de cassation, sitting in Assemblée plénière on 25 July 2025, has just decided about the personal immunity of a serving head of State before French judges. The distinction between territory and airspace, and between national courts and the international court, decides everything.
I. Why France Let the Plane Pass: What the Rome Statute and French Procedure Actually Require
A. Can France Be Forced to Arrest a Wanted Person Who Merely Flies Over? No
The starting point is the warrant itself. On 21 November 2024, Pre-Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court issued warrants of arrest for Mr Benjamin Netanyahu and Mr Yoav Gallant, after unanimously rejecting Israel’s challenges to the Court’s jurisdiction. According to the official ICC press release of that day, Pre-Trial Chamber I, sitting for the Situation in the State of Palestine, unanimously rejected two jurisdictional challenges brought by Israel and issued arrest warrants for Benjamin Netanyahu and Yoav Gallant. Israel rejects the Court’s jurisdiction and denies war crimes in Gaza, and it is contesting the warrants. The United States, under President Donald Trump, has gone further, announcing a campaign to isolate the Court and urging ICC member States to leave the Court altogether. None of that changes the legal analysis inside France, which is a State party and is formally bound to cooperate with the Court. The question is only what cooperation means at 35,000 feet.
French domestic law answers through a dedicated title of the Code of criminal procedure. Article 627 of the Code of criminal procedure provides: “Pour l’application du statut de la Cour pénale internationale signé le 18 juillet 1998, la France participe à la répression des infractions et coopère avec cette juridiction dans les conditions fixées par le présent titre.” In English: for the application of the Rome Statute, France takes part in punishing the offences and cooperates with the Court under the conditions set by this title. Everything that follows in that title concerns persons on French soil. Article 627-1 of the Code of criminal procedure channels ICC requests for assistance to the competent authorities under article 87 of the Statute and provides that “Ces documents sont transmis au procureur de la République antiterroriste qui leur donne toutes suites utiles” — the documents go to the national antiterrorism prosecutor in Paris, who takes all useful steps. Article 627-2 of the Code of criminal procedure then states that assistance requests are executed by that prosecutor or by the investigating judge in Paris, acting across the whole national territory. Article 627-3 of the Code of criminal procedure governs protective measures on French territory. The territorial anchor is constant: the machinery presupposes presence on the territory of the Republic.
Arrest-and-surrender follows the same logic. Article 627-4 of the Code of criminal procedure provides that “Les demandes d’arrestation aux fins de remise délivrées par la Cour pénale internationale sont adressées, en original et accompagnées de toutes pièces justificatives, aux autorités compétentes en vertu de l’article 87 du statut” — ICC arrest-and-surrender requests go, in original with supporting documents, to the competent authorities under article 87 of the Statute, which then transmit them to the prosecutor general at the Paris Court of Appeal “et, dans le même temps, les mettent à exécution dans toute l’étendue du territoire de la République”, enforced across the whole extent of the Republic’s territory. The Rome Statute itself, in articles 86 to 89, obliges States Parties to cooperate fully and to comply with requests for arrest and surrender of persons found on their territory. Nothing in articles 86, 87, 89 or 98 creates a duty to intercept a foreign State aircraft in overflight, to force it to land, or to treat transit through sovereign airspace as presence on the territory for arrest purposes. Intercepting a State aircraft carrying a sitting head of government would collide with the Chicago Convention regime on State aircraft, with the customary inviolability of the persons on board, and with the elementary fact that no ICC Chamber had asked France to do any such thing.
That last fact matters enormously and is under-reported. As Le Monde noted after questioning the Foreign Ministry, the ICC judges did not explicitly request that Netanyahu be arrested by any of the four States he flew over, and they are not expected to summon those States to demand explanations. Judge Gilbert Bitti, cited by Le Monde, described the practice plainly: the ICC had never required States to arrest a suspect in flight, since what counts is the ability to arrest, meaning enforcement of the warrant once the wanted person is on State territory. The precedent cited is former Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir, also under ICC warrant, who flew over dozens of countries without the Court reprimanding them. A reader who wants the wider picture of how France physically handles ICC fugitives once they are actually here should read our analysis of the first ICC trial opening against a Libyan suspect and the French surrender mechanics (El-Hishri, Libya and the first ICC trial: what France does with ICC fugitives). The contrast is the whole point: on the ground, France has a complete, coercive, judge-supervised surrender machine; in the sky, there is no legal handle to grab.
