On 9 October 2026, Ethiopia accused Eritrea of an “all-out invasion” in a letter to the United Nations Security Council, stating that Eritrean troops had advanced up to 60 kilometres into the northern Tigray region. One day later, Eritrea asked the same Council to take deterrent measures against Ethiopia, describing Addis Ababa’s accusations as a “declaration of war”. The two neighbours had cut diplomatic ties on 1 October, government forces had retaken the Tigrayan capital Mekelle, and witnesses reported Eritrean troops in Adigrat before Ethiopian drone strikes hit them. For Eritreans and Ethiopians living in France, and for their families, the question is immediate and practical: does this new war open a right to asylum in France, who qualifies as a refugee, who can claim subsidiary protection instead, and where do these claims fail? This article answers from French law as applied by the French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons (OFPRA), the National Court of Asylum (CNDA) and the Conseil d’État, including a Conseil d’État ruling of 26 May 2026 concerning an Eritrean claimant.
I. Can Eritreans and Ethiopians obtain refugee status or subsidiary protection in France since the October 2026 war?
A. I am Eritrean and I refuse indefinite national service: does France recognise draft evaders and deserters as refugees?
Eritrean claims in France very often turn on one institution: open-ended national service. A French refugee-support publication recalls that since 1995, all Eritrean citizens, men and women, aged 18 to 40, have been required to perform compulsory service, and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees listed draft evaders and deserters among the risk profiles in its Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Asylum-Seekers from Eritrea, published in April 2009 (ecoi.net document 1097270). Refusing the call-up or deserting after incorporation is therefore not treated by OFPRA and the CNDA as a mere breach of military discipline: the question is whether the punishment the claimant faces on return amounts to persecution connected to one of the five Convention grounds.
French statute law starts from the Geneva Convention itself. Article L. 511-1 of the Code de l’entrée et du séjour des étrangers et du droit d’asile provides: “La qualité de réfugié est reconnue : 1° A toute personne persécutée en raison de son action en faveur de la liberté ; 2° A toute personne sur laquelle le Haut-Commissariat des Nations unies pour les réfugiés exerce son mandat aux termes des articles 6 et 7 de son statut tel qu’adopté par l’Assemblée générale des Nations unies le 14 décembre 1950 ; 3° A toute personne qui répond aux définitions de l’article 1er de la convention de Genève du 28 juillet 1951 relative au statut des réfugiés. Ces personnes sont régies par les dispositions applicables aux réfugiés en vertu de la convention de Genève susmentionnée.”. The Conseil d’État recalled the Convention definition word for word in its Eritrea ruling of 26 May 2026 (Conseil d’État, 2nd chamber, 26 May 2026, n. 497326): a refugee is any person who “craignant avec raison d’être persécutée du fait de sa race, de sa religion, de sa nationalité, de son appartenance à un certain groupe social ou de ses opinions politiques, se trouve hors du pays dont elle a la nationalité et qui ne peut, ou, du fait de cette crainte, ne veut se réclamer de la protection de ce pays”. Three consequences follow for Eritrean files.
First, punishment for draft evasion still needs a Convention ground. Article L. 511-4 of the same Code states: “Pour que la qualité de réfugié soit reconnue à un demandeur, il doit exister un lien entre l’un des motifs de persécution qu’il allègue et les actes de persécution ou l’absence de protection contre de tels actes.”. In Eritrean cases, OFPRA and the CNDA typically examine political opinion, imputed or real: a deserter is often perceived by the Eritrean authorities as an opponent, and the penalty imposed on him can then be read as persecution for an imputed political opinion rather than as ordinary prosecution. Second, the claimant does not need to prove that the authorities correctly identified his beliefs. Article L. 511-5 provides: “Lorsque l’autorité compétente évalue si un demandeur craint avec raison d’être persécuté, il est indifférent que celui-ci possède effectivement les caractéristiques liées au motif de persécution ou que ces caractéristiques lui soient seulement attribuées par l’auteur des persécutions.”. An Eritrean who never held opposition views can therefore still qualify if the regime treats him as an opponent because he fled. Third, the assessment of what counts as persecution follows European Union law: Article L. 511-2 directs the French authorities to assess acts and grounds of persecution under Article 9(1) and (2) and Article 10(1) of Qualification Directive 2011/95/EU, which covers prosecution for refusing military service where that service would involve committing war crimes or where the punishment is disproportionate and connected to a Convention ground.
