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US Employment Based Green Card Proposal: Does the PERM Overhaul Affect Pending Cases?

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Maître Hassan KOHEN, avocat au Barreau de Paris
Hassan KOHEN
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US Employment Based Green Card Proposal: Does the PERM Overhaul Affect Pending Cases?

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Searches for “us employment based green card proposal” rose across the United States on Monday, November 16, 2026, after the U.S. Department of Labor released a notice of proposed rulemaking titled Modernizing the Labor Market Test and Improving Protections for U.S. Workers in the PERM Immigrant Visa Program. The notice, docket ETA-2026-0133, is scheduled for publication in the Federal Register on November 17, 2026. It would rewrite 20 C.F.R. part 656, the federal regulations that govern the labor certification most EB-2 and EB-3 green cards require. Its main proposals are concrete: end Schedule A, the list that lets employers of nurses, physical therapists and certain people of exceptional ability skip the recruitment test; keep job advertisements open for at least 90 days; bar filings for two years after certain layoffs of U.S. workers; and keep the notice of filing available to workers until the immigrant petition is decided.

The short answer for anyone with a case in progress is that nothing in the notice binds anyone today. It is a proposal, open for 60 days of public comment, and the current part 656 continues to govern every filing. If the Department finalizes it as written, the proposed transition rule would apply the new requirements only to applications filed on or after the 90th day after the final rule is published. What follows explains the federal statute, the procedure an agency must follow, three court decisions on proposed rules, retroactivity and agency authority, and the practical checks an employer or a sponsored worker can make now. The discussion is general in scope and makes no findings about any particular employer, worker or application.

I. Does the PERM proposal change anything for a green card case today?

A. A proposed rule is not law yet, and the comment period is where its content is decided

Start with the statute, because the proposal is built on a reading of it. Under the federal Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(5)(A), a foreign national who seeks to enter the United States to perform skilled or unskilled labor is inadmissible unless the Secretary of Labor has certified two things to the Secretary of State and the Attorney General: that there are not sufficient U.S. workers who are able, willing, qualified and available at the time of application and at the place of work, and that “the employment of such alien will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of workers in the United States similarly employed.” The same paragraph contains a special rule for members of the teaching profession and people with exceptional ability in the sciences or the arts, for whom the comparison is with “equally qualified” U.S. workers.

That certification matters because of where it sits in the green card system. The federal preference categories in 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b) make visas available in the second preference to professionals holding advanced degrees and people of exceptional ability “whose services in the sciences, arts, professions, or business are sought by an employer in the United States,” and in the third preference to skilled workers, professionals and other workers. The second preference contains its own exit: under § 1153(b)(2)(B)(i), the government may waive the job offer requirement when it deems a waiver to be in the national interest. The Department’s notice describes this national interest waiver as the one exception the statute provides, and the waiver is decided by the Department of Homeland Security rather than under the Labor Department’s part 656. For everyone else sponsored by an employer in EB-2 or EB-3, the PERM labor certification is the first gate.

The current rules for that gate are in the federal regulations at 20 C.F.R. part 656, and they remain the rules today. The Department says in its notice that it has not updated the PERM regulations in nearly 20 years, and it proposes to replace large parts of them. But a notice of proposed rulemaking is a step in a procedure set by the federal Administrative Procedure Act. Under 5 U.S.C. § 553, an agency publishes a general notice of proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register that includes either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects and issues involved. It must then give interested persons an opportunity to participate through written data, views or arguments, and, after considering what it receives, incorporate in the rules it adopts “a concise general statement of their basis and purpose.” Section 553(d) adds that a substantive rule must generally be published at least 30 days before its effective date, with listed exceptions. The Department’s notice goes further than that minimum: it proposes a 60-day delayed effective date and an additional 30 days of transition. Under the notice, comments are due 60 days after publication in the Federal Register; if publication occurs on November 17, 2026, as scheduled, that count points to January 16, 2027, and the published notice will state the controlling date.

Why the comment period matters in practice is shown by a dispute over this very program. In Kooritzky v. Reich, 17 F.3d 1509 (D.C. Cir. 1994), decided on March 18, 1994, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reviewed a 1991 Department of Labor “interim final rule” that limited a labor certification to the foreign worker named on the employer’s application, which ended the employer’s ability to substitute a new worker when the original one could no longer take the job. The Department’s earlier notice had said its proposal was limited to implementing the Immigration Act of 1990 and minor technical changes, and that it would not affect the section providing that certifications were valid indefinitely. The court explained that “It is an elementary principle of rule-making that a final rule need not match the rule proposed, indeed must not if the record demands a change,” but that the final rule must be a logical outgrowth of the proposal, and it found nothing in the notice to support the substitution ban: “Something is not a logical outgrowth of nothing.” The court held that the Department had promulgated the 1991 amendment in violation of 5 U.S.C. § 553, reversed the district court and remanded for appropriate relief. The lesson for today’s proposal is direct: the final PERM rule may move away from the text now on public inspection, but only within the subjects and issues the notice actually put on the table, so a comment on the 90-day advertising period, the two-year layoff bar or the transition dates is the moment to shape the result.

