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Colombia’s ‘Spider’ Flown to California on Narco-Terrorism Charges: What a French Extradition Court Would Have Done

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Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

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Colombia’s ‘Spider’ Flown to California on Narco-Terrorism Charges: What a French Extradition Court Would Have Done

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On 25 September 2026, under heavy security at a Colombian National Police air base in Bogota, Geovany Andres Rojas, known as Arana, the Spider, was handed to American agents in front of his own president and flown to San Diego to answer federal charges of narco-terrorism and international cocaine conspiracy. Nineteen months earlier he had been arrested in the Colombian capital on the basis of an Interpol Red Notice. Between those two dates, the Supreme Court of Colombia unanimously approved his extradition, a first president suspended it so that the suspect could sit at a peace-negotiation table, and a second president tore up that protection and personally supervised the handover. For readers who follow cross-border cases, the file concentrates every live question of modern extradition law in one story: the weight of a Red Notice arrest, the political offence exception, the suspension of a surrender for peace talks, and the assurances a requesting state must give before a court lets a man be flown across the world to face decades behind bars. This article sets out the facts as published by the United States Department of Justice and international news agencies, then examines the case through the lens of French extradition law, because Paris remains one of the few capitals where each of these defences has been tested in reported decisions within the last two years.

I. Arrested on an Interpol Red Notice, surrendered after a presidential U-turn: the Arana extradition step by step

A. From a Bogota arrest in February 2025 to a San Diego tarmac in September 2026: how Colombia handed over its narco-terror suspect

The starting point is an arrest that will be familiar to anyone who has followed our coverage of arrest in France on an Interpol diffusion or Red Notice, release and deletion strategy. According to the press release of the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of California dated 25 September 2026, Colombian authorities apprehended Geovany Andres Rojas on 12 February 2025 pursuant to an Interpol Red Notice based on narcotics-related offences. The Red Notice did the job it was designed for: it located the wanted man and placed him in custody so that the extradition machinery could start. What followed shows how long and how political that machinery can be.

On 7 March 2025, a federal grand jury in the Southern District of California returned a two-count superseding indictment charging Rojas, a Colombian national described as a high-level narco-terrorist and prolific cocaine trafficker, with international conspiracy to distribute cocaine and with narco-terrorism. American prosecutors present him as a spokesman and a leader of Comandos de la Frontera, a rebel group known for trafficking cocaine in Putumayo, the Colombian province that borders Ecuador and Peru, and they allege that he orchestrated multi-ton cocaine shipments bound for the United States, feeding through networks as far as the cartel-contested plazas of Tijuana. The investigation runs as part of a Homeland Security Task Force, with the Drug Enforcement Administration and the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the lead.

In October 2025, the Supreme Court of Colombia unanimously approved the extradition. In many systems that would have been the end of the legal debate, the judicial green light after which only the logistics of surrender remain. Colombia added a twist that makes this case a textbook illustration of the tension between peace processes and criminal justice. Then-President Gustavo Petro suspended the court-approved extradition, arguing that he needed Rojas to participate in a new round of peace talks between the Colombian government and several armed groups, including Comandos de la Frontera. The suspect, in other words, moved from a cell to a negotiating table, shielded by an executive decision that overrode a unanimous judicial authorisation.

The shield lasted less than a year. Abelardo de la Espriella, elected in June 2026 on a security platform and endorsed during the campaign by President Donald Trump, suspended talks with rebel groups, militarised a northern city where a drug gang had tried to impose a three-day curfew, and on 26 August 2026 ordered that the extradition should proceed. Reporting by CBS News, updated on 28 September 2026, quotes the new president supervising the transfer in person and declaring that peace cannot be built by protecting “narco-terrorists” such as “this bandit”. He added that he had asked the American authorities to ensure that the suspect could not negotiate deals leaving his crimes unpunished. On the morning of 25 September 2026, Rojas was handed over to United States officials at the Bogota air base with the Colombian president in attendance, and he arrived at an undisclosed location in San Diego at 4.30 p.m. Pacific time, flanked by DEA and FBI agents, with the Department’s judicial attache in Bogota, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of California and senior DEA, FBI and Homeland Security Investigations officers photographed around him.

United States Attorney Adam Gordon summed up the political message of the operation in the Department’s release: “a clean sweep of narcoterrorists” DEA Administrator Terry Cole added that the extradition shows that borders, criminal influence and efforts to conceal illegal activity will not prevent American agents and their partners from bringing major transnational traffickers to justice. The language is deliberately muscular, and defence lawyers will note it carefully, because every public statement by the requesting authorities becomes part of the file on which the courts of the requested state, and later the trial court, assess the fairness of the proceedings.