The October 2026 war changes the factual picture in two ways that help new claims but do not decide them automatically. Mobilisation orders, round-ups and the recall of reservists decided after the outbreak of hostilities can create a risk that did not exist when the claimant left Eritrea, and the French authorities assess the risk as it stands on the day they decide, taking account of events that occurred after departure. A young Eritrean who left for economic reasons in 2024 and receives a call-up in October 2026, or whose desertion becomes known to the authorities through the current mobilisation wave, can present a claim based on facts that arose after he left. But general deterioration is not enough on its own: the European Court of Human Rights, ruling on an Eritrean removal case on 20 June 2017 (M.O. v. Switzerland, HUDOC 001-174424), held that the general human rights situation in Eritrea does not as such bar every removal, that the risk linked to desertion and illegal exit could not be discounted, and that decisive weight falls on the plausibility and detail of the applicant’s own account, with national authorities best placed to assess credibility. In short, the war supplies the context, while the claimant’s personal story supplies the proof.
B. I am a civilian from Tigray or the Ethiopian border zone: when does French subsidiary protection apply?
Many Ethiopian claimants will not meet the refugee definition because they are fleeing shells and drone strikes rather than targeted persecution. French law offers them a second route: subsidiary protection. Article L. 512-1 of the Code de l’entrée et du séjour des étrangers et du droit d’asile grants it to any person who does not qualify as a refugee but faces a real risk of serious harm, including “3° S’agissant d’un civil, une menace grave et individuelle contre sa vie ou sa personne en raison d’une violence qui peut s’étendre à des personnes sans considération de leur situation personnelle et résultant d’une situation de conflit armé interne ou international.”. Civilians from Mekelle, Shire, Adigrat and the Tigray border strip, where Al Jazeera reported the TPLF retreat, the Ethiopian army advance and Eritrean troop sightings within the first ten days of October 2026, fall squarely within the factual hypothesis of this provision: an internationalised armed conflict producing violence that strikes without regard to personal situation.
The Conseil d’État has given this provision a broad and practical reading that matters directly for Tigray files. In a ruling of 21 July 2022 (Conseil d’État, 2nd chamber, 21 July 2022, n. 453997), the Court held: “Le bénéfice de la protection subsidiaire, au titre des dispositions du c) de l’article L. 712-1 du code de l’entrée et du séjour des étrangers et du droit d’asile, devenu l’article L. 512-1 du même code, découle, en principe, de l’existence, dans la région que l’intéressé a vocation à rejoindre, d’un degré de violence généralisée tel qu’il existe des motifs sérieux et avérés de penser qu’un civil renvoyé dans cette région courrait, du seul fait de sa présence sur ce territoire, un risque réel de subir une menace grave, directe et individuelle contre sa vie ou sa personne.”. Two points in that ruling deserve attention from Ethiopian applicants. First, where the level of generalised violence in the home region is high enough, the civilian needs no individual targeting: presence alone creates the risk. Second, the protection can also follow from the journey itself: even if the home region were calmer, subsidiary protection may result from the fact that the claimant cannot reach it without crossing a zone whose level of conflict violence exposes him, by the mere fact of even temporary passage, to such a threat. A Tigrayan who would have to transit through contested areas or a militarised border to reach home can rely on that reasoning.
Three limits must be stated plainly. First, subsidiary protection requires a civilian fleeing indiscriminate violence; a claimant from Addis Ababa or a calm region who faces no personal risk and whose route home avoids the combat zones will struggle to meet the test. Second, the assessment is dated: the CNDA judges the intensity of the conflict on the day it rules, so a ceasefire or a stabilised front line can close a claim that the October 2026 fighting had opened. Third, removal remains absolutely barred where there is a real risk of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment, whatever the conflict map says: Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights lays down an absolute prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment (Council of Europe treaty text, STE n. 005). That absolute guarantee protects Eritreans and Ethiopians alike at the removal stage, even when neither refugee status nor subsidiary protection has been granted.
