On 26 August 2026, the United States Department of Justice and the FBI announced court-authorised seizures of domains used by the QScan and QTRouter platforms. According to the unsealed affidavit, the platforms were operated by the China-linked QTFY group and were used to scan or compromise internet-of-things devices and to conceal the origin of cyber intrusions. The government says the seized domains were hard-coded into the malware and that taking them over made the platforms inoperable. The announcement is an allegation-based enforcement action, not a criminal conviction against every person or company named in the investigative material. Its immediate importance for France is practical: a French company may be a victim, a cloud customer, a hosting or connectivity provider, a witness, or an operator whose devices appear in the evidence map. In each position, the company must preserve volatile records without contaminating them, separate incident response from legal production, and test whether a foreign demand has a valid route into data protected in France or the European Union. This analysis explains what the QTFY seizure changes for a French business, how French procedure treats connected systems and foreign-hosted data, and which challenges may remain available when cross-border electronic evidence is later used in court.
I. What does the QTFY domain seizure mean for a French company holding the data?
A. Is a U.S. domain seizure the same as a French search or seizure?
The first legal distinction is between the object seized and the evidence that may surround it. The DOJ announced court-authorized domain seizures
against three domain names identified in the supporting affidavit: qtproxy.xyz, qt-proxy.org and qt-team.com. The official press release describes QScan as a tool that scanned and automatically infected thousands of IoT devices worldwide. It describes QTRouter as a network made up of compromised devices, commercial proxy-service devices and leased virtual private servers. The DOJ press release of 26 August 2026, updated on 28 August, also lists NASA, the Federal Reserve, the Departments of Energy, Justice and Health and Human Services, the National Institutes of Health and the U.S. Senate among the alleged targets.
The affidavit matters because the public announcement is expressly based on allegations set out in a court filing. It describes the domains, the registration and payment trails relied upon by investigators, the infrastructure associated with the platforms, and the legal basis asserted for the seizure. A French company should keep the official QTFY domain-seizure affidavit separate from press coverage and separate from its own incident report. The three documents answer different questions. The press release explains the enforcement event. The affidavit explains what the United States asked a court to accept at the seizure stage. The company’s incident report should record what actually happened on its systems, with timestamps, identifiers and technical uncertainty.
A domain takeover is not automatically a seizure of every server, account, customer record or device that communicated with that domain. It is a technical disruption directed at the domain assets and the functions that depended on them. The DOJ says the domains were hard-coded into the malware and used for communication and authentication. That fact may make the seizure highly disruptive, but it does not identify every endpoint that contacted the infrastructure, every person who operated an endpoint, or every record that proves a criminal offence. The legal status of a French company therefore depends on its conduct and its evidential position, not on the mere presence of an IP address in a government diagram.
A French company can occupy several positions at once. It may be a victim whose router, camera, industrial gateway or virtual server was compromised. It may be a customer whose logs are held by a French hosting company while a related account is held by a provider outside the Union. It may be a provider that receives a request for subscriber information, traffic data or content. It may be a witness whose employees administer the affected system. In a less common but more dangerous scenario, investigators may view the company as a possible user of the platform rather than an innocent intermediary. The first response should preserve the facts needed to distinguish those positions.
The French legal framework does not treat the location of a screen as the only relevant location. Article 706-72 of the Code of Criminal Procedure places offences referred to in Articles 323-1 to 323-4-1 of the Penal Code under a dedicated procedural title. The connecting offence is not a label that can be inferred from a technical indicator. Article 323-1 of the Penal Code addresses fraudulent access to or maintenance in all or part of an automated data-processing system and provides increased penalties when data are deleted or modified or the system’s operation is altered. A company that detects an intrusion should preserve indicators and report facts; it should not attempt a retaliatory intrusion that could itself be characterised as unauthorised access.
Nor does a foreign seizure notice prove that the French business is implicated. A compromised French device can be evidence of victimhood, not participation. QTRouter’s alleged purpose was to make malicious communications appear to originate from devices outside China and potentially close to the targeted network. That architecture makes attribution a central issue. A source IP can describe a route through an infected device rather than the person who selected or controlled the route. The more the infrastructure was designed to obscure origin, the more important it becomes to preserve endpoint logs, authentication events, firmware state, administrator activity and provider records that can distinguish a relay from an operator.
French procedure also distinguishes an investigative request from a coercive act. Article 56 of the Code of Criminal Procedure permits the seizure of papers, documents and computer data necessary to establish the truth during a search, while requiring measures to protect professional secrecy and defence rights. Its current text provides that the data seized may be placed under judicial control through the physical medium or a copy made in the presence of those attending the search. The official provision is available at Article 56 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. A U.S. domain order should not be treated as if it were a French Article 56 search carried out on the company’s premises.
