Europe paid around €7.88 billion for Russian Arctic liquefied natural gas in the first nine months of 2026, a record 12.18 million tonnes reaching European ports between January and September, according to figures compiled by the campaign group Urgewald from Kpler market data and reported by Euronews on 9 October 2026. France received nearly three-quarters of September’s European deliveries at the Dunkirk and Montoir terminals. Ten days earlier, on 30 June 2026, the Paris economic activities court ordered a Singapore shipper of Russian LNG to pay more than €20 million in unpaid terminal fees to a French terminal operator, rejecting the argument that European sanctions excused payment. The two events belong to the same story: Russian gas still flows into Europe through French ports under contracts signed long before the sanctions, while the legal framework around those flows tightens every quarter and the European Union’s full ban on Russian LNG takes effect on 1 January 2027.
According to the published judgment of the Tribunal des activités économiques de Paris of 30 June 2026 (RG 2025094070), the French operator Elengy Hub & Expertise sought payment of thirteen monthly invoices issued between May 2025 and May 2026 under a 23-year transshipment contract concluded on 2 June 2015, and the Singapore company Novatek Gas & Power Asia Pte. Ltd. refused to pay from April 2025 onwards, arguing that the European Union’s 14th sanctions package made performance impossible. The court dismissed the force majeure defence, held that transshipment of Russian LNG remained possible until the end of 2026 subject to authorisation by the competent authority, and ordered payment of each invoice with interest at Euribor plus two points, plus €60,000 under article 700 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The judgment was given at first instance and remains subject to the ordinary avenues of appeal. The developments that follow are general in scope: they describe the verification steps useful in any comparable situation and do not describe the situation of Elengy or Novatek, about which this article makes no finding.
I. Why the Paris court refused to treat European sanctions as a blank cheque for non-payment
A. How a French terminal became the gateway for Russian Arctic gas and what the 14th package actually banned
Ship-to-ship transshipment is the quiet hinge of the Arctic gas trade. Ice-class tankers load liquefied gas at the Yamal peninsula above the Arctic Circle, sail to a European terminal, and transfer their cargo directly to conventional carriers without intermediate storage, so that the expensive ice-breaking vessels turn around quickly instead of sailing all the way to the final customer. The contract at the heart of the Paris dispute, concluded on 2 June 2015 between the French operator and a Swiss predecessor of the Singapore shipper and later transferred to the current parties with effect in 2016 and 2018, reserved thirty-three transshipment slots per year at the Montoir terminal for twenty-three years starting with the first operations in 2018, against a monthly minimum payment of about €1.5 million even if the slots went unused. The judgment records that the French company is a wholly owned subsidiary of an operator that has designed and run three French LNG terminals for more than sixty years, and that the shipper belongs to a Russian gas group that entered the world gas market in 2012 with the Yamal LNG project. That architecture — a decades-long reservation of French port capacity paid for whether used or not — is standard in the terminal-use agreements that underpin every major European LNG import route, and it explains why the sums at stake, about €1.55 million per monthly invoice, look disproportionate to any gas actually handled in a given month.
On 24 June 2024 the Council of the European Union adopted Regulation (EU) 2024/1745, the 14th sanctions package, which amended Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 to prohibit reloading services for the transshipment of Russian LNG on EU territory with effect from 26 March 2025. The prohibition is real and directly effective, but it was never drafted as an absolute wall. Article 3s — article 3 novodecies — of Regulation 833/2014 provides, in the wording quoted by the Paris court, that “les autorités compétentes peuvent autoriser les services de rechargement aux fins d’opérations de transbordement de gaz naturel liquéfié relevant du code NC 2711 11 00, originaire de Russie ou exporté de Russie, si un tel rechargement est nécessaire à son transport vers un État membre et si cet État membre a confirmé que le transbordement sert à assurer l’approvisionnement énergétique dans ledit État membre”. In France the competent authority is the Directorate General of the Treasury, and the Commission’s published guidance confirms that a Member State may grant one operator an authorisation covering a series of similar transshipment operations over a set period, weekly or quarterly, under the applicable derogation: a single authorisation granted to a specific operator and covering a run of similar or identical transshipment operations over a defined period, as the court summarised the Commission guidance. The Paris court added, on the basis of the parties’ own agreement, that transshipment to another French port requires no prior authorisation at all, and that only operations sending the gas onward to a non-EU state fall outside the derogation entirely. The regulatory picture that emerges is therefore a two-lane system: licensed continuity for gas genuinely destined for EU Member States until the end of 2026, and a hard stop for re-export beyond the Union, followed by what the court described, without contradiction from either side, as an absolute prohibition from 1 January 2027.