II. How does the French asylum procedure work, and why do Eritrean and Ethiopian claims fail?
A. Where and how do I apply for asylum in France: OFPRA interview, Dublin screening, CNDA appeal and right to stay?
Any foreigner present on French territory who wishes to seek asylum must first register the claim in person. Article L. 521-1 of the Code de l’entrée et du séjour des étrangers et du droit d’asile provides: “Tout étranger présent sur le territoire français et souhaitant demander l’asile se présente en personne à l’autorité administrative compétente qui enregistre sa demande et procède, dans des conditions fixées par décret en Conseil d’Etat, à la détermination de l’Etat responsable en application du règlement (UE) n° 604/2013 du Parlement européen et du Conseil, du 26 juin 2013, établissant les critères et mécanismes de détermination de l’Etat membre responsable de l’examen d’une demande de protection internationale introduite dans l’un des Etats membres par un ressortissant de pays tiers ou un apatride, ou en application d’engagements identiques à ceux prévus par le même règlement.”. This Dublin screening matters enormously for Horn of Africa routes: many Eritreans and Ethiopians reach France after being fingerprinted or refused elsewhere in Europe. The Conseil d’État’s Eritrea ruling of 26 May 2026 illustrates the pattern: the claimant, an Eritrean national, had been refused asylum in Norway before entering France in 2021 and applying to OFPRA, which rejected his claim on 15 September 2023. Secondary movements of this kind do not extinguish the right to have the claim examined, but applicants should expect questions about their itinerary and prepare proof of when and how they entered France.
Once France is responsible, the file goes to OFPRA, which examines it on the documents and, as a rule, in a personal interview. Article L. 531-12 provides: “L’Office français de protection des réfugiés et apatrides convoque le demandeur d’asile à un entretien personnel par tout moyen garantissant la confidentialité et la réception personnelle de cette convocation.”. Eritrean and Ethiopian claimants should treat that interview as the decisive moment: the protection officer tests the chronology of military service, the date and circumstances of desertion or flight, knowledge of units and places, and the reasons why return is feared. Country information used at this stage comes largely from OFPRA’s own documentation division, whose country publications are freely accessible on the OFPRA country publications page, and the claimant’s lawyer can and should consult the same sources before the hearing.
While OFPRA examines the claim, the applicant is protected from removal. Article L. 541-1 states: “Le demandeur d’asile dont l’examen de la demande relève de la compétence de la France et qui a introduit sa demande auprès de l’Office français de protection des réfugiés et apatrides bénéficie du droit de se maintenir sur le territoire français.”. If OFPRA rejects the claim, the remedy lies with the National Court of Asylum. Article L. 532-1 provides: “La Cour nationale du droit d’asile, dont la nature, les missions et l’organisation sont notamment définies au titre III du livre I, statue sur les recours formés contre les décisions de l’Office français de protection des réfugiés et apatrides prises en application des articles L. 511-1 à L. 511-8, L. 512-1 à L. 512-3, L. 513-1 à L. 513-5, L. 531-1 à L. 531-35, L. 531-41 et L. 531-42.”, and Article L. 532-2 provides: “Saisie d’un recours contre une décision de l’Office français de protection des réfugiés et apatrides, la Cour nationale du droit d’asile statue, en qualité de juge de plein contentieux, sur le droit du requérant à une protection au titre de l’asile au vu des circonstances de fait dont elle a connaissance au moment où elle se prononce.”. The Court re-examines the whole case as a full-jurisdiction judge, which means it can hear the claimant again, order further inquiry and substitute its own assessment of the facts for OFPRA’s. In the 26 May 2026 case, the CNDA had annulled OFPRA’s refusal and recognised the Eritrean claimant as a refugee on 25 June 2024, before OFPRA appealed to the Conseil d’État. The lesson for applicants is twofold: a refusal at OFPRA is the beginning of the judicial phase, not the end of the road, and every stage rewards detailed, consistent and documented accounts.
Preparation decides more files than doctrine. Claimants should gather call-up papers, desertion warrants, judgments in absentia, photographs of injuries, medical and psychological certificates, and proof of opposition activity or of the date on which their flight became known, with translations where possible, because both OFPRA and the CNDA test consistency between documents and oral testimony. Representation by a lawyer experienced in asylum hearings is strongly advisable from the OFPRA stage, and the 26 May 2026 ruling itself records claims made under Article 37 of the Law of 10 July 1991 on legal aid, which confirms that aid mechanisms exist for impecunious applicants in this litigation. A well-ordered file presented early avoids the contradictions that exclusion and credibility findings feed on later.
