KOHEN AVOCATS FIRM · PARIS 16
Nord Stream Sabotage Trial Opens in Hamburg After Surrender From Italy: European Arrest Warrant, Specialty Rule and Trial Explained

Hassan KOHEN acts in urgent matters, from the police station to the assize court. Initial strategic analysis: €80 incl. VAT, personal reply within 24 hours.

100% confidential · Legal professional privilege · No obligation

Article generated by artificial intelligence, through a process designed and supervised by the firm

Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

Paris Bar Police custody, investigation, assize court CNB listing avocat.fr
Maître Hassan KOHEN, avocat au Barreau de Paris
Hassan KOHEN
Attorney at the Paris Bar

Nord Stream Sabotage Trial Opens in Hamburg After Surrender From Italy: European Arrest Warrant, Specialty Rule and Trial Explained

Speak to a lawyer 06 89 11 34 45

On 14 October 2026, a Ukrainian national named Serhii Kuznetsov walked into a Hamburg courtroom and became the first person to stand trial for blowing up the Nord Stream gas pipelines in the Baltic Sea in September 2022. He had been arrested in Italy in August 2025 while on a family holiday, travelling on a false passport according to Italian police, and handed over to Germany late last year after Italy’s highest court approved the transfer. He denies the charges. A second suspect, arrested in Croatia in August 2026 on a European warrant, is fighting his surrender to Germany and has applied for asylum there. The defence in Hamburg argues the handover itself was flawed, because the war-crimes charge now pursued was not mentioned when Italy surrendered him. That single objection opens the whole machinery of European surrender law: the arrest warrant that moves a person across borders in weeks, the specialty rule that limits what the receiving country may prosecute, the asylum claim that can block a transfer, and the question of which country is even entitled to try sabotage of undersea pipelines as a war crime. This article explains that machinery from the inside, the way a French court would apply it, because France uses exactly the same European rules and the same checks.

I. Arrested in Italy, on Trial in Germany: How Surrender Inside the European Union Really Works

A. European Arrest Warrant Between EU Countries: Why the Surrender From Italy Was Almost Automatic

Inside the European Union, one country does not ask another to extradite a suspect through diplomacy. A judge in Hamburg issues a European Arrest Warrant, police in Italy make the arrest, an Italian court checks a short list of legal conditions, and the person is handed over, usually within weeks. The French Code of Criminal Procedure gives the textbook definition, which is identical in substance in every Member State because all of them transposed the same European Framework Decision of 13 June 2002: « Le mandat d’arrêt européen est une décision judiciaire émise par un Etat membre de l’Union européenne, appelé Etat membre d’émission, en vue de l’arrestation et de la remise par un autre Etat membre, appelé Etat membre d’exécution, d’une personne recherchée pour l’exercice de poursuites pénales ou pour l’exécution d’une peine ou d’une mesure de sûreté privative de liberté ». Note the vocabulary: there is an issuing State and an executing State, and both are judges talking to judges, with no government deciding guilt.

Not every offence qualifies. French law sets the entry thresholds this way: « Les faits qui peuvent donner lieu à l’émission d’un mandat d’arrêt européen sont, aux termes de la loi de l’Etat membre d’émission, les suivants : 1° Les faits punis d’une peine privative de liberté d’une durée égale ou supérieure à un an ou, lorsqu’une condamnation à une peine est intervenue, quand la peine prononcée est égale ou supérieure à quatre mois d’emprisonnement ». Sabotage of energy infrastructure charged as a war crime clears that bar without discussion, which is why the warrant against the Nord Stream suspects travelled so fast once German prosecutors identified them.

The warrant itself must contain a fixed set of information, and this is where defence lawyers strike first when something is missing: « Tout mandat d’arrêt européen contient les renseignements suivants : -l’identité et la nationalité de la personne recherchée ; -la désignation précise et les coordonnées complètes de l’autorité judiciaire dont il émane ; -l’indication de l’existence d’un jugement exécutoire, d’un mandat d’arrêt ou de toute autre décision judiciaire ayant la même force selon la législation de l’Etat membre d’émission et entrant dans le champ d’application des articles 695-12 et 694-32 ; -la nature et la qualification juridique de l’infraction, notamment au regard de l’article 694-32 ; -la date, le lieu et les circonstances dans lesquels l’infraction a été commise ainsi que le degré de participation à celle-ci de la personne recherchée ». The Hamburg defence argument reported by the BBC fits exactly here: if the legal characterisation of the facts changed after surrender, from ordinary explosives offences to a war crime under international criminal law, the question is whether the warrant as executed fairly warned the executing judge and the defence of what the person would actually face. That is not a technicality. It is the core guarantee of the system, and it has a name: the specialty rule, examined in Part II.

