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Afghan Deportation to the Central African Republic: What France Would Test Before a Third-Country Removal

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Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

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Afghan Deportation to the Central African Republic: What France Would Test Before a Third-Country Removal

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The United States has deported dozens of people to the Central African Republic in a third-country removal operation, according to an Associated Press report published on 29 August 2026. The report identifies an Afghan man whose lawyers say a United States judge had protected him from removal to Afghanistan because he feared persecution by the Taliban. One brother served in the Afghan National Army and another, a pilot trained by the United States, was killed by the Taliban. The flight reportedly included twelve Afghans, eight Iranians and nationals of other countries.

The immediate legal question is not whether the Central African Republic agreed to receive the passengers. It is whether a state may send a person to a second country that has not been shown to offer lawful admission, effective protection, a genuine asylum procedure or a reliable barrier against onward removal. A third-country arrangement can change the geography of the risk without resolving it. It can also make urgent litigation harder when the person, documents and diplomatic assurances move faster than a court can obtain a complete record.

French and European law cannot be used as a direct appeal against an American removal decision. It does, however, provide a precise lens for assessing a similar transfer. French administrative courts separate removal from the destination decision, test the actual risk in that destination and treat Article 3 ill-treatment risk as a hard limit. The analysis applies that lens without assuming that the AP report establishes every factual detail or that the person’s American protection order is identical to refugee status.

I. What does an Afghan deportation to the Central African Republic reveal about third-country removal?

A. Can protection against deportation to Afghanistan prevent transfer to the Central African Republic?

The first distinction is between protection from one destination and permission to enter another. The AP report says that the Afghan man had obtained protection against deportation to Afghanistan from a United States judge. That description is important, but it does not by itself answer whether he could be lawfully transferred to the Central African Republic. A withholding order, a deferral of removal or another form of protection against return to the country of origin can prevent one specific removal route while leaving the administration searching for a lawful alternative. It does not automatically confer immigration status in the alternative country, establish that the alternative country will admit the person, or prove that the person will be safe once there.

The legal risk therefore has at least three layers. The first is the risk of direct harm in the Central African Republic: detention, violence, lack of access to counsel, lack of status, or removal to a country where the person faces persecution or torture. The second is the risk that the receiving state will not provide a real opportunity to claim protection. The third is the onward-risk chain: the person may be moved from the Central African Republic to Afghanistan, Iran or another state without a meaningful assessment of the original fear. A protection order directed at Afghanistan may be respected formally while being defeated in practical terms if the intermediate country becomes a staging point for the same return.

This is the central reason why a third-country transfer cannot be analysed as a simple logistical question. A receiving government’s willingness to accept passengers is not the same as a legal finding that each passenger can enter, remain, seek protection and challenge removal. A diplomatic arrangement may allocate transport costs and landing permission without resolving individual status. The absence of a public bilateral agreement may make the record more difficult, but secrecy is not proof of illegality either. The legal inquiry must remain individualised and evidence-based.

The Refugee Convention states the core rule in Article 33(1): “No Contracting State shall expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner whatsoever” to a territory where life or freedom would be threatened. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees describes non-refoulement as the Convention’s cornerstone and as a rule reflected in customary international law. The rule is not limited to a flight directly from the country of asylum to the country of origin. The phrase “in any manner whatsoever” is why an intermediate destination deserves scrutiny when it creates a foreseeable route back to danger.

Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights adds a separate and absolute prohibition on torture and inhuman or degrading treatment. In Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary, application no. 47287/15, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights explained that choosing a third country does not erase the sending state’s responsibility. The Court’s formulation is concise: “this leaves the responsibility of the Contracting State intact”. The relevant question is whether substantial grounds show a real risk, either directly in the third country or indirectly through a later return to the country of origin or another unsafe state.

