On 28 September 2026, the Council of the European Union adopted two sanctions packages in a single day, and each of them breaks new ground. The first puts a North Korean children’s camp on the EU blacklist for helping transfer Ukrainian children out of occupied territory. The second puts sitting judges of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation on the same list for barring the country’s last anti-war party from parliamentary elections. Twenty-seven persons and entities on one side, ten individuals on the other, all frozen out of the European financial system within hours. For readers in France, these decisions are not distant diplomacy. A listing decided in Brussels takes effect in Paris the same morning: bank accounts are frozen, transactions are blocked, and anyone who deals with a listed person without authorisation commits a criminal offence. At the same time, the facts behind the listings — the deportation of more than 20,500 Ukrainian children, documented by the European Council itself — are the very facts for which the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants in March 2023, and for which French courts can claim jurisdiction under universal-jurisdiction provisions. This analysis explains what the Council decided on 28 September, who exactly is targeted and why, and what a lawyer in Paris does with such a file: enforcing the freeze, preparing a criminal complaint, or challenging the listing before the EU courts in Luxembourg.
I. What the Council decided on 28 September 2026: a North Korean camp and Russian judges on the EU blacklist
A. Ten individuals and seventeen entities listed for the deportation of Ukrainian children, including the Songdowon camp in North Korea
The first decision of the day, Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/2185 of 28 September 2026 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, adds ten individuals and seventeen entities to the EU sanctions list. According to the Council press release of 28 September 2026, the decision targets those responsible for systematic unlawful deportation and forcible transfer of Ukrainian children to the Russian Federation and within temporarily occupied territories, and for their forced assimilation through indoctrination and militarised education. The background figures are stark: since the start of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, an estimated total of more than 20,500 deported and forcibly transferred Ukrainian children, in what the Council describes as serious breaches of international law aimed at erasing Ukrainian identity.
The list of entities reads like an X-ray of the deportation system. It includes the Moscow City Tourism Committee and two Russian companies operating in children’s recreation, tourism and entertainment services, described as organising activities focused on Russian history, war commemorations and military-patriotic education. Children’s camps and sports centres in Russia and in temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine are listed for cultural reorientation, propaganda-based education and military-patriotic activities aimed at integrating children into Russian identity frameworks. And then comes the entry that made headlines around the world: the Songdowon International Children’s Camp, a state-operated institution in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, which takes part in organised programmes transferring Ukrainian children from temporarily occupied Ukrainian territory in coordination with the Russian Federation in order to promote pro-Russian narratives. It is the first time an institution in North Korea is listed specifically for its role in the Ukrainian children file, and it documents the internationalisation of the transfer network beyond Russia’s borders.
On the individuals’ side, the best-known name is Rustam Minnikhanov, President of the Republic of Tatarstan, listed for facilitating the illegal deportation of Ukrainian children to camps located in his region. Alongside him appear the minister and deputy ministers of education and science of certain occupied territories, the minister of sports and tourism of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic, and heads of children’s camps and schools accused of contributing to ideological indoctrination. Every person listed is subject to an asset freeze, and EU citizens and companies are forbidden from making funds, financial assets or economic resources available to them. The natural persons are additionally subject to a travel ban prohibiting entry into or transit through EU territory. The mechanism is the familiar one of Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014, the general instrument for the Ukraine territorial-integrity regime, under which listed funds are frozen and any making-available of resources is prohibited unless an exemption or a national authorisation applies.
Why does this matter beyond sanctions technique? Because the conduct described by the Council — unlawful deportation and forcible transfer of children from occupied territory — is word for word the conduct for which the International Criminal Court acted more than three years ago. On 17 March 2023, Pre-Trial Chamber II issued warrants of arrest for Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin and Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova, as the ICC press release of 17 March 2023 records. Mr Putin is allegedly responsible for the war crimes of unlawful deportation of population (children) and unlawful transfer of population (children) from occupied areas of Ukraine to the Russian Federation under articles 8(2)(a)(vii) and 8(2)(b)(viii) of the Rome Statute, with crimes allegedly committed on Ukrainian occupied territory from 24 February 2022 onwards. Ms Lvova-Belova, Commissioner for Children’s Rights in the Office of the President of the Russian Federation, faces the same allegations, for acts committed directly, jointly with others or through others within the meaning of article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute. The Chamber found reasonable grounds to believe each suspect bears responsibility for the war crimes of unlawful deportation and unlawful transfer of population from occupied areas of Ukraine to the Russian Federation, to the prejudice of Ukrainian children. The EU listings of September 2026 therefore do not create a new narrative; they attach financial consequences to individuals and entities operating inside a factual matrix that the world’s permanent criminal court has already qualified as alleged war crimes. That continuity between The Hague and Brussels is precisely what gives victims, NGOs and prosecutors in France concrete material to work with, as the second part of this analysis will show.