The commercial data published on 9 October 2026 fits that legal picture exactly. Urgewald’s figures show September 2026 deliveries of 792,440 tonnes, slightly above the previous year, despite a ban on short-term contract imports in force since 25 April 2026; Yamal deliveries to EU ports up 9.5% year on year, with EU ports absorbing 85% of the project’s recorded shipments; and France taking the dominant share of September arrivals. The EU Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators, cited in the Paris judgment, reported that gas from the Yamal plant transported in particular by the sanctioned group’s vessels represented most Russian LNG imported into the EU in 2024 and 2025. None of this means the sanctions are decorative: it means they were designed as a phased strangulation — first the re-export business, then short-term contracts, then everything — and that during the transition the gas keeps flowing through the authorised lane while the revenue keeps funding the Russian war effort, which is precisely the contradiction the German campaigners want the 22nd sanctions package to resolve by targeting the specialised Arc7 ice-class tanker fleet without which Arctic exports cannot move.
B. When sanctions excuse a debtor and when they do not: irresistibility, foreseeability and the burden of proof
French courts accept that a European embargo can constitute force majeure, but they apply the statutory test of article 1218 of the Civil Code without indulgence: “Il y a force majeure en matière contractuelle lorsqu’un événement échappant au contrôle du débiteur, qui ne pouvait être raisonnablement prévu lors de la conclusion du contrat et dont les effets ne peuvent être évités par des mesures appropriées, empêche l’exécution de son obligation par le débiteur.” The same article adds the decisive follow-up for temporary disruption: “Si l’empêchement est temporaire, l’exécution de l’obligation est suspendue à moins que le retard qui en résulterait ne justifie la résolution du contrat. Si l’empêchement est définitif, le contrat est résolu de plein droit et les parties sont libérées de leurs obligations dans les conditions prévues aux articles 1351 et 1351-1”. Three cumulative conditions — an event beyond the debtor’s control, unforeseeable at signature, unavoidable despite appropriate measures — plus a proven impossibility of performing the specific obligation, not a mere increase in cost or inconvenience. A party that invokes hardship rather than impossibility belongs in a different room: article 1195 of the Civil Code provides that “Si un changement de circonstances imprévisible lors de la conclusion du contrat rend l’exécution excessivement onéreuse pour une partie qui n’avait pas accepté d’en assumer le risque, celle-ci peut demander une renégociation du contrat à son cocontractant”, with performance continuing during renegotiation — a route that preserves the contract rather than suspending payment.
The 2015 transshipment contract layered a contractual definition on top of the statute. Its clause 20.6 states, as recorded by the court, that force-majeure events include acts of a governmental authority, or compliance with such acts, directly affecting the ability of the operator to perform its obligations under the contract, or any compliance issue with an embargo rule issued by France, the European Union, Russia, Switzerland or the United States, as the court recorded the clause. Article 20 added that only an event that cannot be overcome despite the reasonable efforts of a party acting as a prudent and reasonable operator qualifies, and article 7.3.1 set the payment mechanics, namely that the shipper owes a monthly minimum payment for the subscribed transshipment capacity, equal to the service tariff multiplied by the capacity for the month concerned, reduced only where unused slots result, among other cases, from the occurrence of a force-majeure event affecting the operator. Every word of that drafting mattered at trial. The clause protects the operator against governmental acts that directly affect its own capacity to perform; it does not protect the shipper against the commercial consequences of sanctions on its own supply chain, and it expressly demands reasonable efforts to overcome the obstacle — including, in a licensing regime, asking for the licence.