That principle matters to the reported Afghan facts because the apparent protection order focuses on Afghanistan while the new flight focuses on the Central African Republic. The second fact does not neutralise the first. It changes the evidence required. Counsel would need to establish not only what the United States order prohibits, but also what the Central African Republic will do on arrival, what status the person will have, whether he can ask for asylum, whether he can obtain a lawyer and interpreter, whether he can challenge any removal order and whether the authorities have any practice of sending people onward. Each answer affects the risk assessment.

The reported flight also shows why group statistics should not replace individual analysis. The AP report attributes the figure of twelve Afghans and eight Iranians to Savi Arvey of Human Rights First. Human Rights Watch also described earlier June arrivals from Afghanistan, Iran and other states and said that almost all had United States court-ordered protections against removal to their countries of origin. Those reports are relevant to the pattern, but they do not prove that every passenger has the same procedural order, the same protected status or the same risk profile. A court would still have to connect the individual’s documents to the proposed destination and route.

The family facts reported by AP would likely be material evidence rather than a complete legal conclusion. Service in the Afghan National Army, a brother’s work as a pilot trained by the United States and a death attributed to Taliban action may support a personal-risk narrative. They do not automatically prove future persecution, and they do not establish what the Central African Republic will do. A proper file would seek the judge’s written order, the factual findings on the Taliban risk, the person’s identity and travel documents, medical and detention records, any communications from the receiving authorities, and evidence about the legal route from Bangui. The strength of the case would depend on the documents and on the speed with which they can be presented.

There is also a jurisdictional limit that must be stated plainly. A French administrative judge would not ordinarily suspend an American removal flight merely because French law would have required a different decision. French remedies become relevant if French authorities make the removal decision, if the person is physically within French jurisdiction, if a French authority assists a transfer in a way that engages its own obligations, or if a comparable fact pattern reaches a French or European court. The French perspective is a comparative legal test, not a claim that France controls the United States’ immigration system.

B. Why must a French judge test the actual destination and any onward route?

French law makes the country-of-destination decision visible as a distinct legal object. Article L. 721-3 of the Code de l’entrée et du séjour des étrangers et du droit d’asile (CESEDA) provides that the administration fixes, “le pays à destination duquel l’étranger peut être renvoyé”, through a decision separate from the removal decision. The official text of Article L. 721-3 matters here because it prevents a destination from disappearing inside a general order to leave. The country, the evidence and the challengeable reasoning must be identifiable.

Article L. 721-4 then sets out the possible categories of destination: the country of nationality, another country with a valid travel document or an agreed country in which the person is legally admissible. The same provision draws the hard line: “Un étranger ne peut être éloigné à destination d’un pays s’il établit que sa vie ou sa liberté y sont menacées”. It also refers to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the European Convention. The official Article L. 721-4 text therefore frames the Central African question in two parts: is the person legally admissible, and would the transfer expose him to the prohibited risk?

The first part is sometimes overlooked in public debate. A government may say that a third country has accepted the person, but acceptance is not necessarily legal admissibility. The file should identify the legal basis for entry, the length and conditions of stay, the identity documents accepted, the person’s ability to obtain a residence document and the consequences if the receiving state later withdraws its consent. If the person is placed in detention on arrival, the authorities should identify the review mechanism, access to counsel and interpreter services, and the legal power under which detention is imposed.

The second part is not a general comparison of living standards. Article 3 asks whether the individual faces a real risk of prohibited treatment. Article 33 of the Refugee Convention asks whether return exposes a refugee to a threat to life or freedom, subject to its limited text and status conditions. A person may therefore need to invoke different instruments on different facts. A person with a United States protection order may rely on the order as evidence of the origin-country risk without assuming that it is conclusive under French procedure.

The Conseil d’État’s recent decision in no. 495898, 28 October 2024 gives the French administrative method in direct terms. It states that “Il appartient au préfet chargé de fixer le pays de renvoi” to ensure that the chosen measures do not expose the person to treatment contrary to Article 3. The same decision explains that the administrative judge must assess the reality of the alleged risks. The court does not simply defer to a general diplomatic statement, and the fact that another asylum authority has reached a position does not remove the prefect’s independent duty to examine the country-of-return decision.

