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Elengy v Novatek in Paris: When EU Sanctions Hit Your Contract — Force Majeure, Frozen Payments and the October 2026 Listings

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Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

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Elengy v Novatek in Paris: When EU Sanctions Hit Your Contract — Force Majeure, Frozen Payments and the October 2026 Listings

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On 12 October 2026, the Council of the European Union adopted what it describes as the largest single round of sanctions listings since 2022: additional restrictive measures against 1,569 individuals and entities in Russia’s military-industrial complex, including 826 companies and 743 of their chief executives. The Council states, in its press release of 12 October 2026, that it adopted additional restrictive measures against 1,569 individuals and entities in Russia’s military and industrial complex, described as the largest single set of listings ever agreed by the EU, bringing total listings under the Ukraine territorial-integrity regime to close to 4,600. The acts were published in the Official Journal as Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/2279 and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026/2281, and those listed face an asset freeze, a prohibition on making funds or economic resources available to them directly or indirectly, and, for listed individuals, a travel ban.

For companies operating in or through France, the question is immediate and practical: a supplier stops delivering, a client stops paying, or a bank freezes a transfer, and everybody invokes “sanctions”. French courts have now answered this question several times, most recently at first instance in Paris on 30 June 2026, when the Paris Economic Activities Tribunal ordered a Singaporean LNG company linked to a Russian gas group to pay more than thirteen million euros in unpaid fees to a French terminal operator, rejecting its force-majeure defence based on the EU transhipment ban. The following analysis is general in scope: it describes the checks, authorisations and contractual steps that are useful in any comparable situation, and it states no finding about the situation of any named company, on which this article makes no determination.

I. Can EU Sanctions Excuse Non-Performance of a Contract in France?

Short answer: only if the party invoking them proves that it was actually prevented from performing. Sanctions are not a magic word that dissolves contracts. That is the consistent thread running through the French decisions examined below, from the Assemblée plénière of the Cour de cassation down to first-instance courts in Paris.

A. Why a Sanctions Ban Is Not Automatic Force Majeure Before French Courts

French contract law defines force majeure narrowly. Article 1218 of the Civil Code provides: “Il y a force majeure en matière contractuelle lorsqu’un événement échappant au contrôle du débiteur, qui ne pouvait être raisonnablement prévu lors de la conclusion du contrat et dont les effets ne peuvent être évités par des mesures appropriées, empêche l’exécution de son obligation par le débiteur. Si l’empêchement est temporaire, l’exécution de l’obligation est suspendue à moins que le retard qui en résulterait ne justifie la résolution du contrat. Si l’empêchement est définitif, le contrat est résolu de plein droit et les parties sont libérées de leurs obligations dans les conditions prévues aux articles 1351 et 1351-1 .” In substance: an event beyond the debtor’s control, unforeseeable at signature, whose effects cannot be avoided by appropriate measures, and which prevents performance. Temporary prevention suspends; definitive prevention terminates. Three cumulative conditions — see also Article 1351-1 of the Civil Code — and above all a proven impossibility, not a mere increase in cost or difficulty.

The sanction for ordinary non-performance follows in Article 1231-1 of the Civil Code: “Le débiteur est condamné, s’il y a lieu, au paiement de dommages et intérêts soit à raison de l’inexécution de l’obligation, soit à raison du retard dans l’exécution, s’il ne justifie pas que l’exécution a été empêchée par la force majeure.”

And Article 1351 of the Civil Code adds: “L’impossibilité d’exécuter la prestation libère le débiteur à due concurrence lorsqu’elle procède d’un cas de force majeure et qu’elle est définitive, à moins qu’il n’ait convenu de s’en charger ou qu’il ait été préalablement mis en demeure.”

The Paris LNG dispute shows how strictly Paris judges apply that test to sanctions. Under a 23-year transhipment contract signed in 2015, a French terminal operator provided ship-to-ship LNG transfer slots to an Asian shipping company, for a monthly minimum fee of about 1.5 million euros payable even for unused slots. After the 14th EU sanctions package banned the provision of Russian LNG transhipment services with effect from 26 March 2025, the customer stopped paying and invoked the contract’s force-majeure clause, which expressly covered embargo measures. According to the judgment, the tribunal examined whether performance had truly become impossible and found that it had not: the EU regulation provides an authorisation route under which competent authorities may authorise transhipment of Russian LNG where the operation serves supply to a Member State that has confirmed the need, with the French Treasury (Direction Générale du Trésor) as the granting authority in France. The decisive findings, again according to the judgment, were that the customer had stopped requesting its slots as early as July 2024, months before the ban took effect, had never applied for an authorisation although guidance designated cargo owners as the applicants, and bore the burden of proving that no authorisation could have been obtained. The tribunal therefore held that the operator was not prevented from carrying out Russian LNG transhipment operations through the end of 2026, dismissed the force-majeure argument, and ordered payment of the invoices with contractual Euribor-plus-two-percent interest. The decision is first-instance and may be appealed, but its method is what matters for any operator: a sanctions ban containing an authorisation mechanism is not an impossibility until the authorisation route has actually been tried and has failed. A parallel strike-based defence failed on the same ground, for lack of proof that transhipment itself had been affected.