B. Former combatants, prison guards and credibility gaps: why does the 26 May 2026 Conseil d’État Eritrea ruling matter?
The war of October 2026 will push some former Eritrean and Ethiopian soldiers, militiamen and prison staff toward France, and their files face a specific danger: exclusion from refugee status. Article L. 511-6 provides: “Le statut de réfugié n’est pas accordé à une personne qui relève de l’une des clauses d’exclusion prévues aux sections D, E ou F de l’article 1er de la convention de Genève du 28 juillet 1951. La même section F s’applique également aux personnes qui sont les instigatrices ou les complices des crimes ou des agissements mentionnés à ladite section ou qui y sont personnellement impliquées.”. Section F covers persons suspected of crimes against peace, war crimes, crimes against humanity, serious non-political crimes or acts contrary to United Nations purposes. The mirror provision for subsidiary protection is Article L. 512-2, which refuses the protection where there are serious reasons to believe, among other cases, “1° Qu’elle a commis un crime contre la paix, un crime de guerre ou un crime contre l’humanité”. Refusal can also follow on security grounds under Article L. 511-7, where the person’s presence constitutes a serious threat.
The Conseil d’État’s ruling of 26 May 2026 (n. 497326) shows how exclusion works in an Eritrean file and why legal advice is indispensable. The claimant had served in the Eritrean army and repeatedly taken part in guarding detainees in a prison camp, and during an interview with the Norwegian immigration authorities on 17 July 2015 he had stated that he had ill-treated prisoners. The CNDA had set the exclusion clauses aside, reasoning that the claimant had incriminated himself before the Norwegians only on poor advice, to bolster his fear of persecution, by deliberately exaggerating acts he had committed. The Conseil d’État quashed that reasoning and sent the case back, holding that the CNDA had distorted the file: the claimant had varied and contradicted himself repeatedly on his role and the circumstances, including whether he was armed and near detainees.
Beyond the outcome, the ruling states the exclusion test that now binds the CNDA in every similar file (Conseil d’État, 26 May 2026, n. 497326): “L’exclusion du statut de réfugié prévue par les a), b) et c) du F de l’article 1er de la convention de Genève est subordonnée à l’existence de raisons sérieuses de penser qu’une part de responsabilité dans les crimes ou les agissements qu’il mentionne peut être imputée personnellement au demandeur d’asile.”. Exclusion therefore requires serious reasons to believe that a share of personal responsibility can be attributed to the claimant, and the CNDA must investigate whether the facts are capable of founding such serious reasons. The ruling also defines who counts as an accomplice: “le complice est celui qui, sciemment, a, par ses agissements, contribué à la préparation ou à la réalisation du crime ou en a facilité la commission ou a assisté à son exécution sans chercher à aucun moment, eu égard à sa situation, à le prévenir ou à s’en dissocier.”. An Eritrean conscript who knowingly helped prepare or carry out abuse, facilitated it, or watched it without ever trying, given his situation, to prevent it or disassociate himself from it, can fall within this definition even if he never gave the orders.
The practical message for former Eritrean servicemen and Tigrayan fighters now arriving is stark. First, every statement made to any European authority counts: the decisive admissions in the 2026 case dated from a 2015 Norwegian interview, eleven years before the Conseil d’État ruled. Second, exaggeration is as dangerous as minimisation: the CNDA had accepted the claimant’s explanation that he had blackened his own record on bad advice, and the Conseil d’État treated his shifting versions as a distortion of the file, not as an excuse. Third, forced conscription does not automatically shield a claimant who personally took part in abuse, because the test is personal responsibility, not the regularity of the uniform. None of this means that every former conscript is excluded: a driver, a clerk or a front-line soldier who never took part in crimes against detainees or civilians has no exclusion problem, but he must still prove his own risk under the refugee or subsidiary protection tests, with the same demand for precise and stable testimony that the Strasbourg Court emphasised in the M.O. case.
Conclusion
The October 2026 war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, with invasion claims before the Security Council, severed diplomatic ties, a retaken Mekelle and Eritrean troops reported 60 kilometres inside Tigray, gives Eritrean and Ethiopian nationals in France genuine new arguments: imputed political opinion for deserters and draft evaders assessed under Articles L. 511-1, L. 511-2, L. 511-4 and L. 511-5, subsidiary protection for Tigrayan civilians under Article L. 512-1 read in the light of the Conseil d’État’s 2022 blind-violence case law, OFPRA examination with a personal interview and a right to remain under Articles L. 531-12 and L. 541-1, and full judicial review by the CNDA. But the same files carry the two great causes of failure that French courts repeat year after year: unstable testimony, as the Strasbourg Court recalled for Eritrean claimants in 2017, and the exclusion clauses of Article 1F applied with full force by the Conseil d’État to an Eritrean former prison guard on 26 May 2026. New facts open the door; only rigorous proof walks through it.