On 17 September 2026, a federal judge in Los Angeles sentenced Samir Ousman Alsheikh, a 74-year-old former Syrian prison warden and provincial governor under Bashar al-Assad, to 60 years in prison for torture and immigration fraud. A jury had found him guilty in March 2026 of one count of conspiracy to commit torture, three counts of torture, one count of visa fraud and one count of attempted naturalization fraud, for acts committed as head of Adra Prison, also known as Damascus Central Prison, between 2005 and 2008. The United States Department of Justice describes him as the highest-ranking former member of the Assad regime to be tried and convicted in person outside of Syria, and the message attached to the sentence is blunt: no safe haven in the United States for human rights violators. Three of his victims testified at trial about the device known as the Flying Carpet, about prisoners manacled to ceilings, beaten inside tires, and packed into tiny underground cells in the prison punishment wing. For an international audience, and for Syrians living in exile in France, the case raises an immediate question: what would have happened if Alsheikh had landed at Roissy instead of Los Angeles? Could French courts have tried him, under which provisions, and with what limits? This article reconstructs the American prosecution first, then sets out the French universal jurisdiction playbook exactly as the Code and the Cour de cassation define it today: the torture route under the New York Convention, the crimes against humanity route with its residence condition, the penalties attached, and the three recent rulings that draw the boundary between admissible cases and files French judges must decline.
I. How America Put a Syrian Prison Chief Behind Bars for 60 Years
A. From Adra Prison’s Wing 13 to an Arrest at Los Angeles Airport: What Did Alsheikh Actually Do?
Samir Ousman Alsheikh ran the largest prison in Syria under the Assad regime. According to the press release of the United States Department of Justice, he headed Adra Prison outside Damascus from approximately 2005 to 2008, and the evidence at trial showed that he ordered and participated in the torture of prisoners, including to silence political dissent. The Center for Justice and Accountability, which represents nine individuals held or present in Adra during his tenure, describes a secret underground Punishment Wing, also known as Wing 13, with small isolation cells and an interrogation room where prisoners were tortured, and reports that Alsheikh monitored interrogations and torture from his office through surveillance cameras installed in that wing. After Adra, his career inside the regime continued: he was appointed governor of Deir Ez-Zour around 25 July 2011, a period during which documentation groups recorded an escalation of enforced disappearances, torture and attacks on civilians, and he remained an official of the regime for years before leaving the country.
The American file did not start with torture. Alsheikh entered the United States in 2020, obtained a green card and applied for American citizenship in 2023, allegedly concealing his role in torture, killings and political persecution as well as his membership of the Syrian Baath Party. He was arrested at Los Angeles Airport on 10 July 2024, and the initial indictment of 8 August 2024 charged only immigration fraud: false statements on his green card and naturalization applications. The turning point came on 12 December 2024, four days after the fall of the Assad regime, when the Department of Justice filed a first superseding indictment adding four torture-related charges. The trial opened on 3 March 2026, lasted nine days, and ended on 16 March 2026 with guilty verdicts on every count: conspiracy to commit torture, three counts of torture, fraud in the possession and use of an immigration document, and attempted naturalization fraud. The legal architecture matters for French readers because it mirrors the two-track logic Paris uses in its own cases: an accessible territorial hook, here immigration fraud on American soil, carrying the file while the extraterritorial atrocity charges, here torture under the federal torture statute, supply the gravity. France works the same way, as shown below, except that the French hook for torture committed abroad is presence on French soil combined with the New York Convention, and for crimes against humanity it is habitual residence in France.
The investigation itself was transnational in a way that should interest any victim or witness living in France. The Department of Justice publicly credited the extraordinary cooperation of Germany’s Federal Criminal Police Office in arranging meetings with many witnesses in Germany, alongside Homeland Security Investigations, the FBI’s International Human Rights Unit and the Human Rights Violators and War Crimes Center created in 2009. Witnesses were heard where they lived, across borders, and their testimony travelled to the Los Angeles courtroom. That method is now standard in atrocity cases: Syrian survivors are scattered across Germany, France, Sweden and the Netherlands, and no single national court can hear them all without foreign police cooperation. France participates in exactly the same networks, through Eurojust joint investigation teams and its own specialized prosecution office for crimes against humanity, and a French complaint filed in Paris can trigger witness hearings in Berlin or Stockholm just as the American case triggered hearings in Germany. The practical lesson for survivors in France is therefore direct: testimony given to French investigators or to an association in Paris can end up supporting a prosecution in another country, and testimony gathered abroad can support a French case, provided the procedural channels are used.
