KOHEN AVOCATS FIRM · PARIS 16
UK Adds Novatek Gas and Power Asia to Its Russia List: 31 Sanctions on the LNG Shadow Fleet and What They Change in France

Hassan KOHEN acts in urgent matters, from the police station to the assize court. Initial strategic analysis: €80 incl. VAT, personal reply within 24 hours.

100% confidential · Legal professional privilege · No obligation

Article generated by artificial intelligence, through a process designed and supervised by the firm

Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

Paris Bar Police custody, investigation, assize court CNB listing avocat.fr
Maître Hassan KOHEN, avocat au Barreau de Paris
Hassan KOHEN
Attorney at the Paris Bar

UK Adds Novatek Gas and Power Asia to Its Russia List: 31 Sanctions on the LNG Shadow Fleet and What They Change in France

Speak to a lawyer 06 89 11 34 45

On 1 October 2026, the British government announced a package of 31 new sanctions against Russia, and for the first time the gas trade sits at the very centre of London’s pressure campaign. According to the official press release published by the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, the package comprises 23 newly designated individuals and entities plus eight specified ships, and it expressly targets vessels acquired to build what London calls a new Russian shadow fleet for gas exports, including some ships that entered service as recently as July 2026. Among the designated entities is Novatek Gas and Power Asia Pte Ltd, designated alongside Marat Arkadyevich Kambolov on grounds connected, in London’s statement of reasons, with operating in a sector of strategic significance to the Russian government. The analysis below is general in scope: it describes the checks that are useful in any comparable situation and does not describe the situation of any designated entity, on which this article makes no finding. For French readers the decisive question is practical rather than diplomatic. A British designation is not a European one, yet it can still freeze a bank account in Paris, block a cargo insured in London, or expose a French company to criminal prosecution at home. This article explains what London decided, when a British measure bites in France, and which remedies exist on each side of the Channel.

I. UK Russia sanctions October 2026: the 31 new measures in detail

The 1 October 2026 package matters because of its timing, its size, and above all its direction of travel. It arrives ahead of winter, after what London describes as more than 3,100 Russian drone strikes on Ukraine in September 2026 alone and sham elections organised in temporarily occupied Ukrainian territories that same month. With this package the United Kingdom says it has now imposed more than 3,400 designations under its Russia regime, including over 500 in 2026, and sanctioned nearly 600 tankers connected with the Russian shadow fleet. The figures come from the British government itself, in the press release of 1 October 2026, and they frame a campaign that has moved step by step from crude oil to gas, from money to people, and from pressure to accountability.

A. Torturers, child indoctrination networks and propagandists: the 23 new British designations

The 23 newly designated individuals and entities fall into three broad categories, and each one tells something about how London now uses sanctions as an instrument of criminal policy as much as economic policy. Understanding these categories matters for French operators because the stated ground of designation determines everything that follows: the scope of the asset freeze, the availability of licences, and the realistic chances of a court challenge.

The first category covers eight individuals said to be involved in the arbitrary detention, torture and ill-treatment of Ukrainian civilians in occupied territories. The British press release describes these abuses as part of a wider system of repression in which enforced disappearance and denial of justice have also been used against civilians. The second category targets seven individuals for their role in the indoctrination and militarisation of Ukrainian children, including children deported by the Russian authorities. London estimates that around 6,000 Ukrainian children have been forcibly relocated to a network of so-called re-education camps, and states that millions more children living under occupation are subjected to propaganda programmes that include weapons handling and drone operation, designed, in London’s words, to strip children of their Ukrainian identity while preparing them to serve the very state attacking their homeland. For a French lawyer, these designations echo categories of domestic criminal law that French courts apply directly. Article 212-1 of the Criminal Code provides that “Constitue également un crime contre l’humanité et est puni de la réclusion criminelle à perpétuité l’un des actes ci-après commis en exécution d’un plan concerté à l’encontre d’un groupe de population civile dans le cadre d’une attaque généralisée ou systématique”, listing among those acts “La déportation ou le transfert forcé de population” and “La torture” (Article 212-1 of the Criminal Code). The militarisation of children through weapons and drone training meets the neighbouring incrimination of war crimes: “Le fait de procéder à la conscription ou à l’enrôlement de mineurs de dix-huit ans dans les forces armées ou dans des groupes armés, ou de les faire participer activement à des hostilités est puni de” severe penalties (Article 461-7 of the Criminal Code). And France does not need the crimes to have been committed on its soil to prosecute: Article 689-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that “peut être poursuivie et jugée par les juridictions françaises toute personne soupçonnée d’avoir commis à l’étranger l’une des infractions suivantes”, namely genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, on condition that the suspect has habitual residence in France (Article 689-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). Torture, deportation of children and denial of justice in occupied territory are precisely the fact patterns that the specialised war crimes unit at the Paris judicial court was built to address.