That is where the defence collapsed, on facts rather than on principle. The court found that the shipper’s slot requests had been declining since 2022 — twenty in 2022, fifteen in 2023, six in 2024 — and had stopped entirely in July 2024, eight months before the transshipment ban took effect on 26 March 2025, while monthly minimum payments continued until March 2025 and stopped only in April. The French Treasury had stated in August 2024 that cargo owners were the parties expected to request the transshipment authorisation, yet the court found no evidence that any request had ever been filed, and it recalled that only the shipper controlled the information an application requires: loading needs, provisional dates, and above all the final destination of each cargo, the intermediary operator having no visibility on where the gas goes next. Because the debtor bears the burden of proving that the creditor was prevented from performing, and because transshipment for EU final consumption remained licensable until the end of 2026, the court concluded that no impossibility had been demonstrated and set the defence aside. A parallel argument based on a staff strike at the terminal in October and November 2025 failed for the same evidentiary reason: the stoppage was shown to have delayed unloading operations only, not transshipment, and the party invoking it did not prove otherwise. The lesson for any operator or cargo interest drafting or litigating under a sanctions-era clause is therefore concrete: calendar the exact date performance allegedly became impossible, file the authorisation request early even if its outcome looks uncertain, keep the paper trail of every slot nomination and every refusal, and expect a French court to treat a pre-existing commercial disengagement — months of unused capacity before the ban — as powerful evidence that the sanctions did not cause the non-performance.
II. What the 1 January 2027 cut-off changes for every contract still running through France
A. From authorised lane to full prohibition: the phase-out calendar and the contracts caught in it
The Paris judgment belongs to the middle chapter of a phase-out written in three successive layers. The first layer, the 14th package of June 2024, killed the re-export model — Russian LNG reloaded in the EU for buyers outside the Union — while preserving, under Treasury authorisation, transshipment genuinely feeding EU consumption. The second layer arrived with the 19th package adopted in October 2025, alongside which the co-legislators aligned the end of eligible long-term LNG contracts on 1 January 2027. The third layer is the phase-out regulation agreed by EU co-legislators in December 2025: no Russian LNG or pipeline gas entering the bloc by the end of 2027, with the ban applying to short-term supply contracts concluded before 17 June 2025 from 25 April 2026 for LNG and 17 June 2026 for pipeline gas, to long-term LNG contracts from 1 January 2027, and to long-term pipeline contracts from 30 September 2027, extendable to 1 November 2027 depending on storage levels — with narrowly drawn treatment for landlocked states, which Hungary and Slovakia announced they would challenge once the law is adopted, according to Euronews. The 21st package followed in the summer of 2026, and campaigners are now pressing the forthcoming 22nd package to close the remaining physical loophole: the Arc7 ice-class fleet that makes Arctic loadings possible at all. Each step narrows the authorised lane the Paris court described, until the lane disappears.