Three features of this chronology deserve emphasis before turning to French law. First, the Red Notice arrest was the trigger, not the trial: nineteen months separated custody from surrender, which recalls that an Interpol notice buys time for the requested state to examine the file rather than ordering immediate transfer. Second, a unanimous supreme court approval did not produce immediate surrender, because the executive kept the final word on timing, a split between judicial authorisation and political decision that exists in France as well, as will be seen below. Third, the peace-negotiator episode raises the exact question that the French political offence exception was written to answer: when does the rebel become a mere trafficker in the eyes of the extradition judge. Readers facing a file where two states claim the same person will find the parallel analysis in our guide to competing extradition requests and priority before the French courts.

B. Narco-terrorism and cocaine conspiracy before a California court: what Geovany Andres Rojas actually faces in the United States

The two counts of the San Diego indictment belong to two different families of federal prosecution, and the distinction matters for any European court asked to measure them against its own public policy. The first count, international conspiracy to distribute cocaine, is a classic transnational drug charge built for cases where the cocaine never touched American soil but was allegedly destined for it. American prosecutors describe multi-ton shipments organised from the mountains of Putumayo toward the United States, which is the standard factual matrix for conspiracy liability: each participant answers for the reasonably foreseeable acts of the network. The second count, narco-terrorism, targets the overlap between drug trafficking and armed violence, punishing drug offences committed in support of a terrorist organisation or an armed group using terror. It is this second count that allowed the Department of Justice to present the operation as the opening of a clean sweep of narcoterrorists rather than as one more drug extradition among many.

What penalties does the suspect face. The Department’s release does not detail the sentencing exposure count by count, and prudence requires stating only what the procedure allows. Federal drug conspiracy on this scale routinely exposes a convicted defendant to decades of imprisonment up to life, and the narco-terrorism count carries some of the heaviest minimum penalties in the federal code. No capital charge has been announced: the indictment as publicised contains no count carrying the federal death penalty, and the initial court appearance reported the week of the transfer concerned detention and the organisation of the defence. That point is not anecdotal. As developed below, the absence of a death-penalty exposure removes the single most powerful blocking argument available before a French extradition chamber, and it channels the defence toward different walls: the political character of the acts, the conditions of a future American life sentence, and the strict control of the procedure that led to surrender.

The procedural posture in San Diego is now conventional. After the initial appearance, the defence will litigate discovery, the admissibility of evidence gathered abroad, and above all pretrial detention, since a foreign national extradited on narco-terrorism charges is the archetype of a defendant the prosecution will argue cannot be released. The American trial, if it goes that far, will test the peace-talks period in a different way: any statement by the Colombian authorities about what Rojas said or did while designated as a negotiator may become the subject of motions to suppress or to exclude, and the defence will scrutinise the conditions of the February 2025 arrest and of the nineteen months of Colombian custody. None of this decides guilt: at the date of writing, Geovany Andres Rojas is presumed innocent, the charges are allegations, and only the federal court in San Diego will rule on them. But the file already demonstrates a structural lesson that French practitioners recognise instantly. Extradition is never a single decision; it is a chain of decisions, arrest, indictment, judicial approval, executive suspension, executive reversal, physical handover, and each link can be attacked on its own legal ground.

For a French-speaking reader the natural question is what would have happened if the Red Notice had pointed to Paris rather than Bogota, and if Washington had asked France to hand over a resident accused of leading an armed cocaine-trafficking group while claiming the status of peace negotiator. French law answers that question with unusual precision, and with two Court of Cassation rulings handed down in 2024 and 2026 that read like they were written for this file.

II. If the file had landed on a Paris desk: how French judges test an extradition like this one

A. Can a rebel leader or a designated peace negotiator claim the political offence shield in France

French extradition law starts from a simple architecture. Article 696 of the Code of criminal procedure provides that “En l’absence de convention internationale en stipulant autrement, les conditions, la procédure et les effets de l’extradition sont déterminés par les dispositions du présent chapitre”, adding that these provisions also apply to points not regulated by international conventions. In other words, statute fills every gap left by treaty, and the grounds for refusal that follow are mandatory, not discretionary. The catalogue sits in Article 696-4 of the Code of criminal procedure, which opens with the words “L’extradition n’est pas accordée”, extradition is not granted, followed by eight cases. The threshold question of which acts can even support a request is answered by Article 696-3 of the Code of criminal procedure: all acts punished with criminal penalties under the requesting state’s law, and correctional acts where the maximum prison term incurred is at least two years, or, for a convicted person, where the pronounced sentence reaches the statutory minimum. A narco-terrorism and multi-ton cocaine file clears that threshold without discussion.

