On 10 October 2026, The Telegraph revealed that Mauritius has threatened to sue the United Kingdom over delays to the Chagos Islands deal. Prime Minister Navin Ramgoolam travelled to London and warned the UK national security adviser, Jonathan Powell, that Port-Louis was prepared to “take the legal route” unless the issue was “expeditiously resolved”. Two weeks earlier, at the United Nations General Assembly in New York, Mauritius had opened a second front — this time against France. Foreign Minister Dhananjay Ramful declared on 26 September that “Tromelin Island is an integral part of the territory of the Republic of Mauritius” and urged Paris to settle the matter in a “spirit of friendship”. Two islands, two former colonial powers, one claimant — and the same question in both files: can a court hand back an island against the will of the state that holds it? This analysis answers two practical questions: what legal weapons Mauritius really holds against London over the Chagos Archipelago and its Diego Garcia military base, and what would happen — in French law, step by step — if Mauritius ever tried the same against France over Tromelin.
I. Can Mauritius Force the UK to Hand Over the Chagos Islands?
A. What Did the ICJ Actually Order the UK to Do About Chagos?
The story starts in 1814, when France ceded Mauritius and its dependencies to Britain, and restarts in 1965, when London detached the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius — three years before Mauritian independence — to create the British Indian Ocean Territory, paying Port-Louis a £3 million grant. Between the late 1960s and the early 1970s, Britain removed the entire population, about 2,000 people, so that the United States could build a strategic base on Diego Garcia, the largest island. Some of the expelled Chagossians settled in Mauritius and the Seychelles; others later moved to the United Kingdom, many of them to Crawley in West Sussex. The base has operated as a joint UK-US facility since the 1970s and, as recent British press coverage recalls, served as a staging ground for American bombing campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq and as a CIA interrogation site after 2001.
Mauritius first took the political route. In 2017 it asked the UN General Assembly to seek an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice; only 15 states, including Britain and the United States, voted against the request. The Court held hearings from 3 to 6 September 2018 and delivered its opinion on 25 February 2019. Its answers were strikingly blunt. The Court concluded that “the process of decolonization of Mauritius was not lawfully completed when that country acceded to independence” and that “the United Kingdom is under an obligation to bring to an end its administration of the Chagos Archipelago as rapidly as possible”. The two questions put to the Court had asked whether decolonization was lawfully completed in 1968 despite the separation of the archipelago, and what legal consequences flowed from continued British administration.
London rejected the opinion, so Mauritius returned to the General Assembly. On 22 May 2019 the Assembly adopted resolution 73/295, demanding that Britain “withdraw its colonial administration” from the islands “within six months”. The vote was crushing: 116 states in favour, only six against, and 56 abstentions — including France, Germany and Canada. Here the crucial legal distinction must be made, because much press commentary blurs it: an ICJ advisory opinion is not a judgment. It binds no party and orders no transfer. What it does is fix, with the highest judicial authority in the UN system, the legal characterization of a situation — unlawful completion of decolonization, obligation to end administration rapidly — and every subsequent negotiation, arbitration and domestic court reads the file through that lens. That is exactly what happened: after 2019, no British government could still present the archipelago as an ordinary overseas territory with a clean title.
The second judicial building block predates the opinion and binds harder, though on a narrower point. In December 2010 Mauritius commenced arbitration against the United Kingdom under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea over a marine protected area London had declared around the archipelago. The tribunal issued its final award on 18 March 2015. It declined jurisdiction over sovereignty itself, but it unanimously found that, in declaring the protected area, the United Kingdom had “failed to give due regard to” Mauritius’s rights and had “breached its obligations under the Convention”. The award established two durable points for practitioners: even without deciding who owns the islands, an international tribunal can sanction the administering power for ignoring the other claimant’s rights; and questions of sovereignty over land territory cannot be smuggled into a Law of the Sea tribunal through the back door of maritime zones.