Between arrest and handover, the person is normally detained. French procedure illustrates the standard European pattern: « Le premier président de la cour d’appel ou le magistrat du siège désigné par lui ordonne l’incarcération de la personne recherchée à la maison d’arrêt du siège de la cour d’appel dans le ressort de laquelle elle a été appréhendée, à moins qu’il n’estime que sa représentation à tous les actes de la procédure est suffisamment garantie », in which case supervision measures can be ordered instead. Kuznetsov spent more than a year in pre-trial detention in Germany before his trial opened, a duration his lawyers will certainly ask the Hamburg court to weigh, but detention during surrender proceedings is the European norm, not an anomaly, because the entire system is built for speed and for securing the person.

The reason surrender is so hard to resist is mutual trust. The French Court of Cassation stated the principle in a 21 January 2025 ruling authorising the surrender of a man arrested in Corsica to the Italian authorities, and the reasoning applies word for word to an Italian court surrendering a suspect to Germany: « la mise en oeuvre de la décision-cadre n° 2002/584/JAI du 13 juin 2002 relative au mandat d’arrêt européen visant à simplifier la procédure de remise des personnes repose sur les principes de confiance et de reconnaissance mutuelle entre Etats membres qui imposent notamment à chacun de ceux-ci de considérer, sauf circonstances exceptionnelles, que tous les autres Etats respectent le droit de l’Union et les droits fondamentaux consacrés par celui-ci » (Cass. crim., 21 January 2025, appeal no. 24-87.212). In that case the suspect argued that transfer to Italy would endanger his life; the Court answered that press cuttings and general reports prove nothing, and that only precise, objective evidence of systemic failure can rebut the presumption that a fellow Member State respects fundamental rights. Italy’s highest court reasoned the same way in reverse when it approved Kuznetsov’s handover to Germany: Germany’s courts are presumed to try him fairly, and it is for the defence to prove the contrary with concrete material, not headlines.

The executing judge is not a rubber stamp, however. The same ruling recalls the limit: « il appartient néanmoins à la chambre de l’instruction de vérifier si les droits fondamentaux de celle-ci seront respectés en cas de remise ». In France that verification is performed by the investigating chamber of the court of appeal; in Italy it was performed by the Italian courts up to the highest level; in Germany it will now be the Hamburg trial court and, on appeal, higher German courts that guarantee a fair trial. Three different national judges, one shared European standard. That is why, when surrender is granted between EU countries, it is granted quickly, and why challenges must target precise legal defects, such as the specialty objection raised in Hamburg, rather than general distrust of a fellow Member State’s justice system. Readers who want the mirror image, a French court refusing surrender over detention conditions, can read our analysis of when a European Arrest Warrant is refused in France over prison conditions and the sentence is enforced at home.

B. When France Can Say No: French Nationality, French Territory and Pending Asylum

Automatic does not mean blind. French law lists cases where the investigating chamber must refuse surrender, and they illuminate every European surrender file, including the Nord Stream cases. The mandatory bars are set out in Article 695-22 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: « L’exécution d’un mandat d’arrêt européen est refusée dans les cas suivants : 1° Si les faits pour lesquels il a été émis pouvaient être poursuivis et jugés par les juridictions françaises et que l’action publique est éteinte par l’amnistie ; 2° Si la personne recherchée a fait l’objet, par les autorités judiciaires françaises ou par celles d’un autre Etat membre que l’Etat d’émission, d’une décision définitive pour les mêmes faits que ceux faisant l’objet du mandat d’arrêt européen », provided any sentence has been served or can no longer be enforced. The second paragraph is the European ne bis in idem rule: no one is surrendered to be tried twice for the same facts. Applied to pipeline sabotage, it means that if a Swedish, Danish or German court had already finally acquitted or convicted a suspect for the September 2022 blasts, a new warrant for the same facts would fail. It also covers age, since surrender is refused where « la personne recherchée était âgée de moins de treize ans au moment des faits », and discriminatory prosecution, because refusal is mandatory where « il est établi que ledit mandat d’arrêt a été émis dans le but de poursuivre ou de condamner une personne en raison de son sexe, de sa race, de sa religion, de son origine ethnique, de sa nationalité, de sa langue, de ses opinions politiques ou de son orientation sexuelle ou identité de genre ». None of these bars was found in the Italian proceedings against Kuznetsov, but each of them frames what a French chamber would examine first if Germany ever sought a suspect on French soil.

