On 30 September 2026, the General Court of the European Union annulled two sets of EU sanctions relistings against Vladimir Avetisyan, a businessman first listed in June 2024 for his role at the top of a Russian management company serving the electronics supply chain. The judgment, Avetisyan v Council, Case T-323/25, wipes out the March 2025 and September 2025 acts that kept his name on the EU restrictive-measures lists, and it does so on grounds that matter far beyond one file: stale evidence, a reversed burden of proof, and a periodic review deprived of any practical effect. The paradox is immediate. According to specialist sanctions press, Mr Avetisyan remains sanctioned today under later acts, so a clear courtroom victory has not reopened a single bank account on its own. The timing sharpens the lesson. On 7 October 2026 EU ambassadors cleared the largest single expansion of the Russia sanctions regime since 2022, targeting 743 individuals and 826 entities, with formal approval by foreign ministers expected in Luxembourg on Monday 12 October 2026. The analysis below is general in scope: it describes the checks and remedies available in any comparable situation and states no finding about Mr Avetisyan’s personal situation, on which this article makes no assessment. It explains why the Council lost, what a freeze means in practice for funds held in France, and which remedies remain open when a name stays on the list after an annulment.
I. Why the Council lost: two relistings annulled for stale evidence and a reversed burden of proof
The action was brought under Article 263 TFEU against four acts: Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/528 of 14 March 2025 and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/527 of the same day, together the March 2025 acts, then Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/1895 of 12 September 2025 and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1894, the September 2025 acts, all of them maintaining the applicant’s name on the lists annexed to Decision 2014/145/CFSP and Regulation (EU) No 269/2014. The applicant raised a single plea alleging errors of assessment, and the Court upheld it for both waves of relistings. The operative part annuls the four acts insofar as they maintained his name on the lists of persons, entities and bodies subject to the restrictive measures, while the remainder of the action was dismissed and each party was ordered to bear its own costs. That costs order already signals a split outcome: a full win on the annulment, a defeat on the accompanying damages claim, examined below.
A. How to challenge an EU sanctions listing from France when the Council works from a frozen file
The story of the March 2025 acts is the story of a file that stopped moving while the listed person’s life moved on. Mr Avetisyan had been added to the lists on 24 June 2024, by Decision (CFSP) 2024/1738 and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1746, on the ground that he was the director general and founder of LLC RBA-Management, a Russian management company providing legal, accounting, corporate security and other management services to clients dealing in electronic components, a company managing JSC Compel, described as taking part in electronic-component import schemes and supplying microelectronics of strategic importance to Russian industry. On 6 September 2024 the Council sent him the evidence file known as WK 7807/2024, dated 31 May 2024. On 12 September 2024 his name was maintained for the same reason. Then, by letters of 31 October and 8 November 2024, he filed a request for review: he had resigned from RBA-Management, sold his shares, and cut the ties between RBA-Management and Compel, with documents produced in support. The Council nevertheless maintained his listing in March 2025.
The Court’s answer turns on one established fact: for the March 2025 maintenance, the Council relied exclusively on the WK file, whose documents had all been consulted on 22 February 2024, except one consulted on 16 April 2024, and it produced no new evidence before the Court to support the reason given in March 2025. Against that background, the judgment restates the rule that structures every sanctions challenge brought from Paris, London or anywhere else: the Council must establish that its reason holds, and the listed person is not required to prove a negative. The Court then draws the consequence without ambiguity: by requiring the applicant to show that he had ended any electronics-sector or Compel-linked activity, or to evidence a new occupation, the Council had reversed the burden of proof.
