One year after United States President Donald Trump announced the first phase of his 20-point Gaza peace plan, the assessment published by Reuters on 6 October 2026 is stark: the ceasefire of 10 October 2025 held in the sense that full-scale war did not resume and the last living hostages seized in the Hamas attacks of 7 October 2023 came home, yet almost every other promise of the plan has stalled. Israel mounts near-daily strikes, its forces which were supposed to withdraw to the so-called yellow line controlling 53 percent of the enclave now effectively control around two-thirds of Gaza, more than 1,400 Palestinians have been killed since the ceasefire according to Gaza health authorities, five Israeli soldiers have been killed in the same period, humanitarian deliveries average far below the 600 trucks a day stipulated in the plan, Hamas has not disarmed, the International Stabilization Force exists mostly on paper, and Gaza faces acute hunger for more than 1.2 million people. For an international audience watching the wires, the question is no longer whether a deal was signed. It is what the deal changed in law, what it left untouched, and what remedies remain open in The Hague, in New York and in Paris.
This article gives a French lawyer’s reading of that one-year record. It is written entirely in English because the audience is international, but its added value is French and European procedure: how a ceasefire interacts with international criminal liability, what the International Criminal Court arrest warrants of 21 November 2024 still require of states, what the International Court of Justice cases still decide regardless of the guns falling silent, and what French courts can still hear for French victims, French nationals held hostage, and suspects present on French soil. A ceasefire suspends hostilities. It does not amnesty crimes, it does not lift arrest warrants, and it does not close court files. That distinction is the thread of the analysis that follows, grounded in the Reuters one-year reporting of 6 October 2026, United Nations documents on the Stabilization Force, International Criminal Court releases, and French statutes verified on Legifrance.
I. What the Trump first-phase deal achieved and where the plan froze one year on
A. Hostages freed, guns quieter but not silent: how much does the October 2025 ceasefire protect civilians today?
The first phase agreed in indirect talks in Egypt and announced on 8 October 2025 contained four concrete elements, according to Reuters reporting from the talks of 8 October 2025: suspension of military operations, partial Israeli withdrawal to an agreed line, exchange of hostages held in Gaza for Palestinian prisoners and detainees held by Israel, and a surge of humanitarian aid. The ceasefire took effect on 10 October 2025. The last 20 living hostages of the 48 still held at the time, from 251 people seized on 7 October 2023, were released, alongside the return of bodies, while Israel freed hundreds of Palestinian prisoners and detainees. United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres publicly demanded that all sides abide fully by the hostage agreement and that immediate and unimpeded entry of humanitarian supplies be ensured. For families, that first phase was decisive. For lawyers, it created a new factual baseline: detention ended for the living hostages, but the legal characterization of the detention, the killings of around 1,200 people on 7 October 2023 and of more than 67,000 Palestinians in the ensuing offensive according to Gaza authorities, and the conditions of detention on both sides remain justiciable facts.
One year later, Reuters reported on 6 October 2026 that there has been no return to full-scale military operations, but Israeli strikes have continued on a near-daily basis, with at least 1,400 Palestinians killed since the October ceasefire, many of them women and children, and five Israeli soldiers killed by Palestinian militants or in combat. Israel states its strikes target Hamas, accusing the group of attempting attacks and rearmament, which Hamas denies. Israel-backed Palestinian militias opposing Hamas use the Israeli-held zone to launch attacks into Hamas-controlled areas. Legally, this pattern matters because a ceasefire is a suspension of arms, not a peace treaty and not a legal finding that international humanitarian law is now respected. Every strike after 10 October 2025 is judged under the same rules as before: distinction, proportionality, precaution, and the prohibition of collective punishment. The fact that the overall intensity fell does not immunize any specific operation. It means each post-ceasefire killing must still be examined as a potentially unlawful killing, a potential war crime, or a lawful act of self-defence depending on facts that only serious investigation can establish. The figure of 1,400 dead since the ceasefire, even allowing for the absence of published militant-versus-civilian breakdowns in the Gaza health ministry count, signals that the protection of civilians has not been restored to any normal standard.