B. Why 60 Years? Victims, the Flying Carpet, and the No Safe Haven Message
The sentence imposed on 17 September 2026 reflects both the cruelty of the facts and the structure of American federal sentencing. Alsheikh faced a theoretical maximum of 100 years: 20 years for each count of torture and conspiracy to commit torture, and 10 years for each immigration fraud count. The judge imposed 60 years in federal prison, a term that at the age of 74 amounts to life behind bars. Three victims testified in person about being tortured and about seeing and hearing the torture of others: bodies folded in half at the waist on the hinged wooden device called the Flying Carpet, prisoners manacled to the ceiling and suspended for hours or days, savage beatings while immobilized inside tires, confinement in tiny, filthy, cold and wet cells infested with insects. The trial also established the mechanism of reprisal inside Adra: when two prisoners refused orders to harm political detainees, and after a third prisoner’s letter of support to a political prisoner was intercepted, Alsheikh sent them to the underground Wing 13 to be tortured in its cells. Victims also participated in the sentencing hearing itself through written statements, recorded videos or live testimony, explaining to the judge how the crimes had marked their lives, and the court weighed those statements in fixing the punishment.
The official reactions frame the case as deterrence policy, and the words chosen deserve quotation because they state the doctrine Paris applies in its own terms. Assistant Attorney General A. Tysen Duva stated that Alsheikh now answers to the United States justice system, that human rights violators who come to the United States will receive no safe haven, and that investigators will find them and see them prosecuted and punished for these crimes. First Assistant United States Attorney Bill Essayli added that criminals who inflict this type of brutality must never be granted refuge, expressing the hope that the sentence brings victims some healing and closure. The FBI stressed that anyone who engages in torture and comes to the United States will face the consequences, and thanked the victims whose testimony led to the sentence. Strip away the flags and the same doctrine governs in France: presence of the suspect on national territory plus a convention-based jurisdictional title equals prosecution, regardless of where the torture occurred and regardless of the victims’ nationality. The difference lies in the details of the titles, the conditions attached to each, and the penalties available, which is where French law must now be examined with precision.
One further American particularity should be noted honestly, because it shapes any comparison with France. The United States prosecuted torture as such, under its federal torture statute, without needing to characterize the facts as crimes against humanity or to prove a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population. The immigration counts then supplied additional years and, crucially, an independent domestic basis for arrest and detention from July 2024 onward. France can do the equivalent on the torture side, as shown below, through the direct route of the New York Convention as implemented in the Code of Criminal Procedure. On the crimes against humanity side, however, France demands more: proof of the contextual element, a planned attack against a civilian population, plus a residence link and, under the case law applicable to older files, attention to the state of foreign law at the time. An Alsheikh file in Paris would therefore most naturally have been built on torture first, with crimes against humanity as the heavier but more demanding second charge, exactly the sequencing the Cour de cassation’s recent rulings confirm.
II. If Alsheikh Had Landed in Paris: the French Universal Jurisdiction Playbook
A. Which French Court Could Try a Foreign Torturer, and Under Which Articles?
The starting point of French universal jurisdiction is a general principle stated in Article 689 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: “Les auteurs ou complices d’infractions commises hors du territoire de la République peuvent être poursuivis et jugés par les juridictions françaises soit lorsque, conformément aux dispositions du livre Ier du code pénal ou d’un autre texte législatif, la loi française est applicable, soit lorsqu’une convention internationale ou un acte pris en application du traité instituant les Communautés européennes donne compétence aux juridictions françaises pour connaître de l’infraction.” In plain English, French courts may try offenders for acts committed abroad either where French law declares itself applicable or where an international convention gives them jurisdiction. The mechanism is then specified convention by convention, and two of those specifications matter for a torturer from a foreign prison system.
