KOHEN AVOCATS · PARIS, FRANCE
Can ICE break your car window? What the Santa Clarita video shows about force, warrants and a damage claim

Hassan Kohen is a Paris-based lawyer admitted to the Paris Bar (Avocat au Barreau de Paris). Initial strategic analysis: €80 incl. VAT, personal reply within 24 hours.

100% confidential · Legal professional privilege · No obligation

Article generated by artificial intelligence, through a process designed and supervised by the firm

Sources: U.S. court opinions and official U.S. government publications, read for this article

Maître Hassan KOHEN, avocat au Barreau de Paris
Hassan KOHEN
Attorney at the Paris Bar

Can ICE break your car window? What the Santa Clarita video shows about force, warrants and a damage claim

Speak to a lawyer 06 89 11 34 45

Searches for the Santa Clarita ICE video climbed overnight, and many readers are typing the same pointed question: can ICE break your car window? According to video shared with the Los Angeles Times and to reports by KABC-TV and FOX 11 published on November 20 and 21, 2026, an Immigration and Customs Enforcement agent used a baton to break the back window of a car in the parking lot of the Santa Clarita Valley Sheriff’s Station, in Los Angeles County, shortly after 11 a.m. on Friday, November 20. Other agents then pulled a man from the back seat, handcuffed him and drove him away. Witnesses quoted in those reports said the man had just been released from custody and had accepted a ride from a couple, and that the driver, his wife and several observers were pepper-sprayed. A Department of Homeland Security spokesperson told the Times that ICE does not discuss its operations, and the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department said its deputies were not involved. The man has not been identified, no warrant, charging document or court filing about the arrest was public when this guide was written, and no court has examined what happened in that parking lot.

The short answer: federal immigration agents can sometimes break a car window, but only when the arrest itself is lawful and the force is reasonable, and a car owner whose property was damaged without justification may have a claim against the United States. The discussion that follows is general in scope: it describes checks useful in comparable situations and makes no findings about the agents involved or about anyone in the car.

I. Can ICE break your car window to make an arrest?

A. The first question is whether the agents could arrest anyone at all

The window is the second legal question, not the first. Force is judged against the arrest it was used to make, so the starting point is the federal arrest power. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2), a federal statute that applies in every state, an immigration officer may arrest a noncitizen without a warrant only if the officer has reason to believe the person is in the United States in violation of the immigration laws and “is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained for his arrest.” The same provision requires that the person arrested be taken without unnecessary delay for examination by an officer with authority to examine immigration status. Two conditions, not one, have to be present for a warrantless arrest: a reason to believe the person is removable, and a reason to believe the person would get away before a warrant could be obtained.

The Department of Homeland Security’s own federal regulation repeats and tightens that rule. Under 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(c)(2), an arrest may be made only when the officer has reason to believe the person committed an offense against the United States or is a noncitizen illegally present, and “A warrant of arrest shall be obtained except when the designated immigration officer has reason to believe that the person is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained.” The regulation also tells the officer what to say. At the time of the arrest, “as soon as it is practical and safe to do so,” the officer must identify himself or herself as an immigration officer authorized to make the arrest and state that the person is under arrest and why. Those are not courtesies. When the government later has to justify an arrest, the presence or absence of a warrant, an escape-risk assessment and an identification statement are the facts a court asks about first.

Courts have applied those rules in cases that began with a broken window. In Caryelis B.B.B. v. Bondi, No. 26-917 (D. Minn. Feb. 4, 2026), the petitioner, a Venezuelan resident of St. Paul whose Temporary Protected Status had expired, told the District of Minnesota that ICE agents smashed her car window on January 31, 2026, forcibly removed her from the vehicle and left the car on the street. The government argued that she was subject to mandatory detention. Judge Donovan Frank disagreed: because she had been living in the United States for over a year, she was held under the discretionary bond statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), and detention under that statute depends on an arrest warrant. The government, given the chance to show the true basis for the arrest, produced no warrant, so the court treated the arrest as warrantless and ordered her immediate release on February 4, 2026. For someone arrested after a window is broken, the first legal fight is often about the paperwork: if the government cannot show a warrant or a documented escape risk, release can follow even before anyone litigates the broken glass.

A federal judge in West Virginia went further. In Urquilla-Ramos v. Trump, 821 F. Supp. 3d 603 (S.D. W. Va. 2026), decided February 19, 2026, the Southern District of West Virginia granted habeas relief to a man seized by masked agents operating from unmarked vehicles, without identification and without any warrant. The court held that, absent a genuine and particularized need, the Fourth Amendment does not allow officers to carry out a civil arrest while concealing their identities in a way that makes the seizure impossible to attribute or review afterward, and it found his detention also violated due process. That ruling binds no court in California, and this research did not locate a later decision applying it, so it should be read as persuasive reasoning from one district court rather than settled law. Its practical lesson still travels: even when no agent can be named, the date, the place, the vehicles, the clothing and the words used at the scene are exactly the facts a later court will want.