Three corollaries in the reasoning deserve attention from any listed person preparing a review request. First, imperfect evidence is not worthless evidence. The Council objected that resolution No 16 ending the applicant’s duties had been heavily redacted, that the identity of the new manager could not be verified, and that the share-transfer agreement lacked proof of actual payment. The Court accepted that the document contained redactions yet held that it clearly showed the essential point, and it refused to let suspicion alone neutralize the file. Second, leaving a targeted company in order to escape sanctions is not held against the applicant. A resignation designed to leave a sanctions regime that has applied since June 2024 is a lawful step that cannot be held against the applicant, and the Court adds that such conduct may be read as the result of the effectiveness of the restrictive measures themselves. Third, a career history cannot freeze a legal situation. The Council had argued, in substance, that a man who spent his career inside Compel could not credibly walk away from it. The Court rejected that reasoning by reference to its Pumpyanskiy judgment of 29 November 2023, T-734/22, holding that such an assessment would freeze the applicant’s situation and deprive the periodic review exercise of any useful effect. For practitioners, the message for review requests is practical: file early, file complete documents, and expect the Council to prove continued involvement with fresh material rather than career narratives.
B. Former director, past support: why even the rewritten September 2025 reason failed
The September 2025 acts presented the harder test, because the Council had adjusted its reason. The new statement of reasons described Mr Avetisyan as the former director general and founder of RBA-Management, kept the description of the company’s electronics-sector clients and of JSC Compel’s strategic microelectronics supplies, and concluded that by virtue of his position he had been responsible for the company’s acts and was therefore responsible for material support to the Russian government. The Council thus conceded the departure while maintaining the listing on the basis of past functions. The Court annulled these acts too, and the passage is the most quotable part of the judgment for future cases: the Council could not presume, from the mere fact that the applicant had led RBA-Management and answered for its acts, that he still qualified months after leaving as a person giving material support to the Russian government. A past directorship, without more, cannot support a present-tense finding of material support months after the functions ended; anything else would freeze the situation and strip the periodic review, required by Article 6(3) of Decision 2014/145 and Article 14(4) of Regulation No 269/2014, of any useful effect, by analogy with the Shulgin judgment of 6 September 2023, T-364/22.
The reasoning then closes a logical trap of the Council’s own making. The Court recalled that the Council may rely on the same evidence as for a previous maintenance only where the reasons are unchanged and the context has not evolved in a way that makes that evidence obsolete. Here the reason had changed, and by acknowledging that the applicant was no longer responsible for RBA-Management’s acts, the Council had necessarily accepted that the WK evidence portraying the applicant as the head of RBA-Management had become outdated. It followed, the Court held, that the Council had not discharged its burden of showing that the applicant, by virtue of his former functions, was providing material support to the government of the Russian Federation within the meaning of criterion (f) at the date of the September 2025 acts. Arguments about Compel’s central role in alleged fraudulent schemes to import equipment supporting the war in Ukraine could not fill that gap, because they concerned the company, not proof of the applicant’s own current conduct.
Two further points complete the picture of the Luxembourg phase. The Court recalled at the outset that while the Council enjoys a margin of appreciation in assessing whether the legal criteria are met, the EU courts exercise, in principle, a full review of the legality of Union acts, citing its Tokareva judgment of 11 September 2024, T-744/22. And the damages claim, based on Article 340 TFEU for an alleged breach of defence rights in handling the October 2024 review request, failed on causation: the applicant invoked the impossibility of opening a bank account in Armenia, but the Court found no direct link between the alleged procedural breach and that harm, applying the settled three-part test of a sufficiently serious breach of a rule conferring rights on individuals, actual damage, and a direct causal link, as recalled from HTTS v Council, C-123/18 P, of 10 September 2019. Annulment yes, compensation no, and each side bearing its own costs: that is the full balance sheet of 30 September 2026.
II. Winning in Luxembourg does not unfreeze Paris by itself: the French end of the sanctions chain
An annulment judgment from Luxembourg travels fast as a headline and slowly as money. EU restrictive measures under the Russia regime apply directly in every Member State, which means a French bank, insurer or notary does not wait for a French decree to freeze: the EU regulation itself is the freezing order. What happens next, however, is governed in France by French mechanisms, French obliged persons, and French courts for everything the EU judge does not decide. Understanding that split is what turns a judgment like Avetisyan into usable strategy rather than false comfort.