The third human category concerns disinformation. Seven individuals, including four Georgian nationals, are designated for spreading pro-Kremlin disinformation, from legitimising the occupation of Ukrainian territory to serving in Russian-installed authorities in occupied South Ossetia. The British Prime Minister is quoted as stating that the Kremlin spends around 1.3 billion pounds each year on manipulating information. This strand of the package continues a pattern established in the British package of 11 May 2026, which had already targeted propaganda networks, and it confirms that information warfare is now treated as a sanctions ground in its own right rather than as background noise.

The economic designations deserve close attention from energy and commodities professionals. The designated gas trader is sanctioned, in London’s published reasoning, for operating in a sector of strategic significance to the Russian government, and the individual designated alongside is sanctioned on grounds that include, according to legal analysis of the package, previous senior roles at the Kurchatov Institute. All 23 designated persons and entities are subjected to asset freezes, trust services sanctions and director disqualification sanctions, with travel bans added for designated individuals. The trust services limb is easily underestimated: under the British Russia sanctions guidance published by the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation, providing trust services to or for the benefit of a designated person is prohibited, which means British trustees, company formation agents and fiduciaries must walk away from structures connected with a listed client. For French groups with British subsidiaries, British directors or trusts administered from London, that prohibition can paralyse governance overnight.

The political message was delivered bluntly by the Minister for Europe, Lord Wood of Anfield, who stated that the measures target both the revenues sustaining the aggression and those responsible for horrific crimes against Ukrainian civilians, including children, and that British support for Ukraine would not falter. The statement captures the dual logic of the package: starve the war economy and punish the crimes, in the same legal instrument, on the same day.

B. Eight sanctioned ships and the Smyrtos warning: what the maritime measures change for gas carriers

The maritime limb of the package is the most innovative and, for the shipping world, the most consequential. Eight ships are now subject to British shipping and trade sanctions: three shadow fleet vessels, two vessels providing them with bunkering services, and three Russian-owned ice-class vessels. Five of the targeted ships are LNG carriers, and the British government stresses that Russia is attempting to build a new shadow fleet specifically to circumvent sanctions and sustain gas export revenues, with some of the targeted vessels having entered service as recently as July 2026. The detail matters: it shows an adversary adapting in real time, ordering or acquiring tonnage for the precise purpose of sanctions evasion, and a sanctioning authority tracking newbuilds and recent acquisitions almost as they hit the water.

This is an escalation, not a repetition. Until now the maritime campaign had concentrated on crude oil tankers; the United Kingdom says it has sanctioned nearly 600 of them. Moving against gas carriers and ice-class tonnage shifts the pressure onto the sector Moscow considers critical to its future export earnings, namely Arctic gas and year-round LNG shipments that depend on reinforced hulls. Targeting the two bunkering vessels at the same time follows the logic of network sanctions: a shadow fleet cannot sail without fuel, and the ships that refuel it at sea, often through ship-to-ship transfers beyond the reach of port controls, are part of the evasion infrastructure. Shipowners, charterers, managers, flag administrations, insurers and P and I clubs are all directly affected, because a specified ship becomes toxic for any British person dealing with it and for any transaction with a British nexus, from insurance to bunkering to brokerage.

London paired the designations with a demonstration of enforcement will. In June 2026, British forces intercepted the shadow fleet vessel Smyrtos, an operation the press release presents as proof that those helping to fund the aggression cannot hide. The message to the maritime industry is deliberate: specification on a list is no longer the end of the story but potentially the beginning of an interdiction. Combined with the figure London advances for the cumulative effect of international sanctions, nearly 500 billion dollars of funding denied to the Russian war effort, the package reads as a claim that economic warfare is working and must now be extended to gas before Moscow’s adaptation is complete.