The humanitarian picture sharpens the point. The Trump plan stipulated a minimum of 600 trucks a day of humanitarian and commercial supplies. Reuters cites August 2026 data from the global hunger watchdog IPC showing an average of 227 trucks a day from the ceasefire to the end of May 2026, less than half the stipulated minimum, with more than 1.2 million people still facing acute hunger despite a scale-up of aid. Israel states around 600 trucks now enter daily and that Gaza receives enough goods, while aid agencies respond that essential items including metal tent poles, engine oil and spare parts are blocked as potentially dual-use. For international lawyers, obstruction of humanitarian relief is not a secondary logistical detail. Wilful impediment of relief supplies, destruction of objects indispensable to civilian survival, and forced displacement engage war-crimes provisions defined in French law by article 461-1 of the Criminal Code, which provides that war crimes and war delicts are offences committed during an international or non-international armed conflict in connection with that conflict, in violation of the laws and customs of war or the international conventions applicable to armed conflicts, against the persons or property protected by the statute. Starvation as a method of warfare, attacks on humanitarian personnel, and forcible transfer belong to that protected core. The French text uses the exact formula: “en violation des lois et coutumes de la guerre ou des conventions internationales applicables aux conflits armés”. A ceasefire that leaves 1.2 million people acutely hungry does not satisfy the obligation to allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of relief. It documents its breach.
The displacement debate adds a further legal layer. Reuters notes that while the Trump plan promises to encourage people to stay in Gaza, Israeli right-wing politicians stepped up calls for mass removal through so-called voluntary emigration, with Defence Minister Israel Katz cited in September 2026 as seeing no real solution without this migration, and a defence ministry office established in 2025 to oversee voluntary emigration after earlier suggestions by Trump that Gazans could be permanently displaced, an idea Trump later backed away from amid Arab and international rejection. In law, there is no voluntary departure when the alternative is bombardment, siege and hunger. Deportation or forcible transfer of population is listed as a crime against humanity under French law where committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack, as article 212-1 of the Criminal Code punishes “La déportation ou le transfert forcé de population” with life imprisonment when committed “en exécution d’un plan concerté à l’encontre d’un groupe de population civile dans le cadre d’une attaque généralisée ou systématique”. The French wording matters because it tracks the Rome Statute while adding autonomous French scope. Any organized policy of removal from Gaza, however labelled, would be tested against that definition, not against its marketing name. The one-year record therefore reads as a partial humanitarian success overshadowed by continuing violations: hostages home, full-scale bombardment paused, but civilians still killed, still hungry, still displaced, and still exposed to transfer rhetoric that international criminal law watches closely.
B. Yellow line, disarmament deadlock and paper governance: why phases two and three never arrived?
The territorial story explains much of the stalemate. The initial phase foresaw Israel withdrawing to a yellow line leaving troops in control of 53 percent of Gaza. Since then Reuters reports in its one-year assessment of 6 October 2026 the military expanded effective control to around two-thirds of the territory, a finding consistent with Israeli maps published in April 2026 outlining an expanded zone of military control. Within that zone, Israel-backed militias operate against Hamas-held areas, which both fragments security and multiplies the chains of responsibility. Later phases of the 20-point plan foresaw Hamas disarming and new governance by a Palestinian body overseen by a Trump-led Board of Peace, with gradual Israeli withdrawal handing territory to a temporary International Stabilization Force working with a new Palestinian security force. None of that sequence occurred. Trump announced that Hamas and other militants had accepted a 15-point roadmap drawn up by the Board of Peace to give up arms, calling it historic, with Israeli forces to withdraw as Hamas disarmed. Hamas said it had agreed to hand over weapons to be stored under control of a United States-backed Palestinian technocratic government, rejecting the word disarmament. Israel, skeptical Hamas will ever disarm, called the plan unacceptable and refused any withdrawal until full disarmament. With an Israeli general election scheduled for 27 October 2026, the first since the 7 October 2023 attack, and polls showing a tight race between pro- and anti-Netanyahu blocs, no Israeli government had an incentive to concede sequencing before the vote.