What, then, is the “legal route” Prime Minister Ramgoolam brandished in London? A contentious case before the ICJ — a real trial ending in a binding judgment — requires the consent of both states, and London has shown no intention of giving it. A fresh Law of the Sea arbitration would crash into the same wall as in 2015: no jurisdiction over who owns the land. The European route is closed for the Chagossians themselves: the European Court of Human Rights declared their application against the United Kingdom inadmissible, holding that by accepting compensation they had waived the right to bring further claims. That leaves Port-Louis with the weapons it is actually using: the credible threat of new proceedings that would keep the file in the headlines, the mobilization of the General Assembly where it commands a solid majority, the hiring of international law firms reported by regional press — and, above all, the signed treaty whose implementation it can demand as a matter of pacta sunt servanda. The threat to sue is best read not as a writ already drafted, but as leverage to force a signature already given to be honoured.
B. Why Has the UK Not Handed Over Diego Garcia Yet?
The deal exists on paper. In May 2025 London and Port-Louis announced an agreement: the United Kingdom would transfer sovereignty over the archipelago to Mauritius and immediately lease back Diego Garcia — the island hosting the joint military base — for 99 years. The financial terms disclosed by the British press are precise: an average of £101 million per year, with £165 million in each of the first three years, £120 million per year from year four to year thirteen, and inflation-linked payments afterwards, for a total package valued around £3.4 billion. The agreement adds a £40 million trust fund for Chagossians, while expressly providing that Mauritius may not resettle Diego Garcia itself. Announcing the deal, the British prime minister justified the leaseback by the need to shield the base from, in his words, “malign influence”, and indicated that the United States would cover the base’s running costs.
The American factor then turned the file upside down. During the February 2025 White House visit the US president had signalled support for the British plan, and after the May signature his secretary of state hailed a “monumental achievement”. But in January 2026 the president denounced the agreement on his Truth Social platform as an “act of total weakness”, writing that the United Kingdom was planning to give away Diego Garcia, “the site of a vital US Military Base”, for no reason whatsoever, and linking the file to his broader strategic demands. A phone call in early February 2026 briefly papered over the dispute — both sides spoke of “very productive” discussions and the president conceded the arrangement might be the best London could obtain — before he attacked again on 18 February, warning that “leases are no good when it comes to countries”, that the prime minister risked a “big mistake” over the “strategically located” island, and that the base might be needed against Iran, described as a “highly unstable and dangerous Regime”. By September 2026 the British press was reporting that London was reviewing the deal over the lack of American backing, and at the bilateral meeting held on the margins of the September General Assembly the president reportedly called the arrangement “terrible”, stressing Diego Garcia’s importance in the context of the war with Iran. This pattern — Washington punishing an international legal outcome it dislikes — will be familiar to readers of this desk’s coverage of the American sanctions campaign against the International Criminal Court: pressure on judges and institutions abroad has become an instrument of US foreign policy, and the Chagos file is its newest illustration.
Added to the American veto is British domestic opposition. The Conservatives and Reform UK denounce a surrender driven, in their argument, by naivety about Mauritius’s ties with China — a claim Port-Louis rejects — and every parliamentary hurdle becomes an opportunity to reopen the price, the duration of the lease and the resettlement question. On the Mauritian side, impatience is symmetrical: Attorney General Gavin Glover has stated that sovereignty “should no longer be subject to debate” and that Port-Louis expects the treaty “to be implemented as soon as possible, in accordance with the commitments made”. Between a creditor waving the signed treaty and two domestic audiences — British and American — demanding it be torn up, the government in London chose the classic escape route: review, delay, and silence. Ramgoolam’s trip to London and his warning to Jonathan Powell are designed to close exactly that escape route by putting a price — a courtroom — on further delay. Whether the threat materializes matters less than what it signals: the ICJ opinion of 2019 did not transfer a single square metre, but it permanently reversed the burden of justification. It is now London that must explain why it still administers the islands, not Mauritius that must explain why it claims them.