The provision the Arana defence would reach for first is the second ground of Article 696-4, and it must be quoted exactly because every word counts: “L’extradition n’est pas accordée : […] 2° Lorsque le crime ou le délit à un caractère politique ou lorsqu’il résulte des circonstances que l’extradition est demandée dans un but politique” (Article 696-4 of the Code of criminal procedure). Two doors, one concerning the political character of the offence itself, the other concerning the political purpose behind the request. A lawyer for a Comandos de la Frontera leader would argue both: that commanding an armed group engaged in confrontations with the state and then designated by a sitting president as a participant in peace talks gives the acts an objectively political dimension, and that the transfer, staged at an air base in the presence of a newly elected president who campaigned on an iron fist, shows a request driven by the political will to display a trophy rather than by neutral criminal justice.

A French chambre de l’instruction hearing that argument would test it against the gravity and the method of the acts, and here the file turns against the claimant. French courts have consistently treated large-scale drug trafficking for profit, mass violence against civilians and terrorist methods as common crimes even when committed inside a political conflict, and the American characterisation matters: an indictment for international cocaine conspiracy and narco-terrorism describes a transnational criminal enterprise, not opinion offences, press offences or electoral offences. The peace-negotiator designation would be weighed as a circumstance, exactly as the statute invites, but a French judge would ask what the designation covered. Sitting at a talks table in 2026 does not retroactively erase multi-ton shipments organised in previous years, and the Colombian sequence itself, unanimous Supreme Court approval followed by executive suspension followed by executive reversal, shows that the negotiator status was a revocable political decision, not a judicial finding of innocence and not an amnesty. A designation granted by one president and withdrawn by the next is the opposite of an acquired right opposable to the extradition judge.

The same article offers the defence a second, more technical line that the Court of Cassation refreshed on 28 January 2026 in a Turkish extradition case, Cass. crim., No. 25-81.433, and the holding governs every file where old facts meet a recent arrest: extradition is refused where limitation has run under the requesting state’s law, judged “d’après la législation de la partie requérante”, while French limitation is irrelevant unless France itself could prosecute. Prescription is assessed at the date of arrest for penalties. In the Arana chronology the point would likely fail, since the alleged shipments and the 2025 indictment are recent, but the ruling is a warning for slower files: a Red Notice that sleeps for years can die of old age under foreign law even when French law would still allow prosecution, and the chamber must verify the foreign limitation account on the basis of the requesting state’s own explanations, as the Court stressed by requiring the chamber to apply the requesting state’s own limitation rules “des informations fournies par ce dernier”.

Two neighbouring shields complete the picture and show why the suspect’s nationality and location would decide much of the outcome in Paris. Had Rojas been French, Article 696-4, 1° would have barred surrender outright, since extradition is not granted “Lorsque la personne réclamée a la nationalité française”. Had he been prosecuted or convicted in France for different acts, Article 696-7 of the Code of criminal procedure would have sequenced the cases: surrender only after the French proceedings end and any French sentence is served, without prejudice to a temporary transfer to appear before the requesting state’s courts. Neither situation matches a Colombian national sought for Colombian-based trafficking, which is precisely why the defence in a French version of this file would concentrate on the political exception, on prescription where available, and above all on the penalty that awaits across the Atlantic. That third battle is examined next, and it is the one French courts have policed most strictly in the last two years. Readers who want the American-penalty angle in depth can consult our analysis of United States extradition files before France, life sentences and the Article 3 block on surrender.

B. Death penalty, irreducible life sentences and detention conditions: the public-policy walls around any surrender to the United States

The sixth ground of Article 696-4 is the wall against which American requests most often break in Europe, and its wording must be read in full: “L’extradition n’est pas accordée : […] 6° Lorsque le fait à raison duquel l’extradition a été demandée est puni par la législation de l’Etat requérant d’une peine ou d’une mesure de sûreté contraire à l’ordre public français” (Article 696-4 of the Code of criminal procedure). Any penalty contrary to French public policy blocks surrender, whatever the gravity of the alleged acts. The death penalty is the archetype, but irreducible life imprisonment and detention conditions amounting to inhuman or degrading treatment belong to the same family, and French chambers verify them with a strictness the Court of Cassation restated on 30 January 2024 in Cass. crim., No. 23-83.549, a Tunisian extradition case that every extradition practitioner in Paris now cites.

The ruling opens with a prohibition built on Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights: where there are “motifs sérieux et avérés de croire” in a “risque réel” of the death penalty in the destination country, surrender is forbidden. The Court then lays down the method: the investigating chamber must obtain “l’engagement dénué de toute ambiguïté” by the requesting state, specific to the person claimed, that the penalty will not be applied. In that case the Tunisian assurances failed the test: the chamber had relied on general considerations, a thirty-year moratorium, international commitments described by the judges themselves as symbolic, and voting patterns at the United Nations, none of which proved anything about the fate of the named individual. General context is not a personal guarantee, and the Court quashed the favourable opinion.