The Santa Clarita reports add a California wrinkle, because the arrest happened in the parking lot of a county sheriff’s station shortly after the man had reportedly been released. California law limits what state and local police may do, not what federal agents may do. Under California Government Code § 7284.6, California law enforcement agencies may not use their money or personnel to investigate, detain or arrest people for immigration enforcement purposes, including “Making or intentionally participating in arrests based on civil immigration warrants,” and they may not transfer a person to immigration authorities unless a judicial warrant, a judicial probable cause determination or the separate rules of Section 7282.5 allow it. That statute explains why a sheriff’s department would stress that its deputies were not involved, and it can matter if records later show coordination over a release time. It does not, however, stop federal officers from making their own arrest in a public lot. We explain how those California rules apply to holds and release notices in our guide on whether a California jail can hold someone for ICE after release is due.

B. The second question is whether breaking the glass was reasonable force

If the arrest was lawful, the next question is how much force the agents could use to complete it. The federal regulation answers in two steps. Under 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(a)(1), “Non-deadly force may be used only when a designated immigration officer” has reasonable grounds to believe that such force is necessary. The officer “shall always use the minimum non-deadly force necessary to accomplish the officer’s mission” and may move to a higher level of force only when the suspect’s actions, apparent intentions and apparent capabilities warrant it. The regulation also directs that violations of these standards be reported to the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of the Inspector General. Breaking a window is non-deadly force, so the regulatory question is concrete: what did the person in the car do, or appear about to do, that made breaking the glass the minimum force needed at that moment?

The Constitution asks a similar question in different words. The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable seizures, and courts treat the use of force during an arrest as part of the seizure. The most detailed recent ruling on a broken car window in an immigration stop comes from Texas. In United States v. Quintanilla-Chavez, 807 F. Supp. 3d 641 (W.D. Tex. 2025), decided October 20, 2025, a Homeland Security Investigations agent punched a hole in a driver’s side window during an investigative stop based on suspicions about the driver’s immigration status, scraping his own arm, and the government then charged the driver with assaulting a federal officer. Judge Xavier Rodriguez recognized that officers who have lawfully stopped a vehicle may order the driver out and may use some degree of physical coercion. He then weighed the severity of the suspected offense, whether the driver posed an immediate threat and whether he was actively resisting or fleeing. Because the agents could not reasonably have seen the driver as a threat on an immigration-status stop, and because he offered only passive resistance once his truck was boxed in, the court held that the force used to arrest him was constitutionally excessive, found that the government had not justified the warrantless arrest, suppressed the evidence and dismissed the indictment.

That reasoning has already been read outside Texas. In United States v. Bamigboye, No. 25-CR-477 (D. Minn. Sept. 1, 2026), a magistrate judge of the District of Minnesota reviewing a prosecution for assaulting federal officers that followed an immigration arrest of two people on December 10, 2025 discussed Quintanilla-Chavez, 807 F. Supp. 3d 641, at length, including that court’s concern that supervisors appeared to be encouraging agents to break car windows. On the thin Minnesota record the magistrate judge declined to recommend dismissing the indictment for outrageous conduct, as the Texas court had done. But because the government chose to offer no evidence that the warrantless arrests rested on probable cause or on a likely-escape finding, the report concluded on September 1, 2026 that the arrests violated the Fourth Amendment and recommended suppressing the evidence derived from them. A magistrate judge’s recommendation is not yet an order of the district court. Its message is still direct: anyone charged after a confrontation during a window-breaking arrest should expect the government to carry the burden of proving that the arrest itself was lawful.

Put together, those authorities turn the viral question into a set of checks. Did the agents have a warrant, or a documented reason to think the man would escape before one could be obtained? Did they identify themselves and give commands before breaking the glass? Did anyone in the car refuse to open the door, try to drive away or make threatening movements, or was the resistance passive? Was the force aimed at the window to open the car, or at people who were not the subject of the arrest? Who owned the car? In the reports about Santa Clarita, the man was a passenger in someone else’s vehicle, and the people who were pepper-sprayed included the driver, his wife and observers. Those facts do not answer the legal question, but they show why the person arrested, the car’s owners and the bystanders each have different issues to raise.

Two cautions follow from the cases. First, a refusal to step out of a car can justify some force; the Texas court itself acknowledged that officers may order a driver out during a lawful stop, so the analysis turns on proportion, not on whether any force at all was used. Second, both federal cases discussed above were prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. § 111, the federal statute on forcibly assaulting, resisting or impeding federal officers. A person who grabs an agent, blocks an arrest or pulls someone away during an arrest risks becoming the defendant, whatever the legality of the original stop. Filming from a distance and staying out of the agents’ path keeps the focus where it belongs, on the agents’ justification.