Federal courts still apply that principle. In Minnesota v. United States Department of Agriculture, No. 25-cv-4767 (D. Minn. Jan. 16, 2026), a federal district court for the District of Minnesota granted the State of Minnesota a preliminary injunction on January 16, 2026, against demands the Department of Agriculture had issued about recertifying food assistance households. One of the court’s reasons was that the agency had not published the project in the Federal Register as its own regulation required, and the court cited Kooritzky v. Reich, 17 F.3d 1509, for the point that notice procedures ensure the agency hears from those affected and considers whether to “adjust or abandon [its] proposals in light of public comments or internal agency reconsideration.” The order shows that the Kooritzky reasoning is still being cited by federal courts in 2026, at least as persuasive authority, when an agency skips the public notice step. It was issued at the preliminary injunction stage, so it reflects the court’s assessment of likely success rather than a final judgment, and it concerns a different statute. For PERM sponsors, the practical reading is the same: written comments filed on docket ETA-2026-0133 are part of the record the Department must consider before it adopts a final rule.

The same mechanics apply to the parallel immigration proposals of the past weeks. We described them for a Department of Homeland Security notice in our article on whether USCIS can deny an H-1B renewal it approved before; the PERM notice is a separate rulemaking by a different agency, but the legal status of a proposal is identical. Until a final rule is published with an effective date, employers file under the current part 656 and the Department adjudicates under it.

B. If the rule is finalized, which applications would it reach?

The Department’s notice answers that question in a new transition section, proposed 20 C.F.R. § 656.7. As drafted, the Department’s processing center would continue to process an Application for Permanent Employment Certification or an Application for Prevailing Wage Determination submitted before the 90th day after publication of the final rule under the requirements in effect before the new rules took effect, and it would process applications submitted on or after that day under the new requirements. The notice explains the design: the new rule would take effect 60 calendar days after publication, and the Department would grant 30 additional calendar days so that employers already engaged in pre-filing recruitment can complete it and file under the current framework. The test is the submission date of the application, so that each application is subject to only one set of rules. These dates are proposals too, and the Department expressly invites comments on the length of the transition period.

That proposed cutoff interacts with the timing rules employers already follow. Under the current federal regulation, 20 C.F.R. § 656.17(e), an employer filing for a professional occupation must place a job order with the State Workforce Agency for 30 days and run two print advertisements on different Sundays, and those mandatory steps must be conducted at least 30 days, but no more than 180 days, before filing. The employer must also select three additional recruitment steps, none of which may have taken place more than 180 days before filing. An employer whose recruitment is already under way, or will be under way before a final rule appears, can therefore plan to file within those windows and before the proposed 90-day cutoff. The proposal would change both ends of that timeline: advertisements would run for at least 90 days, and recruitment would have to be completed no more than 60 and no fewer than 30 calendar days before the expected filing date.

For the sponsored worker, the filing date also fixes a place in line. Under the federal regulation on immigrant petitions, 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(d), the priority date of a petition accompanied by an individual labor certification is the date the labor certification application was accepted for processing by any office of the Department of Labor, while the priority date of a petition accompanied by an application for Schedule A designation is the date the completed petition is properly filed with USCIS. Once a certification is approved, the clock keeps running: under 20 C.F.R. § 656.30(b)(1), an approved permanent labor certification granted on or after July 16, 2007, expires if it is not filed in support of a Form I-140 petition within 180 calendar days of the date the Department granted it. Those two rules, not the headlines, are the dates to write down in any pending file.

Could a final rule reach back to applications already filed? The general answer in federal law is no, unless Congress has clearly authorized it. In Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital, 488 U.S. 204 (1988), decided on December 12, 1988, the Supreme Court of the United States considered a Medicare cost-limit rule that a federal court had set aside for lack of notice and comment, and that the Secretary of Health and Human Services then reissued after notice and comment with effect back to July 1, 1981, recouping payments from hospitals. The Court held that “a statutory grant of legislative rulemaking authority will not, as a general matter, be understood to encompass the power to promulgate retroactive rules unless that power is conveyed by Congress in express terms,” found no such authority in the Medicare Act and affirmed the judgment that the retroactive rule was invalid. Applied to PERM, the point is practical: a final rule that tried to apply the new recruitment standards to applications already submitted under the current rules would face that default presumption, and the Department’s own proposal avoids the problem by tying the regime to the filing date.