One further point deserves attention before leaving this first package. The Council deliberately used the Ukraine territorial-integrity regime — Decision 2014/145/CFSP and its implementing regulation — rather than a thematic human-rights instrument. The legal consequence is significant: the listing criterion is contribution to undermining Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, which covers organisers, facilitators and beneficiaries of the transfer system, including foreign partners such as the North Korean camp. A camp director who argues he merely hosted children on holiday will have to answer the statement of reasons describing organised programmes coordinated with the Russian Federation. And because the regime is now one of the most litigated in Luxembourg, every new entry will be tested against the General Court’s increasingly demanding standards on evidence and reasoning — standards this firm examined earlier in the Avetisyan annulment of 2025 relistings. The lesson for listed persons is that the fight will be won or lost on the file, not on politics.
B. Ten individuals listed for barring Yabloko from the Duma elections, including three Supreme Court judges
The second decision of the day, Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/2192 of 28 September 2026 amending Decision (CFSP) 2024/1484 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Russia, operates under a different legal framework and pursues a different objective. It adds ten individuals under the EU’s Russia human-rights regime — the framework created in March 2024 after the death of Alexei Navalny — for supporting the repression of democratic opposition and seriously undermining democracy and the rule of law in Russia. With this decision, as the Council press release of 28 September 2026 states, restrictive measures in view of the situation in Russia apply to a total of 108 individuals and 7 entities.
The trigger is the exclusion of the Yabloko party from the September 2026 elections to the State Duma. Yabloko was the only political party that openly opposed Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, and its removal from the ballot over alleged breaches of copyright, extremism and other misconduct eliminated the last anti-war voice from the federal list. The Council listed three judges of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation and an official of the Prosecutor General’s Office involved in the barring decision. It also listed the judge who sentenced Lev Shlosberg, a Yabloko opposition politician, to 11 years and one month of imprisonment for discrediting the Russian army and so-called fake news about the war, together with the state prosecutor who requested that sentence. Finally, it listed the judges involved in the trials of Maxim Kruglov and Nikolai Rybakov, two other prominent Yabloko leaders. Listing sitting judges of a supreme court is an exceptionally rare step in EU sanctions practice, and it sends a precise message: participating in the judicial machinery of political repression is treated as personal conduct engaging individual responsibility, not as a neutral exercise of office shielded by judicial immunity.
The international context reinforces the decision. On 19 August 2026, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, publicly expressed alarm at the barring of Yabloko from the parliamentary elections and the sentencing of its deputy chair to more than 11 years in prison over anti-war speech, calling on the authorities to respect freedom of expression and citizens’ right to participate fully and freely in electoral processes. In its statement of 21 September on the Duma elections held on 18-20 September 2026, the EU High Representative stressed that the systematic exclusion of Yabloko candidates from the federal list further limited voters’ choice, debarring one of the last remaining opposition forces and the only party with an anti-war platform. The sanctions decision converts that diplomatic condemnation into individual financial consequences: asset freeze and prohibition on making funds available, applicable across all Member States from the date of publication in the Official Journal.
For practitioners, the Yabloko package raises a question of a different nature than the children’s package. The listed judges will inevitably argue that they applied domestic law as judges and that sanctioning them punishes the exercise of judicial office. The Council’s answer, implicit in the statement of reasons, is that the listing targets the concrete role each person played in decisions that eliminated democratic opposition — the barring ruling, the 11-year sentence, the trials of opposition leaders — and not the judicial function in the abstract. Whether that distinction survives review by the General Court will depend on the evidence file: the judgments signed, the reasoning adopted, the disproportion between the conduct punished and the penalty imposed. Judges who signed collective decisions may argue collegiality; prosecutors may argue they merely requested the application of the law. Luxembourg case law on similar listings, notably concerning repression in other contexts, examines precisely these individual links. The practical consequence is that the file each judge can assemble — dissenting opinions, procedural safeguards respected or ignored, comparability with sentences in ordinary cases — will decide the outcome of any annulment action brought under Article 263 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the provision under which individuals challenge EU acts directly before the General Court. A related large-scale designations wave adopted in early October 2026, with its French freeze consequences, is examined in our companion analysis of the record Russia designations and frozen assets in France.