II. After the glass breaks: what can the person arrested, the car owner and bystanders do?

A. In the first hours: custody decisions, release and the evidence to keep

For the person taken into custody, the federal regulation sets the next steps. Under 8 C.F.R. § 287.3, a noncitizen arrested without a warrant is to be examined by an officer other than the arresting officer, unless no other qualified officer is readily available and waiting would cause unnecessary delay. Someone placed in formal removal proceedings must be told the reasons for the arrest and of the right to be represented at no expense to the government, and must be given a list of no-cost legal service providers in the district where the hearing will be held. Unless voluntary departure has been granted, a decision must be made within 48 hours of the arrest, save an emergency or other extraordinary circumstance, on whether the person will stay in custody or be released on bond or recognizance, and on whether a notice to appear and an arrest warrant will be issued.

That 48-hour decision is where families should focus first, because the statute that governs detention often decides whether bond is even possible. In Caryelis B.B.B. v. Bondi, discussed above, the court rejected the government’s claim that a long-time resident was subject to mandatory detention and held that she fell under the discretionary bond provision of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). The same court ordered release because no warrant was shown. A lawyer handling a case like the Santa Clarita arrest will usually ask, in this order, which statute the government says authorizes detention, whether a warrant existed before the arrest, and whether a habeas petition in federal court is the faster route than a bond request in immigration court. Those questions are separate from the broken window, but the window can be evidence: a dramatic forced arrest with no warrant is a fact pattern judges have already examined.

For the couple who owned the car and for the observers, the first hours are about preserving proof. Keep the original video files, not only copies posted online, because the original carries the time and location data. Photograph the broken window, the glass on the seats and the ground, and any injuries or redness from pepper spray, and note when symptoms began and ended. Get a written repair estimate and keep the receipt. Write down, while memory is fresh, what the agents said, whether they identified themselves, whether anyone asked for a warrant and what the answer was, and the descriptions or plates of the vehicles involved. If medical care was needed, keep the records. If the car is insured, read the policy before filing, because your own insurer may pay for the glass and may then pursue the same claim against the government.

Bystanders who were sprayed sometimes hope for a court order stopping the tactic. Recent appellate law in the Ninth Circuit, which includes California, shows how hard that route is. In Dickinson v. Trump, No. 26-1609 (9th Cir. Apr. 27, 2026), a Ninth Circuit panel stayed a district court injunction that had barred federal agents at the Portland ICE facility from using tear gas, pepper balls and similar munitions unless someone posed an imminent threat of physical harm. The panel found that the government was likely to win on the plaintiffs’ First Amendment retaliation claim because they had not shown retaliatory intent or an unwritten policy targeting them, while acknowledging that “some individual incidents might indicate an arguably disproportionate use of force.” That was an order on a stay pending appeal, not a final ruling on the merits, and it concerned crowd-control at a federal building rather than a single arrest. It nonetheless signals that, for most people pepper-sprayed at one scene, the realistic path is an individual damages claim rather than an injunction.

B. Paying for the window: a claim against the United States, not a lawsuit against the agent

Damage caused by federal employees is paid, when it is paid, by the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The jurisdictional provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1), gives federal district courts exclusive jurisdiction over claims against the United States for money damages for injury or loss of property, or personal injury, caused by the negligent or wrongful act of a federal employee acting within the scope of employment, where a private person would be liable “in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.” For an incident in a Santa Clarita parking lot, the law of the place is California tort law. The claim runs against the United States, not against the agent who swung the baton, which also means the claimant does not need to know the agent’s name to start.

Before any lawsuit, the claim has to go to the agency. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a), no action may be filed unless the claimant “shall have first presented the claim to the appropriate Federal agency” and the agency has finally denied it in writing; if the agency does not decide within six months, the claimant may treat the silence as a denial. The same section limits a later lawsuit to the amount claimed, except for newly discovered evidence or intervening facts. The Justice Department’s federal regulation at 28 C.F.R. § 14.2 says a claim is presented when the agency receives “an executed Standard Form 95 or other written notification of an incident, accompanied by a claim for money damages in a sum certain” for the property loss or injury, and that the claim belongs with the agency whose activities gave rise to it. A repair estimate converted into a specific dollar figure is therefore not paperwork for later; it is part of what makes the claim valid.

Timing is set by statute. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b), a tort claim against the United States “shall be forever barred unless it is presented in writing to the appropriate Federal agency within two years after such claim accrues,” or unless suit is begun within six months after the agency mails its notice of final denial. The statute uses the word “accrues” without defining it in that sentence, so the sensible course is to treat the two-year period as a reason to file promptly, not as a date to plan around, and to calendar the six-month window as soon as any denial letter arrives.