This deadlock is legally significant because disarmament and withdrawal were drafted as reciprocal steps without an agreed verification mechanism, timeline or enforcement authority. The United Nations Security Council authorized an International Stabilization Force in Resolution 2803, and the United Nations press release on the Resolution 2803 vote together with the 2026 implementation reporting on Resolution 2803 describe a mandate to secure Gaza alongside a new Palestinian force, but the Force has no agreed area to secure while the yellow line moves in the wrong direction and no agreed counterpart to receive territory while governance remains split between Hamas administration, Israeli military control, allied militias and an unformed technocratic body. International lawyers recognize the pattern from other conflicts: a stabilization force without a status-of-forces agreement, without rules of engagement matched to a real map, and without a civilian administration to support becomes a label rather than a lever. The Reuters one-year piece therefore correctly treats the ISF as stalled rather than deployed. For readers who followed this desk’s earlier analysis of the Stabilization Force mandate under Resolution 2803, available at the firm’s earlier guide to the Gaza Stabilization Force mandate, the update is that the mandate survived on paper while the conditions for its exercise deteriorated on the ground.
The governance vacuum has concrete consequences for civilians seeking remedies. When control is divided among four actors, each denies responsibility for detentions, for aid diversion, for rubble clearance, for identification of remains of the 28 dead hostages whose bodies were to be recovered from rubble, and for investigation of the 1,400 post-ceasefire deaths. Hamas officials insisted recovery of bodies would take longer given destruction. Israel dialled down but never halted strikes at Trump’s behest. The Board of Peace issues roadmaps that one party rejects in substance while accepting in vocabulary. In such fragmentation, the applicable legal strategy is to anchor claims to the actor exercising effective control over the place and time of each violation, under the law of occupation and the law of non-international armed conflict as appropriate, rather than to grand labels about who rules Gaza. Effective control is a factual test, not a proclamation. The expansion from 53 percent to two-thirds control, documented by maps and reporting rather than by decree, increases the range of incidents for which the controlling force bears obligations as the power in effective control, including ensuring public order, allowing relief, and investigating deaths. The disarmament dispute does not suspend those obligations. A force that controls territory must protect its population even while it negotiates with its adversary about weapons. That is the part of the one-year record most often missed in political commentary and most central to litigation.
II. What international and French law still require while the truce holds
A. Arrest warrants do not expire with a ceasefire: what should happen with ICC cases and ICJ proceedings?
The International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants on 21 November 2024 for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defence Minister Yoav Gallant alongside warrants concerning Hamas leadership, as reported by United Nations News on 21 November 2024, and the Court’s defendant pages confirm the warrants remain listed as outstanding, including the public case page for Netanyahu. The charges as authorized concern crimes against humanity and war crimes including murder, persecution and starvation-related conduct, and Israel’s challenges to jurisdiction were rejected at the pre-trial stage, as recorded in the Court’s decision rejecting jurisdictional challenges. A ceasefire, even one holding for a year, has no effect on those warrants. Warrants are judicial orders. Only the judges who issued them can withdraw or vary them, and only surrender, trial and judgment can exhaust them. States Parties to the Rome Statute remain under an obligation to arrest and surrender persons subject to warrants found on their territory, and to cooperate with the Court. Travel planning by wanted persons must therefore still account for transit and overflight risks, and third states including France must still treat any presence as triggering cooperation duties rather than diplomatic discretion. The one-year anniversary changes the political calendar with the Israeli election of 27 October 2026. It changes nothing in the judicial calendar in The Hague.
The same persistence applies to state responsibility before the International Court of Justice. South Africa’s genocide-convention case against Israel (ICJ case 192), with multiple intervening states, and related advisory proceedings on occupation and on humanitarian obligations continue on their own procedural timetable regardless of whether rockets fly on a given week. Provisional measures ordered by the Court concerning humanitarian access, prevention of genocidal acts, and preservation of evidence remain binding while in force. A ceasefire that delivers 227 trucks a day instead of 600, that leaves 1.2 million people acutely hungry, and that coincides with continued strikes killing 1,400 people in a year is evidence to be placed before the Court, not an argument that the cases became moot. In French domestic law, the definitions that mirror these international prohibitions are written in exact terms that practitioners should quote precisely. Article 211-1 of the Criminal Code defines genocide as acting “en exécution d’un plan concerté tendant à la destruction totale ou partielle d’un groupe national, ethnique, racial ou religieux, ou d’un groupe déterminé à partir de tout autre critère arbitraire”, by committing against members of the group wilful killing, grave attacks on physical or mental integrity, subjection to conditions of existence likely to bring about total or partial destruction of the group, measures to prevent births, or forcible transfer of children, punished by life imprisonment. Article 212-1 of the Criminal Code separately punishes as a crime against humanity any of eleven listed acts “commis en exécution d’un plan concerté à l’encontre d’un groupe de population civile dans le cadre d’une attaque généralisée ou systématique”, including wilful killing, extermination, deportation or forcible transfer, torture, sexual violence, persecution and enforced disappearance. These French definitions are the gateway for domestic prosecution where international courts cannot immediately act, and they do not require the conflict to be ongoing. They require a concerted plan, a protected group or civilian population, and listed acts. The Reuters one-year factual record, casualty counts, hunger data, truck counts, territorial expansion maps, and official statements on emigration, is precisely the kind of material that investigators test against those elements.
