On the night of 16 October 2026, the President of the United States signed an executive order setting aside many of the Russia sanctions that Congress had passed a month earlier, invoking the national interest two days before they were due to take effect. In London, the story led the morning bulletins and lit up search trends. In Paris, a treasurer reading the news over coffee could be forgiven for asking the only question that matters to him: does anything change for the frozen account, the blocked payment, the sanctioned supplier? The answer is no. Four days earlier, on 12 October, the Council of the European Union had adopted its largest-ever round of Russia listings, close to 1,600 new names, followed on 15 October by fresh designations targeting circumvention networks. Those European acts apply in France by themselves, they are enforced by French ministers, French customs officers, French judges and even the French audiovisual regulator, and only the Council of the European Union can lift them. A waiver signed in Washington is not an authorization in Paris. This article explains what the American president actually waived, what Brussels adopted the same week, and what anyone living, banking or trading in France must still do — freeze, refuse, report — and how French courts punish those who improvise, with four recent rulings to prove it.
I. Washington hit pause while Brussels hit accelerate: two Russia-sanctions policies in a single week
A. What Donald Trump waived on 16 October — and the tariff threat he kept alive
The American story starts with a statute. In September 2026, Congress passed, by a rare bipartisan agreement, the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026, and the President signed it. According to the BBC’s account of the events, the legislation aimed at the Russian economy on several fronts at once: sanctions against senior Russian figures including Vladimir Putin, against Russian financial institutions, and against the so-called shadow fleet of tankers used to move Russian energy around existing embargoes. Its most striking weapon was commercial rather than financial: broad powers for the President to levy tariffs of up to 100 percent on imports from the top five purchasers of Russian oil and gas, most significantly China and India, with an exception for countries importing less than 15 percent of Russia’s natural gas exports that have taken significant steps to reduce those imports. The the Guardian’s reconstruction of 17 October 2026 adds the key procedural detail: under the legislation as signed, the President had until 18 October to impose the sanctions and tariffs on Russian energy — or to waive them.
On Friday night, he waived them. The executive order states that withholding many of the sanctions, restrictions and duties is in the national interest of the United States. The BBC reports that the order blocks numerous sanctions two days before they were due to take effect, and the Guardian notes that the suspension was greeted in Moscow as an important and truly historic moment by presidential envoy Kirill Dmitriev. Backlash in Washington was immediate and bipartisan. A dozen senators, including six Republicans, had written on the preceding Tuesday urging the President to execute the sanctions authorities in the legislation and to rescind a parallel arrangement: a deal under which the United States would import Russian diesel — more than 300,000 metric tons at once, then an additional 500,000 tons in November, one million tons immediately thereafter and three million more within a short period — presented as a way to bring down energy prices that have soared during the war with Iran, with midterm elections weeks away. One Democratic congressman publicly accused the President of capitulating to Moscow and betraying Kyiv; Kyiv itself warned that the diesel money would start flowing back into Russia.
The waiver cannot be read in isolation from the open row between Washington and Kyiv. Within days, the two capitals had clashed over an announced energy ceasefire covering strikes on energy infrastructure, which Ukraine first greeted with surprise, then resumed abandoning after fresh Russian attacks on its refineries and power plants; over the uplink speeds of the Starlink satellite network used extensively by the Ukrainian military; and over intelligence-sharing, which the President denies having halted. The Guardian reports the President publicly criticising his Ukrainian counterpart Volodymyr Zelenskyy, including suggesting the country needs a new leader. For a European reader, the political lesson is plain: American sanctions policy toward Russia is currently hostage to a bilateral quarrel and to domestic fuel prices. The legal lesson, developed below, is even plainer: none of this has any legal effect inside the European Union.