A. Frozen in a French bank after a Luxembourg victory: who must freeze, what is forbidden, and who authorizes what
The starting point in France is the circle of persons bound to apply freezes without delay. Article L. 562-4 of the Monetary and Financial Code provides: “Sont tenus d’appliquer sans délai les mesures de gel et les interdictions de mise à disposition ou d’utilisation prévues au présent chapitre et aux articles L. 712-4 et L. 712-10 et d’en informer immédiatement le ministre chargé de l’économie”. Every bank holding an account, every insurer holding a policy, every professional handling funds must therefore freeze first and notify the Minister for the Economy immediately, with no grace period for commercial negotiation. The prohibitions that follow are drafted in deliberately wide terms. Article L. 562-5 of the same code states: “Il est interdit aux personnes mentionnées à l’article L. 562-4 de mettre à disposition directement ou indirectement, ou d’utiliser des fonds ou ressources économiques au profit des personnes dont les fonds et ressources économiques font l’objet d’une mesure de gel”. And Article L. 562-6 adds the anti-circumvention layer: “Il est interdit aux personnes mentionnées à l’article L. 562-4 de participer, sciemment et volontairement, à des activités ayant pour objet ou pour effet de contourner les mesures prises en vertu du présent chapitre”. In practice, this is why French compliance departments react to a listing within hours, why they also freeze by association where control is suspected, and why informal workarounds, replacement accounts or screened payments routed through third parties expose everyone involved.
Two operational details from the same chapter are regularly overlooked. First, frozen accounts are not sealed against incoming credits: Article L. 562-7 of the Monetary and Financial Code allows funds to be paid into accounts held with the obliged institutions even where frozen, while requiring the crediting institutions to inform the Minister for the Economy without delay. Salary remnants, refunds or counterpart payments can therefore land on a frozen account and stay frozen, a point that matters for anyone mapping what survives a listing. Second, freezes can follow the person into the land registry: Article L. 562-8 of the code allows freezing decisions and prohibitions, including measures implemented under acts adopted pursuant to Article 29 of the Treaty on European Union or Article 75 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, to be published in the land register at the request of the Minister for the Economy. That cross-reference to Articles 29 TEU and 75 TFEU is precisely the legal basis of the EU Russia sanctions, so Paris real estate held directly or through a company is part of the same enforcement surface as the bank account. The definitions in Article L. 562-1 of the code and the national designation power in Article L. 562-2, under which the Ministers for the Economy and for the Interior may jointly order six-month renewable freezes connected with terrorism, complete the domestic architecture, alongside the United Nations track in Article L. 562-3-1, under which funds of persons designated under Chapter VII resolutions are frozen upon publication by the Minister for the Economy.
The decisive French precedent on what a freeze blocks is a Cour de cassation judgment that every creditor and every listed debtor should know. On 7 September 2022, the First Civil Chamber, pourvoi No 19-25.108, Libyan Investment Authority, ruled on enforcement action taken in France against frozen Libyan assets held with banks in Paris. The Court held: “Il en résulte que ne peut être diligentée, sur des fonds ou des ressources économiques gelés, aucune mesure d’exécution qui aurait pour effet, non seulement de les faire sortir du patrimoine du débiteur, mais aussi de conférer au créancier poursuivant un simple droit de préférence, sans une autorisation préalable du directeur du Trésor, autorité nationale désignée en application de l’article 11 § 2 du règlement n° 2016/44”. The official decision is published on the Cour de cassation website. The principle reaches beyond the Libyan file: on frozen funds, even a conservatory advantage such as a preference right requires the prior authorization of the Director of the Treasury, the designated national authority, because anything less would compromise the effectiveness of the restrictive measures. Anyone reading the Avetisyan annulment as an automatic key to a Paris account must therefore reckon with this second lock: until the freeze itself is lifted for the person concerned, the funds stay frozen in France regardless of who won which argument in Luxembourg about a different listing period.
