KOHEN AVOCATS FIRM · PARIS 16
Punished Twice for Staying: Herrera-Salazar, Double Jeopardy and What France Would Do

Hassan KOHEN acts in urgent matters, from the police station to the assize court. Initial strategic analysis: €80 incl. VAT, personal reply within 24 hours.

100% confidential · Legal professional privilege · No obligation

Article generated by artificial intelligence, through a process designed and supervised by the firm

Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

Paris Bar Police custody, investigation, assize court CNB listing avocat.fr
Maître Hassan KOHEN, avocat au Barreau de Paris
Hassan KOHEN
Attorney at the Paris Bar

Punished Twice for Staying: Herrera-Salazar, Double Jeopardy and What France Would Do

Speak to a lawyer 06 89 11 34 45

On 13 October 2026, the Supreme Court of the United States refused to hear the case of Jesus Herrera-Salazar, a Mexican national punished twice with prison for what two justices describe as a single continuous presence on American soil. Justice Sonia Sotomayor, joined by Justice Neil Gorsuch, issued a written statement denouncing a constitutional absurdity: after serving a first prison term for being found in the United States without authorisation, Herrera-Salazar was ordered by a federal court to remain in Oklahoma while on supervised release, then arrested in that same state, prosecuted again for being found in the United States, and sent back to prison for the same uninterrupted stay. The two justices warned lower courts to give the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment its full weight the next time such a file reaches them. The story matters well beyond America, because it tests a question every European removal system must answer: how many times can the state punish a foreign national for simply remaining? France answers that question very differently, and the comparison is instructive for any migrant, employer, airline or family facing a removal measure in Paris. European Union law forbids sending an unlawfully staying foreigner to prison for the sole reason that he remains, French criminal law punishes only precise acts of evasion or re-entry after a ban, and the ne bis in idem rule, as restated by the Cour de cassation in 2021 and 2023, bars a second criminal prosecution for the same continuous facts once a final judgment exists. This article reconstructs the American file from the two wire reports published on the day of the order, explains the warning issued by the two justices, and sets out, point by point, what a Paris court would do with an identical file.

I. Twice Punished for One Continuous Stay: the Herrera-Salazar Case Before the United States Supreme Court

A. From a 2015 Removal to Two Prison Terms: How One Uninterrupted Presence Produced Two Convictions

Jesus Herrera-Salazar is a Mexican national whose file spans almost a decade of American immigration enforcement. He was first deported on 12 February 2015 and knowingly re-entered the United States afterwards. Apprehended by Border Patrol agents near Brownsville, Texas, he was charged with one count of being unlawfully found after deportation, pleaded guilty, and was sentenced to 15 months in prison with two years of probation. That first conviction is undisputed: an unlawful re-entry followed by a guilty plea and a served sentence. The controversy begins with what happened next.

In June 2021, Herrera-Salazar was released, barred from returning to Mexico and ordered to remain within Oklahoma while on probation. The federal supervised-release order therefore commanded him to stay exactly where he was: inside the United States, inside one state. On 1 April 2022, he was arrested in Heavener, Oklahoma, and charged with one count of the same offence, which the government argued constituted a separate violation of the same law. He moved to dismiss the indictment, lost, was convicted by a jury and sentenced to 21 months in prison with three years of probation. He was deported in 2024. Two prison terms, two periods of supervised release, one continuous presence interrupted only by the bars of his own cell.

The criminal statute behind both convictions is section 1326(a) of Title 8 of the United States Code, which punishes any person who has been deported or removed and thereafter enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time found in the United States without the express consent of the Attorney General, as published in section 1326 of Title 8 of the United States Code. The decisive words are found in: the offence is not limited to the physical act of crossing the border, and the prosecution argued that each finding of the migrant on American soil could support a fresh charge. When Herrera-Salazar appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, invoking double jeopardy, the appeals court rejected the argument and affirmed the second sentence. Its reasoning, as reported, relied on the idea that the allowable unit of prosecution did not require a separate re-entry attempt, so that each of his prosecutions and convictions punished a separate offence. The Tenth Circuit’s reading is also reported to conflict directly with rulings of the Fifth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits, which have treated the offence as completed when the migrant is found, meaning when he is arrested. A genuine circuit split therefore existed when the file reached Washington, and it was against that background that the Supreme Court issued its order of 13 October 2026 declining review, accompanied by the Sotomayor statement joined by Gorsuch, whose text was published with the order list and analysed the same day by UPI and by Courthouse News.

Three features of the file deserve emphasis because each of them has a direct French counterpart examined in the second part of this article. First, the conduct punished the second time was not a new clandestine crossing but a presence the government itself had ordered: remain in Oklahoma. Second, the two convictions overlap in time and substance, since the presence punished in 2022 began before the first sentence was even pronounced and continued through it. Third, the government’s theory has no visible stopping point, a point on which the two justices insisted with unusual force.