Two accompanying licensing decisions complete the picture and show that sanctions remain a calibrated instrument rather than a blanket embargo. As part of work with international partners on their transition away from Russian energy, London extended existing licensing arrangements to cover LNG on a targeted and time-limited basis to support the energy security of Japan and South Korea. According to detailed legal analysis of the package, two new general trade licences will permit certain activities supporting LNG imports from the Sakhalin-2 project under contracts concluded before 17 June 2025, running from 1 January 2027 until 31 March 2028, alongside an existing transitional exemption and general trade licence that expire on 1 January 2027. At the same time, British restrictions on maritime transportation and related services for Russian LNG tighten further from 1 January 2027. For LNG buyers, traders and charterers, the practical lesson is familiar but urgent: every cargo must be mapped against overlapping timelines, because what is licensed today may be prohibited in January, and what London licenses may still be prohibited in Paris or Rotterdam. All designations and notices are published on the United Kingdom Sanctions List and in the dedicated Russia designations and sanctions notices page, including the sanctions notice of 1 October 2026 itself, and professionals should check these sources before every transaction rather than relying on commercial databases alone.

II. Sanctioned in London, frozen in Paris: exposure and remedies for French operators

The question every French general counsel asks after a British package is the same: we are in France, we comply with European Union law, so why should a London list change anything for us. The honest answer is that it often changes a great deal, through at least four transmission belts: the direct application of European measures that increasingly mirror or anticipate British ones, the British nexus hidden inside apparently French transactions, the French national freeze machinery that can be triggered alongside European freezes, and the criminal risk that now surrounds any sanctions violation in Europe. Each belt has its own legal basis, its own authority, and its own remedy, and confusing them is the most expensive mistake a company can make.

A. When a British listing bites in France: asset freezes, hidden British links and criminal risk

The starting point of French law is that European Union restrictive measures apply directly in France without any transposition. Council Regulation 269 of 2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining Ukraine’s territorial integrity, available on European Commission sanctions page for Regulation 269 of 2014, freezes all funds and economic resources belonging to, owned, held or controlled by listed persons and prohibits making any funds or economic resources available to them. Council Regulation 833 of 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine, available on Council explainer for Regulation 833 of 2014, carries the sectoral prohibitions on energy, finance, transport and services, including the LNG-related restrictions that now form the European counterpart of London’s maritime campaign. A French bank that holds an account for a person listed in the annexes of these regulations must freeze it; a French insurer that covers a prohibited cargo must walk away; a French port that services a banned operation must refuse. The lists are consolidated at European level, and the French Treasury’s national register of frozen assets, the economic sanctions pages of the Directorate General of the Treasury, which operate the national register of frozen assets, allows anyone to check whether a person, entity or vessel is subject to a freeze enforceable in France.

Alongside European freezes, France retains a national freeze power that is broader than many operators realise. Article L. 562-3 of the Monetary and Financial Code provides: “Le ministre chargé de l’économie peut décider, pour une durée de six mois, renouvelable, le gel des fonds et ressources économiques”, covering persons designated under United Nations Chapter VII resolutions or European acts, as well as entities they own, control, or on whose instructions they knowingly act. The full text is published on Legifrance as Article L. 562-3 of the Monetary and Financial Code. Its companion, Article L. 562-2 of the same Code, gives the Ministers of the Economy and of the Interior a joint six-month renewable power to freeze funds connected with terrorism. In practice, therefore, a freeze enforceable in France can come from Brussels, from New York through European implementation, or from Paris itself, and the three layers stack rather than replace each other. The personal scope of the French freeze is deliberately wide: Article L. 562-4 of the Monetary and Financial Code requires all persons on national territory and the regulated professions to apply freeze measures and prohibitions on making funds available without delay and to inform the Minister of the Economy immediately, while Article L. 562-5 of the same Code states: “Il est interdit aux personnes mentionnées à l’article L. 562-4 de mettre à disposition directement ou indirectement, ou d’utiliser des fonds ou ressources économiques au profit des personnes dont les fonds et ressources économiques font l’objet d’une mesure de gel”. In other words, once a freeze attaches in France, any French person who feeds the frozen circuit, even indirectly, commits a domestic offence.