The Cour de cassation goes further for the listed person itself. In its Assemblée plénière judgment of 10 July 2020 concerning an Iranian bank whose assets had been frozen under UN and EU measures, the Court held: “Ne constitue pas un cas de force majeure pour celle qui le subit, faute d’extériorité, le gel des avoirs d’une personne ou d’une entité qui est frappée par cette mesure en raison de ses activités.” A freeze imposed on a person because of its own activities lacks exteriority and therefore cannot be force majeure for that person. Read the full decision here: Assemblée plénière, 10 July 2020, Bank Sepah. A counterparty that has itself been listed, or whose designation flows from its own sector of activity, should not expect French courts to release it from its contracts on that basis.

The Paris civil courts apply the same discipline to the mirror situation: a buyer who cannot move money because its bank was sanctioned. In a July 2024 judgment, the Paris judicial court accepted in principle that the EU measures disconnecting Russian banks from financial messaging could be unforeseeable and irresistible, but still rejected the defence. The court accepted that the EU measures against Russian banks could in principle be an unforeseeable event beyond the buyer’s control, yet found that she had not shown that those measures had prevented her from completing the purchase. The buyer held accounts outside Russia, produced no evidence of insolvency, and could not even show that the funds had been available in the frozen account — so the court found no proof that the sanctions, rather than the buyer’s own choices, had caused the failure, and refused to terminate the preliminary sale agreement on force-majeure grounds. The lesson for any foreign buyer or payer in France is blunt: alternative payment channels and other accounts must be documented, because the judge will ask why they were not used.

There is one nuance worth keeping. In December 2023, the Versailles Court of Appeal, ruling in summary proceedings on another Russian buyer’s aborted purchase, found that the war and its consequences on fund transfers between Russia and France raised a serious dispute, and therefore refused the seller a provisionally enforceable payment order. Force majeure had not been established, but it was sufficiently arguable to block summary relief. Sanctions arguments can therefore buy time and shift the case to full proceedings, even when they ultimately fail on the merits.

B. When a Counterparty Is Listed: Frozen Funds, Banned Payments and Treasury Authorisations

Once a name appears in Annex I of Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 — as 1,569 new names did on 12 October 2026 — two prohibitions apply immediately and directly, without any French implementing text. Article 2 of Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 provides: “Sont gelés tous les fonds et ressources économiques appartenant aux personnes physiques ou à des personnes physiques ou morales, entités ou organismes qui leurs sont associés énumérés à l’annexe I, de même que tous les fonds et ressources économiques que ces personnes physiques ou que ces personnes physiques ou morales, entités ou organismes qui leurs sont associés possèdent, détiennent ou contrôlent.” It continues: “Aucuns fonds ni ressources économiques ne sont mis, directement ou indirectement, à la disposition des personnes physiques ou des personnes physiques ou morales, des entités ou des organismes qui leurs sont associés énumérés à l’annexe I, ni dégagés à leur profit.” In other words, everything belonging to the listed person is frozen, and nothing of value may be paid to or for the listed person. A French company that keeps paying a newly listed supplier, or keeps delivering value that benefits it, breaches EU law from the publication date.

France adds its own national freeze layer. Article L562-3 of the Monetary and Financial Code provides that “Le ministre chargé de l’économie peut décider, pour une durée de six mois, renouvelable, le gel des fonds et ressources économiques” of persons designated under UN Chapter VII resolutions or EU acts — the definitions sitting in Article L562-1 of the same Code. In practice, banks in France freeze first and ask questions later, and a transfer that looks sanctions-related can be stopped overnight with little explanation.