The first and most direct route is torture under the New York Convention of 10 December 1984. Article 689-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides: “En application des conventions internationales visées aux articles suivants, peut être poursuivie et jugée par les juridictions françaises, si elle se trouve en France, toute personne qui s’est rendue coupable hors du territoire de la République de l’une des infractions énumérées par ces articles.” Presence in France is the trigger: if the suspect is found on French soil, prosecution is possible. Article 689-2 then designates the torture convention expressly: “Pour l’application de la convention contre la torture et autres peines ou traitements cruels, inhumains ou dégradants, adoptée à New York le 10 décembre 1984, peut être poursuivie et jugée dans les conditions prévues à l’article 689-1 toute personne coupable de tortures au sens de l’article 1er de la convention.” An Alsheikh arrested at Roissy, like the real one arrested at Los Angeles Airport, would therefore fall squarely within French jurisdiction for torture, with no need to prove any additional link to France beyond his presence, and no need to characterize a widespread attack. The substantive offence would be drawn from the Penal Code: Article 222-1 states that “Le fait de soumettre une personne à des tortures ou à des actes de barbarie est puni de quinze ans de réclusion criminelle” and Article 222-3 raises the penalty to twenty years of criminal imprisonment where the offence is committed with aggravating circumstances, opening: “L’infraction définie à l’article 222-1 est punie de vingt ans de réclusion criminelle lorsqu’elle est commise” followed by the list of protected victims and contexts, which counsel must check against each victim’s situation.
The second route, heavier and more demanding, is crimes against humanity. Article 689-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure allows French courts to try “toute personne soupçonnée d’avoir commis à l’étranger l’une des infractions suivantes : 1° Le crime de génocide défini au chapitre Ier du sous-titre Ier du titre Ier du livre II du code pénal ; 2° Les autres crimes contre l’humanité définis au chapitre II du même sous-titre Ier ; 3° Les crimes et les délits de guerre définis aux articles 461-1 à 461-31 du même code.” But unlike the torture route, presence alone does not suffice: the same article requires that “La personne soupçonnée doit avoir une résidence habituelle sur le territoire français,” habitual residence defined by a sufficient connecting link with France, assessed notably on the duration of the current or foreseeable presence of the person concerned. A torturer merely transiting through Roissy could be arrested and tried for torture under Articles 689-1 and 689-2, but a crimes against humanity prosecution would require showing that he actually resides, or is durably settling, in France. The substantive definitions then supply the contextual element the American torture counts did not need: Article 211-1 of the Penal Code defines genocide as acts “en exécution d’un plan concerté tendant à la destruction totale ou partielle d’un groupe national, ethnique, racial ou religieux,” punishable by life imprisonment, “Le génocide est puni de la réclusion criminelle à perpétuité” while Article 212-1 defines crimes against humanity, also punished by life imprisonment, as acts “commis en exécution d’un plan concerté à l’encontre d’un groupe de population civile dans le cadre d’une attaque généralisée ou systématique” expressly listing torture as item 6°, “6° La torture.” Prison torture ordered against political detainees as part of a regime’s apparatus of repression fits that definition where the systematic character is documented, which is precisely what documentation groups, trial testimony and the Adra evidence would establish. Readers should note that the official database currently flags Articles 689, 689-1, 689-2 and 689-11 as subject to deferred repeal, so counsel must always verify the version in force on the day a complaint is filed rather than relying on any summary, including this one.
B. What the Cour de Cassation Really Allows: Incompetence in 2021, Lafarge, and the 2025 Assises Referral
Three published rulings of the criminal chamber map the real boundary, and each must be read for what it actually holds rather than for what commentators wish it held. The first is a warning. On 24 November 2021, in case No. 21-81.344 (ECLI:FR:CCASS:2021:CR01269, published in the Bulletin), the Cour de cassation quashed a Paris investigating chamber ruling and declared the French courts incompetent to hear torture and crimes against humanity charges arising from Syria. The investigating chamber had reasoned that even though Syrian criminal law does not expressly define crimes against humanity, it punishes murder, acts of barbarity, rape, violence and torture, that the 2012 Syrian Constitution prohibits torture, and that Syria is party to the Geneva Conventions and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, so that Syrian law represses the underlying facts. The Cour de cassation rejected that equivalence in terms that remain the controlling statement of the double criminality requirement for older files: “Les crimes contre l’humanité sont définis au chapitre II du sous-titre Ier du code pénal, et nécessairement commis en exécution d’un plan concerté à l’encontre d’un groupe de population civile dans le cadre d’une attaque généralisée ou systématique.” It continued: “Dès lors, l’exigence posée par l’article 689-11 du code de procédure pénale, selon laquelle les faits doivent être punis par la législation de l’Etat où ils ont été commis, inclut nécessairement l’existence dans cette législation d’une infraction comportant un élément constitutif relatif à une attaque lancée contre une population civile en exécution d’un plan concerté.” The operative part follows without ambiguity: “DÉCLARE INCOMPÉTENTES les juridictions françaises pour connaître des poursuites engagées contre le demandeur” For victims, the lesson is sharp: under the version of Article 689-11 applicable to that file, punishing ordinary murder or torture in the territorial state was not enough; the foreign law had to criminalize the attack against a civilian population as such. Later statutory reform reshaped these conditions, which is why any Syrian file in Paris today must be built on the current text, verified article by article, and not on the pre-reform case law alone.