Applied to a French version of the Arana file, this case law draws a clear map. With no capital count in the indictment as publicised, the death-penalty wall would not close the case by itself, but the defence would immediately redirect the same reasoning toward the life exposure: an American sentence that offers no realistic prospect of release can, under European human rights law, raise the same Article 3 question as developed by the Strasbourg court, and the chambre de l’instruction would have to examine the American sentencing regime count by count rather than accepting global assurances. The method would be identical to the Tunisian case: demand undertakings attached to the named person, reject vague references to American prosecutorial discretion or to statistics about sentences usually imposed, and order further information where the file is ambiguous.

French procedure gives the defence the tools for exactly that fight. Article 696-15 of the Code of criminal procedure provides that when the claimed person tells the general prosecutor that he does not consent to extradition, the investigating chamber is seized without delay, hears him within ten working days, and “donne son avis motivé sur la demande d’extradition”, a reasoned opinion, within one month unless further information has been ordered. The same article adds that the opinion is unfavourable where the legal conditions are not met or there is an obvious error, and that review before the Court of Cassation is narrowly confined: “Le pourvoi formé contre un avis de la chambre de l’instruction ne peut être fondé que sur des vices de forme de nature à priver cet avis des conditions essentielles de son existence légale.” Only formal defects capable of depriving the opinion of the essential conditions of its legal existence. The Tunisian ruling shows what that means in practice: reasoning that substitutes generalities for a person-specific verification is such a defect, and it leads to cassation. For the defence, the practical consequence is that the battle is won or lost before the investigating chamber, in the request for supplementary information and in the attack on the quality of foreign assurances, because Cassation will not reweigh the facts.

One last French element would shape the file: double criminality in substance. The American charges translate without friction into French categories. Article 421-1 of the Criminal Code defines terrorist acts as offences intentionally connected with an individual or collective undertaking aimed at seriously disturbing public order through intimidation or terror: “Constituent des actes de terrorisme, lorsqu’elles sont intentionnellement en relation avec une entreprise individuelle ou collective ayant pour but de troubler gravement l’ordre public par l’intimidation ou la terreur, les infractions suivantes”. Article 421-2-1 of the Criminal Code adds that participating in a group formed or an agreement established with a view to preparing such acts, characterised by one or more material facts, is itself terrorism. On the drug side, Article 222-34 of the Criminal Code punishes directing or organising a group dealing in narcotics with life imprisonment and a 7.5 million euro fine: “Le fait de diriger ou d’organiser un groupement ayant pour objet la production, la fabrication, l’importation, l’exportation, le transport, la détention, l’offre, la cession, l’acquisition ou l’emploi illicites de stupéfiants est puni de la réclusion criminelle à perpétuité et de 7 500 000 euros d’amende.” Even simple trafficking under Article 222-37 of the Criminal Code carries ten years. A French chamber would therefore have no difficulty finding that the American counts correspond to grave French offences, which closes the double-criminality debate and sends the defence back to the three real walls: political character, prescription and penalties contrary to public policy.

The Colombian procedure, finally, offers a mirror in which the French system can recognise itself with one major difference. Colombia required a supreme court approval, then left the executive free to suspend and later to revive the surrender, and the transfer was staged as a presidential act. France separates the same functions more rigidly: the investigating chamber gives a reasoned opinion after adversarial debate, an unfavourable opinion binds the government and forbids surrender by decree, a favourable opinion merely authorises the government to surrender by an extradition decree reviewable by the administrative courts, and the whole chain is policed by Cassation on formal grounds. The lesson of the Arana chronology for a person claimed in Paris is therefore practical rather than theoretical. Attack the file early at the chamber stage, demand person-specific undertakings on penalties, force the requesting state to document prescription under its own law, and treat every executive statement about sweeping away criminals as material for the argument that the request serves a political purpose. The file that flew to San Diego on 25 September 2026 would, in Paris, have spent many more months before the investigating chamber, and its outcome would have depended less on presidential will than on the quality of American assurances.

Conclusion

The extradition of Geovany Andres Rojas closes a nineteen-month Colombian sequence and opens an American trial in which the presumption of innocence applies in full: the narco-terrorism and cocaine conspiracy charges remain allegations that the San Diego court alone will judge. But the case already stands as a reference file for cross-border defence, because it displays each gear of the mechanism in the open, Red Notice arrest, foreign indictment, supreme court approval, executive suspension for peace talks, executive reversal, and photographed handover. Transposed to France, the same gears would turn under stricter judicial control: the political offence exception of Article 696-4 tested against the gravity of narco-terrorism, prescription verified under the requesting state’s law as restated by the Court of Cassation on 28 January 2026, and penalties filtered through the unambiguous-undertaking rule laid down on 30 January 2024. Governments change, peace tables come and go, and presidents supervise tarmacs; the extradition judge answers only to the statute, to the assurances in the file, and to the risk faced by the named person. That is the constant practitioners should carry from the Spider’s flight to California into the next file that lands, in Bogota, in Paris, or anywhere a Red Notice can reach.

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