B. Hobson’s Choice and Constitutional Absurdity: What Sotomayor and Gorsuch Actually Wrote

Justice Sotomayor agreed that the Court did not need to take up Herrera-Salazar’s petition, since he had already been removed from the country, but she wrote that she felt the need to underscore the serious constitutional problems that plague the government’s treatment of him. Joined on this point by Justice Gorsuch, appointed by a Republican president while she was appointed by a Democrat, she described the second prosecution as difficult to square with the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which protects individuals against being prosecuted twice for the same offence.

The heart of the statement is a passage on continuous offences that American criminal lawyers will quote for years: When a defendant is convicted of a crime that involves continuous, uninterrupted conduct, our precedents and the logic of the Double Jeopardy Clause strongly suggest that the Government is barred from charging that defendant with the same continuous crime for a second time simply by focusing on a different time marker. Applied to the file, the reasoning is devastating. Herrera-Salazar, the statement explains, was convicted of a crime which was continuous, extending over the whole period he was present in the United States after his previous removal and re-entry, and that continuous crime plainly could not have concluded until the government allowed Herrera-Salazar to leave the country. In other words, the clock the prosecution used for the second charge was ticking inside a period already punished by the first conviction.

Sotomayor then turned to the human trap the two proceedings had built around the migrant. From the moment he was released from custody after serving his first term of imprisonment, Herrera-Salazar was presented with a Hobson’s choice, she wrote: whether he stayed in the Eastern District of Oklahoma as his supervision required or left the United States, he would be breaking the law in the government’s eyes, while being forbidden to leave the United States. She added that the criminal statute’s found in language did not seem clearly to cover a man already found by the government and compelled to remain under government supervision. And she drew the logical consequence of the Tenth Circuit’s allowable-unit-of-prosecution theory: By those lights, with a single unlawful reentry supplying the necessary statutory predicate, a person in Herrera-Salazar’s shoes can be subjected to repeated, limitless ‘found in’ charges without offending the Constitution. The right against double jeopardy, she insisted, is not such a fragile guarantee that prosecutors can slice one crime into several by choosing different dates and places. Under the government’s theory, she warned, Herrera-Salazar could have faced charges for each day he was ‘found in’ prison while serving his sentence. Courts confronted with such a configuration in the future, the two justices concluded, should avoid the constitutional absurdity that occurred here and give the double jeopardy clause its full weight and meaning.

The warning is not a judgment: certiorari was denied, the Tenth Circuit’s affirmance stands for this defendant, and no binding rule was laid down. But a cross-ideological statement of this clarity functions as a roadmap for defence lawyers. It identifies the three arguments that will be raised next time: the offence is continuous and was already punished in its entirety; the defendant’s presence during the second period was compelled by a court order, which destroys any new culpable act; and slicing a continuous presence into successive time-marked charges empties the Double Jeopardy Clause of meaning. Each of these three arguments has a French twin, and on each point the French answer is stricter for the prosecution than even Sotomayor’s position.

II. What France Would Do With the Same File: No Second Prison Term for Simply Remaining

A. In France Remaining Is Not a Crime: the Return Directive, Retention and Articles L824-3, L824-9 and L824-11 of the CESEDA

The first and most important difference is structural. In France, merely remaining on the territory without authorisation is not a criminal offence. A foreign national in an irregular situation faces an administrative removal procedure, an obligation to leave French territory, possibly placement in administrative retention or house arrest, and ultimately enforced removal, but no prison sentence for the sole fact of staying. This is not a policy choice Paris could reverse at will: it is imposed by Directive 2008/115/EC of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures for returning illegally staying third-country nationals, whose published text binds all Member States. The Court of Justice of the European Union drew the criminal-law consequence in two judgments every French removal file must respect. In El Dridi (C-61/11), the Court ruled that the Return Directive, in particular its Articles 15 and 16 on detention for removal, bars national legislation that imposes a prison sentence on an unlawfully staying third-country national for the sole reason that he remains without valid grounds on the territory, contrary to an order to leave within a given period. That ruling therefore bars exactly what the American second prosecution did: turning the sheer fact of remaining into a prison term while the return procedure has not run its course. In Achughbabian (C-329/11), the Court refined the rule in two branches that French courts apply daily: prison is barred for an unlawfully staying foreigner who is unwilling to leave voluntarily where neither the coercive measures of Article 8 of the directive have been applied nor the maximum detention period has expired; it remains permitted where the directive’s return procedure has been applied and the person stays on without a justified ground for non-return. That two-branch ruling is therefore the gate through which every French prosecution for staying must pass: prison is possible only after the return procedure has been applied and has failed, never as a substitute for it.