The Bowen rule is not a museum piece. In Wille v. Lutnick, No. 24-1734 (4th Cir. Oct. 31, 2025), a published decision of October 31, 2025, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit quoted Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital, 488 U.S. 204, 208, for both the presumption against retroactive administrative rules and the requirement of express congressional authorization, and then explained what kind of retroactivity the doctrine targets: “Disfavored retroactivity turns conduct that was considered lawful at the time into unlawful conduct.” The court held that the later ratification, by an official with authority, of a National Marine Fisheries Service rule restricting approaches to Hawaiian spinner dolphins was not impermissibly retroactive, and it affirmed the dismissal of the challenge. Read together, the two decisions give a sponsored worker or employer a precise question to ask about any final PERM rule: does it attach new legal consequences to recruitment, filings or certifications completed under the old rules, or does it only govern what is filed afterward?

One gap deserves attention. The proposed transition text is written for applications submitted to the Department’s processing center. Schedule A cases work differently today: under the current regulations the employer obtains a prevailing wage determination and files an uncertified application directly with USCIS together with the Form I-140 petition, without pre-filing recruitment. In the parts of the notice reviewed for this article, the transition section does not separately address a Schedule A petition already pending at USCIS on the day a final rule takes effect. That is a point to watch in the final rule and a natural subject for a comment, and it is a reason for employers of nurses and physical therapists who already qualify under the current rules not to assume an automatic grace period.

II. What would the PERM overhaul change if it is finalized as proposed?

A. Schedule A would disappear, and the authority question would go to the courts

Schedule A is short. The current federal regulation, 20 C.F.R. § 656.5, states the Department’s determination that there are not sufficient U.S. workers who are able, willing, qualified and available for the listed occupations, and that employing foreign workers in them will not adversely affect U.S. workers similarly employed. Group I covers physical therapists who possess all the qualifications necessary to take the licensing examination in the state where they will practice, and professional nurses who hold a certificate from the Commission on Graduates of Foreign Nursing Schools, hold a full and unrestricted license in the state of intended employment, or have passed the NCLEX-RN examination. Group II covers people of exceptional ability in the sciences or arts, including college and university teachers of exceptional ability, and people of exceptional ability in the performing arts. An employer seeking certification for a listed occupation applies under § 656.15, which is the route that skips the recruitment test.

The Department proposes to delete § 656.5 in its entirety and reserve subpart B. Its stated reasons are twofold. First, it says it “lacks the authority to establish an exception to the INA’s labor market test,” because § 1182(a)(5)(A) requires a certification before “any alien” may be admitted to perform skilled or unskilled labor and does not authorize the Department to exempt occupations. Second, it says that even if it had that authority, it could no longer justify the list: its 2023 request for information drew more than 2,000 comments, none of which, in the Department’s view, supplied a reliable and objective methodology for identifying shortage occupations. The scale is significant. Using USCIS data, the Department estimates an average of about 23,835 Schedule A petitions per year for fiscal years 2023 through 2025, compared with an average of 108,786 certified PERM applications. Under the proposal, positions formerly in Group I would follow the standard PERM process, and recruitment for positions formerly in Group II would be assessed under the “equally qualified” standard that already applies to college and university teachers, while USCIS would continue to decide whether the worker actually has exceptional ability.

If the Department finalizes this change, a legal challenge would turn on the meaning of the statute, and that question now belongs to the courts. In Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, No. 22-451 (June 28, 2024), decided on June 28, 2024, the Supreme Court of the United States overruled the Chevron doctrine, under which courts had sometimes deferred to permissible agency readings of ambiguous statutes. The Court held that courts must exercise their independent judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority, as the Administrative Procedure Act requires, and that courts “may not defer to an agency interpretation of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous.” The application to Schedule A cuts both ways. A court reviewing a final rule would decide for itself whether § 1182(a)(5)(A) permits the Department to pre-certify entire occupations, and after Loper Bright it would owe no deference either to the Department’s new view that it lacks that power or to the opposite view reflected in the regulation the Department kept for decades. Loper Bright also leaves room for respect for executive interpretations that are thorough and consistent, and it directs courts to honor genuine delegations of authority, so the outcome would depend on the statutory text and context rather than on the agency’s say-so.

The review standard comes from the same federal statute. Under 5 U.S.C. § 706, the reviewing court “shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action,” and it must hold unlawful and set aside agency action found to be arbitrary or capricious, in excess of statutory authority, or adopted without observance of procedure required by law. Those are the three lines of attack a final PERM rule could face: that it misreads § 1182(a)(5)(A), that its reasons do not hold together on the record, or that it departs from what the notice proposed. Those lines of attack concern a final rule; while the rulemaking is pending, the current regulations remain the ones employers must follow.