B. What the EU Council adopted on 12 and 15 October — and why only that governs in France
While Washington was preparing its waiver, Brussels was moving in the opposite direction. On 12 October 2026, the Council of the European Union announced what it describes as its largest-ever package of listings: 820 individuals and 826 entities added to the Russia sanctions list, targeting companies and executives linked to the defence industries alongside political figures, as detailed by sanctions practices in London and Washington the same week. A companion analysis published on this site reconstructs the 12 October listings package, its immediate freeze effect and the authorization procedure in detail. Three days later, on 15 October, the Council adopted additional restrictive measures against three individuals and nine entities involved in importing sanctioned goods into Russia and in circumvention schemes, expressly to close loopholes, according to the Council’s own press release. These designations sit on top of the 19th sanctions package adopted on 23 October 2025, which introduced a ban on imports of Russian liquefied natural gas starting in January 2027 alongside measures against Russian energy, third-country banks and crypto-asset providers, as the Council announced at the time.
The individual freeze that concerns most readers in France rests on Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 of 17 March 2014, adopted to implement Decision 2014/145/CFSP on restrictive measures in response to actions undermining the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. Its core rule, as recorded by the French Conseil d’Etat in its 2023 ruling on the French publication decree examined below, is that all funds and economic resources belonging to, held or controlled by the persons and entities listed in Annex I are frozen, and no funds or economic resources may be made available to them, directly or indirectly, or released for their benefit. Sectoral restrictions, including the ban on broadcasting content from listed outlets, rest notably on Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine, likewise recorded by the Conseil d’Etat. Both instruments were adopted on the basis of Article 29 of the Treaty on European Union and Article 215 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and both are applied in France directly by French authorities and French courts — which is exactly why an American waiver cannot suspend them. As the Conseil d’Etat put it this summer in a case upholding a French blocking order, the measures run until the Council of the European Union itself lifts the sanctions. No other capital gets a vote.
II. In France the freeze holds: immediate duties, criminal punishment and the narrow lawful exits
A. Freeze first, ask later: who must comply and how French courts punish evasion
French sanctions enforcement does not wait for anyone’s permission, and it certainly does not wait for Washington. Alongside the European regulations applied directly, France maintains its own national freeze machinery in Chapter II of Title VI of the Code monetaire et financier. Two ministerial tools matter here. Under Article L. 562-2 of that Code, « Le ministre chargé de l’économie et le ministre de l’intérieur peuvent décider, conjointement, pour une durée de six mois, renouvelable, le gel des fonds et ressources économiques » of persons involved in terrorism, while under Article L. 562-3, « Le ministre chargé de l’économie peut décider, pour une durée de six mois, renouvelable, le gel des fonds et ressources économiques » of persons designated under United Nations Security Council Chapter VII resolutions or acts adopted under Article 29 of the Treaty on European Union or Article 75 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union — the very legal bases of the EU Russia measures. Definitions sit in Article L. 562-1. But the provision that bites every bank, insurer, employer, notaire and trader in France is Article L. 562-4: « Sont tenus d’appliquer sans délai les mesures de gel et les interdictions de mise à disposition ou d’utilisation prévues au présent chapitre » all individuals on national territory and the regulated entities of Article L. 561-2, who must also inform the Minister of the Economy immediately. Refusal or delay is not an option the statute offers. Mirror prohibitions follow in Article L. 562-5 — « Il est interdit aux personnes mentionnées à l’article L. 562-4 de mettre à disposition directement ou indirectement, ou d’utiliser des fonds ou ressources économiques au profit des personnes dont les fonds et ressources économiques font l’objet d’une mesure de gel » — and in Article L. 562-6: « Il est interdit aux personnes mentionnées à l’article L. 562-4 de participer, sciemment et volontairement, à des activités ayant pour objet ou pour effet de contourner les mesures ». The 15 October EU designations aimed precisely at circumvention networks show why that second prohibition matters this month: routing a payment through an unlisted intermediary to reach a listed destination is the textbook case the statute already forbids.
