On 23 September 2026, Trial Chamber VI of the International Criminal Court found Mahamat Said Abdel Kani guilty of crimes against humanity committed in Central African Republic in 2013. The verdict, delivered in The Hague after a trial that opened on 26 September 2022, is the first conviction to emerge from the Court’s Central African Republic II situation on these charges, and it arrives with a split result that every defence lawyer should study: conviction as a direct co-perpetrator for imprisonment, torture, persecution and other inhumane acts committed at the Office Central de Répression du Banditisme (OCRB) in Bangui between 12 April and 30 August 2013, and acquittal on the war crimes counts of torture, cruel treatment and outrages upon personal dignity. The Defence and the Prosecution may appeal the verdict within 30 days, which puts the appeal deadline around 23 October 2026. After the verdict, the Chamber will decide on Mr Said’s sentence under a dedicated timetable, and a reparations process will begin for the victims of the crimes for which he was convicted. For an international audience watching from Paris, London or New York, the case is also a masterclass in how international surrender works in practice: a warrant issued under seal on 7 January 2019, a surrender to the Court on 24 January 2021 in procedural terms that French lawyers will recognise at once, and a French cooperation statute that would have governed every step had the fugitive been arrested on French soil. This article explains what the judges decided, what happens between conviction and sentence, and exactly what France would do with a file like this.
I. What the ICC decided on 23 September 2026: guilty of crimes against humanity, not guilty of war crimes
A. How does the ICC prove crimes against humanity at a detention site like the Bangui OCRB?
The Chamber’s answer starts with the evidence. After analyzing the evidence submitted at trial, the judges found Mr Said guilty beyond any reasonable doubt for the crimes against humanity of imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty, torture, persecution and other inhumane acts. These crimes were committed at the Office Central de Répression du Banditisme (‘OCRB’) in Bangui (Central African Republic) between 12 April and 30 August 2013. The Chamber found that, in light of his role and functions as the Seleka commander in charge of the OCRB, Mr Said acted with the necessary intent and knowledge, and convicted him as a direct co-perpetrator of these crimes. Three points matter for practitioners. First, the mode of liability: direct co-perpetration means the judges placed Mr Said inside the criminal machinery of the detention centre, not at a desk far from it. Second, the catalogue of crimes reads like an inventory of what a captured, enclosed site makes possible: people locked up, hurt, selected and broken. Third, the time window is tight and precise, less than five months, which shows that crimes against humanity do not require years of violence; they require an attack, victims selected under a policy, and a commander who runs the site where it happens.
The scale of the trial explains why the deliberation carried such weight. Over the course of 130 trial hearings, the Chamber heard 58 witnesses called by the Prosecution and 3 witnesses called by the Defence. A total of 3,863 items of evidence were recognised as formally submitted into evidence. 32 victims represented by their legal counsel Sarah Pellet, have been granted the right to participate in the proceedings. The Prosecution concluded its presentation of evidence on 15 November 2024, the Defence called its first witness on 17 March 2025 and concluded its presentation of evidence on 2 September 2025, and closing statements ran from 25 to 27 November 2025. Ten months then passed before judgment. Anyone who imagines international justice as summary justice should read those numbers twice. Judge Maria del Socorro Flores Liera appended a separate opinion to the judgment, a signal that at least one point of law or reasoning divided the bench and a possible roadmap for the appeal that either side may file within the 30-day window.
French criminal law speaks the same language as the verdict, which is precisely why the case resonates in Paris. Article 212-1 of the French Criminal Code provides: « Constitue également un crime contre l’humanité et est puni de la réclusion criminelle à perpétuité l’un des actes ci-après commis en exécution d’un plan concerté à l’encontre d’un groupe de population civile dans le cadre d’une attaque généralisée ou systématique : 1° L’atteinte volontaire à la vie ; 2° L’extermination ; 3° La réduction en esclavage ; 4° La déportation ou le transfert forcé de population ; 5° L’emprisonnement ou toute autre forme de privation grave de liberté physique en violation des dispositions fondamentales du droit international ; 6° La torture ; 7° Le viol, la prostitution forcée, la grossesse forcée, la stérilisation forcée ou toute autre forme de violence sexuelle de gravité comparable ; 8° La persécution de tout groupe ou de toute collectivité identifiable pour des motifs d’ordre politique, racial, national, ethnique, culturel, religieux ou sexiste ou en fonction d’autres critères universellement reconnus comme inadmissibles en droit international ; 9° La disparition forcée ; 10° Les actes de ségrégation commis dans le cadre d’un régime institutionnalisé d’oppression systématique et de domination d’un groupe racial sur tout autre groupe racial ou tous autres groupes raciaux et dans l’intention de maintenir ce régime ; 11° Les autres actes inhumains de caractère analogue causant intentionnellement de grandes souffrances ou des atteintes graves à l’intégrité physique ou psychique. » Items 5, 6, 8 and 11 map directly onto the OCRB convictions. And Article 211-1 of the French Criminal Code defines genocide in equally severe terms, punished by life imprisonment, which completes the French substantive mirror of the Rome Statute’s core crimes. A French court describing an OCRB-type file would therefore work with categories its own code already contains, and a French lawyer defending such a file would attack the same joints the Hague defence attacked: the existence of the plan, the link between the accused and the site, and the proof of intent.