B. What Would Happen If the Wanted Person Actually Landed in France?
The overflight debate hides the real story, which is how formidable the French surrender procedure is once a wanted person is physically present. Suppose the aircraft had landed at Roissy. From that second, the wanted person would be a person found on French territory, and the full Title on cooperation with the ICC would apply. Article 627-5 of the Code of criminal procedure requires that “Toute personne appréhendée en vertu d’une demande d’arrestation aux fins de remise doit être déférée dans les vingt-quatre heures au procureur de la République territorialement compétent” — anyone apprehended under an ICC arrest-and-surrender request must be brought within twenty-four hours before the locally competent public prosecutor, with the safeguards of articles 63-1 to 63-7, identity verification, information in a language the person understands, and immediate access to counsel of choice or court-appointed counsel. The person is told that he or she will appear within a maximum of five days before the prosecutor general at the Paris Court of Appeal. Article 627-6 of the Code of criminal procedure organises transfer to Paris and detention at the remand centre of the Paris Court of Appeal’s district, with release ordered by the president of the investigation chamber if the five-day transfer deadline is missed without insurmountable circumstances, and formal notification of the arrest request and the charges by the prosecutor general.
Then comes the judicial phase. Article 627-7 of the Code of criminal procedure provides that “La chambre de l’instruction est immédiatement saisie de la procédure. La personne réclamée comparaît devant elle dans un délai de huit jours à compter de sa présentation au procureur général” — the investigation chamber is seized immediately and the person appears within eight days, with a possible additional eight days, an examination recorded in minutes, and a hearing in public unless publicity would harm the proceedings, third-party interests or dignity. And Article 627-8 of the Code of criminal procedure sets the famous narrow standard: “Lorsque la chambre de l’instruction constate qu’il n’y a pas d’erreur évidente, elle ordonne la remise de la personne réclamée et, si celle-ci est libre, son incarcération à cette fin.” When the chamber finds no obvious error, it orders surrender — and jails the person for that purpose if free. It rules within fifteen days of appearance; on appeal, the criminal chamber of the Cour de cassation rules within two months of receiving the file. “Toute autre question soumise à la chambre de l’instruction est renvoyée à la Cour pénale internationale qui lui donne les suites utiles” — every other question goes back to the ICC. This is not extradition as lawyers know it with dual criminality, political-offence exceptions and government discretion. It is a quasi-automatic judicial surrender where the Paris investigation chamber checks identity and obvious error, and the ICC decides the rest. Enforcement of ICC fines and forfeiture follows through the same channel under Article 627-17 of the Code of criminal procedure, with proceeds transferred to the Court or the victims’ fund.
That is why last year’s detour matters. Media reported that Netanyahu flew a circuitous route to New York to skirt several European airspaces, including France’s. The 2026 decision to fly straight over France, Greece, Italy and Canada therefore reads as a calculated legal assessment: transit is tolerated, landing would be a different gamble entirely. For defence counsel advising any ICC-wanted client, the practical lesson is sharp. Never confuse tolerated overflight with safe territorial presence. A refuelling stop, a diversion for weather, a medical emergency landing — any of these converts a lawful transit into presence on the territory, triggering articles 627-4 to 627-8 within hours, with the antiterrorism prosecutor, the Paris prosecutor general and the investigation chamber in sequence. Flight plans for exposed clients must include diversion airports in non-States Parties, continuous monitoring of the ICC docket for any new public request, and a standing French surrender-defence file: identity documents, counsel designated in advance in Paris, medical certificates, and submissions on obvious error ready to file within the eight-day window. The French machine moves fast once it starts, and the fifteen-day ruling deadline leaves no room for improvisation.