For contracts performed through French terminals, the practical consequence is a diary with three dates already past or imminent. Any delivery under a short-term arrangement after 25 April 2026 needed a clean legal basis the moment it crossed a French flange; any long-term LNG volume must be wound down by 1 January 2027; and any take-or-pay or ship-or-pay commitment extending beyond that date must be renegotiated, assigned, or litigated now, because French courts will not rewrite the economics afterwards. The Paris ruling shows exactly how judges will read the file: they will ask when nominations stopped, who applied for which authorisation and when, what the contract’s minimum-payment clause says about unused slots, and whether the party claiming impossibility can produce the refusal letter rather than an assumption that refusal was certain. Parties should therefore audit four things before the end of the year. First, the sanctions clause itself — does it, like clause 20.6 of the 2015 contract, cover embargoes of five different jurisdictions, and does it demand reasonable efforts including licence applications. Second, the payment architecture — minimum monthly fees survive unused capacity unless a defined force majeure event affecting the operator is proven, and late payment carries contractual interest, in this case Euribor plus two points, on top of the statutory late-payment discipline of article L. 441-10 of the Commercial Code, which provides that “Sauf dispositions contraires figurant aux conditions de vente ou convenues entre les parties, le délai de règlement des sommes dues ne peut dépasser trente jours après la date de réception des marchandises ou d’exécution de la prestation demandée.” Third, the forum — the Paris court sat because article 35 of the contract assigned it jurisdiction, a reminder that terminal-use agreements pointing to Paris will be tested in Paris under French procedural tools, including the €60,000 awarded under article 700 of the Code of Civil Procedure, under which “Le juge condamne la partie tenue aux dépens ou qui perd son procès à payer : 1° A l’autre partie la somme qu’il détermine, au titre des frais exposés et non compris dans les dépens”. Fourth, the endgame — hardship renegotiation under article 1195 of the Civil Code remains available where performance has become excessively onerous without becoming impossible, but it requires continuing to perform while talking, the opposite reflex to stopping payment. Companies that spent 2025 assuming the authorisation lane would carry them into 2027 now face a hard stop measured in weeks, and the files that will survive judicial scrutiny are the ones documenting, month by month, what was requested, from whom, and with what answer.
B. Frozen money, seized cargoes and the American shadow: getting paid and shipping safely through the transition
While terminal fees are litigated in Paris, the money itself moves through banks that have their own sanctions duties, and the cargoes sit in ports where creditors may try to seize them. France operates a double freeze system. At national level, article L. 562-2 of the Monetary and Financial Code provides that “Le ministre chargé de l’économie et le ministre de l’intérieur peuvent décider, conjointement, pour une durée de six mois, renouvelable, le gel des fonds et ressources économiques” belonging to persons involved in terrorism, and article L. 562-3 of the same Code gives the economy minister a parallel power to order that “Le ministre chargé de l’économie peut décider, pour une durée de six mois, renouvelable, le gel des fonds et ressources économiques” in further defined cases, with definitions set by article L. 562-1. Alongside it, European freezing regulations apply directly, and every bank in the chain must run customer and beneficial-owner checks before touching a transaction: article L. 561-5 of the Monetary and Financial Code requires that “Avant d’entrer en relation d’affaires avec leur client ou de l’assister dans la préparation ou la réalisation d’une transaction, les personnes mentionnées à l’article L. 561-2 : 1° Identifient leur client et, le cas échéant, le bénéficiaire effectif au sens de l’article L. 561-2-2 ; 2° Vérifient ces éléments d’identification sur présentation de tout document écrit à caractère probant.” A payment for an LNG cargo whose ownership chain passes near a listed person can therefore be frozen mid-wire even where the underlying gas sale is perfectly lawful, and unfreezing it means an application to the Treasury, not a phone call to the bank. The procedure for contesting a listing itself before the EU courts is a separate discipline, explained in this firm’s guide on how to challenge an EU listing or a frozen account from France.