Three misunderstandings must be corrected because they circulate widely one year on. First, the hostage-prisoner exchange does not extinguish criminal liability for hostage-taking, torture or inhuman treatment during captivity, nor for ill-treatment of Palestinian detainees. Release ends the ongoing offence but preserves the completed offences for prosecution, with testimony of freed hostages and freed detainees forming core evidence. Second, the partial withdrawal to and subsequent expansion beyond the yellow line does not create a new legal border. It creates a factual line of effective control relevant to occupation law and to attribution, but it does not annex territory, does not legalize settlements, and does not transfer sovereignty. Third, the Board of Peace and ISF labels do not confer immunity on any actor. International personnel enjoy only the immunities of their specific mandate and status agreements, and no political roadmap can amnesty genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes, which French law punishes with life imprisonment and which international law treats as non-amnestiable. Readers searching whether the Gaza ceasefire ended ICC cases or whether the Trump plan cancelled the warrants should understand the answer is negative in both instances. The warrants stand, the Court cases proceed, and the ceasefire is at most a contextual fact about gravity, cooperation and sentencing, never a jurisdictional bar.
B. French courts after the hostages came home: how can victims and families still act from Paris?
France has concrete hooks that an international reader may underestimate. French criminal law applies to any felony committed by a French national abroad, and to misdemeanours carrying imprisonment committed by French nationals abroad where also punishable locally, while it also applies to any felony and any imprisonable misdemeanour committed abroad by a French or foreign perpetrator where the victim was French at the time. The exact French rules are worth reading literally. Article 113-6 of the Criminal Code states “La loi pénale française est applicable à tout crime commis par un Français hors du territoire de la République”, and article 113-7 of the Criminal Code adds “La loi pénale française est applicable à tout crime, ainsi qu’à tout délit puni d’emprisonnement, commis par un Français ou par un étranger hors du territoire de la République lorsque la victime est de nationalité française au moment de l’infraction”. Several French nationals were among those killed on 7 October 2023 and among hostages held in Gaza, and French-Palestinian families in Gaza suffered killings, injuries and destruction. For those files, articles 113-6 and 113-7 open French investigations on active personality and passive personality grounds without waiting for any international tribunal, for murder, kidnapping, hostage-taking, torture and related offences, with civil-party constitution allowing families to join the proceedings, be heard, request investigative acts and seek damages at trial.
Beyond French victims, France incorporated a universal-jurisdiction mechanism for the most serious international crimes. Article 689 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that perpetrators or accomplices of offences committed outside France may be prosecuted and tried by French courts either where French law applies or where an international convention or European Union act gives French courts jurisdiction. For genocide, other crimes against humanity and war crimes as defined in the Criminal Code, article 689-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure allows French prosecution of any person suspected of having committed such crimes abroad where the suspect has habitual residence in France, defined as a sufficient link assessed notably on duration of presence, conditions and reasons for presence, manifested will to settle or remain, and family, social, material or professional ties, with the exact statutory test reading “celle-ci se définissant par un lien de rattachement suffisant avec la France”. Prosecution under this head can only be brought at the request of the anti-terrorism prosecutor and where no international or national court seeks surrender or extradition, the prosecutor verifying absence of International Criminal Court proceedings and of competing surrender or extradition requests, with the precise condition that “si aucune juridiction internationale ou nationale ne demande la remise ou l’extradition de la personne”. In practice, this means Paris can act against suspects who settle in France, including dual nationals, residents, or visitors whose presence becomes habitual, while deferring where The Hague or another competent court claims the person. Complaints with civil-party constitution, reports to the anti-terrorism prosecutor, and preservation of evidence from Gaza, hospitals, morgues, satellite imagery, truck manifests and official statements all feed that channel. The one-year mark is procedurally relevant because memories fade, phone data is lost, and residence links evolve, so filing and evidence preservation should not wait for the political process to conclude.
