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Nord Stream Sabotage: Croatia Approved the EAW Surrender, How France Would Rule

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Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

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Nord Stream Sabotage: Croatia Approved the EAW Surrender, How France Would Rule

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On 18 September 2026, a Croatian court approved the surrender to Germany of a Ukrainian diver wanted for blowing up the Nord Stream pipelines. The ruling is not final: defence lawyer Ljubo Pavasovic Viskovic immediately announced an appeal, so nobody knows when, or whether, the handover will happen. But the file itself is now one of the most instructive European arrest warrant cases in years, and it deserves a close French reading. The German Federal Prosecutor says a state-ordered sabotage team planted military-grade explosives under the Baltic Sea; a Polish court already refused to surrender the same man last year; a second suspect was transferred from Italy to Germany in November 2025 and goes on trial in Hamburg on 14 October 2026. If the arrest had taken place in Pula’s French equivalent, in Marseille or in Nice rather than in Pula, it is a Paris chambre de l’instruction that would be deciding today whether the man boards a plane for Germany. This article explains what Berlin alleges, why Zagreb said yes, and exactly how French judges would test the same warrant.

I. The German warrant and the Croatian decision to surrender

A. What the Federal Prosecutor alleges: divers, a yacht rented on false papers and military explosives

The starting point is an official charging document, not a press rumour. On 2 July 2026 the German Federal Prosecutor (Generalbundesanwalt) announced that it had filed an indictment on 30 June 2026 before the State Security Senate of the Hanseatic Higher Regional Court in Hamburg against the Ukrainian national Serhii K. The release states that on 30 June 2026 the Federal Prosecutor filed an indictment with the State Security Senate of the Hanseatic Higher Regional Court in Hamburg against the Ukrainian national Serhii K. Serhii K. is described as sufficiently suspected of having acted as co-perpetrator of a war crime consisting of an attack against civilian objects (section 11(1), first sentence, no. 2 of the Code of Crimes against International Law, the VStGB), of causing an explosives detonation (section 308(1) of the Criminal Code), of destroying structures (section 305(1)) and of disrupting public operations (section 316b(1) no. 2 and (3)). The factual account given in the indictment is remarkably detailed. Serhii K. was an officer of the Ukrainian army in 2022. After the Russian war of aggression began at the end of February 2022, he and other military personnel allegedly developed, on orders from state bodies in Ukraine, a plan to destroy the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 gas pipelines running from Russia through the Baltic Sea to Lubmin in Germany, so as to cut off gas deliveries permanently and stop Russia using gas revenues to finance its war effort. A team of professional divers, a skipper and an explosives expert was formed under his leadership. On 4 September 2022 Serhii K. allegedly entered Germany via Poland on a forged Ukrainian passport, boarded a seagoing sailing yacht rented from a German company in Rostock with forged identity papers through intermediaries, and transported large quantities of military-grade high-performance explosives through international waters to a point near the Danish island of Bornholm. There, the group attached several explosive devices with time fuses to the pipelines on the seabed before 22 September 2022. The devices detonated on 26 September 2022 and severely damaged both pipelines, at a time when roughly half of Germany’s annual natural gas needs for energy production flowed through Nord Stream 1. The same release confirms the procedural backbone of the whole affair: The release thus certifies the procedural chain: arrest in Italy on a European arrest warrant in August 2025, transfer to Germany in November 2025, indictment in June 2026, and due to stand trial in Hamburg from 14 October 2026 into February 2027, according to consistent press reporting confirmed by the court calendar.