French domestic criminal law mirrors that architecture with surgical precision. Three offences exist around a removal measure, and none of them reproduces the American found in charge. Article L824-11 of the CESEDA punishes re-entry, not presence: Est puni de trois ans d’emprisonnement le fait, pour un étranger faisant l’objet d’une interdiction administrative du territoire, d’une interdiction de retour sur le territoire français, d’une décision d’expulsion ou d’une peine d’interdiction du territoire français, de pénétrer de nouveau sans autorisation en France. The punishable act is the fresh crossing in breach of a ban, a discrete act with a date and a place, not a state of being. Article L824-9 of the CESEDA punishes evasion: Est puni de trois ans d’emprisonnement le fait, pour un étranger, de se soustraire ou de tenter de se soustraire à l’exécution d’une interdiction administrative du territoire français, d’une obligation de quitter le territoire français ou d’une décision d’expulsion. Refusing the designated transport or the sanitary formalities for enforced removal falls under the same text. Here again the offence requires an act, flight, refusal or concealment, and the prosecution must prove it. Article L824-3 of the CESEDA comes closest to punishing a stay, but only in a narrow post-procedure window: Est puni d’un an d’emprisonnement et de 3 750 euros d’amende le fait, pour un étranger, de se maintenir irrégulièrement sur le territoire français sans motif légitime, après avoir fait l’objet d’une mesure régulière de placement en rétention ou d’assignation à résidence ayant pris fin sans qu’il ait pu être procédé à son éloignement en exécution d’une interdiction administrative du territoire français, d’une obligation de quitter le territoire français, d’une décision de mise en œuvre une décision prise par un autre État, d’une décision d’expulsion ou d’une peine d’interdiction du territoire français. Prison for remaining is therefore possible in France only after retention or house arrest has ended without removal being achieved, and the absence of any legitimate reason must be established. Finally, Article L824-4 of the CESEDA punishes breach of house arrest with three years of imprisonment, which confirms the logic of the whole chapter: disobeying an order to stay somewhere is an offence, but obeying it can never be one. House arrest itself is framed by Article L731-1 of the CESEDA, which provides that L’autorité administrative peut assigner à résidence l’étranger qui ne peut quitter immédiatement le territoire français mais dont l’éloignement demeure une perspective raisonnable, dans les cas suivants: the measure is designed precisely for foreigners who cannot leave immediately, which was Herrera-Salazar’s exact position under his Oklahoma supervision order.

Transpose Herrera-Salazar’s file into this framework and the American second prosecution collapses at every stage. The June 2021 order to remain in Oklahoma is the functional equivalent of a French assignation à résidence: a court-ordered obligation to stay put. In France, staying put in compliance with such an order cannot constitute soustraction, because soustraction means fleeing enforcement, and it cannot constitute maintien under Article L824-3 either, since remaining for a legitimate reason, and obedience to a court order is the most legitimate reason imaginable, takes the conduct outside the offence. The April 2022 arrest in Heavener would therefore have produced, at most, an administrative review of the removal measure, not a criminal file. And the administrative track itself is fenced in: Article L741-1 of the CESEDA allows the administration to place a foreigner in retention pour une durée de quatre-vingt-seize heures only where the person offers no effective guarantee against flight and no lighter measure would secure removal, with extensions controlled by the liberty and detention judge. Ninety-six hours, renewable under judicial control within strict maximum periods, for the purpose of organising removal: that is the French measure of coercion for presence, and it is administrative, time-limited and judge-supervised, not a 21-month prison sentence imposed twice. Readers familiar with French detention safeguards will recognise the same philosophy that governs arrest on a foreign warrant, where French procedure imposes a strict 30-day rule for detention pending extradition: liberty is the principle, detention the narrowly timed exception.

B. One Continuous Act Means One Prosecution in Paris: Ne Bis in Idem and the Defence Playbook

Suppose, for the sake of argument, that a French prosecutor nevertheless tried what the Oklahoma prosecutor did: charging the same continuous presence a second time by pointing at a later segment of it. In Paris that attempt would meet the ne bis in idem wall, and the wall is higher than its American equivalent. The European guarantee is written in Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 to the European Convention on Human Rights: No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again in criminal proceedings under the jurisdiction of the same State for an offence for which he has already been finally acquitted or convicted in accordance with the law and penal procedure of that State. The Cour de cassation restated the complete French framework in a leading 2021 judgment that every defence brief in Paris now cites. Criminal chamber, 15 December 2021, No. 21-81.864 holds that in successive prosecutions, ne bis in idem guarantees legal certainty by ensuring that no one is prosecuted or punished for an offence for which a final judgment of acquittal or conviction already exists. The Court added that the principle is guaranteed at treaty level by Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 to the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 50 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and domestically by Article 6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which extinguishes public prosecution upon res judicata, and Article 368 of the same code, under which a lawfully acquitted person cannot be retried for the same facts even under a different legal qualification. The two cited code provisions are worth reading in full, because they show how mechanically the French shield operates. Article 6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that L’action publique pour l’application de la peine s’éteint par la mort du prévenu, la prescription, l’amnistie, l’abrogation de la loi pénale et la chose jugée. Article 368 of the same code adds: Aucune personne acquittée légalement ne peut plus être reprise ou accusée à raison des mêmes faits, même sous une qualification différente. Same facts, even re-labelled: no second trial. A prosecutor who re-characterised the 2022 presence as a new offence would therefore run directly into the mêmes faits, même sous une qualification différente prohibition.