That reasoning is especially important where the proposed country is neither the person’s country of nationality nor a country in which he has previously lived. The administration would need to explain why the person can lawfully be received in the Central African Republic and what protection is available there. A bare statement that the country accepted a group of deportees would leave unanswered the individual questions: can this Afghan enter under a recognised status, can he register a protection claim, can he remain while it is examined, and can the Central African authorities lawfully transfer him onward?

The Conseil d’État has also described the Article 3 limit in a context involving the removal of a recognised refugee. In reféré decision no. 496704, 21 August 2024, the court wrote that “un Etat membre ne saurait éloigner un réfugié” where there are serious and established grounds for believing that he faces a real Article 3 risk. The case must be read in its own procedural and factual setting, but its practical message is clear: public-order reasoning or the existence of an available destination cannot authorise a transfer to a real risk of torture or inhuman treatment.

The European Court of Human Rights adds an additional safeguard where the third country is supposed to provide the protection. In Ilias and Ahmed, the Grand Chamber held that, when removal occurs without a prior merits examination in the sending state, the authorities must thoroughly examine the risk that the receiving country will deny access to an adequate asylum procedure. The HUDOC judgment warns that a state cannot merely assume that the receiving country will comply with its asylum law; it must verify how that law operates in practice. This is the difference between a written assurance and a protection mechanism that a person can actually use.

The new European Union case law adds a narrow but timely point about several possible destinations. In DL v. Minister van Asiel en Migratie, C-182/26 PPU, Hardeker, judgment of 25 June 2026, the Court of Justice considered the Return Directive, detention and a return decision naming several potential countries. The operative reasoning requires a court to examine “the lawfulness of such detention in the light of that principle”, meaning non-refoulement, and treats the principle as satisfied only where removal to at least one specified destination is not prohibited by the relevant risk.

That holding should not be turned into a licence for destination shopping. C-182/26 PPU addressed detention review in a European Union return framework. It does not say that an administration may select a country with no demonstrated admission or asylum safeguards merely because another country on a list might be safe. Nor does it replace the individual examination under Article 3. For a French case involving a single proposed Central African destination, the administration would still have to identify the route, the legal admission basis and the protection available in practice. The judgment is useful because it shows that naming multiple destinations cannot remove judicial review; it does not lower the non-refoulement threshold.

The related French-law analysis of the United States–Eswatini third-country deportation pattern illustrates the same point in another factual setting. The existence of an arrangement with a receiving state does not answer the separate questions of individual risk, detention and access to a remedy. The Afghan transfer raises an even sharper issue because the reported protection order already identifies the origin-country danger and the new destination appears to be an intermediate state.

The judicial question is consequently concrete: what did the authority know when it fixed the destination, what did it verify about the receiving state’s practice and what mechanism would stop onward transfer if the risk materialised? A French court would not need to decide whether every third-country arrangement is unlawful in the abstract. It could suspend one decision because the administration had not established lawful admission, had not assessed the applicant’s personal evidence or had not confronted an obvious onward-removal risk.

II. What would a French court examine before blocking or accepting removal?

A. Which evidence and urgent remedies make a non-refoulement challenge credible?

A successful urgent application would start with a precise factual theory rather than a general objection to deportations. Counsel would identify the protected origin-country risk, the proposed intermediate country and the mechanism by which the transfer could recreate the original danger. In the reported Afghan case, the written United States order would be central. The record should show whether the order is withholding of removal, deferral, protection under the Convention Against Torture or another remedy; what conduct or destination it covers; whether it contains factual findings; and whether it remains in force.