B. Why was Mahamat Said acquitted of war crimes in the same judgment?
The second half of the verdict is as instructive as the first. The Chamber did not find Mr Said guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the war crimes of torture, cruel treatment, and outrages upon personal dignity. Same accused, same building, same months, opposite outcome on a parallel set of charges. The lesson is procedural, not political: each count must be proved to the criminal standard on its own legal elements, and the elements of war crimes differ from those of crimes against humanity, notably on the nexus with an armed conflict and the status of victims and perpetrators. Evidence that suffices to establish a systematic attack against a civilian population through a detention apparatus does not automatically establish every war crime charged on the same facts. Defence teams in national courts should read split verdicts as proof that granular, count-by-count litigation works even against the gravest accusations, and prosecution teams should read them as a warning that overcharging carries a visible cost.
What comes next is now calendared. The Defence and the Prosecution may appeal the verdict within 30 days. Following the verdict, the Chamber will decide on Mr Said’s sentence. In a decision issued on the day of the verdict, the judges announced the timeline for the sentencing proceedings. A reparations process will also begin, for the victims of the crimes for which Mr Said was convicted. Three tracks therefore run in parallel from autumn 2026: a possible appeal on conviction, a sentencing phase with its own briefs and hearing, and a reparations phase for the 32 participating victims and potentially others the Chamber recognises. The separate opinion of Judge Flores Liera will likely feed the first track, the parties’ sentencing submissions will shape the second, and the victims’ counsel will drive the third. For observers, the practical consequence is that the Said case will generate at least two more appealable decisions before it is over, each of them capable of refining the law applied on 23 September.
II. After the guilty verdict: the road from sealed warrant to sentence, and what France would do with a file like this
A. From a sealed warrant in 2019 to a sentence still pending: how long does ICC justice take?
The Said case began in silence. The warrant of arrest against Mr Mahamat Said Abdel Kani was issued under seal on 7 January 2019 for war crimes and crimes against humanity allegedly committed in Bangui (CAR) in 2013. Mr Said was surrendered to the ICC on 24 January 2021. The initial appearance of Mr Said before the Single Judge of Pre-Trial Chamber II, Judge Rosario Salvatore Aitala, took place on 28 and 29 January 2021. The confirmation of charges hearing took place from 12 to 14 October 2021. From sealed warrant to surrender: two years. From surrender to trial judgment: almost six more. This is the normal tempo of international criminal justice, and it carries a direct message for anyone subject to an ICC warrant today, including the four men named in the Afghanistan warrants unsealed on 5 October 2026: a sealed warrant does not expire with the news cycle, and surrender can come years after issue, from any State willing to cooperate. The recent analysis of the ICC arrest warrants in the Afghanistan situation and the French surrender procedure shows the same mechanics at work on a second front, and the parallel with the Duterte trial calendar and ICC surrender files confirms that The Hague now runs several high-profile tracks at once.
Between conviction and sentence, the Statute system opens a distinct phase that national lawyers sometimes underestimate. Sentence is not a formality stapled to the verdict; it is a second judgment, with submissions, evidence on aggravating and mitigating factors, and the personal situation of the convicted person. The Trial Chamber’s sentencing timetable, announced the day of the verdict, structures that adversarial debate. Then comes enforcement: a convicted person does not automatically serve his sentence in the Netherlands. Under the cooperation regime, States volunteer to receive sentenced persons, and France is one of the States whose statute books expressly organise that reception. Which leads to the Paris question at the heart of this article: had Mr Said been arrested in France in 2019 or 2020, what exactly would French judges have done, step by step, and what defences would have been available?
B. Arrested in France on an ICC warrant: the 24-hour rule, the Paris judges and the manifest-error test
France gave itself a complete, self-contained ICC cooperation code in 2002, now codified in the Code of Criminal Procedure. Its opening provision sets the frame: Article 627 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states that for the application of the Statute of the International Criminal Court signed on 18 July 1998, France participates in the punishment of offences and cooperates with that jurisdiction under the conditions set by the present title, and that the following provisions apply to any person prosecuted before the International Criminal Court or convicted by it for acts constituting, within the meaning of articles 6 to 8 and 25 of the Statute, genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes. Three consequences follow. First, French cooperation is statutory, not discretionary diplomacy: the code tells each judge what to do. Second, the personal scope covers suspects and convicts alike, so the same title governs arrest for surrender and later enforcement of sentence. Third, the material scope mirrors the verdict in Said exactly: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes.