A British designation made in London does not automatically create a European or French freeze, and that distinction must be stated clearly: as long as a person is listed only by the United Kingdom, the European prohibitions do not attach to it by contagion. But the practical effects in France are immediate whenever the transaction carries a British link, and such links are everywhere. A payment in sterling cleared in London, a hull policy placed on the London market, a P and I club based in the United Kingdom, a British director of a French subsidiary, a trust administered from the Channel Islands or London, financing documents governed by English law: each of these gives the British prohibition a hook into an apparently French deal. Any British person involved must comply with the British freeze and commits an offence by dealing with frozen funds without a licence from the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation. French groups therefore cannot treat a London-only listing as someone else’s problem; they must map their British nexus counterparty by counterparty, contract by contract, before deciding whether a payment, a shipment or a corporate action can proceed.

The criminal dimension has hardened across Europe and must be stated without euphemism. Directive 2024/1225 on the definition of criminal offences and penalties for the violation of Union restrictive measures, published on European Parliament briefing on the directive on the violation of Union restrictive measures, requires Member States to criminalise the making available of funds to listed persons, the circumvention of freezes through front men or opaque structures, and related conduct, with serious penalties including imprisonment and confiscation. In France, sanctions evasion connected with Russia has already produced searches, police custody and seizures in Paris, and the specialised press regularly reports on prosecutions for contournement. A French executive who authorises a payment to a designated network, a trader who re-routes a cargo through intermediaries to hide its origin, or a fiduciary who maintains a structure for a listed client is no longer facing a theoretical regulatory risk but a concrete criminal one, investigated by customs, the Treasury’s control services and the financial prosecutor’s office. Internal screening that stops at the European list, ignores the British list for British-nexus deals, and fails to detect 50-percent ownership or control by a listed person is not a compliance programme; it is an exhibit for the prosecution.

Ownership and control is where most French compliance failures occur, and the new package illustrates why. European and British rules both extend the freeze to entities owned or controlled by listed persons, generally at the 50-percent threshold for ownership, with control assessed on the facts: the power to appoint directors, to direct actions, to use assets. A gas trader, a bunkering company or a single-ship vehicle that is majority-owned by a listed person is frozen even if its own name appears on no list. A structure in which a listed person retains de facto control through nominees, back-to-back options or family members is frozen as well, and deliberately using such arrangements can constitute circumvention, which is itself a criminal offence. Screening the names on the invoice is therefore never enough; the beneficial owner, the person giving instructions, and the source of funds must be identified, documented and re-checked at every payment, because lists change while contracts are still being performed. French banks, insurers and payment institutions have no choice in the matter: Article L. 561-2 of the Monetary and Financial Code lists the institutions subject to statutory vigilance and reporting duties, which is why a French bank will freeze first and ask questions later, and why being unable to explain the ownership chain behind a payment is enough to lose the account.

B. Challenging a listing or unblocking funds from France: British licences, European authorisations and the Luxembourg judge

Being caught by a freeze is not the end of the legal story, but the remedies run on separate tracks in London, Brussels and Luxembourg, and choosing the wrong track wastes the short time limits the law allows. The first reflex must always be to stop, preserve and qualify: stop the prohibited performance, preserve the funds without moving them, and qualify precisely which prohibition applies to which act. Moving frozen money to “protect” it, netting it against other claims, or transferring it to a lawyer’s account without authorisation can transform a curable commercial problem into a criminal one. The second reflex is to identify the competent authority for the specific freeze: the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation in London for British designations, the Directorate General of the Treasury in Paris for the French implementation of European freezes, and the Council of the European Union in Brussels for the listing decision itself.

On the British track, the realistic instrument is the OFSI licence. A person affected by a British designation, including from France, can apply for a specific licence authorising defined acts that would otherwise be prohibited: payment of reasonable professional fees and expenses, satisfaction of pre-designation contractual obligations, winding down of positions within a set period, or access to frozen funds for basic needs in individual cases. General licences published by OFSI can also authorise categories of acts for limited periods, as the financial sector saw repeatedly after the 2022 waves. Applications must be precise, evidenced and narrowly drawn; OFSI grants what is necessary and refuses what is convenient. For the shipping sector affected by the eight vessel specifications, the parallel instrument is the trade licence: certain movements, port calls for safety, or the discharge of cargoes loaded before specification may be licensable, but each voyage must be assessed on its own facts, and the period between announcement and entry into force of tightened measures, such as the January 2027 LNG transport tightening, is the moment to seek advice, not after the ship has sailed.