That difference is decisive when a company receives an email headed “FBI seizure,” “federal subpoena,” “preservation request” or “domain abuse notice.” The sender, the legal instrument, the recipient entity, the data categories, the time range and the requested action must all be authenticated. A notice to a registrar may concern control of a domain. A request to a cloud provider may concern account records. A request to a French operating company may concern logs in its possession. Each has a different scope and potentially a different international-law route. A company should not volunteer a complete customer environment merely because one domain appears in the notice.
The event nevertheless changes the risk timetable. If a domain was hard-coded into malware, the seizure can cause devices to stop communicating, rotate to fallback infrastructure, or be reconfigured by their operators. If a French business waits until its normal retention period expires, the most probative records may disappear. The company should therefore preserve first, investigate under a documented protocol, and then decide whether to disclose. Preservation is not an admission. It protects the company’s ability to show what it knew, when it knew it, what it did to contain harm, and whether a requested record is complete.
B. What evidence should a French company preserve before the cloud record changes?
The preservation set should be broader than screenshots and narrower than an indiscriminate copy of every employee account. Start with the incident clock. Record the first alert, the first observed connection to a QTFY-related indicator, the time the domain began returning a seizure notice, the time a device was isolated, and every material containment step. Preserve the original time zone and the system used to generate each timestamp. Keep a hash or equivalent integrity record for exported files, but do not let a hash replace the underlying source. A later expert must be able to explain what was copied, from where, with which tool, and at what time.
For an endpoint or IoT device, preserve the device model, serial number, firmware version, configuration, volatile memory where technically justified, local logs, DNS cache, routing information, certificates, credentials history, connected peripherals and the relevant network segment. Do not reset or reflash the device before an evidence decision unless safety requires it. If a reset is necessary to protect a production environment, record who authorised it, what state was captured first, which data were lost, and whether a provider or forensic image can fill the gap. The same rule applies to virtual machines: preserve snapshots, disk images, metadata, security-group changes, console activity and cloud audit trails before an automated retention policy removes them.
For the cloud layer, identify the account owner, tenant, region, legal entity, service provider, administrator roles, retention schedule and backup location. Preserve authentication logs, API calls, object access, security alerts, firewall events, DNS queries, load-balancer logs, billing and provisioning records, support tickets, abuse reports and communications with the provider. If the provider uses a global control plane, record the data centre or region shown in the export, but do not assume that the displayed region proves the exclusive location of all relevant copies. Replication, support access, disaster-recovery copies and metadata may follow different paths.
For attribution, preserve the link between a technical identifier and the person or organisation authorised to use it. This may include identity-provider records, multi-factor authentication events, hardware security-key events, VPN assignments, administrator tickets, change approvals and employment or contractor records. A source IP alone should be described as a source IP. It should not be upgraded in a report into a person’s identity without corroborating evidence. A provider’s subscriber record may also be incomplete, stale or based on a payment intermediary. The evidential value depends on the time window and on the provider’s method of collection.
For content, retain the original export and the human-readable rendering. This is important for chat messages, email headers, abuse complaints, domain-registration records and malware reports. Preserve the language, encoding, character set, attachment relationship, message identifier, sender and recipient fields, and any provider-generated export certificate. If the record is translated, keep the original next to the translation and identify the translator or translation method. An English summary should not silently replace a French, Chinese or multilingual source. Meaning, time and technical labels can change during translation.
For legal privilege and confidential material, establish a separate review channel. Article 56 expressly requires steps to protect professional secrecy and defence rights during a French search. The company should identify communications with outside counsel, internal legal advice, medical or employee information, trade secrets, security credentials and unrelated customer data before a production package is assembled. Segregation does not mean deletion. It means controlled access, a documented reason for exclusion or redaction, and a way to give the competent authority or court a precise explanation if the scope is disputed.
Encryption requires an equally disciplined response. Article 230-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure allows a competent French authority, in the conditions stated by the provision, to appoint a qualified person to perform technical operations where seized or obtained data are transformed, encrypted or protected by authentication. The text refers to obtaining access to information in clear form and, where cryptology is used, the secret decryption convention when necessary. That is not a reason for employees to circulate passwords through an unverified email. It is a reason to preserve the key-management facts, custodians and access events and to obtain legal instructions before handing over credentials or decrypted copies.