Arrest triggers a fast, protective clock. Article 627-5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure requires that any person apprehended under a request for arrest for surrender be brought within twenty-four hours before the territorially competent public prosecutor, with custody safeguards applying in the meantime. After verifying identity, the prosecutor informs the person, in a language he understands, that he is the subject of a request for arrest for surrender and that he will appear within a maximum of five days before the prosecutor general at the Paris Court of Appeal. The prosecutor also informs him that he may be assisted by counsel of his choice or, failing that, by court-appointed counsel, and that he may speak with that counsel immediately, with all of this recorded in an official report sent at once to the Paris prosecutor general. If the person is not left at liberty, the liberty and custody judge orders detention, or, where appearance at every step is sufficiently guaranteed, may impose judicial supervision measures. For a suspect arrested at Roissy or in Paris on an ICC request, the first 24 hours therefore look like this: identity check, notification in an understood language, immediate access to a lawyer, and a Paris judge within five days. Any defence strategy starts here, with the record of those first hours.
The decisive hearing belongs to the investigating chamber of the Paris Court of Appeal, and its review is deliberately narrow. Article 627-8 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides: « Lorsque la chambre de l’instruction constate qu’il n’y a pas d’erreur évidente, elle ordonne la remise de la personne réclamée et, si celle-ci est libre, son incarcération à cette fin. Toute autre question soumise à la chambre de l’instruction est renvoyée à la Cour pénale internationale qui lui donne les suites utiles. La chambre de l’instruction statue dans les quinze jours de la comparution devant elle de la personne réclamée. En cas de pourvoi, la chambre criminelle de la Cour de cassation statue dans un délai de deux mois suivant la réception du dossier à la Cour de cassation. » Surrender, not extradition: the chamber does not retry the case, it checks for manifest error, orders surrender, and refers every other question to the ICC itself. It rules within fifteen days of appearance, and the Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation rules within two months on any appeal. Speed plus narrow review is the whole philosophy: international surrender is a transfer between cooperating jurisdictions, not a second trial.
The Court of Cassation polices that narrow review strictly, and its leading decision deserves close reading because it states the test every Paris defence must meet. Ruling on a surrender to the Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals, the Criminal Chamber held on 30 September 2020, appeal no. 20-83.181, published in the Bulletin: that the investigating chamber review is limited to verifying the identity of the person, the titles supporting the request, whether the facts fit the statutory definition, and the absence of manifest error, with review of fundamental guarantees added where a breach is invoked Identity, papers, definitional fit, no manifest error, plus fundamental guarantees where invoked: that is the complete checklist. In that 2020 case the Court rejected every branch of appeal, including arguments about the transmission channel of the request, the health and age of the person sought during the pandemic, and the asserted risk of onward transfer, confirming that only a manifest defect or a proven breach of fundamental guarantees can stop a surrender. A Said-type file in Paris would be litigated on exactly these five points, and counsel would be ill-advised to promise more.
French law also answers the question clients always ask after surrender: what happens to assets and to victims. On protective measures, Article 627-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure entrusts the anti-terrorism prosecutor with ordering, at Treasury cost, the conservatory measures requested by the Court, for a maximum of two renewable years. And on money, Article 627-16 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that enforcement in France of ICC fines, confiscation and reparation orders is authorised by the Paris criminal court on referral by the prosecutor, with the court bound by the ICC decision including as to third-party rights, hearing the convict and any right-holders, and referring any good-faith third-party prejudice back to the Court. Article 627-17 then directs the proceeds toward the Court, the victims’ fund or designated victims. With the Said reparations phase now opening in The Hague, these provisions are not theory: any assets traceable to France connected to the case would travel through the Paris criminal court under exactly this procedure.
Finally, France can be the State where an ICC sentence is served. Article 627-18 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states that where the Government has accepted to receive a person convicted by the International Criminal Court to serve his prison sentence on national territory, the sentence is directly and immediately enforceable upon transfer onto national soil for the remaining term, with execution governed by the French code subject to the Statute. No exequatur trial, no re-sentencing: the Hague sentence walks off the plane enforceable. For Mr Said, the enforcement State will be designated after sentencing; for future convicts, France’s door is statutorily open. Add the two safety nets practitioners should never forget: release and sentence-review questions arising mid-surrender go back to the ICC, and every French order in the chain, from the liberty judge to the investigating chamber, is subject to appeal culminating before the Criminal Chamber within two months.
Conclusion
The 23 September 2026 verdict does three things at once. It validates a six-year investigation and trial effort with convictions for imprisonment, torture, persecution and other inhumane acts committed at the Bangui OCRB between April and August 2013. It demonstrates, through the war-crimes acquittals, that the criminal standard of proof bites on every count even in atrocity cases. And it opens three live fronts, appeal, sentence and reparations, whose next decisions will shape the law further into 2027. For France, the case is a reminder written in its own code: a 24-hour presentment, a Paris hearing within days, a manifest-error test within fifteen days, Cassation within two months, and a complete downstream machinery for fines, confiscation, reparations and sentence enforcement. Surrender to The Hague is neither extradition nor hospitality; it is a statutory transfer with narrow but real judicial controls. Anyone named in a sealed warrant, anyone holding assets within reach of a reparations order, and anyone advising them, should prepare on that basis now, before the appeal deadline of late October 2026 closes the first door.