The man at the centre of the Croatian proceedings is the alleged diver of that team. On 19 August 2026 the Federal Prosecutor announced that, on the basis of a European arrest warrant issued by the investigating judge of the Federal Court of Justice on 3 June 2024, that the Ukrainian national Vladimir Z. had been arrested in Pula, Croatia, by the local police directorate coordinated by the Zagreb general police directorate — the Ukrainian national Vladimir Z. had been arrested in Pula, Croatia, by the local police directorate coordinated from Zagreb. The release says he is strongly suspected of jointly causing an explosives detonation (section 308(1) of the Criminal Code), of sabotage against the constitutional order (section 88(1) no. 3) and of destroying structures (section 305(1)). The warrant accuses him, in substance, of the following: Vladimir Z. is a trained diver; he belonged to a group around the separately prosecuted Serhii K. that placed explosive devices on the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 pipelines near Bornholm in September 2022; he personally took part in the dives required for that purpose; the group used a sailing yacht that had set off from Rostock after being rented with forged papers through middlemen; the devices exploded on 26 September 2022 and severely damaged both pipelines. The release adds that after transfer from Croatia he is to be brought before the investigating judge of the Federal Court of Justice. Three features of this warrant matter enormously for any executing court, including a French one. First, it is a prosecution warrant, not a sentence warrant: Germany wants to try the man, not to enforce a prison term, which removes a whole family of refusal grounds linked to in absentia convictions and to the enforcement of foreign sentences. Second, the underlying facts are dated, located and attributed with unusual precision — yacht, dates, island, forged passports — which makes the classic defence lines of mistaken identity or vague allegations very hard to run. Third, the legal characterisation chosen in Berlin reaches the highest level of German criminal law: sabotage against the constitutional order and, for the co-accused, a war crime against civilian objects. A French executing judge would read those labels carefully, because they determine whether the dual-criminality control can be skipped altogether.

B. Why the Croatian court said yes, and what the appeal can still challenge

According to reporting by Al Jazeera, AFP, AP and Reuters published on 24 September 2026, the Croatian court granted extradition on 18 September and the defence will appeal, which suspends any handover until a final decision. The suspect had been arrested on the European warrant in the northern Croatian town of Pula in August, reportedly while working on a dramatised film project about the attack. His lawyer confirmed the ruling is not final. Legally, the outcome so far is unsurprising. A European arrest warrant is not a diplomatic request for extradition; it is a judicial decision issued by one Member State with a view to the arrest and surrender of a requested person for prosecution or for the execution of a custodial sentence, as defined by Article 1 of the Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States. Within the Union, surrender is the rule and refusal the narrowly interpreted exception. Croatia applied that logic: a valid German judicial warrant, serious facts punishable by long custodial sentences, no obvious mandatory bar. The appeal will therefore have to find a precise defect — a mandatory ground such as a final judgment for the same facts, discrimination in the issuing of the warrant, minority of the person at the time of the facts, or a well-built optional ground such as concurrent domestic proceedings or a genuine fundamental-rights risk in the issuing state. General political arguments about the war in Ukraine are not, as such, refusal grounds under the Framework Decision.

The most eye-catching feature of the file is the Polish precedent. The Associated Press reported that the man arrested in Croatia is the same person who had been arrested in Poland the previous year and then released when a Polish court refused to extradite him to Germany. Polish authorities identified him as Volodymyr Zhuravlov, and photographs of his 2025 hearing before the Warsaw regional court circulated worldwide. For a lay reader this looks contradictory: how can one European Union court refuse surrender and another grant it for the same man and the same facts? For a lawyer the answer is straightforward and must be stated plainly. A refusal of surrender by one Member State does not bind the courts of another Member State. Each executing authority examines the warrant before it under its own law transposing the Framework Decision, on the evidence before it, at the date it rules. Above all, a refusal that is not founded on a final criminal judgment on the merits — a release, a finding that the conditions for detention were not met, a decision that surrender would be premature — has no ne bis in idem effect. Only a final decision acquitting or convicting the person for the same material facts, with any sentence executed, being executed or unenforceable, blocks a second surrender. That is precisely the line French law draws in Article 695-22 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, whose second paragraph refuses execution only where “la personne recherchée a fait l’objet, par les autorités judiciaires françaises ou par celles d’un autre Etat membre que l’Etat d’émission, d’une décision définitive pour les mêmes faits que ceux faisant l’objet du mandat d’arrêt européen”, with the well-known proviso on sentences. A Polish release order is not, on the facts publicly known, a final judgment of acquittal on the sabotage charges, and Croatia was therefore free to decide differently. The same reasoning would apply in Paris. There is a second, political dimension that a French observer cannot ignore. German investigators reportedly believe a Ukrainian state agency ordered the operation to deprive Moscow of the revenues financing its invasion, and Berlin has been one of Kyiv’s strongest supporters since 2022. Trying Ukrainian nationals for an attack that hurt Russia puts Germany in an awkward position and feeds every conspiracy theory about the case. But awkwardness is not a legal category. The executing judge in Zagreb, like the one in Paris, is not asked whether the prosecution is geopolitically convenient. He is asked whether a valid warrant exists, whether the legal conditions for surrender are met, and whether a listed ground for refusal is established by the defence. That discipline is the whole point of mutual recognition, and it is also its permanent tension.