France also makes the freeze visible. Under Article L. 562-8, freeze decisions and prohibitions may be published in the land registry against real estate belonging to the frozen person, and the Minister of the Interior may record an objection to any transfer of a vehicle’s registration certificate. The Conseil d’Etat upheld exactly this transparency policy for Russian sanctions in its ruling of 7 April 2023, no. 465879, rejecting the application by three companies — 33 rue de l’Universite, Le Cordillera and Winberg Saint-Tropez — for judicial review of the decree of 16 May 2022 publishing the list of legal persons owning frozen real estate under Regulation No 269/2014. The Court held that « Il résulte de tout ce qui précède que la requête des sociétés requérantes doit être rejetée », dismissing in turn the property-rights argument, the argument based on national publication rules, the demand for individual reasoning and adversarial procedure, and the claim that the applicants should never have appeared on the published list — the decree, the Court observed, sets publication mechanics and does not itself designate anyone. The full ruling is published at CE, 7 April 2023, no. 465879. For owners of Paris real estate held through deseminated companies, the message is that the freeze follows the asset into the land registry and the courts will not pull it out on procedural pretexts.
Evasion, meanwhile, is a criminal offence tried by the criminal courts, and customs officers are its investigators. In its ruling of 29 November 2023, no. 22-85.867, the Criminal Chamber of the Cour de cassation recalled that « l’article 459 du code des douanes réprime l’infraction de soustraction à une mesure de gel des avoirs de la confiscation du produit du délit et d’une amende douanière égale au minimum au montant et au maximum au double de la somme sur laquelle a porté l’infraction ». The case concerned the president and the secretary of two associations dissolved in March 2019 as vectors of hateful ideology, whose bank assets had been frozen by four joint ministerial orders taken between October 2018 and April 2021 under Article L. 562-2; both were convicted of evading the freeze, receiving suspended prison terms alongside a customs fine and confiscation, and the Cour de cassation upheld the convictions, quashing only the confiscation and fine calibrations for one of them. Read the ruling at Cass. crim., 29 November 2023, no. 22-85.867. The same enforcement machinery operates at the border: on 7 September 2022, no. 21-85.236, the Criminal Chamber rejected the appeal of a freight forwarder convicted of violating a statutory export prohibition — used vehicle batteries shipped toward Madagascar — reclassified as export without declaration of prohibited goods, punished by fifteen months suspended imprisonment, customs fines and confiscation of seized cash. See Cass. crim., 7 September 2022, no. 21-85.236. Anyone moving sanctioned goods through a French port or airport this autumn faces the same customs-criminal track.
Enforcement even reaches screens. On 15 July 2026, no. 509579, the Conseil d’Etat rejected Cloudflare’s application against the audiovisual regulator Arcom’s decision of 9 July 2025 ordering the company, under Article 11 of the Law of 21 June 2004, to take measures preventing access from French territory, within seventy-two hours, to online services disseminating content in breach of Regulations No 833/2014 and No 269/2014 — measures running, again, until the Council of the European Union itself lifts the sanctions. The Court found the order satisfied the Digital Services Act’s injunction requirements, held it inflicted no disproportionate interference with freedom of communication and expression given the objectives of the European measures, and refused to refer any preliminary question to Luxembourg, concluding that « la société requérante n’est pas fondée à demander l’annulation de la décision qu’elle attaque ». See CE, 15 July 2026, no. 509579. A hosting provider, a platform, a media buyer: all are within the enforcement perimeter, and the perimeter is drawn in Luxembourg and Paris, not in Washington.
B. The only two lawful exits: Treasury authorization and the judge — both strict
French law provides exactly two ways out of a freeze, and an American waiver is neither of them. The first is prior authorization. Under Article L. 562-11 of the Code monetaire et financier, the Minister of the Economy may authorize the release of part of funds frozen under Article L. 562-3 or under an act adopted under Article 29 TEU or Article 75 TFEU — the EU sanctions track — where use is compatible with public order and with the decisions and acts behind the freeze, and such authorizations may be granted on the ministers’ own initiative or upon request. Symmetrically, at European level, release of funds frozen under an EU regulation requires the green light of the competent national authority designated by that regulation. The Cour de cassation enforces this requirement without mercy. On 5 February 2026, no. 23-15.936, the Second Civil Chamber rejected the appeal of a Kuwaiti company holding an arbitral award against the Libyan State, declared enforceable in France, which had attached the Paris accounts of the Libyan Investment Authority at Societe Generale in October 2020: the Paris enforcement judge had retracted the authorization and annulled the attachment, the Paris Court of Appeal had confirmed, and the Cour de cassation agreed. Its reasoning quotes the Libya regulation directly: funds of the listed entities « restent gelés », and « peuvent autoriser, dans les conditions qu’elles jugent appropriées, le déblocage de certains fonds ou ressources économiques gelés » only the competent authorities of the Member States, for payments due under pre-designation contracts and under strict conditions. An enforceable award plus an enforcement judge’s initial permission were not enough; without the Treasury-style authorization, the seizure died. See Cass. civ. 2, 5 February 2026, no. 23-15.936. Creditors of newly listed Russian debtors after the 12 October wave should read that ruling twice: attaching first and asking later produces an annulled attachment, not a payment.