The second ruling shows the offensive side of French universal jurisdiction: corporate complicity. On 7 September 2021, in the Lafarge case No. 19-87.367 (ECLI:FR:CCASS:2021:CR00868, published in the Bulletin), the criminal chamber quashed the Paris ruling that had annulled the company’s indictment for complicity in crimes against humanity, holding: “CASSE ET ANNULE l’arrêt susvisé, mais en ses seules dispositions ayant déclaré le mémoire de l’association European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights irrecevable, ayant annulé la mise en examen de la société Lafarge du chef de complicité de crimes contre l’humanité et ordonné une cancellation à la cote D 1338/2, et ayant rejeté le moyen d’annulation de la mise en examen de ladite société du chef de mise en danger de la vie d’autrui” The case, arising from payments made to armed groups in Syria to keep a cement plant running, restored the complicity indictment and confirmed that French investigating judges may pursue legal persons for complicity in crimes against humanity committed abroad. For an Alsheikh-type file, the Lafarge precedent matters at the margins that often decide real cases: former officials rarely act alone, and the networks that finance, supply or politically cover a prison apparatus, including companies and intermediaries present or domiciled in France, can be drawn into the same investigation. It also confirms the standing of specialized associations as civil parties, since the Court restored the admissibility of the ECCHR brief, which means victims’ associations in Paris are procedural actors in these files, not spectators.
The third ruling is the most recent and the most directly encouraging for victims. On 7 May 2025, in case No. 25-81.446 (ECLI:FR:CCASS:2025:CR00754, published in the Bulletin), the criminal chamber ruled on a Paris investigating chamber decision of 22 January 2025 which had closed the genocide and crimes against humanity counts but referred the accused to the specially composed Paris cour d’assises: the lower court had “renvoyée devant la cour d’assises de Paris, spécialement composée, sous l’accusation d’association de malfaiteurs terroriste et de complicité de crimes contre l’humanité.” The Cour de cassation declared the accused’s appeal inadmissible and, on the prosecution’s appeal, partially quashed only the provisions dropping the genocide indictment, expressly maintaining all other provisions, so the trial before the Paris assises for complicity in crimes against humanity stands. The trajectory is therefore complete and current: 2021 incompetence for a Syrian file under the old double criminality reading, 2021 restoration of a corporate complicity indictment, 2025 confirmation of a referral to the Paris assises for complicity in crimes against humanity. A Syrian prison chief residing in France today would face a jurisdiction whose judges know these files, whose prosecutors have a specialized office, and whose highest criminal court has just sent a comparable complicity case to trial. The American 60-year sentence and the French playbook thus converge on the same practical advice: file where the suspect is, document the system rather than only the suffering, and choose the charge that fits the evidence, torture where presence suffices, crimes against humanity where residence and context can be proved.
Conclusion
The Los Angeles sentence of 17 September 2026 closes one file and opens a method. Samir Ousman Alsheikh, head of Adra Prison from 2005 to 2008, supervisor of the underground Wing 13, arrested at an American airport in July 2024 after hiding his past from immigration authorities, tried over nine days in March 2026, now serves 60 years in federal prison for torture and fraud, with his victims heard and the cooperation of German investigators acknowledged on the record. France holds an equivalent arsenal, and in some respects a sharper one: immediate jurisdiction over any torturer found on its territory under the New York Convention route of Articles 689-1 and 689-2, with torture punished by fifteen years under Article 222-1 and twenty years in aggravated form under Article 222-3; and jurisdiction over genocide and crimes against humanity under Article 689-11 for suspects habitually resident in France, with life imprisonment under Articles 211-1 and 212-1. The limits are equally documented: the 2021 incompetence ruling for Syrian facts under the old double criminality reading, the Lafarge restoration of corporate complicity indictments, and the 2025 referral of a complicity case to the specially composed Paris assises. For survivors living in France, the conclusion is operational rather than rhetorical. Preserve testimony early, identify the suspect’s French footprint with precision, and let counsel select the charge the file can actually carry. The American court has shown what a complete file earns; the French courts have shown which files they accept. The distance between the two is evidence, and evidence is built now.