II. The same file before a French executing court

A. Surrender is the principle, refusal the strictly interpreted exception

French readers sometimes confuse the European arrest warrant with classic extradition, and the distinction matters enormously here. Extradition with a non-EU state such as Dubai or the United States is a long, partly diplomatic procedure in which nationality, politics and reciprocity play a visible role, as this desk recently showed in our analysis of the Megaupload extradition battle and what France would do with such a file). Inside the European Union, the warrant replaced that logic with direct judge-to-judge surrender. The Cour de cassation repeats the hierarchy in almost every ruling, “conformément au principe de reconnaissance mutuelle, l’exécution du mandat d’arrêt européen constitue le principe et le refus d’exécution, qui n’est possible que pour des motifs de non-exécution obligatoire ou facultative procédant de la décision-cadre 2002/584/JAI, est conçu comme une exception, à interpréter strictement (CJUE, [GC], 6 juin 2023, O.G, C-700/21, § 33).” That passage comes from the widely cited judgment of the Criminal Chamber of 7 August 2024, appeal no. 24-81.863, published in the Bulletin, which itself relies on the Court of Justice’s O.G. ruling of 6 June 2023 (C-700/21). Concretely, a Paris chambre de l’instruction faced with the Vladimir Z. warrant would work through a closed list, and only that list.

The mandatory grounds for refusal are set out in Article 695-22 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in the version in force since 24 December 2021: “L’exécution d’un mandat d’arrêt européen est refusée dans les cas suivants : 1° Si les faits pour lesquels il a été émis pouvaient être poursuivis et jugés par les juridictions françaises et que l’action publique est éteinte par l’amnistie ; 2° Si la personne recherchée a fait l’objet, par les autorités judiciaires françaises ou par celles d’un autre Etat membre que l’Etat d’émission, d’une décision définitive pour les mêmes faits que ceux faisant l’objet du mandat d’arrêt européen à condition, en cas de condamnation, que la peine ait été exécutée ou soit en cours d’exécution ou ne puisse plus être ramenée à exécution selon les lois de l’Etat de condamnation ; 3° Si la personne recherchée était âgée de moins de treize ans au moment des faits faisant l’objet du mandat d’arrêt européen ; […] 5° S’il est établi que ledit mandat d’arrêt a été émis dans le but de poursuivre ou de condamner une personne en raison de son sexe, de sa race, de sa religion, de son origine ethnique, de sa nationalité, de sa langue, de ses opinions politiques ou de son orientation sexuelle ou identité de genre, ou qu’il peut être porté atteinte à la situation de cette personne pour l’une de ces raisons.” Applied to the Nord Stream file, none of these bars bites on the known facts. There is no amnesty covering submarine sabotage; the suspect is an adult; the Polish release is not a final decision within the meaning of paragraph 2; and the discrimination clause, sometimes invoked in politically coloured files, requires proof that the warrant was issued because of the person’s nationality, opinions or other protected characteristic, or that his situation would suffer on such grounds — a very different thing from arguing that the prosecution is geopolitically inconvenient for Ukraine. The defence could try to frame Ukrainian nationality as the real motive, but Berlin’s file also targets the factual organisers regardless of passport, and the Hamburg indictment of Serhii K. shows a prosecution built on divers, boats and explosives rather than on ethnicity.