The remaining question is whether administrative removal measures, retention, house arrest, the obligation to leave, can be combined with a criminal prosecution for the same facts, since Herrera-Salazar’s file mixes supervision orders, detention and prison. French law answers with the coordination doctrine consolidated in 2023. Criminal chamber, 22 March 2023, No. 19-81.929 recalls first the Charter rule that no one may be prosecuted or punished for an offence for which he has already been finally acquitted or convicted within the European Union in accordance with the law. It then states the condition under which a dual track of proceedings and sanctions of a criminal nature can survive: national law must keep the combined burden imposed on the person strictly necessary to the objective pursued, through coordination of procedures and sanctions. Coordination of procedures and sanctions, limited to what is strictly necessary: that is the test. Applied to a Herrera-Salazar file in France, the test bites hard. Retention is administrative and aimed at organising removal, not at punishing; if the administration then sought a criminal conviction for the same period of presence already sanctioned by a final criminal judgment, the criminal court would have to find distinct facts, a new crossing, a proven act of evasion, a stay after failed retention without legitimate reason, and to coordinate the overall burden. Simply pointing at a later slice of the same court-ordered stay would fail, exactly as Sotomayor argued it should fail in America.

Concretely, the Paris defence playbook for such a file would unfold in four moves. First, raise the exception de chose jugée before the criminal court on the basis of Articles 6 and 368 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Article 4 of Protocol No. 7, producing the first final judgment and demonstrating the identity of facts across the two periods. Second, invoke the primacy of the Return Directive as interpreted in El Dridi and Achughbabian through conventionality review, asking the court to set aside any reading of domestic law that would imprison a foreigner for the sole fact of remaining before the return procedure has been exhausted. Third, contest the administrative track in parallel: obligation to leave before the administrative court, retention extensions before the liberty and detention judge, house-arrest conditions before the competent judge, so that no unreviewed measure sustains the prosecution. Fourth, document the court-ordered nature of the stay during the second period, because obedience to a judicial order is both a legitimate reason under Article L824-3 and the negation of any fraudulent intent to evade removal under Article L824-9. Each move has its deadline, and the American file is a cautionary tale about missing them: Herrera-Salazar’s second conviction became final enough to be served before the Supreme Court ever looked at the constitutional objection. In France, the objection must be raised in limine, before the trial court, with the first judgment, the supervision order and the return-procedure history attached. The same discipline of early, parallel challenges applies across transatlantic files handled in Paris, from the comparison this desk recently drew between the American denaturalization drive and the French déchéance de nationalité regime to the analysis of the Abbas UN visa ban and what France would do: American enforcement measures do not cross the Atlantic unchanged, and the French forum rewrites their effects.

Conclusion

The Herrera-Salazar order of 13 October 2026 will not free Herrera-Salazar, who has already served both sentences and been deported, and it lays down no binding American rule. Its importance lies in the public warning signed by two justices from opposite ends of the Court: a continuous presence, once punished, cannot be punished again by cutting it into time-marked slices, and a migrant ordered by a court to stay cannot be reproached for staying. France goes further by design rather than by judicial warning. Union law, through the Return Directive read in El Dridi and Achughbabian, forbids prison for the sole fact of remaining; the CESEDA punishes only defined acts, re-entry in breach of a ban under Article L824-11, evasion of enforcement under Article L824-9, remaining after failed retention without legitimate reason under Article L824-3, breach of house arrest under Article L824-4; and ne bis in idem, from Protocol No. 7 to Articles 6 and 368 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as restated by the Cour de cassation in December 2021 and March 2023, bars a second criminal prosecution for the same facts even under a new label. Anyone facing a French removal measure after a foreign conviction, or fearing that one stay will generate two punishments, should therefore have the file reviewed early, with the foreign judgment, the supervision orders and the return-procedure history in hand, so that the French judge sees one continuous story and applies one coherent rule: one stay, one procedure, one punishment.

📄 Official circular