II. The Immunity Battle Behind the Overflight: What the Cour de Cassation Has Just Decided
A. Can a Sitting Head of State Be Arrested by French Judges? The Assemblée Plénière Answers No
The fiercest criticism of Paris does not concern airspace at all. It concerns immunity. The International Federation for Human Rights accuses France of lying about Netanyahu’s immunity, arguing that article 27 of the Rome Statute strips all official-capacity immunity before the ICC and that article 98 cannot shield a suspect when the Court has already decided. The Foreign Ministry answers that bilateral and customary immunity rules still bind France vis-à-vis a non-party State. Readers deserve the exact state of French judge-made law, because in July 2025 the Cour de cassation settled a closely related question at the highest possible level — and its answer is uncomfortable for those who expected French judges to arrest a serving president.
The case concerned Syria. After complaints filed in March 2021 by a Franco-Syrian victim and an association over the chemical attacks of August 2013 in the Ghouta region, French investigating judges opened an inquiry for crimes against humanity and war crimes and, on 13 November 2023, issued an arrest warrant against the then Syrian president for complicity in those crimes. The antiterrorism prosecutor asked the Paris investigation chamber to rule on the warrant’s validity, and the immunity of a serving head of State reached the Assemblée plénière — the most solemn formation of the Cour de cassation. On 25 July 2025 it gave two judgments: pourvoi number 24-84.393, available at Assemblée plénière, 25 July 2025, no. 24-84.393, and pourvoi number 24-84.071, available at Assemblée plénière, 25 July 2025, no. 24-84.071. In the first, the Court quashed the Paris decision, ruled without remand, and declared void the arrest warrant issued on 13 November 2023 against the Syrian president. In the second, it rejected the appeal on related proceedings. The reasoning, set out in the part of the judgment dealing with the general principles of international law on the jurisdictional immunity of serving heads of State, now binds French courts.
The Court first recalls the foundation: criminal jurisdictional immunity derives from the sovereign equality of States. Then comes the decisive split between national and international courts: immunity applies before national courts, the judgment explains, but it cannot be raised before international courts, whose statutes expressly set aside immunity and which act on behalf of the international community. On personal scope, the Court holds that personal immunity, as distinct from functional immunity, belongs only to a serving head of State, head of government or foreign minister, and that it covers every act, whether private or official. Because such immunity is an obvious procedural bar to a national court exercising jurisdiction, the judge must consider it of his or her own motion. The Court roots this in custom, in the sovereign-equality Declaration of 1970, and in the International Court of Justice’s Djibouti v. France judgment of 4 June 2008.
The consequence for the Netanyahu debate is direct and two-sided, and both sides quote only half of it. Against France’s critics: the highest French court has just confirmed that a serving head of State enjoys full personal immunity before French national judges, even for crimes against humanity and war crimes, and that a French arrest warrant issued against him while in office is void. A French investigating judge could not lawfully issue today what the 2023 judges issued against the Syrian president. Against France’s government, however: the same judgment expressly preserves ICC warrants, since immunity cannot be raised before international courts. France cannot rely on this case law to invalidate the ICC’s own warrant against Netanyahu — it can only rely on it for acts of French national courts. The real battlefield is therefore article 98 of the Rome Statute, under which the Court may not proceed with a surrender request that would require the requested State to breach its international obligations on State or diplomatic immunity unless the third State waives. France reads article 98 as covering Israel’s claimed immunity; the FIDH and many scholars read article 27 plus Palestine’s territorial jurisdiction as removing it. The Assemblée plénière did not decide that dispute — it could not, since it rules on French warrants, not ICC ones. Anyone presenting the July 2025 rulings as settling the Netanyahu question in either direction is overstating them. What they settle is narrower and still essential: French judges will not be the ones to arrest a serving head of State on French soil under a French warrant; if an arrest ever happens in France, it will be under the ICC surrender channel of articles 627-4 to 627-8, where immunity objections are referred to The Hague under article 627-8 itself.