II. What France does with these listings: freeze the assets, open the criminal file, or challenge the measure
A. From Brussels to Paris: the immediate asset freeze and the French criminal route for deported children
An EU listing is directly applicable in France from its publication: no transposition is needed. In practice, the freeze is implemented through the French domestic machinery of the Code monétaire et financier. Under article L. 562-3 of the Code monétaire et financier, the Minister for the Economy may order the freezing of funds and economic resources belonging to, possessed, held or controlled by persons designated under acts adopted pursuant to Article 29 TEU or Article 75 TFEU — which covers both the Ukraine regime and the Russia human-rights regime used on 28 September 2026. The freeze lasts six months and is renewable. Under article L. 562-4 of the same Code, banks, financial institutions and indeed any person operating on national territory must apply the freeze and the prohibitions on making available without delay and inform the Minister for the Economy immediately — including, for entities headquartered in France, in respect of activities carried out abroad. A Paris bank that holds an account linked to a newly listed camp director or to a company in the listed recreation network must therefore freeze on the morning of publication, file its report, and refuse any instruction to move the funds. Failure to freeze is a criminal offence; moving frozen funds without Treasury authorisation exposes the institution and its officers to prosecution.
But the freeze is only the defensive side of the French response. The offensive side is criminal law, and here the children’s package meets one of the most powerful tools in the French arsenal. Under article 689-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in its version applicable since the reform of 22 November 2023: “Hors les cas prévus au sous-titre Ier du titre Ier du livre IV pour l’application de la convention portant statut de la Cour pénale internationale, ouverte à la signature à Rome le 18 juillet 1998, peut être poursuivie et jugée par les juridictions françaises toute personne soupçonnée d’avoir commis à l’étranger l’une des infractions suivantes : 1° Le crime de génocide défini au chapitre Ier du sous-titre Ier du titre Ier du livre II du code pénal ; 2° Les autres crimes contre l’humanité définis au chapitre II du même sous-titre Ier ; 3° Les crimes et les délits de guerre définis aux articles 461-1 à 461-31 du même code.” In plain English: French courts may try any person suspected of having committed abroad genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes as defined by French law. The suspect must have habitual residence in France, assessed through a sufficient connecting link — duration of presence, conditions and reasons for staying, intention to settle, family, social, material or professional ties. Prosecution can only be initiated at the request of the anti-terrorism prosecutor in Paris, and only if no international court has requested surrender and no State has requested extradition of the person. Where the Paris prosecutor closes a case without action, a victim’s report can be reviewed by the prosecutor general of the Paris Court of Appeal, who must hear the complainant on request.
The substantive French definitions fit the deportation facts closely. Article 211-1 of the Code pénal defines genocide as acts committed pursuant to a concerted plan to destroy a national, ethnic, racial or religious group in whole or in part, including “transfert forcé d’enfants” — the forcible transfer of children — punishable by life imprisonment. Article 212-1 of the same Code defines crimes against humanity to include, when committed pursuant to a concerted plan against a civilian population as part of a widespread or systematic attack, “La déportation ou le transfert forcé de population” — deportation or forcible transfer of population — likewise punishable by life imprisonment. And article 461-2 of the Code pénal punishes wilful attacks on life and physical or psychological integrity, as well as abduction and unlawful detention, committed against persons protected by the international law of armed conflict. A camp director who organised the reception, re-education and militarised training of transferred Ukrainian children, if ever habitually resident in France or present on French territory in conditions meeting the residence test, could therefore in principle face investigation in Paris for complicity in war crimes or crimes against humanity — with the EU statement of reasons, the ICC warrants’ factual matrix and the Council’s figure of more than 20,500 children forming the documentary starting point of the file. The specialised war-crimes unit of the Paris judicial court and the anti-terrorism prosecution service have already shown, in the Syrian and Rwandan files, that they will pursue such cases to trial when the evidence allows.
Three practical consequences follow for different readers. First, for victims and associations: a complaint with constitution de partie civile is not the route here — article 689-11 reserves initiation to the anti-terrorism prosecutor — so the effective move is a detailed report to the Paris prosecutor documenting the suspect’s French connecting link, with the EU listing annexed as corroboration. Second, for banks and companies: the 28 September listings require an immediate screening of client and counterparty databases against the 37 new names, bearing in mind that the recreation and tourism companies in the network may operate under commercial brands that do not match the listed legal names. Third, for the listed persons themselves: any asset in France is now frozen, any euro transaction through a French correspondent bank is blocked, and travel through the Schengen area is barred — which makes the question of legal challenge urgent, and which is the subject of the final section.