Beyond the mandatory bars sits a second circle of optional refusals, and these are the levers defence lawyers actually pull in France. Article 695-24 provides that « L’exécution d’un mandat d’arrêt européen peut être refusée : 1° Si, pour les faits faisant l’objet du mandat d’arrêt, la personne recherchée fait l’objet de poursuites devant les juridictions françaises ou si celles-ci ont décidé de ne pas engager les poursuites ou d’y mettre fin ». Paris could therefore keep a case it is already prosecuting. The same article protects French nationals and residents convicted abroad: surrender for serving a sentence may be refused « Si la personne recherchée pour l’exécution d’une peine ou d’une mesure de sûreté privatives de liberté est de nationalité française, a établi sa résidence sur le territoire national ou demeure sur ce territoire et si la décision de condamnation est exécutoire sur le territoire français », so that the sentence is served in France instead. Territory matters too: refusal is possible « Si les faits pour lesquels il a été émis ont été commis, en tout ou en partie, sur le territoire français », and time can kill a warrant, « si la prescription de l’action publique ou de la peine se trouve acquise » where French courts could have heard the case. For pipeline sabotage in the Baltic Sea, none of these French anchors obviously applies, which is precisely why Germany, Denmark and Sweden, the coastal States, carried the investigations. But the grid matters for every French reader with a cross-border file: nationality, residence, territory and limitation are checked before any handover, in that order.

French nationality also triggers a forward-looking guarantee. Where the wanted person is French or has lived in France continuously for at least five years, « l’exécution du mandat d’arrêt européen peut être subordonnée à la vérification qu’elle peut être renvoyée en France pour y effectuer la peine qui sera éventuellement prononcée par l’autorité judiciaire de l’Etat d’émission pour les faits faisant l’objet du mandat ». Paris surrenders its own only against a promise of return to serve the sentence at home. Germany cannot demand such a guarantee for a Ukrainian suspect, but any French national caught in a future European sabotage or sanctions-evasion file would surrender to Hamburg or elsewhere only with that ticket home in the file.

The sharpest live issue in the Nord Stream saga is asylum. The second suspect, arrested in northern Croatia in August 2026, is fighting his transfer to Germany and has applied for asylum in Croatia. Can a protection claim block a European Arrest Warrant? French case law answers yes, but only through guarantees, not through automatic immunity. On 5 November 2024 the Court of Cassation reviewed the surrender to Sweden of an Afghan national who held refugee status in France and was wanted for prosecution for rape. The investigating chamber had asked Stockholm twice for assurances that the man would not later be removed to Afghanistan, and the Court approved the surrender on this reasoning: « les autorités judiciaires suédoises ont indiqué, en premier lieu, que la Suède respecte la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme et que toute remise en violation de ce texte serait exclue par le droit suédois », while the Swedish prosecution service separately undertook not to seek his expulsion in the framework of the ongoing preliminary investigation. The Court concluded that « les autorités judiciaires suédoises ont pris un engagement ferme et non équivoque, cohérent avec leur rôle et leurs prérogatives, de sorte que les droits de M. [U] se trouvent préservés en cas de remise » (Cass. crim., 5 November 2024, appeal no. 24-85.705). The method is now settled: the chamber interrogates the issuing State, demands a firm and unequivocal undertaking tailored to the risk, and surrenders only once it has it.

Transpose that method to Croatia. The suspect’s asylum application does not by itself cancel the German warrant; Croatian judges will have to ask Germany what happens after trial, whether return to a war zone is on the table, and what guarantees Berlin offers that the man will not be sent somewhere he faces persecution or inhuman treatment. If Germany gives a firm and unequivocal undertaking, surrender can proceed despite the asylum claim. If it refuses or answers vaguely, the Croatian court can stall or refuse. Asylum seekers with European warrants should understand the sequence: claim protection early, force the issuing State onto the record with written guarantees, and attack any gap between the promise and the practice. And the broader lesson for anyone who thinks borders protect them: inside the Union, moving from Germany to Croatia, or from France to Italy, buys no immunity. It only changes the courtroom where the same European checks are performed. For the logic of surrender to an international court rather than to a neighbour, see our companion analysis of surrender proceedings in France when the ICC seeks a fugitive, where the guarantees demanded follow the same philosophy.