Two recent Cour de cassation rulings show how unforgiving the frozen-asset regime is in French enforcement proceedings. On 5 February 2026 the Second Civil Chamber rejected an attempt to enforce an arbitral award against the Libyan Investment Authority by attaching funds held at Société Générale in Paris (Cass. 2e civ., 5 Feb. 2026, No 23-15.936), holding that “que ne peut être diligentée, sur des fonds ou des ressources économiques gelés, aucune mesure d’exécution qui aurait pour effet, non seulement de les faire sortir du patrimoine du débiteur, mais aussi de conférer au créancier poursuivant un simple droit de préférence, sans une autorisation préalable du directeur du Trésor, autorité nationale désignée en application de l’article 11, § 2, du règlement” — here Regulation (EU) 2016/44 on Libya — and that “à défaut d’autorisation préalable du directeur du Trésor, aucune mesure de saisie-attribution, laquelle emporte, à concurrence des sommes pour lesquelles elle est pratiquée, attribution immédiate au profit du saisissant de la créance saisie disponible entre les mains du tiers et de ses accessoires, ne peut être autorisée ou validée par le juge de l’exécution”. The court added that the 2016 Sapin 2 requirement of prior judicial authorisation for enforcement against foreign states does not replace the Treasury’s administrative authorisation, because the primacy of EU law means the administrative green light must come first. Six years earlier, the Assemblée plénière had already sent the same structural question to Luxembourg in the Bank Sepah litigation over Iranian frozen assets (Cass., Ass. plén., 10 July 2020, Nos 18-18.542 and 18-21.814), asking whether the EU freezing regulations must be read as opposing, without prior authorisation from the national competent authority, even a non-allocative measure such as a judicial security or a conservatory attachment under the French enforcement code: “doivent-ils être interprétés en ce sens qu’ils s’opposent à ce que soit diligentée sur des avoirs gelés, sans autorisation préalable de l’autorité nationale compétente, une mesure dépourvue d’effet attributif, telle une sûreté judiciaire ou une saisie conservatoire, prévues par le code des procédures civiles d’exécution français ?” Any creditor tempted to arrest an LNG cargo or attach a gas payment in a French port should read those two rulings twice: freeze first, Treasury second, judge third, in that order, or the measure fails.
The criminal background is hardening at the same time. Directive (EU) 2024/1226 requires Member States to criminalise the violation of EU restrictive measures, turning what used to be principally a regulatory and contractual risk into potential criminal exposure for the individuals who sign off on a prohibited transfer. And the American dimension hangs over every European gas deal: according to Euronews, Washington recently announced the Lindsey Graham Act, giving the United States power to sanction Russian LNG deliveries to Europe even before the EU import ban takes effect, at a moment when European storage sits at record lows and the bloc faces a possible gas shortfall of up to 15% if a severe winter hits. European operators caught between a US prohibition and an EU permission have one shield expressly designed for that dilemma, Council Regulation (EC) No 2271/96, the Blocking Statute, which neutralises specified foreign extraterritorial measures inside the Union — but the shield must be invoked properly, documented, and coordinated with the contract’s own multi-jurisdiction embargo clause, not assumed. The files that cross the 1 January 2027 threshold cleanly will be those whose owners mapped, this autumn, every payment route, every flag, every insurer and every bank against three overlapping grids — the EU prohibition, the French authorisation procedure, and the reachable arm of US secondary sanctions — and filed the paperwork for each grid before the gas moves.
Conclusion
The Paris terminal judgment and the €7.9 billion import tally tell a single story about the end of an era. Until 31 December 2026, Russian LNG can still lawfully enter the Union through the authorised lane, provided the Treasury route is used and the contract paperwork supports it; courts will enforce minimum-payment commitments against buyers who stopped nominating cargoes without proving impossibility, and they will protect frozen assets against creditors who skip the Treasury queue. From 1 January 2027 the lane closes, long-term LNG contracts fall under the ban, and the dispute moves from authorisation strategy to exit strategy — renegotiation, assignment, or litigation over who bears the cost of a prohibition both sides saw coming for two years. Operators, shippers, lenders and cargo interests with volumes still scheduled through French terminals should treat the remaining weeks as a closing window: confirm the final eligible delivery dates in writing, secure Treasury authorisations covering the last authorised quarter, align banking chains with the freeze regulations, and put the post-ban economics of every take-or-pay clause on the negotiating table now. The courts have shown they will read the file exactly as written; the task is to make sure the file, when read, tells the story its owner intended.