B. Challenging the listing in Luxembourg and protecting creditors in Paris: the two remedies that actually work
A person listed on 28 September 2026 has two months from notification or publication to bring an action for annulment before the General Court of the European Union under Article 263 TFEU, and that deadline is strict. The action does not suspend the freeze: the assets stay frozen while the case proceeds, which typically takes eighteen months to two years. To succeed, the applicant must demolish the statement of reasons — the short paragraph in the listing act explaining why this person, and not another, was designated. The General Court annuls where the reasons are too vague, where the evidence does not support them, or where the Council made a manifest error of assessment. Recent practice shows the Court is not intimidated by the political sensitivity of a file: it annulled 2025 relistings earlier this year, a precedent analysed in our Avetisyan ruling commentary, and it regularly sends the Council back to produce the underlying evidence. For the Tatarstan president, the argument will focus on whether facilitating means deciding or merely hosting; for camp directors, on whether the statement proves their personal role in transfers rather than ordinary holiday activities; for the listed judges, on whether signing a collective ruling demonstrates individual support for repression. A parallel request for interim measures — suspension of the freeze pending judgment — is theoretically available but almost never granted in sanctions cases, because the Court considers the public interest in maintaining restrictive measures to prevail; applicants should therefore file it only with exceptional evidence of irreparable harm, and concentrate their resources on the main annulment action plus a well-documented administrative request for delisting addressed to the Council, which can succeed faster when the factual basis has genuinely changed.
The second remedy concerns not the listed person but the creditor — and it was clarified in Paris only six days ago. On 1 October 2026, the Second Civil Chamber of the Cour de cassation delivered a ruling of direct importance for anyone holding frozen assets in France: Cass. 2e civ., 1 October 2026, No H 24-10.958, Al-Kharafi v. Libyan Investment Authority (ECLI:FR:CCASS:2026:C200924). The case concerned enforcement against assets of the Libyan Investment Authority frozen under the EU Libya sanctions regulation. The Court approved the Paris Court of Appeal’s holding that no enforcement measure may be pursued against frozen funds or economic resources where it would remove them from the debtor’s estate or even confer a mere right of preference on the pursuing creditor, without prior authorisation from the Director of the Treasury, the designated national authority. The creditor’s argument — that the regulation requires authorisation only at the payment stage, after seizure — was rejected, following the Court of Justice’s interpretation of the identically worded Iranian freeze regulation, under which authorisation must come before seizure. The same judgment recalls the procedural safeguard of article R. 211-3 and article R. 211-11 of the Code of Civil Enforcement Proceedings: a saisie-attribution against a foreign State on funds held by an entity characterised as a State emanation must be denounced to the foreign State within eight days on pain of lapse, while the emanation itself, as a distinct legal person, must have knowledge of the seizure to be able to contest it — including by invoking the unseizability of the funds by reason of an EU freeze measure. For victims of the deportation system who might one day hold a damages award and look to frozen assets in France, the message is operational: apply to the Directorate General of the Treasury for release authorisation before seizing, document the humanitarian or compensatory purpose, and serve every emanation separately. Skipping the Treasury step invalidates the enforcement, however strong the underlying judgment.
Two final warnings complete the picture. First, circumvention is itself an offence: any person who makes funds available to a listed person, or who participates in activities whose object or effect is to circumvent the freeze, faces criminal penalties in France, and the recreation-tourism network described in Decision 2026/2185 — with its commercial brands, intermediaries and cross-border programmes — is exactly the type of structure through which circumvention is attempted, and therefore watched. Banks should treat payments to children’s camps, sports centres and tourism operators with Russian or North Korean links as high-risk from October 2026 and escalate them to compliance. Second, time limits are short on every front: two months for the Luxembourg annulment action, immediate effect of the freeze, six-month renewable national orders, and prescription rules that continue to run on the underlying criminal facts. Anyone concerned — listed person, creditor, victim, or compliance officer — should have the file reviewed without delay, because in sanctions matters as in criminal matters, the party that moves first usually defines the terrain on which the case will be fought.
Conclusion
The Council’s double decision of 28 September 2026 will be remembered as the day EU sanctions reached inside a North Korean children’s camp and inside the chambers of Russia’s Supreme Court. The two packages share a method — individual designations with asset freezes, adopted under published legal acts and reviewable by an independent court — but they pursue two distinct policies: dismantling the material system that deported more than 20,500 Ukrainian children, and penalising the judicial personnel who eliminated the last anti-war party from Russia’s parliament. In France, these decisions bite immediately through the Treasury freeze machinery, open a credible path to criminal investigation under universal jurisdiction for the deportation facts, and offer listed persons a structured but demanding route to challenge before the General Court. The Cour de cassation’s Al-Kharafi ruling of 1 October 2026 adds the final piece: even frozen assets remain within the reach of creditors who follow the Treasury authorisation procedure. Sanctions, criminal justice and creditors’ rights are converging on the same files. The files opened in the autumn of 2026 will occupy courts in Paris and Luxembourg for years — and the parties that prepare them properly, with verified facts and respected procedures, will be the ones still standing when the judgments fall.