The next document set would concern the person’s identity and route. The applicant would need to establish nationality, family history, language, medical vulnerability, prior detention and any relationship to United States or Afghan institutions. The file should identify the flight, the receiving authority, the legal basis for entry into the Central African Republic, the expected place of stay, any detention order, the person responsible for registering an asylum request and the procedure for challenging a subsequent transfer. Public reporting can establish urgency and a plausible pattern, but an interim judge will usually need a link between that pattern and the individual.

Evidence about the Central African Republic would be organised around actual protection rather than reputation alone. Relevant material could include the country’s asylum legislation, the capacity of the competent authority, registration practices, access to an interpreter, detention conditions, the presence of counsel, the treatment of prior deportees and any agreement governing the group’s status. Human Rights Watch’s account of the June arrivals and the AP account of the August flight are leads for evidence, not substitutes for an individual legal record. The question is whether the person can invoke protection at the airport, in detention or before removal onward.

The third evidence set is often the hardest: proof of onward risk. Counsel would look for readmission clauses, public statements by the receiving state, travel-document arrangements, the person’s lack of status, the history of removals from the Central African Republic and any evidence that the intermediate country is being used precisely because the origin-country protection order prevents direct return. The claim need not show that onward removal is certain. It must show why the risk is real and why the administration’s assurances do not remove it.

French procedural law offers several routes, depending on the underlying removal measure and the deadline. Article L. 721-5 CESEDA states that “La décision fixant le pays de renvoi peut être contestée selon la même procédure” as the removal decision. The official text of Article L. 721-5 confirms that the country decision is not an unreviewable logistical annex. Counsel should check the notification, the applicable time limit, whether the country decision was notified separately, and whether the person is already detained or about to board a flight.

Where the ordinary challenge will not be decided before removal, the urgent application becomes decisive. Article L. 521-1 of the Code de justice administrative allows the référé-suspension mechanism when the statutory conditions are met. The official text begins with the premise that, when an administrative decision is challenged, “le juge des référés” may be seised in the urgent procedure. The applicant must then establish urgency and a serious ground capable of calling the decision into question. A detailed Article 3 risk, linked to the destination decision and supported by documents, is stronger than an abstract assertion that the receiving country is unstable.

Recent Conseil d’État case law confirms that urgency can be inherent in an imminent removal, although the precise measure matters. In decision no. 506729, 9 June 2026, concerning an expulsion decision, the court described the measure as causing, in principle, “une atteinte grave et immédiate” to the person’s situation. The decision was about expulsion and should not be mechanically transposed to every obligation to leave or country-of-destination case. It nevertheless shows why a last-minute flight requires counsel to identify the measure being executed and to explain the irreversible consequence of boarding.

An earlier Conseil d’État decision, no. 306238, 18 February 2008, used similar language for an expulsion order, describing “une atteinte grave et immédiate” and an urgent situation. The importance of citing both decisions is not to create an automatic suspension. It is to show that the urgent judge will examine the practical timing, the legal nature of the order and the risk that an eventual merits judgment would become ineffective after departure.

If France has jurisdiction over the person’s asylum request, Article L. 531-2 CESEDA provides the procedural gateway for submitting the request to OFPRA. The official provision begins by stating that, where France is responsible, the foreign national introduces the asylum claim to OFPRA. That provision does not automatically convert a third-country transfer into a French asylum case. It matters when the facts show that the person is in France, that France is the responsible state under the applicable European rules, or that the authorities have failed to recognise a request for protection made in French territory.

Family and private-life evidence may provide a separate ground in a French case, but it should not be confused with non-refoulement. In Conseil d’État, Assembly, no. 107470, Belgacem, 19 April 1991, the court held that “Un étranger peut utilement se prévaloir” of Article 8 of the European Convention. A spouse, child, long residence, medical treatment or established professional life in France may support a proportionality challenge. Article 8 does not replace the Article 3 analysis, and a strong family-life case does not by itself prove that the Central African Republic presents a real risk of prohibited treatment. Counsel should plead the grounds separately so that the court can decide each legal question on the correct test.