On the European track, two doors exist and they must not be confused. The first is the national authorisation, called derogation, granted by the Treasury in Paris under the provisions of the European regulations themselves: release of funds for basic needs, payment of reasonable legal fees, satisfaction of judicial or arbitral decisions rendered before listing, or performance of pre-existing contracts within defined windows. A company whose Paris account is frozen under Regulation 269 of 2014 does not sue its bank; it applies to the Treasury for an authorisation to use defined sums for defined purposes, with supporting documents, and the bank executes only within the perimeter of the authorisation. The second door is the listing challenge in Luxembourg. A person or entity listed by the Council can request administrative review of its listing and, crucially, bring an annulment action before the General Court of the European Union within two months of notification or publication, under the conditions of Article 263 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Recent European practice shows that these actions are not theoretical: the Council’s 2026 decisions delisting certain prominent businessmen while extending the sanctions framework itself demonstrate that listings are reviewed, evidence is tested, and outcomes vary person by person. Our analysis of that practice is developed in our companion piece on how to challenge a European listing or a frozen account from France, and the method described there, statement of reasons dissected line by line, supporting evidence demanded, manifest error pleaded, applies equally to any new designation wave.

For a British-only designation with effects in France, the strategy combines both tracks without mixing them. The British designation is challenged, if at all, through British remedies: representations to the Foreign Office, administrative review, and ultimately the British courts, with the well-known procedural difficulties that classified evidence creates for the applicant. The French effects are managed through French compliance: mapping the British nexus, suspending affected performance, applying for OFSI licences where British persons are involved, and seeking Treasury authorisations where European freezes overlap. What must never be done is to treat the absence of a European listing as permission to help evade the British freeze from French territory. Knowingly structuring payments, reflagging vessels on paper, inserting intermediaries, or falsifying cargo documents to defeat a foreign sanctions measure can constitute fraud, forgery, or money laundering under French criminal law even where the underlying foreign measure has no direct effect in France, and French prosecutors have shown in the Russia sanctions context that they will pursue circumvention schemes aggressively, as explained in our guide to prosecutions for Russia sanctions evasion in Paris.

Five practical steps follow for any French operator with exposure to Russian energy, shipping, insurance or commodities. First, screen immediately against the updated British list and not only the European one, including the eight newly specified ships by IMO number, and extend screening to owners, controllers and instructing parties. Second, freeze the analysis date: capture list versions, contract dates and loading dates in writing, because licences and transitional periods turn on precise chronology, as the Sakhalin-2 contract cut-off of 17 June 2025 illustrates. Third, suspend and segregate: stop prohibited performance, isolate affected funds, and document every decision so that good faith is demonstrable. Fourth, apply early for the right authorisation from the right authority, OFSI in London for British prohibitions and the Treasury in Paris for European ones, rather than improvising private workarounds. Fifth, calendar the Luxembourg two-month limit from the day a European listing affecting the group is published, because once that window closes the listing can generally only be attacked at its next review. These steps cost a fraction of a seizure, a prosecution or a lost banking relationship, and they are the difference between a company that suffers a sanctions event and a company that survives one.

Conclusion

The 1 October 2026 British package is a hinge moment in the economic confrontation over Ukraine. By moving against gas carriers, bunkering ships and ice-class tonnage, London has signalled that the adaptation strategies of the Russian shadow fleet will be tracked vessel by vessel and sanctioned network by network. By designating alleged torturers, child indoctrination networks and disinformation operatives in the same instrument, it has confirmed that sanctions are now an accountability tool as much as a pressure tool. And by pairing designations with licences for partners’ energy security, it has shown that the regime remains a precision weapon rather than a blockade. For France, the consequences are indirect but real: no automatic freeze follows a London-only listing, yet any sterling payment, London insurance slip, British director or trust link can import the British prohibition into a French transaction, while the parallel European prohibitions and the French criminal law of evasion apply in their own right. The operators who will navigate the winter of 2026 to 2027 safely are those who screen both lists, date every document, suspend first and ask the competent authority second, and treat the two-month Luxembourg clock as seriously as a limitation period. In sanctions law as in maritime law, the ships that survive the storm are the ones whose charts were updated before leaving port.

📄 Official circular