II. Could Mauritius Take Tromelin From France Next?
A. Who Owns Tromelin Island, France or Mauritius?
Tromelin is a flat coral islet in the Indian Ocean, about 1,700 metres long and 700 metres wide — roughly 80 hectares — north of Mauritius and La Réunion and east of Madagascar. Seabirds nest there in large numbers; there is no harbour and no continuous human presence, but there is a 1,200-metre airstrip and a small French weather and military station. A French navigator discovered it in 1722. It then became the scene of one of the grimmest episodes of the slave trade: around 60 Malagasy men and women, abandoned in the 1760s after the French slave ship carrying them ran aground, survived fifteen years on the islet before seven women and an eight-month-old child were rescued in 1776 by Bernard Boudin de Tromelin, captain of the warship La Dauphine, who raised the French flag and gave the island his name. Britain seized the islet in 1810 along with Mauritius, and in 1954 London consented to France’s effective control. Since the independence of Mauritius in 1968, Port-Louis has claimed sovereignty — a claim it has pressed continuously since 1976, also writing it into section 111 of its own Constitution and depositing maritime charts around Tromelin with the United Nations in 2008.
France’s legal answer rests on three pillars. First, historical title: discovery of what Paris regards as terra nullius in 1722, followed by two centuries of administration. A much-cited academic study recalls that a French Senate report defending the 2010 agreement pointed to the multiplicity of France’s “acts of sovereignty and administration over this islet even before the independence of Mauritius [in 1968] […] without UK protest”. Second, the Treaty of Paris of 30 May 1814, by which France ceded Mauritius — then the Isle of France — to Britain. Its Article VIII provides that the French king “cedes in full right and sovereignty to his Britannic majesty” the Isle of France “and its dependencies, especially Rodrigues and Les Sechelles”. Paris reads that enumeration as excluding Tromelin; Port-Louis reads the assignment of the Isle of France as including it, so that independent Mauritius should have inherited the islet in 1968. The honest assessment, shared by scholars on both sides, is that neither reading is self-evident and that a full audit of French, British and Mauritian archives would be needed to settle the historical title — exactly the kind of evidentiary battle France has an interest in never having to fight.
Third, and most awkwardly for Paris, its own conduct since 2010. In June 2010 France and Mauritius signed a framework agreement organizing joint economic, scientific and environmental management — cogestion — of Tromelin and its surrounding waters, expressly without settling sovereignty. Sixteen years later, the French Parliament has still not ratified it: the ratification bill stalled after a heated 2017 debate in the National Assembly, where opponents denounced a disguised abandonment of sovereignty, and in September 2026 the French Foreign Ministry was still describing the ratification process as incomplete. From Port-Louis’s perspective, the lesson of the Chagos file applies directly: international judges reward the claimant that keeps the file alive. After the 2019 ICJ opinion, analysts observed that the Mauritius-UK agreement would encourage Port-Louis to press its Tromelin claim with Paris — and that is precisely what happened at the September 2026 General Assembly, where Minister Ramful publicly called on France to resume “constructive dialogue” on sovereignty.
The material stakes explain the stubbornness on both sides: the sea, not the sand. In 1978 France created, by Decree No. 78-146 of 3 February 1978, an economic zone off Tromelin and the other Scattered Islands, applying the Act of 16 July 1976, whose Article 1 provided that the Republic exercises “dans la zone économique exclusive pouvant s’étendre depuis la limite des eaux territoriales jusqu’à 188 milles marins au-delà de cette limite, des droits souverains en ce qui concerne l’exploration et l’exploitation des ressources naturelles, biologiques ou non biologiques, du fond de la mer, de son sous-sol et des eaux surjacentes”. That 1976 regime has since been recodified by Ordonnance No. 2016-1687 of 8 December 2016 on the maritime spaces under French sovereignty or jurisdiction: Article 1 lists the exclusive economic zone among the spaces defined by the Montego Bay Convention; Article 2 fixes the baselines from which their breadth is measured; Article 11 caps the zone at 200 nautical miles from those baselines; and Article 12 vests the Republic with sovereign rights over the exploration, exploitation, conservation and management of natural resources. A 200-nautical-mile circle around an 80-hectare islet represents tens of thousands of square kilometres of fisheries and potential seabed resources. But Mauritius has a doctrinal card here too: Article 121(3) of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea provides that “[r]ocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf”. Whether a windswept coral strip with an airstrip but no permanent population qualifies as a full island or a mere rock is one of the most litigated questions in maritime law — the 2016 South China Sea award devoted hundreds of pages to it — and Paris knows that any tribunal seized of Tromelin would start there. Behind Tromelin stands a larger archipelago of disputes: Mauritius, the Comoros and Madagascar also contest French sovereignty over the other Scattered Islands — Juan de Nova, Glorioso, Europa, Bassas da India and the Banc du Geyser — which is why every French government treats the 2010 Tromelin agreement as a potential precedent and refuses to move.