B. Recruitment, layoffs and notice: what employers and sponsored workers can check now

Beyond Schedule A, the proposal would rebuild the recruitment test. Today, § 656.17(e) prescribes a job order and print advertisements for professional occupations, plus three steps chosen from a menu that includes job fairs, the employer’s website and job search websites. The notice would replace that menu with a single set of electronic recruitment requirements for all occupations, built around the employer’s website, job search websites, social media platforms and job fairs or on-campus recruiting. Advertisements, including the job order with the State Workforce Agency, would remain available for no less than 90 calendar days, or for the number of days the employer customarily advertised similar jobs not requiring labor certification during the most recent 12 months, whichever is longer. Recruitment would have to end no more than 60 and no fewer than 30 calendar days before filing, and the employer would submit a recruitment report with the application. The Department also proposes to extend the optional competitive recruitment procedure now used for college and university teachers to professional athletes and professional sports team coaches.

The layoff rules would tighten sharply. Under the current regulation, § 656.17(k), an employer that has had a layoff in the area of intended employment within 6 months of filing, in the occupation involved or a related occupation, must document that it notified and considered all potentially qualified laid-off U.S. workers. The proposal would instead require the employer to attest that it has not laid off any U.S. worker in the same or similar occupation in the area of intended employment within 2 years before filing; an employer unable to make that attestation could not file. If a qualifying layoff occurred after filing and before USCIS approves the immigrant petition, or before a denial or withdrawal, the employer would have to notify the Department’s processing center, and USCIS when a petition is pending, within 5 business days, and offer the job to the laid-off workers on the terms of the application. A staffing employer could not place the sponsored worker with another employer that laid off U.S. workers in the same or similar occupation during that window, where there are indicia of an employment relationship with that other employer. The notice of filing would begin within 10 business days before filing and remain available to workers until the immigrant petition is approved or a final denial or withdrawal occurs.

For employers, these proposals translate into a short list of checks. Map each planned case against the current windows in § 656.17(e) and the proposed 90-day cutoff, keeping in mind that the cutoff will run from the publication date of a final rule that does not yet exist. Review layoffs in the relevant occupations and locations over the past two years now, because the proposal looks back that far. Decide whether to comment on docket ETA-2026-0133, and on what: the notice invites comments on all aspects of the proposal and asks specifically about the two-year layoff period, the change to the “same or similar occupation” wording and the length of the transition period, and the treatment of Schedule A petitions in transition is a gap worth raising. A comment that supplies data is more useful than one that only states a preference, because the Department must explain its final choices in light of the record under § 553(c).

For sponsored workers, the useful questions are more personal. Has your employer requested a prevailing wage determination or started recruitment, and when does it expect to file? If an application has already been filed, the regulation in § 204.5(d) means your priority date is the date the Department accepted it for processing, and the proposed transition section would keep an application submitted before the cutoff under the current rules. If a certification has been approved, confirm that the I-140 petition was filed within the 180-day window of § 656.30(b)(1). If you are a nurse or physical therapist in a Schedule A case that has not yet been filed, ask whether the employer can file under the current rules before any final rule takes effect, since the current regulation remains in force until then. And if the employer is reconsidering sponsorship altogether, the rules on withdrawn petitions matter more than this proposal; we covered them in our article on what happens when an employer stops sponsoring an H-1B worker, including the effect of a written withdrawal of an approved I-140 petition.

Two cautions keep these checks honest. First, every number in this section comes from a proposal: the 90 days, the 60-to-30-day window, the two years and the 10 business days could all change in a final rule, within the limits Kooritzky v. Reich describes. Second, the transition rule protects applications by their filing date, not by the date recruitment began; an employer that has started recruitment but has not filed by the cutoff in a final rule would have to meet the new requirements. Planning that assumes the proposed dates are certain, or that assumes the proposal will never be finalized, rests on a guess either way.

Conclusion

The employment-based green card proposal scheduled for Federal Register publication on November 17, 2026, is a significant rewrite of the PERM program, but it is still a proposal. The federal statute in § 1182(a)(5)(A) has not changed, the current regulations in part 656 still govern every filing, and the Administrative Procedure Act requires the Department of Labor to consider comments and explain its choices before anything becomes binding. If the Department finalizes the rule as written, applications filed before the 90th day after publication of the final rule would be processed under the current rules, and later ones under the new rules. Kooritzky v. Reich shows that a final rule cannot stray beyond what the notice proposed; Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital, as applied in Wille v. Lutnick, shows that an agency needs express authority to reach back in time; and Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo means that any dispute over the end of Schedule A would be decided by judges reading the statute themselves. The dates that matter for a pending case today are the ones already in the regulations: the filing date that sets the priority date, the recruitment windows, and the 180 days to use an approved certification.

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