The practical application should end with a short chronology. It should state when the United States protection order was made, when the proposed flight was announced, when counsel learned the destination, when the person was detained, when the country decision was notified and when removal is scheduled. It should attach the order, identity documents, detention papers, flight or transfer notice, evidence of the brothers’ service and death, relevant country information and any request for an asylum interview. A court cannot assess a hidden onward risk if the application does not identify the route by which the risk would occur.

Finally, the application should ask for a remedy that matches the legal problem. It may seek suspension of the destination decision, an order requiring an individual examination, access to counsel and an interpreter, disclosure of the transfer arrangement, or a direction preventing onward removal until a protection claim is examined. The request should avoid asking the court to redesign the entire migration policy. The sharper request is to prevent this person’s transfer until the authority has answered the destination-specific questions required by Article 3 and the applicable French and European rules.

B. What must the administration prove about admission, safety and review?

An administration defending a third-country removal would need more than a landing agreement. Its record should show that the receiving state has accepted the individual, not merely an anonymous group; that the person is legally admissible under the receiving state’s law; that he will not be placed in a legal vacuum; and that he can access a procedure capable of examining persecution and torture claims. If the person will be detained, the state should disclose the legal basis, duration, review authority, access to counsel and ability to communicate in a language he understands.

The administration should also explain how it evaluated the original country risk. A United States order protecting an Afghan from removal to Afghanistan would be highly relevant evidence even if it is not binding on a French prefect. The French authority could reach its own conclusion, but it would have to confront the order, its reasons and the factual material behind it. Ignoring an individual judicial finding because the planned flight lands elsewhere would leave the central onward-risk question unanswered.

The French Code’s destination rules require the authority to connect destination and admissibility. Article L. 721-4 allows a country supported by a valid travel document or a country in which the person is legally admissible with his agreement. That is not an invitation to treat consent as a waiver of Article 3. Consent to board a plane may be affected by detention, lack of information, language barriers or the absence of a meaningful alternative. Even voluntary acceptance of a destination would not permit removal to a real risk of torture or inhuman treatment.

The authority must then investigate practice, not just paper. Ilias and Ahmed is decisive on this distinction. A receiving state may have an asylum statute and still offer no effective procedure to a newly arrived deportee. It may register claims only after prolonged detention, deny access to counsel, lack a mechanism to stop onward removal or rely on an informal agreement that is not visible to the person affected. The European Court’s requirement to verify how the law operates in practice means that a court will expect evidence about implementation: prior cases, registration records, access arrangements, diplomatic communications and a named authority responsible for protection.

The administration should identify a credible answer to five questions. First, what status will the person hold on arrival? Second, where and how can he ask for international protection? Third, who decides whether he may remain while that request is examined? Fourth, what prevents transfer to Afghanistan or another unsafe country? Fifth, what independent body can review a removal decision before it is executed? These questions do not create a new statutory test; they make the destination-specific Article 3 and non-refoulement assessment operational.

The record should also distinguish a security or public-order allegation from a finding of danger in the destination. French law may allow certain removal measures on public-order grounds, but no administrative interest permits exposure to treatment prohibited by Article 3. The Conseil d’État’s no. 496704 decision is useful precisely because it refuses to let the removal framework obscure the real-risk inquiry. A public authority may have a legitimate reason to remove someone from its territory and still have to choose a different destination or defer removal because the selected country is unsafe.

Nor can the administration rely on the assumption that another state will correct its mistake. The logic of non-refoulement is preventive. Once the person is transferred to a country with no effective procedure, the sending state may no longer be able to make the risk disappear. The fact that the individual could theoretically file a new complaint after onward transfer is not equivalent to a remedy available before the first removal. That is why urgency and destination evidence belong together in the court file.