The second exit is the judge — and here too France defers to Luxembourg rather than to any foreign capital. The leading French precedent is the plenary Assembly ruling of 10 July 2020, nos. 18-18.542 and 18-21.814, in the Bank Sepah litigation: an Iranian bank with a Paris branch, listed under the EU Iran regulations, fought attachments carried out by two American companies on its frozen assets, and the Cour de cassation, rather than deciding alone whether even non-attributive measures — judicial securities and protective attachments under the French Code of Civil Enforcement Procedures — « peuvent être diligentées sans autorisation préalable sur des avoirs gelés », stayed proceedings and referred the interpretation questions to the Court of Justice of the European Union, expressly listing those measures: « Ces mesures sont les sûretés judiciaires et les saisies conservatoires ». See Cass., Ass. plen., 10 July 2020, nos. 18-18.542 and 18-21.814. The institutional moral is the opposite of the week’s American news: when a French court doubts what a freeze permits, it asks Luxembourg, never Washington. Direct challenges to EU listings follow their own European track — recent annulments obtained in Luxembourg, such as the third annulment secured against an EU Russia listing as reconstructed in the Boguslayev annulment analysis on this site, show that route is real but slow, technical and decided on the file as it stood at listing. National implementing measures, for their part, go before the French administrative judge, where this year’s scoreboard reads zero for two: the real-estate publication decree survived in 2023 and the Arcom blocking order survived in July 2026.
For a company, a bank or an individual in France, the resulting checklist for the coming weeks is short and unforgiving. Screen counterparty lists again against the 12 and 15 October additions before every payment, delivery or service. Freeze immediately and inform the Minister of the Economy where the statute requires it; the duty in Article L. 562-4 runs « sans délai ». Make nothing available, directly or indirectly, to a listed person or to entities they own or control, and do not route around the freeze through intermediaries — Articles L. 562-5 and L. 562-6 prohibit both, and the 15 October circumvention designations prove the Council is watching the detours. Seek prior authorization from the competent authority before any payment touching frozen funds, even under a contract or a judgment that predates the listing; the Libyan attachment ruling shows what happens otherwise. And treat the American waiver for what it is in a Paris compliance file: a foreign enforcement decision that suspends American measures only. It does not appear among the French authorizations, it is not a competent authority under any EU regulation, and no French court has ever treated it as one. The freeze in France ends when the Council of the European Union ends it, or when a judge says otherwise — nowhere else.
Conclusion
The week of 12 to 17 October 2026 staged a transatlantic split in real time: the European Union adopted its largest-ever round of Russia listings and then struck at circumvention networks, while the President of the United States set aside the sanctions Congress had voted, citing the national interest eighteen months into a war whose energy costs now dominate his domestic calendar. Both events are real, but only one of them is law in France. European regulations apply here directly; French ministers freeze, French customs prosecute, the Conseil d’Etat publishes and blocks, and the Cour de cassation annuls seizures made without authorization and sends hard questions to Luxembourg. Businesses and individuals in France should therefore do exactly what they did on 11 October: screen, freeze, refuse, request authorization — and file the Washington news under politics, not compliance. The next legally relevant date is not the American deadline of 18 October. It is whatever day the Council of the European Union decides to lift, amend or extend its own measures — and until that day, as France’s highest courts keep repeating, the funds stay frozen.