The Act also has exceptions. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2680, subsection (a) excludes claims based on the exercise of a discretionary function, and subsection (h) excludes claims arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest and several other intentional torts. A proviso in subsection (h) restores six of those claims, including assault, battery, false imprisonment and false arrest, when the acts were committed by investigative or law enforcement officers, defined as “any officer of the United States who is empowered by law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations of Federal law.” ICE officers making arrests fit that description, which is why a pepper-spray claim framed as a battery is not automatically barred.

The Supreme Court explained how those pieces fit together in Martin v. United States, 605 U.S. 395 (2025), a unanimous decision of the Supreme Court of the United States issued June 12, 2025, after FBI agents raided the wrong house in suburban Atlanta, injured the family inside and damaged their property. The Court held that the law enforcement proviso overrides only the intentional-tort exception in subsection (h), not the discretionary-function exception or the other exceptions in § 2680, and that the Supremacy Clause gives the United States no defense in these suits, because the Act makes the government liable under state law on the same terms as a private person. It sent the case back for the lower court to decide whether the discretionary-function exception applied. For a Santa Clarita-type claim, that means the window and any battery claim are judged under California tort law, but the government may still argue that the decision to break the glass was a protected discretionary choice.

The Court has since relied on that reasoning. In Hencely v. Fluor Corp., No. 24-924 (Apr. 22, 2026), a case about a military contractor’s liability for an attack on a base in Afghanistan, the Supreme Court of the United States cited Martin, 605 U.S. 395, for the point that state law must yield under the Supremacy Clause when a regulated party cannot comply with both federal and state directives, and then stressed that preemption needs a constitutional text or a federal statute behind it. That citation confirms that Martin’s account of federal displacement remains the Court’s working statement, which matters to claimants because it narrows the government’s ability to escape state tort rules by pointing to federal policy alone.

A second federal statute closes the door on suing the agent under state law. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1), the remedy against the United States under the Act “is exclusive of any other civil action or proceeding for money damages” against the employee for the same subject matter. The statute carves out actions brought for a violation of the Constitution or of a federal statute that authorizes suit against an individual. That carve-out is where a constitutional damages claim, known as a Bivens claim after the 1971 decision that first allowed one, would have to fit.

That constitutional door is now nearly shut. In Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482 (2022), decided June 8, 2022, the Supreme Court of the United States held that Bivens does not extend to a Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim against a Border Patrol agent who, on the plaintiff’s account, threw him against a vehicle and then to the ground at his inn near the Canadian border, nor to a First Amendment retaliation claim. The Court explained that a court may not create a damages remedy where Congress or the Executive has already provided an alternative remedial structure, and that the risk of undermining border security gave reason to hesitate. The plaintiff there had also filed an administrative claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act, which was denied. A Santa Clarita bystander or car owner who wants damages from an individual ICE agent for excessive force should expect Egbert to block that suit and should plan around the Federal Tort Claims Act claim instead.

The Court has repeated that message. In Goldey v. Fields, No. 24-809 (June 30, 2025), a per curiam decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, the Court refused to recognize a Bivens claim for excessive force by federal prison officials and quoted Egbert, 596 U.S. 482, for the principle that “prescribing a cause of action is a job for Congress, not the courts.” Goldey shows the Court applying Egbert to a different excessive-force setting within three years, so there is little reason to expect a broken window during an immigration arrest to be treated differently. We walked through the same two-track structure, a claim against the United States and a narrow path against individual officers, in our analysis of what a federal shooting claim against ICE must prove.

In practice, the car owners in a case like this one would file a written claim with the Department of Homeland Security for the repair cost, supported by photos, the estimate, proof of ownership and the video; anyone pepper-sprayed would file a separate claim describing the injury and its cost; and the person arrested would keep any property or injury claim in mind while the custody case moves on its own track. The agency’s answer, or six months of silence, then decides whether a federal lawsuit under California tort law becomes the next step. None of this requires proving that the arrest was unlawful in immigration court, but the same facts, the warrant, the escape risk, the commands and the resistance, will drive both.

Conclusion

Can federal immigration agents break your car window? Sometimes, but only at the end of a chain that has to hold at every link: a lawful basis to arrest, which for a warrantless arrest means both a reason to believe the person is removable and a reason to believe the person would escape before a warrant could be obtained; an identification and a chance to comply; and force no greater than the minimum needed at that moment. Courts in Minnesota and Texas have already scrutinized arrests that began with a broken window, ordering release where no warrant was shown and finding excessive force where the driver posed no threat. For the people around the car, the remedy is rarely a suit against an individual agent. It is a written claim to the agency, stated in a specific dollar amount and filed well within the two-year window, judged under the law of the state where the glass broke, with the government free to argue that its agents made a protected discretionary choice. The evidence gathered in the first hours, the original video, the photos, the estimate and a careful account of what was said, is what will decide which of those links fails.

📄 Official circular