II. Surrendered Is Not Tried: The Battles That Remain After the Handover

A. The Specialty Rule in Extradition: Can Hamburg Try a War-Crimes Charge Added After Surrender?

The Hamburg defence struck at the most technical and potentially the most powerful point in the file. According to the BBC’s reporting from the courtroom, the lawyers argued that the extradition from Italy was flawed because no mention had been made at the time of the war-crimes allegation now forming the backbone of the prosecution. In plain terms: Italy agreed to hand over a man accused of planting explosives, and Germany is trying a man accused of a war crime. If those are legally different prosecutions for earlier facts, the receiving State needs fresh permission. That permission mechanism is called the specialty rule, and it is one of the oldest protections in extradition law, fully preserved inside the European Arrest Warrant system.

French law states the mechanism plainly. After surrender, the issuing State cannot simply add charges at will for facts predating the handover: « La chambre de l’instruction devant laquelle la personne recherchée a comparu est saisie de toute demande émanant des autorités compétentes de l’Etat membre d’émission en vue de consentir à des poursuites ou à la mise à exécution d’une peine ou d’une mesure de sûreté prononcées pour d’autres infractions que celles ayant motivé la remise et commises antérieurement à celle-ci ». The same chamber also decides on any request to pass the person on to yet another Member State: « La chambre de l’instruction est également compétente pour statuer, après la remise de la personne recherchée, sur toute demande des autorités compétentes de l’Etat membre d’émission en vue de consentir à la remise de la personne recherchée à un autre Etat membre » for any earlier and distinct offence. The surrendered person is heard through a formal record, « un procès-verbal consignant les déclarations faites par la personne remise est également transmis par les autorités compétentes de l’Etat membre d’émission et soumis à la chambre de l’instruction », and those statements may be completed by observations from a lawyer of his choice or appointed ex officio. The chamber then rules within thirty days, after checking that the request contains the same full information as an initial warrant and obtaining guarantees where needed, and its decision can go to the Court of Cassation.

Consent is granted where the new acts constitute one of the serious offences that justify a warrant and fall within its scope; it is refused on the same mandatory grounds as an initial surrender and may be refused on the optional ones. Everything turns, therefore, on characterisation. If the war-crimes charge is merely the legal label Germany always attached to the same explosive facts described in the warrant executed by Italy, specialty is satisfied and the trial proceeds. If, on the contrary, the warrant described ordinary criminal damage and the war-crimes prosecution rests on materially different earlier facts, for example a commanding role in a military operation never disclosed to the Italian judge, then Germany would have needed Italy’s supplementary consent, and the Hamburg court would have to pause, seek it, or drop the added counts. The defence says the war-crimes dimension came as a surprise; the prosecution will answer that the facts never changed, only their legal reading. Only the trial judges can settle that dispute, possibly by asking Italy for retroactive consent, a request the Italian authorities could grant or refuse under their own transposition of the same European rule.

The practical lesson extends far beyond one pipeline. Anyone surrendered within Europe should assume that the file can grow but cannot mutate without permission: new evidence about the same facts is normal trial life, while new charges for different earlier facts require a return ticket to the executing State’s judges. Defence teams should therefore compare, line by line, the warrant as executed with the indictment as served, and attack every added count that the executing judge never saw. Prosecutors, symmetrically, should draft warrants broadly enough to cover the foreseeable legal characterisations, because a narrow warrant is an invitation to a specialty battle years later. In Hamburg that battle is now open, and its outcome could shape whether the trial stays on the war-crimes track or falls back to ordinary explosives charges, with very different sentencing horizons.

B. Who Can Judge Pipeline Sabotage as a War Crime, France Included?

Germany is prosecuting the Hamburg defendant for a war crime, described by prosecutors as an attack by military means against civilian objects under its code of crimes against international law. The choice of venue and charge raises a question many readers ask: why Germany, why a war crime, and could France do the same? Start with venue. The pipelines carried Russian gas to Germany, the economic victim was first and foremost the German energy supply, and the suspect was physically available once Italy surrendered him. Territorial and protective links point to Hamburg, and no competing final judgment from another State has been reported that would trigger ne bis in idem. The suspect’s reported false passport and clandestine travel add investigative colour, but they do not create jurisdiction; at most they explain why identification took years while Swedish, Danish and German investigators each pursued their own inquiries into the September 2022 blasts.