Dual criminality — the requirement that the conduct be an offence in both states — looks like the next natural line of defence, and French law closes it quickly. Article 695-23 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that “L’exécution d’un mandat d’arrêt européen peut également être refusée si le fait faisant l’objet dudit mandat d’arrêt ne constitue pas une infraction au regard de la loi française”, but immediately adds the exception: “Par dérogation au premier alinéa, un mandat d’arrêt européen est exécuté sans contrôle de la double incrimination des faits reprochés lorsque les agissements considérés sont, aux termes de la loi de l’Etat membre d’émission, punis d’une peine privative de liberté d’une durée égale ou supérieure à trois ans d’emprisonnement ou d’une mesure de sûreté privative de liberté d’une durée similaire et entrent dans l’une des catégories d’infractions prévues par l’article 694-32.” Terrorism is expressly on that list — Article 694-32 opens with “1° Participation à une organisation criminelle ; 2° Terrorisme” — and the German charges of causing explosives detonations, sabotage against the constitutional order and destruction of structures plainly carry custodial sentences far above the three-year threshold. A French court would therefore almost certainly execute the warrant without any dual-criminality review, exactly as the Criminal Chamber recalled on 23 August 2023 (appeal no. 23-84.608, full text on the Cour de cassation website), censuring executing judges who go looking for optional refusal grounds the defence never properly raised— where no argument based on the optional refusal ground in Article 695-23(1) was put forward, the court cannot construct one for the parties.

The optional grounds are where a serious defence would actually fight, and French law lists them in Article 695-24 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: “L’exécution d’un mandat d’arrêt européen peut être refusée : 1° Si, pour les faits faisant l’objet du mandat d’arrêt, la personne recherchée fait l’objet de poursuites devant les juridictions françaises ou si celles-ci ont décidé de ne pas engager les poursuites ou d’y mettre fin ;” In a sabotage of pipelines landing in Germany, with a yacht rented in Rostock and explosives embarked there, France has no obvious concurrent prosecution — but the provision matters in a subtler way. The pipelines carried Russian gas to the whole European market, the environmental damage spread across the Baltic, and several states opened files. If Paris had opened its own judicial investigation into the same material facts, the chambre de l’instruction could refuse surrender in favour of French proceedings. The Cour de cassation polices this ground strictly. In its judgment of 2 December 2025, appeal no. 25-87.216, published in the Bulletin, it recalled that “Cet article transpose l’article 4, § 2, de la décision-cadre 2002/584/JAI du Conseil du 13 juin 2002 relative au mandat d’arrêt européen et aux procédures de remise entre États membres qui énonce que l’autorité judiciaire peut refuser l’exécution du mandat d’arrêt européen lorsque la personne qui en fait l’objet est poursuivie dans l’Etat membre d’exécution pour le même fait que celui qui est à la base dudit mandat.”, adding, by reference to the Court of Justice’s X ruling of 29 April 2021 (C-665/20 PPU), that the relevant test is the identity of the material facts — “l’existence d’un ensemble de faits indissociablement liés entre eux, indépendamment de la ou des qualifications pénales retenues dans l’Etat membre d’émission” — regardless of the legal labels used by the issuing state. A French defence team would therefore have to show a genuine French investigation into the same inseparable set of facts, not merely that France is interested in the affair. The same December 2025 judgment closes another classic door, the private-and-family-life argument: where surrender is said to harm family life in France, the executing court must establish “l’existence de circonstances exceptionnelles permettant de faire prévaloir le droit au respect de sa vie privée et familiale en France sur le but légitime poursuivi par sa remise en exécution du mandat d’arrêt européen, notamment au regard de la gravité des faits”, exceptional circumstances capable of outweighing the legitimate aim of surrender, assessed notably against the gravity of the facts. Pipeline sabotage with military explosives is about as grave as non-violent-against-persons crime gets, so that plea would face a steep climb. Two further optional grounds deserve a mention for completeness. Under paragraph 2 of the same article, surrender for the enforcement of a sentence can be refused where a French national or resident can serve it in France — irrelevant here because Germany seeks a trial, not enforcement. And paragraph 3 allows refusal where the acts were committed in whole or in part on French territory, which on the known facts points to Germany, Denmark, Poland and international waters, not to France.