Frozen does not mean confiscated, and it does not mean the creditor of a listed person is left with nothing — but every step passes through the Treasury. The Cour de cassation clarified the rule in a February 2026 judgment concerning enforcement against Libyan frozen assets: “Il résulte des dispositions du règlement n° 2016/44, qui a pour objectif la prévention de « la menace que représentent les personnes et entités qui possèdent ou contrôlent des fonds publics libyens détournés sous l’ancien régime de [O] [I], susceptibles d’être utilisés pour mettre en danger la paix, la stabilité ou la sécurité en Libye, ou pour entraver ou compromettre la réussite de sa transition politique » (2ème considérant), que ne peut être diligentée, sur des fonds ou des ressources économiques gelés, aucune mesure d’exécution qui aurait pour effet, non seulement de les faire sortir du patrimoine du débiteur, mais aussi de conférer au créancier poursuivant un simple droit de préférence, sans une autorisation préalable du directeur du Trésor, autorité nationale désignée en application de l’article 11, § 2, du règlement.” — no enforcement measure over frozen funds, not even one merely conferring a preference, without prior authorisation from the Treasury, which the Court identifies as the competent French authority under the EU regulations. Read the full decision here: Second Civil Chamber, 5 February 2026, Libyan Investment Authority. A French creditor holding a judgment or arbitral award against a newly listed debtor must therefore apply to the Direction Générale du Trésor before seizing frozen accounts in France, and a payment owed under a pre-listing contract can be released only through the derogation in Article 6 of Regulation 269/2014: “Par dérogation à l’article 2 et pour autant qu’un paiement soit dû par une personne physique ou morale, une entité ou un organisme figurant sur la liste de l’annexe I au titre d’un contrat ou d’un accord conclu ou d’une obligation contractée par la personne physique ou morale, l’entité ou l’organisme concerné avant la date de son inscription à l’annexe I, les autorités compétentes des États membres peuvent autoriser, aux conditions qu’elles jugent appropriées, le déblocage de certains fonds ou ressources économiques gelés, pour autant que l’autorité compétente concernée ait établi que:” — a payment owed by a listed person under a pre-listing contract may be released once the competent authority so determines, on condition that the funds serve a payment by the listed person and that the payment does not breach the making-available ban.

Basic needs, legal fees and routine maintenance of frozen assets have their own derogation in Article 4 of the same Regulation. Companies that discover a listing in their supply chain after a wave like October 2026 should therefore do three things at once: suspend affected payments, file for Treasury authorisation where a pre-existing contract genuinely requires payment, and start building the documentary record that no value reaches the listed person.

II. How to Keep Performing — or Exit Cleanly — Under French Law After the October 2026 Wave

The October 2026 listings enlarge the population of problematic counterparties overnight: mid-level industrial suppliers with at least 20 billion euros in combined annual turnover, according to the Council, embedded in European supply chains for electronics, communications, aviation and optics. The French answer is procedural and contractual, not rhetorical. Businesses that prepare the paperwork survive the freeze; businesses that simply stop paying, or keep paying, end up funding the other side’s litigation.

A. Which Contract Terms Decide Who Bears the Sanctions Risk in France?

The first document a Paris judge reads is the contract, not the regulation. Three clauses decide most cases. The first is the sanctions and force-majeure clause itself: does it name embargoes expressly, who may invoke it, and — the point the LNG judgment makes decisive — who must apply for governmental authorisations when the regulation offers them? An operator that merely waits for the other side to seek a permit, while itself holding the customer data the Treasury requires, will struggle to prove prevention. Allocating the authorisation duty in writing, with deadlines and information-sharing obligations, turns an abstract ban into a checkable procedure.

The second is the EU “no-claims” clause, which many operators discover only when they sue. Article 11 of Regulation 269/2014 provides: “Il n’est fait droit à aucune demande à l’occasion de tout contrat ou toute opération dont l’exécution a été affectée, directement ou indirectement, en tout ou en partie, par les mesures instituées en vertu du présent règlement, y compris à des demandes d’indemnisation ou à toute autre demande de ce type, telle qu’une demande de compensation ou une demande à titre de garantie, notamment une demande visant à obtenir la prorogation ou le paiement d’une garantie ou d’une contre-garantie, notamment financière, quelle qu’en soit la forme, présentée par:” — no claim connected with a contract affected by the measures, including indemnity, compensation or guarantee claims, may be satisfied if made by designated persons or those acting for them. A listed counterparty’s damages claim for interruption therefore hits a wall in any EU court, while the non-listed party’s own claim for unpaid invoices remains admissible, as the Paris LNG ruling confirms — with the burden of proving that a claim is not prohibited placed on the claimant.