The CJEU’s C-182/26 PPU judgment reinforces the need for judicial control where several destinations are possible. It does not make every listed country lawful. Rather, it requires detention to be reviewed in light of non-refoulement and recognises that the principle is satisfied only in relation to a destination where removal is not prohibited. A French decision-maker relying on that judgment would have to identify the actual country that can receive the person lawfully and safely. Listing the Central African Republic beside an unspecified alternative would not answer the individual’s challenge.

The relationship between the removal order and the country decision also matters for access to justice. Article L. 721-5 CESEDA makes the country decision challengeable under the relevant procedure, while Article L. 521-1 CJA supplies the urgent framework when suspension is sought. The applicant must not wait for the aircraft to depart before requesting the record. Counsel should ask for the notification, destination decision, travel-document basis, receiving-state assurance, detention decision and any risk assessment. If the administration withholds the documents, the application should say what is missing and why the missing material is itself relevant to urgency and effective judicial review.

The scope of the court’s review will depend on the facts. A French court cannot order Bangui authorities to grant a particular status unless French jurisdiction and an applicable legal basis exist. It can, however, suspend a French removal measure, annul a country decision, require the administration to reconsider the destination or prevent an Article 3 risk where the legal conditions are satisfied. It may also assess whether a removal decision disproportionately interferes with family life under Article 8, using the approach reflected in Belgacem. The remedy must be formulated around the French act being challenged.

The likely outcome of a properly documented case would therefore turn on proof, not on the label “third-country deportation”. If the authority demonstrates lawful admission, a real protection procedure, access to counsel and a reliable barrier against onward transfer, the destination may survive review even if the person cannot return to Afghanistan. If the authority demonstrates only an acceptance email, a short-term landing arrangement and no way to challenge onward removal, the risk may be too substantial for the transfer to proceed. A court need not decide that the Central African Republic is unsafe for every person; it must decide whether this person can be removed there on this record.

That is also why public reporting should be used carefully. The AP account makes the matter urgent and identifies the alleged protection order and family facts. A contemporaneous Center for Constitutional Rights case page concerning an Afghan man’s prolonged detention shows that litigation is examining the consequences of withholding protection and third-country removal. That matter should not be merged with the AP passenger without proof that they are the same person. It is a separate signal that the legal problem is recurring: protection from origin-country removal, continued detention and a proposed third-country route can generate distinct claims.

The strongest administrative record would therefore be transparent enough to be tested by a judge before departure. It would name the receiving authority, identify the legal status, explain the asylum pathway, show the detention safeguards, evaluate the personal risk and address onward removal with evidence from actual practice. The strongest challenge would answer each of those points with the individual’s documents and a clear request for interim protection. Neither side can resolve the case by repeating that the receiving state has agreed to take the person.

Conclusion

The reported Afghan transfer to the Central African Republic is legally significant because it exposes the weakness of a purely geographic answer to a protection order. If a United States judge has found that return to Afghanistan is unsafe, moving the person through Bangui does not automatically make the risk disappear. It creates a new set of questions: whether he can enter the Central African Republic lawfully, whether he can obtain protection there, whether detention and review are real rather than nominal, and whether the receiving authorities can send him onward without preventing him from challenging the danger.

French and European law would approach those questions through the destination decision and the non-refoulement safeguards. Articles L. 721-3 to L. 721-5 CESEDA separate the country of return from the general removal order, require a lawful destination and preserve a route of challenge. Conseil d’État decisions including nos. 495898 and 496704 require the authority to examine the actual Article 3 risk. Ilias and Ahmed requires practical verification of the third country’s protection system. C-182/26 PPU confirms that multiple destinations and detention do not remove judicial review.

The AP report does not by itself prove the final legal status of the Afghan passenger, the exact terms of the Central African arrangement or the existence of an onward flight. It does establish a hot, document-driven issue that deserves immediate scrutiny. The decisive material will be the protection order, the transfer documents, the receiving state’s legal commitments and evidence of how those commitments operate. For a French lawyer assessing a comparable case, the first task is not to debate the label attached to the flight. It is to stop the timetable long enough to test the destination, the route and the remedy.

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