B. Consent, time limits, specialty and the shadow of the Polish refusal

Procedure is where European arrest warrant cases are won and lost in Paris, and the Code organises it as a sprint. Article 695-31 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that “Si, lors de sa comparution, la personne recherchée déclare consentir à sa remise, la chambre de l’instruction l’informe des conséquences juridiques de son consentement et de son caractère irrévocable”, and that “Lorsque la personne recherchée maintient son consentement à la remise, la chambre de l’instruction lui demande si elle entend renoncer à la règle de la spécialité, après l’avoir informée des conséquences juridiques d’une telle renonciation et de son caractère irrévocable.” Where consent is given and the legal conditions are met, the court records it and grants surrender, ruling “dans les sept jours de la comparution” — within seven days of the appearance — and that decision cannot be appealed. Where the person refuses consent, “la chambre de l’instruction statue par une décision dans le délai de vingt jours à compter de la date de sa comparution”, subject only to appeal to the Cour de cassation by the prosecutor general or the requested person. Three practical lessons follow for a file like Nord Stream. First, consent is irrevocable and fast: a suspect who agrees to go cannot change his mind a week later, and the seven-day track leaves almost no time to build a refusal case — experienced counsel therefore almost never consent in a contested sabotage file. Second, the twenty-day contested track is real litigation time: that is when the defence files a proper memorandum raising a specific listed ground, because, as the 2024 and 2023 rulings above insist, judges will not raise optional grounds of their own motion and will be censured if they order further inquiries into a ground nobody pleaded. Third, specialty matters enormously here. Under Article 695-46 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, “La chambre de l’instruction devant laquelle la personne recherchée a comparu est saisie de toute demande émanant des autorités compétentes de l’Etat membre d’émission en vue de consentir à des poursuites ou à la mise à exécution d’une peine ou d’une mesure de sûreté prononcées pour d’autres infractions que celles ayant motivé la remise et commises antérieurement à celle-ci.” In plain terms, once surrendered for the Bornholm explosions, Vladimir Z. could not be tried by Germany for other earlier offences without fresh consent from the executing court — a protection the defence would keep in reserve if Berlin were tempted, after the Hamburg trial of Serhii K., to extend the case to wider conspiracy or intelligence charges. The same article gives the executing court a say over any onward surrender to a third Member State.

That leaves the Polish shadow, which is the question every client in this position asks: does a refusal elsewhere protect me in France? The honest answer is no, with one precise exception. Had the Polish court acquitted the man on the merits for the same material facts, in a final decision, Article 695-22(2) would bar any French executing court from surrendering him again for those facts. A release following a refusal to surrender is not that. It is a procedural outcome attached to one warrant, before one court, at one date — and the German warrant of 3 June 2024 is still alive, as the Pula arrest and the Zagreb approval demonstrate. The defence’s real leverage in a French court would therefore lie elsewhere: attacking the identification evidence, disputing that the German factual account describes this individual, invoking a genuine French prosecution for the same inseparable facts if one existed, or building a documented fundamental-rights case about detention conditions or trial fairness in the issuing state — the Aranyosi line of the Court of Justice case law that French courts apply with increasing rigour. None of those plea is visible on the public record today, which is exactly why Croatia approved surrender.

Conclusion

The Nord Stream surrender litigation is now a two-track race. In Croatia, the appeal against the 18 September approval will test whether any listed refusal ground can stop a textbook European arrest warrant: judicial issuer, grave facts, precise allegations, prosecution purpose. In Germany, the Hamburg trial of Serhii K. opening on 14 October 2026 will expose, for the first time in open court, the full evidentiary architecture — forged passports, the Rostock yacht, the Bornholm dives, the alleged state order — on which the warrant against Vladimir Z. also rests. For anyone facing a European arrest warrant in France, the file is a masterclass in what actually matters before the chambre de l’instruction: surrender is the principle and refusal the strictly interpreted exception; only pleaded, listed grounds count; consent is irrevocable and buys speed at the price of every defence; specialty survives surrender and can still shape the trial to come; and a refusal won in Warsaw protects nobody in Paris or Zagreb unless it is a final judgment on the same facts. The Croatian judges understood that grammar. A French court, applying Articles 695-22 to 695-46 of the Code of Criminal Procedure under the control of the Cour de cassation, would very likely read the file the same way.

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