The third is renegotiation. Where performance has become ruinously expensive but not impossible, Article 1195 of the Civil Code offers a path: “Si un changement de circonstances imprévisible lors de la conclusion du contrat rend l’exécution excessivement onéreuse pour une partie qui n’avait pas accepté d’en assumer le risque, celle-ci peut demander une renégociation du contrat à son cocontractant.” The duty to keep performing during renegotiation, and to request it before asking a judge to adapt or terminate, makes this a use-it-or-lose-it tool. A party that never requests renegotiation and simply defaults arrives in court with the weakest possible file — a point illustrated by buyers who invoked changed circumstances only after missing their deadlines.

B. What Steps in Paris Turn a Frozen File Into an Enforceable Outcome?

For files connected to France, the practical circuit runs through Paris. The Direction Générale du Trésor, the authority competent to grant the release and derogation authorisations described above, sits in Paris and applies published guidance on listings, licences and reporting; applications must identify the exact legal basis — basic needs, legal fees, pre-listing contractual payment — and demonstrate that no value will be made available to the listed person beyond the authorised payment. The Paris courts that hear the resulting disputes are the Tribunal des activités économiques and the Tribunal judiciaire de Paris at first instance, with the Paris Court of Appeal above them, and jurisdiction clauses designating Paris are routinely given effect, as in the LNG contract’s forum clause. A company that receives a freeze notice from its French bank should therefore instruct counsel in Paris immediately: to verify the listing in the Official Journal, to suspend or ring-fence the affected flows, to file the Treasury application with a complete evidentiary record, and to prepare the merits case on prevention rather than on indignation.

Two shields protect operators that act in good faith. Article 10 of Regulation 269/2014 states: “Le gel des fonds et des ressources économiques ou le refus d’en autoriser la mise à disposition, pour autant qu’ils soient décidés de bonne foi au motif qu’une telle action est conforme au présent règlement, n’entraînent, pour la personne physique ou morale, l’entité ou l’organisme qui y procède, sa direction ou ses employés, aucune responsabilité de quelque nature que ce soit, à moins qu’il ne soit établi que le gel ou la rétention de ces fonds et ressources économiques résulte d’une négligence.” — a freeze decided in good faith as compliant with the Regulation creates no liability, unless negligence is proved. A bank or business that freezes on a reasonable reading of the list is protected; one that freezes out of panic, overbreadth or negligence is not — which is why the legal analysis behind each freeze must be written down at the time. Conversely, Article 9 warns: “Il est interdit de participer sciemment et volontairement à des activités ayant pour objet ou pour effet de contourner les mesures énoncées à l’article 2.” — knowing, intentional participation in circumvention is prohibited. Rerouting payments through intermediaries, renaming the counterparty on invoices, or splitting transfers to stay below screening thresholds would, if done knowingly, fall squarely within circumvention and invite French enforcement, from administrative action to criminal prosecution. Between those two poles lies the only safe corridor: freeze what must be frozen, authorise what can be authorised, document everything, and litigate prevention with evidence rather than assertions.

Where the listing itself looks wrong, the remedy is a direct challenge before the EU General Court in Luxembourg, which has annulled a series of Russia-related listings for insufficient reasoning or stale evidence — a route analysed in detail in our analysis of the Tkach annulment and its consequences for asset freezes in France and in our commentary on the Avetisyan relisting annulment. For the October 2026 wave specifically, our companion piece on challenging the 1,569 new listings and releasing frozen funds in France covers the listing-side strategy, while the broader framework is set out in our EU sanctions hub: delistings, extensions to 2029 and challenges in France. The present article covers the other side of the same wave: the contracts, payments and procedures of everyone who does business with the newly listed.

Conclusion

The October 2026 listings will freeze assets and interrupt supply chains across Europe, and France will be one of the principal enforcement venues. The French case law currently points in one direction: sanctions excuse only proven impossibility, never assumed impossibility; the listed person’s own freeze is not force majeure for it; enforcement over frozen funds requires prior Treasury authorisation; and the party that documents authorisation attempts, alternative payment routes and renegotiation efforts wins, while the party that simply stops paying — or keeps paying in breach — loses. Check the Official Journal annexes today, suspend affected flows, file Treasury applications on the correct legal basis, align the contract’s authorisation duties before the next wave, and treat every freeze decision as a file a judge will one day read.

📄 Official circular