B. Can France Give Away an Island Without a Vote?
Suppose, for argument’s sake, that a future French government decided to settle the Tromelin file by treaty — a transfer of sovereignty, a condominium, or even the long-pending cogestion agreement if it touched sovereign rights. French law would impose not one lock, but four, and each of them involves a judge. This is where the French lawyer’s craft matters: unlike the British file, where Parliament can in principle legislate anything, the French file runs through constitutional filters that no government can bypass.
The first lock is Article 53 of the Constitution of 4 October 1958, which provides that treaties or agreements “qui comportent cession, échange ou adjonction de territoire, ne peuvent être ratifiés ou approuvés qu’en vertu d’une loi”, and adds the decisive sentence: “Nulle cession, nul échange, nulle adjonction de territoire n’est valable sans le consentement des populations intéressées.” No cession, no exchange, no addition of territory is valid without the consent of the populations concerned. Two consequences follow. First, the executive cannot dispose of Tromelin alone: any treaty touching the island’s status requires a statute authorizing ratification, voted by the National Assembly and the Senate. That is precisely the stage at which the 2010 framework agreement has been stuck for sixteen years — and the 2017 parliamentary revolt shows the vote cannot be taken for granted. Second, the “populations concerned” must consent. The precedent is the consultation of the population of Mayotte on the agreement of 27 January 2000 on the island’s future, organized by statute and reviewed by the Constitutional Council on 4 May 2000 in the light of the free determination of peoples proclaimed by the Preamble of the Constitution. Tromelin has no permanent civilian population — only rotating military and meteorological personnel — which raises a formidable preliminary question: whose consent counts when there is nobody to consult? Paris would have to construct a consultation mechanism from scratch, and any mechanism invented for the occasion would itself be challenged before the courts. The consent requirement, designed as a democratic guarantee, thus operates here as a near-absolute practical barrier to any discreet diplomatic arrangement.
The second lock is prior constitutional review. Article 54 of the Constitution provides that if the Constitutional Council, seized by the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, the president of either House or sixty deputies or sixty senators, has declared that an international undertaking contains a clause contrary to the Constitution, “l’autorisation de ratifier ou d’approuver l’engagement international en cause ne peut intervenir qu’après la révision de la Constitution”. With sixty signatures — a threshold the Tromelin file would clear effortlessly given the 2017 precedent — the opposition of the day can force the Council to examine any draft treaty clause by clause. A provision abandoning part of the national territory, or stripping 280,000 square kilometres of exclusive economic zone from the Republic’s maritime domain, would face the Council’s scrutiny against the indivisibility of the Republic and the constitutional status of the Southern and Antarctic Lands, to which Tromelin belongs by statute: Article 1 of the Act of 6 August 1955, as amended by the Act of 21 February 2007, provides that Saint-Paul, Amsterdam, Crozet, Kerguelen, Adélie Land and the islands of Bassas da India, Europa, the Glorieuses, Juan de Nova and Tromelin “forment un territoire d’outre-mer doté de la personnalité morale et possédant l’autonomie administrative et financière”, bearing the name Terres australes et antarctiques françaises. Article 1-1 of the same 1955 Act adds that statutes authorizing the ratification or approval of international undertakings apply as of right in the territory — so the authorization statute itself would reach Tromelin automatically. Removing Tromelin from that list requires more than a ministerial signature; it requires rewriting a statute — and surviving the Council.