Two further French levers deserve attention from an international audience. First, extradition and surrender. France does not extradite its own nationals, bars extradition for political offences, for offences committed on French soil, for cases already finally judged in France, and where limitation has run, under article 696-4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, whose first paragraph states “L’extradition n’est pas accordée : 1° Lorsque la personne réclamée a la nationalité française”. Persons sought for Gaza-related crimes who reach France therefore face a differentiated regime: French nationals will be judged in France rather than surrendered, while foreign nationals may face extradition subject to human-rights bars including the European Court of Human Rights prohibition on removal risking torture, inhuman treatment or flagrantly unfair trial, and to International Criminal Court primacy where the Court seeks surrender. Second, protection. Gazans and others fleeing persecution who reach France may seek refugee status where they meet the Geneva Convention definition, as article L. 511-1 of the Code on Entry and Stay of Foreigners and Asylum recognizes refugee quality for any person meeting the 1951 Geneva Convention definition, with the exact phrase “A toute personne qui répond aux définitions de l’article 1er de la convention de Genève du 28 juillet 1951 relative au statut des réfugiés”. Exclusion clauses for war criminals and procedural bars for security threats apply, but the baseline is that civilians fleeing bombardment, hunger and persecution are protection holders, not security suspects. France’s practice in terrorist and war-crimes files is to separate the protection track from the prosecution track: protect the civilian, investigate the suspect, and never confuse the two. Families in Paris and Ile-de-France assisting relatives from Gaza should organize files accordingly, with identity, nationality and victim-status evidence for French-victim complaints on one side, and Geneva-based protection evidence on the other.
Practically, what should victims, journalists and nongovernmental organizations do now that the ceasefire is one year old. Preserve evidence as if trial were tomorrow: medical certificates describing injuries with dates, death certificates, lists of detainees with transfer dates, photographs of rubble and of remains with metadata, truck and aid manifests, official statements on withdrawal lines and on emigration policy, and full chains of custody for videos. File in the right forum without double-filing inconsistently: French complaint for French victims under articles 113-6 and 113-7, report to the anti-terrorism prosecutor for universal-jurisdiction suspects present in France under article 689-11, communication to the International Criminal Court for crimes within its situation, and applications to the European Court of Human Rights only after understanding admissibility and interim-measures thresholds. Track the ISF and Board of Peace paper trail because mandates, maps and rules of engagement will determine attribution for the next incident. And calendar the Israeli election of 27 October 2026 for what it is: a political event that may accelerate or freeze negotiations, but that neither lifts warrants nor closes investigations. The law moves slower than the news cycle and outlasts it.
Conclusion
One year after the 10 October 2025 ceasefire, the Trump plan has delivered its most human promise and missed almost every other: the living hostages are home, hundreds of Palestinian detainees were freed, full-scale war did not resume, yet 1,400 more Palestinians were killed, Israeli control expanded from 53 percent to two-thirds of Gaza, aid runs at a fraction of the promised 600 trucks a day, 1.2 million people face acute hunger, Hamas keeps its weapons, the Stabilization Force waits for a map and a mandate it can actually exercise, and talk of removal persists at the margins of Israeli politics. None of that ambiguity suspends the law. Arrest warrants issued on 21 November 2024 remain enforceable, International Court of Justice proceedings continue, war-crimes definitions in articles 461-1, 211-1 and 212-1 still classify the same facts, and French courts remain open to French victims under articles 113-6 and 113-7, to universal-jurisdiction cases under articles 689 and 689-11 where suspects reside in France, to extradition litigation under article 696-4, and to refugee protection under article L. 511-1. A ceasefire is a chance to stop killing, to feed civilians, to identify the dead, and to let investigators work. It is not an eraser. The year ahead will test whether the parties use the pause the first phase bought to complete the exchange of the dead, to open the roads to 600 trucks, to agree a verifiable disarmament and withdrawal sequence, to stand up a civilian administration, and to cooperate with courts rather than denounce them. Until then, the task for lawyers, journalists and families is the same: document each strike, each convoy, each statement and each transfer, file in the forum that has jurisdiction, and keep the record intact for the trials and judgments that a truce can postpone but never replace.