B. Listed in the EU and banked in Paris: the remedies that actually move the needle after an annulment like Avetisyan
The first remedy is the one Mr Avetisyan used: a fresh action for annulment under Article 263 TFEU against the acts currently in force, before the General Court in Luxembourg, within the strict two-month time limit running from publication or notification. Jurisdiction over the validity of EU restrictive measures lies in Luxembourg, not before the French courts, and the Avetisyan reasoning hands future applicants three ready-made arguments: evidence older than the review file cannot carry a relisting, the Council bears the burden of proving current involvement, and a rewritten reason that concedes the departure while presuming continued support months later will not survive the periodic-review test of Article 6(3) of Decision 2014/145 and Article 14(4) of Regulation No 269/2014. A parallel request for interim measures can seek suspension of the freeze pending judgment, though the bar is high and requires urgency plus a prima facie case. A damages action under Articles 268 and 340 TFEU remains theoretically available, but Avetisyan shows how steep the slope is: without a sufficiently serious breach and a direct causal link between the breach and a quantified loss, the claim fails, and costs may be split rather than shifted.
The second track runs in Paris, and it concerns daily life under a freeze rather than the listing itself. Authorization requests for the release of frozen funds, for basic needs, legal fees or other justified purposes, are addressed to the national competent authority, in France the Treasury administration, and any enforcement step by a creditor over frozen assets needs the same prior authorization, as the 2022 Libyan Investment Authority ruling confirms. Banks that freeze must notify the Minister for the Economy, and the account holder should build a documentary record from day one: listing notices, Council correspondence, review requests with complete unredacted evidence, proof of payment for any share transfer, registry extracts showing the current management, and every refusal or silence encountered. The Avetisyan file is a cautionary tale on this point: redacted resolutions, unverified new managers and unproven payments nearly sank the review request, and only the Council’s heavier burden saved the case. A future applicant should assume no such luck and produce a file that proves the break cleanly.
The third track is political and calendrical, and it explains why victories like this one so often feel hollow. The Council reviews and renews the Russia individual-sanctions regime periodically, and each renewal is a new act that must be challenged separately within its own time limit. An annulment of the March and September 2025 acts does not touch later acts covering later periods, which is why a person can win on Tuesday and remain listed on Wednesday. The context of October 2026 illustrates the treadmill: while the Court was annulling two 2025 relistings for lack of fresh evidence, EU ambassadors were clearing a record tranche of about 1,650 new designations, the 22nd package, for formal adoption on 12 October 2026 in Luxembourg. Anyone considering a challenge should therefore calendar every renewal, request review with updated evidence before each cycle, and treat each new listing reason as a new case. Readers familiar with this firm’s earlier analysis of how another listed person obtained the annulment of an EU listing and approached frozen assets in France will recognize the same architecture: Luxembourg decides validity, Paris manages the freeze, and only coordinated action on both fronts converts a judgment into usable funds.
Conclusion
The Avetisyan judgment of 30 September 2026 is a genuine advance for listed persons and a cold shower in equal measure. It confirms that the Council cannot maintain a name on the EU sanctions lists with a file consulted two years earlier while ignoring a documented resignation, that demanding negative proof from the applicant reverses the burden of proof, and that presuming present material support from past functions months after a departure empties the periodic review of its substance. It also confirms the limits of the exercise: no damages without a direct causal link, costs shared, and above all no automatic unfreezing in France, where banks freeze without delay, circumvention is prohibited, enforcement requires prior Treasury authorization, and each new listing act restarts the clock. The practical conclusion for anyone listed and banked in France is therefore a double discipline: challenge each act in Luxembourg within its time limit with a complete and current evidence file, and manage the freeze in Paris through authorization requests and a documentary record from the first day. A courtroom victory is the beginning of the unfreezing, not its end.