The third lock is the authority of treaties once ratified, and it cuts both ways. Article 55 of the Constitution provides: “Les traités ou accords régulièrement ratifiés ou approuvés ont, dès leur publication, une autorité supérieure à celle des lois, sous réserve, pour chaque accord ou traité, de son application par l’autre partie.” French courts enforce that primacy daily: the Court of Cassation, in Joint Chambers on 24 May 1975 in the Jacques Vabre case, and the Council of State, in Assembly on 20 October 1989 in the Nicolo case — in which the administrative judge held that it falls to him to review “la compatibilité entre les traités internationaux et les lois françaises même postérieures” — each accepted to set aside a later French statute incompatible with a treaty. For Tromelin, the practical meaning is symmetrical. On one side, France’s own ratification of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea — authorized by Act No. 95-1311 of 21 December 1995 and published by Decree No. 96-774 of 30 August 1996, whose preamble cites Articles 52 to 55 of the Constitution — means the Convention outranks any later French statute in domestic courts: a French judge seized of a fisheries or seamapping dispute around Tromelin applies the Convention first. On the other side, any Franco-Mauritian treaty duly ratified and published would enjoy the same supremacy — which is exactly why opponents of the 2010 agreement fought ratification so hard: once published in the Journal officiel, the text becomes enforceable against the French state itself before French judges.
The fourth lock is jurisdictional, and it protects France better than any legal argument. When France ratified the Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1996, it filed a declaration refusing the compulsory dispute-settlement procedures of Part XV, section 2, for “disputes concerning the interpretation or application of articles 15, 74 and 83 relating to sea boundary delimitations, or those involving historic bays or titles”. In plain terms: Mauritius cannot drag France before the Hamburg tribunal or an arbitral panel to delimit the waters around Tromelin or to litigate France’s historic title. Nor can it easily go to The Hague: a contentious ICJ case needs French consent, and France — which has lived through the Nuclear Tests cases — does not give such consent lightly. That leaves, for Port-Louis, the same weapons it uses against London: UN resolutions, where France’s 2019 abstention on the Chagos text shows Paris prefers to watch from the sidelines; political pressure at each General Assembly; and the slow erosion of the status quo. International lawyers sometimes separate the sovereignty question from the maritime-entitlement question — as the South China Sea tribunal did — but against France that separation helps nobody without a court willing and competent to hear either half.
The result is a paradox that any client with interests in the western Indian Ocean — shipowners, fishing operators, energy prospectors, insurers — must price in. Against the United Kingdom, Mauritius holds a signed treaty, an ICJ opinion and a General Assembly majority, and still cannot collect: law without enforcement is negotiation by other means. Against France, Mauritius holds thinner cards — a 1976 claim, an unratified 2010 agreement, an annual speech — but faces thicker walls: a constitutional consent requirement with no population to consult, a statute anchoring Tromelin to the Southern and Antarctic Lands, a Constitutional Council one referral away, and a jurisdictional shield filed in 1996. The Chagos deal, if it is ever implemented, will embolden Port-Louis; French law, as it stands, gives Paris every tool to wait it out. The only scenario that changes the equation is the one Paris fears most: a French government that actually wants to settle — and must then win a statute, a consultation without voters, and a constitutional review, in that order.
Conclusion
Mauritius’s threat to sue Britain is serious without being literal: no court can order London to hand over Diego Garcia tomorrow, but the combination of the 2019 advisory opinion — decolonization “not lawfully completed”, administration to end “as rapidly as possible” — the 2015 unanimous arbitral finding of breach, the 116 votes at the General Assembly and the signed 2025 treaty makes every additional month of delay more expensive politically than performance. The American veto explains the stall; it does not cure the unlawfulness. For France, the lesson of the autumn of 2026 runs in the opposite direction. Tromelin will not be taken in The Hague or Hamburg, because France has made sure no court there can hear the case without its permission. It can only be given away in Paris — by statute, after constitutional review, and with the consent of populations concerned — which, on an island with no permanent inhabitants and a Parliament that has refused ratification for sixteen years, amounts to the strongest protection any windswept coral islet in the Indian Ocean currently enjoys. The files will meet again at the next General Assembly. Legally, they remain what they have always been: two different islands, two different empires’ afterlives, and two very different sets of locks.