B. Landing, Transiting or Prosecuting in France: the Three Doors and Which One Is Open
With the case law in place, the situation maps onto three doors. Door one is overflight: lawful transit, no ICC request for interception, no French arrest power that could practicably attach to persons on board a foreign State aircraft without violating air law and inviolability rules. The ninth overflight confirms the practice, and the Bashir precedent shows the ICC itself acquiesces. Door two is landing or presence on French territory under an ICC warrant: the surrender machine of articles 627-4 to 627-8 engages within twenty-four hours, the investigation chamber checks obvious error within fifteen days, and immunity arguments go to The Hague rather than blocking the Paris judge. Any counsel who tells an ICC-wanted client that France is safe because planes pass undisturbed is confusing door one with door two, and the confusion could end in a cell at the Paris remand centre. Door three is French national prosecution under universal jurisdiction, and here the door is barely ajar. Article 689-11 of the Code of criminal procedure allows French courts to try genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes committed abroad, but only where the suspect has habitual residence in France — a sufficient connecting link assessed on the length of actual or foreseeable presence — and, for the core crimes, only where the ICC has expressly declined jurisdiction or France has refused surrender, with prosecution exclusively by the antiterrorism prosecutor. The Assemblée plénière clarified this architecture on 12 May 2023 in pourvoi number 22-82.468, available at Assemblée plénière, 12 May 2023, no. 22-82.468, recalling that under the cooperation title and the universal-jurisdiction provisions, French courts may act only within the statutory conditions, beginning with presence or residence. A fleeting airport transit does not create habitual residence, and a serving head of State adds the personal-immunity shield of the July 2025 rulings on top. Door three is therefore closed for a Netanyahu-type figure today; it opens, if ever, after loss of office, when personal immunity lapses and only the narrower functional immunity for official acts remains — itself widely considered inapplicable to international crimes before courts exercising universal jurisdiction, though that fight would be fierce.
Two wider forces frame all of this. First, the American pressure campaign against the Court changes the political cost of cooperation without changing its legal content: sanctions on ICC personnel and calls to quit the Statute do not amend articles 86 to 89 or the French Code, and a French judge applying articles 627-4 to 627-8 would be bound by statute, not by Washington’s rhetoric. Second, the Gaza war-crimes docket is growing in parallel before French prosecutors under universal jurisdiction for other suspects without immunity, which means France’s credibility as a cooperating State will be tested less on spectacular overflights than on quiet arrests at airports and border posts. The firm-side lesson for internationally exposed clients — executives, officials, military personnel — is to commission a France-specific risk memo before any travel: check the ICC and French dockets, assess immunity status ratione personae and ratione materiae, map every transit and diversion airport against States Parties, and retain Paris counsel in advance so the twenty-four-hour clock of article 627-5 never runs undefended. For victims and associations, the lesson is symmetrical: the French path runs through article 627-1 referrals to the antiterrorism prosecutor and through documented ICC cooperation requests, not through demanding interceptions of aircraft that no court has ordered.
Conclusion
The ninth overflight was not the collapse of international justice; it was the system working as written. The ICC warrant of 21 November 2024 against Benjamin Netanyahu and Yoav Gallant binds France to arrest and surrender them if they are found on its territory, through the Paris-centred procedure of articles 627-4 to 627-8 of the Code of criminal procedure — twenty-four hours to the prosecutor, five days to Paris, eight days to the investigation chamber, fifteen days to the surrender order, with all other questions sent to The Hague. It does not oblige France to intercept a foreign State aircraft in transit, and the ICC has never asked any State to do so. The Cour de cassation, in its Assemblée plénière judgments of 25 July 2025, has added the missing piece for French territory: a serving head of State enjoys full personal immunity before French national judges, covering private and official acts alike, so that a French warrant against him is void — while ICC warrants stand on their own international footing, with State-immunity disputes under article 98 belonging to The Hague. Overflight is tolerated; landing triggers the machine; national prosecution waits for residence and the end of office. Clients, counsel and commentators who keep these three doors separate will read the next tracked flight correctly — and will know exactly what to do the day a wanted aircraft requests landing clearance at a French airport rather than merely passing through French skies.