Preservation must coexist with incident containment. Disconnecting an infected device, blocking an indicator, rotating a credential or stopping a malicious process can be necessary to protect people and systems. But the company should preserve a pre-containment snapshot where feasible, record the technical reason for the action, and avoid changing the original evidence more than necessary. The response team should maintain a change log with an incident identifier, operator, command or action, target, timestamp and result. A later court is more likely to trust a record that admits an alteration and explains it than one that presents an apparently perfect image with no provenance.
Personal-data rules do not disappear during an incident. The company should involve its data-protection officer where personal data are involved, define the processing purpose, limit access to those who need it, and document the legal basis for preservation and any disclosure. Article 32 of the General Data Protection Regulation requires security measures appropriate to risk; Article 48 addresses third-country court or administrative decisions seeking a transfer or disclosure of personal data. Article 48 states that such a decision may be recognised or enforced only if based on an international agreement, without prejudice to other Chapter V transfer grounds. A U.S. demand therefore needs a combined criminal-procedure and data-transfer analysis. GDPR is not a licence to destroy evidence, but a foreign order is not automatically a complete EU-law answer either.
The preservation pack should end with a decision register. List each source, its custodian, its location, the retention deadline, the legal hold date, the integrity method, the access restrictions, the proposed disclosure route and the unresolved questions. Include the QTFY indicators that were actually observed and those that were merely supplied by a government advisory. This distinction prevents a threat-intelligence list from being mistaken for proof that the company’s systems were compromised. It also gives counsel a basis to ask for a narrower request, a secure transfer method, confidentiality protection or a forensic examination.
II. How will French and European procedure test evidence gathered across borders?
A. How can investigators obtain cloud and IoT data stored abroad?
French investigators have several procedural routes, and none should be described as a universal “cloud warrant.” During a French search, Article 57-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure permits access, through a computer system located at the search site, to data relevant to the investigation that are accessible from or available to the initial system. The same provision addresses data already established to be stored in another computer system outside France, subject to the conditions of applicable international commitments. It uses the phrase situé en dehors du territoire national
and expressly preserves those international conditions. The provision therefore supports carefully defined technical access in a lawful search; it should not be read as an unlimited power to enter any foreign provider’s infrastructure.
Article 57-1 also permits copies and allows investigators to seek information from a person who knows the protective measures applied to the data or who can provide access information. A company receiving such a request should identify the exact French proceeding, the authority, the system covered, the data period and the requested credentials or export. It should keep an audit trail of the response. If the request concerns a foreign-hosted environment, counsel should ask whether the requested access is being carried out through the French system, through mutual assistance, through provider cooperation, or through another instrument. The answer affects both the company’s obligations and the later challenge to the evidence.
For information held by a French company, Article 60-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure permits the prosecutor or an authorised judicial police officer to require information from a person, public or private body or administration likely to hold information relevant to an investigation, including information from an IT system, in digital form. Its wording includes notamment sous forme numérique
. Article 60-2 addresses the provision of useful information held in computer systems and, under its stated safeguards, preservation measures directed to telecommunications operators. Both provisions concern French procedural authority. They do not turn a French request into a binding command to a U.S. registrar or a U.S. cloud provider.
The preliminary-investigation counterpart is Article 77-1-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which also permits requisitions for information relevant to the investigation, including digital information, subject to the exceptions and safeguards in the text. Article 77-1-2 sets out authorisation routes for requisitions under Article 60-2 and requires the concerned organisations or persons to make the information available electronically within the best possible time. The quote dans les meilleurs délais
captures the urgency, but urgency does not erase scope, privilege, authentication or data-minimisation questions.
The Court of Cassation addressed a foreign provider in Criminal Division judgment no. 12-87.130, delivered on 6 November 2013. The official decision explains that investigators could request information from a person domiciled abroad without violating territorial competence or international mutual-assistance rules where the person remained free not to answer. It describes the request as a form of information gathering rather than a coercive search and separately discusses publicly accessible data under Article 32 of the Budapest Convention. The judgment is available at Cour de cassation, Criminal Division, 6 November 2013, no. 12-87.130. The practical phrase is libre de ne pas y répondre
: a voluntary response is not the same thing as compulsory production.
That principle is important for a French provider contacted directly by U.S. authorities. The provider must not confuse a voluntary request, a preservation letter, a subpoena, a search warrant, a seizure order, a treaty request or an emergency disclosure process. The provider should preserve the request, verify its authenticity through an independent channel, identify its legal recipient and obtain advice on whether French law, the provider contract, data-protection law or an international agreement permits the requested action. If the request is coercive but addressed to a foreign group company, the French entity should not assume that a group email or shared administrator account makes it the correct recipient.