The war-crimes label is bolder. It treats underwater sabotage of civilian energy infrastructure, committed in the context of an international armed conflict raging since February 2022, as an attack on civilian objects rather than as ordinary criminal damage or terrorism. Whether that characterisation survives appellate review will be one of the most closely watched legal questions in Europe, because it decides the sentencing frame and the symbolic weight of any conviction. The defence already signals its counter-attack: only circumstantial evidence after four years of investigation, no witness, no forensics, no DNA, no fingerprints, in the words of the Italian defence lawyer quoted by the BBC outside the courtroom, plus the soldier’s-bind argument that a serviceman bound to secrecy cannot fully defend himself by revealing where he was and which witnesses to call. Presumption of innocence applies in full, and the packed Hamburg gallery watched a defendant who denies everything, not a convicted saboteur.

Could France prosecute the same kind of facts? French law answers with a conditional yes, fenced by strict cumulative conditions. Outside the cases reserved to cooperation with the International Criminal Court, « peut être poursuivie et jugée par les juridictions françaises toute personne soupçonnée d’avoir commis à l’étranger l’une des infractions suivantes : 1° Le crime de génocide […] ; 2° Les autres crimes contre l’humanité […] ; 3° Les crimes et les délits de guerre définis aux articles 461-1 à 461-31 du même code ». War crimes are therefore covered, but the suspect must have a real anchor in France: « La personne soupçonnée doit avoir une résidence habituelle sur le territoire français, celle-ci se définissant par un lien de rattachement suffisant avec la France », assessed through the duration and conditions of presence, the reasons for it, the stated will to settle or remain, and family, social, material or professional ties. Prosecution can then only be launched at the request of the anti-terrorism prosecutor and where no international or national court seeks the person’s surrender or extradition, with the prosecution service verifying that absence of competing proceedings. A suspect merely changing planes at Roissy would not qualify; a suspect living in France with family, work and settled presence could, provided Paris moves before any other competent court claims him.

That subsidiarity condition is the quiet engine of the whole Nord Stream file: Germany prosecutes because Germany moved first and holds the defendants, while France, Sweden and Denmark stand back. Had a suspect settled in Lyon or Marseille, the French anti-terrorism prosecutor could have opened a war-crimes file under the same provision, and Germany would then have had to request surrender from France under the very European warrant rules examined in Part I, with France checking specialty, fundamental rights and the return guarantee for any French national. The European system is circular by design: jurisdiction follows the anchor, surrender follows jurisdiction, and guarantees follow surrender.

French readers with interests touched by the sabotage, energy companies, insurers, investors in infrastructure, should draw the concrete consequences. Criminal proceedings in Hamburg do not by themselves compensate losses; civil-party claims before the German court or separate civil actions remain the route for damages, under German procedural rules and limitation periods that a French lawyer must coordinate with local counsel rather than improvise. Contractual chains affected by the shutdown of Nord Stream 1 and the stillborn Nord Stream 2, force majeure clauses, sanctions compliance, frozen payments, belong to civil and regulatory litigation, not to the war-crimes trial, even though the same facts feed both. And anyone who handled funds, equipment or logistics connected with the operation, however innocently, should preserve documents now: European sabotage, sanctions and money-laundering investigations share evidence across borders, and a witness in one file can become a suspect in another.

Conclusion

The Hamburg trial is the visible tip of a European legal machine that worked exactly as designed: a German warrant, an Italian arrest on a family holiday, review up to Italy’s highest court, handover within months, and a trial opening a year later before the judges of the State most directly harmed. The two live fault lines are the specialty objection, whether a war-crimes charge can be tried on a surrender granted for explosives facts, and the Croatian file, whether an asylum claim can extract written guarantees from Berlin or block the second suspect’s transfer. France would handle each step with the same tools: the investigating chamber checking the warrant’s contents and the mandatory and optional bars, the Court of Cassation presuming mutual trust while verifying fundamental rights, the specialty consent procedure for any added charges, and universal jurisdiction for war crimes only where the suspect is genuinely anchored in France and no other court claims him. Watch three dates: the Hamburg court’s ruling on the specialty challenge, the Croatian decision on the asylum-blocking surrender, and the final verdict, appealable through the German courts and ultimately reviewable in Strasbourg on fair-trial grounds. Until then, the defendant is presumed innocent, the pipelines lie on the seabed, and the law of European surrender keeps turning, fast, technical and unforgiving of imprecise warrants.

📄 Official circular