For a request moving between EU Member States, the procedural landscape has recently changed. Article 694-15 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states that, unless the Code provides otherwise, requests for criminal mutual assistance between France and other EU Member States use European Investigation Orders. In parallel, Regulation (EU) 2023/1543 on European Production Orders and European Preservation Orders for electronic evidence applies from 18 August 2026. Its Article 1 covers orders addressed to service providers offering services in the Union, including regardless of the location of the data, and the Regulation expressly includes domain-name and IP-numbering services within the relevant provider categories.
The new EU Regulation does not answer the QTFY request by itself. Article 1(4) excludes proceedings initiated to provide mutual legal assistance to another Member State or a third country. A U.S. request to France or to a French provider remains a third-country cooperation question, even though the French provider may also operate services in the Union. The French company should therefore separate three situations: an EU authority using the new European order system in its own criminal proceedings; a French authority seeking evidence from another EU Member State; and a U.S. authority seeking evidence for a U.S. case. The data may look identical while the legal instrument and challenge route are different.
Article 694-3 provides the French rule for foreign mutual assistance requests. The official text of Article 694-3 states that foreign judicial-assistance requests are executed under the procedural rules of the Code, while permitting the foreign procedure specified in the request if it does not reduce the rights and procedural guarantees provided by French law. The quoted condition is ne réduisent pas les droits des parties
. For a company, that can translate into questions about legal privilege, confidential business information, data subjects, authentication, notice, redaction and the ability to contest the scope of a request.
Preservation and production should also be separated in time. A preservation measure freezes the relevant data so that a later production request can be assessed. It does not necessarily authorise the authority or provider to disclose the entire account immediately. A production request should identify the categories, custodians, date range, legal basis and secure transmission method. The company should preserve the raw record and produce a controlled copy if legally required. A provider that has already changed the environment in response to a domain seizure should document whether the change altered logs, routing, authentication or content.
Finally, any demand for access credentials needs a technical and legal protocol. Credentials can reveal unrelated tenants, privileged communications or the ability to modify a live system. A company may be able to satisfy a lawful request through an export, a read-only account, a forensic image or a provider-assisted production rather than by transferring a master administrator password. Article 230-1’s treatment of authentication and decryption shows why the access mechanism itself can become an evidential issue. The safest response is to make the authority’s objective achievable while reducing unnecessary control over the wider environment.
B. What can a company challenge before cross-border evidence is used?
The first challenge is scope. A domain seizure or cyber-investigation request should identify the systems, accounts, devices, data types and period relevant to the alleged conduct. A request that captures an entire tenant because one device communicated with a listed domain may contain unrelated customer records, privileged material and evidence of other people’s activity. French law repeatedly connects seizure to relevance and necessity. Article 56 refers to data necessary to establish the truth, and Article 57-1 refers to data relevant to the investigation. Those words create a basis for demanding a technical explanation of how the requested set was selected.
The second challenge is integrity and traceability. In Criminal Division judgment no. 22-86.512 of 7 November 2023, the Court of Cassation examined copied computer data and an online storage space. It held that the lower court had been wrong to treat computer-data seizure as exempt from the general rules on immediate inventory and sealing, even though the conviction-stage challenge failed on the facts because the applicant had attended the copying operation, retained the physical supports and had not substantiated a discrepancy. The decision records the phrase il n’y a pas lieu de rechercher un placement sous scellés définitifs
in the lower court’s reasoning, then explains why the procedural distinction was wrong. For a company, the lesson is not that every delayed seal invalidates evidence. It is that the defence should preserve a concrete complaint about what changed, who had access, and how the copy can be tested.
The third challenge is attribution. A technical record may be authentic as a server log and still fail to prove that a particular employee, customer or director caused the event. Counsel should ask whether the source was a compromised relay, a shared account, a proxy, a virtual machine, an administrator account or a device controlled by several people. The question is not whether the record exists; it is what proposition the record can actually prove. A court should be shown the limitations as well as the matches.
The fourth challenge is proportionality and the protection of private or privileged data. In Criminal Division judgment no. 24-82.908 of 7 January 2025, the Court of Cassation considered a challenge to the capture of computer data. The decision states that the authorisation must identify the offence and provide a detailed description of the targeted automated data-processing systems, including servers identified by IP addresses and connected terminals or peripherals. The decision uses the phrase la description détaillée des systèmes
. It also addresses the Article 8 European Convention concern raised by an indiscriminate capture argument. The point for a French company is concrete: an order that identifies a server or technical perimeter may be defensible, but a vague order that leaves the investigators free to collect an entire population of users is open to a more serious challenge.
The fifth challenge is the legal route used to obtain the record. A foreign authority may have obtained material by a voluntary provider response, by a domestic subpoena, by a court-authorised seizure or through mutual legal assistance. The route affects the authority’s power, the provider’s duties and the defence’s ability to seek the underlying order. The French court may not re-try every issue of foreign law as if it were the foreign court, but the parties can still debate authenticity, reliability, relevance, fairness, privilege, proportionality and the conditions under which the material entered the French procedure.
The sixth challenge is the difference between evidence obtained abroad and evidence obtained through a French act. Article 427 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that offences may, outside statutory exceptions, be established by any mode of proof and that the judge may rely only on evidence presented at the hearing and discussed adversarially. The official text is Article 427 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; it includes the expression contradictoirement discutées
. This does not make every foreign export automatically admissible or persuasive. It means that the defence must have a meaningful opportunity to test the record and that the judge remains responsible for assessing its weight.
Translation and disclosure can affect that opportunity. If the prosecution supplies only a translated extract, the defence may need the original metadata, the complete conversation, the export protocol, the translator’s method and the surrounding records. If the authority withholds the underlying affidavit or technical report, counsel may argue that the court cannot assess the scope or reliability of the summary. If a provider can produce a certificate or a reproducible export, the certificate should be examined rather than treated as a substitute for every underlying fact.
For a company that is only a witness or victim, the objective is often a controlled, useful production rather than a broad objection. The company can offer a chronology, a read-only evidence room, a data map, a list of affected systems, a description of the preservation process and a point of contact for technical questions. It can request confidentiality over trade secrets, redaction of unrelated personal data, a protective order, a secure transfer channel and confirmation that the authority will preserve the original. Cooperation is more defensible when the company can show exactly what it is producing and exactly what it is not producing.
For a company treated as a suspect, the response changes. Counsel should assess jurisdiction, the factual basis for attribution, the offence elements, the scope of the order, the integrity of the collection, privilege and the availability of a remedy in the requesting and requested states. Employees should receive a preservation instruction and a protocol for interviews. No one should delete messages, overwrite logs, reconfigure a device to make a narrative look cleaner, or contact an alleged operator without advice. The company’s own remediation steps can become evidence, so they should be technically necessary, proportionate and documented.
The QTFY seizure also creates a potential conflict between operational continuity and evidence preservation. A business may have to replace a router, terminate a proxy, rotate keys or block a domain immediately. That is sensible cybersecurity. It can also destroy the state needed to determine whether the business was a victim. The answer is not to keep a dangerous system online for the sake of a future trial. It is to capture the relevant state safely, record the decision, preserve provider-side records and have counsel and the technical lead agree on a defensible sequence.
A final challenge concerns the limits of public claims. The DOJ release says the QTFY activity dates back at least to 2018 and that the platforms served paying customers, including entities the government identifies as the PRC Ministry of State Security and the People’s Liberation Army. Those are government allegations described in a seizure announcement and affidavit. A French company should not repeat them in a complaint as established facts unless the underlying evidence supports the proposition. Its own legal analysis should use careful categories: “the government alleges,” “the log records,” “the provider confirms,” “the forensic image shows,” and “the witness recalls.” That precision protects credibility and avoids turning an intelligence lead into an unsupported accusation.
The result is a two-track litigation file. The first track is technical: contain the compromise, preserve the data, verify indicators, map the infrastructure and determine what the company actually observed. The second is procedural: identify the authority, instrument, jurisdiction, data category, transfer route, privilege issue and remedy. The tracks must communicate but should not be merged into a single unreviewed disclosure. French procedure gives investigators meaningful tools, including access to connected systems, digital requisitions, preservation measures and technical assistance. It also supplies the language of relevance, international commitments, procedural guarantees, detailed targeting and adversarial review that a company can use to test an overbroad or unreliable demand.
Conclusion
The QTFY domain seizure shows how a single technical intervention can generate legal consequences on several continents. A French company whose cloud, router, proxy, IoT fleet or provider records intersect with the investigation should treat the event as an evidence-preservation emergency, not as proof of liability. It should preserve volatile records, separate original data from working copies, document containment, protect privilege and personal data, and verify whether the request is voluntary, coercive, European or based on third-country assistance. Articles 56, 57-1, 60-1, 60-2, 77-1-1, 230-1, 694-3, 694-15, 706-72 and 427 of the French codes, read with the verified decisions of the Court of Cassation, provide a procedural vocabulary for that work. The strongest position is usually built before production: know what was collected, why it was collected, who handled it, where it was stored, which legal instrument required it, and what the record can genuinely prove.