On 24 September 2026, the Council of the European Union placed Xenia Fedorova, the former president and news director of RT France, on the EU sanctions list for foreign information manipulation and interference. The decision freezes every asset she holds in the Union and makes it a criminally relevant offence for any EU bank, company or individual to put funds at her disposal. It arrived forty-eight hours after the Council extended the entire Russia-related individual sanctions regime, covering more than 3,000 persons and entities, for three more years until 22 September 2029. For Russians, Belarusians, Ukrainians and international media professionals living in Paris, the message is blunt: Brussels now treats disinformation operations run from French soil as a sanctions matter, and Paris enforces that choice through its banks, its Treasury and its media regulator. This analysis explains what the listing does, how it bites in France, and which legal routes exist to live with it or to challenge it before the EU General Court and the French courts.
I. Why the EU listed the former RT France chief on 24 September 2026
A. Information manipulation as a sanctions ground: the hybrid toolbox and the Fedorova designation
The press release issued by the Council on 24 September 2026 states that the Council adopted restrictive measures against Xenia Fedorova for her role in Russia’s continued hybrid activities, in particular foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) said to undermine democracy and stability in the EU and its member states. The Council describes Fedorova as a Russian media figure and former senior executive of Russia Today France, recalling that in her capacity as President and Director of Information of RT France, she participated in the implementation and dissemination of the channel’s editorial line, including pro-Russian narratives in the context of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. The same statement adds that after RT’s broadcasting activities were suspended in the Union, Fedorova continued to disseminate narratives aligned with those promoted by the Russian authorities concerning the war against Ukraine, European support for Ukraine, NATO and relations between Russia and the Union, in French media such as CNews, Europe 1 and Le JDNews.
Two features make this designation legally significant. First, it was adopted under the framework created by Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643 of 8 October 2024 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s destabilising activities, the so-called hybrid toolbox, rather than under the older Ukraine-territorial-integrity regime. The Council notes that with this decision, restrictive measures in view of Russia’s destabilising activities now apply to a total of 81 individuals and 20 entities. The hybrid regime targets sabotage, cyber operations, instrumentalised migration and information manipulation as such, which means the operative question for future listings is not whether the person commanded troops or financed the war, but whether documented conduct amounts to interference in the democratic space of the Union. Second, the designation attaches to a person whose professional base was Paris: RT France was a French-registered company broadcasting from studios in Boulogne-Billancourt until its suspension in March 2022. The listing therefore lands where the evidence was gathered, where the accounts were held and where the audience was addressed, and it is in Paris that its practical effects will be felt first.
For readers who follow sanctions litigation, the contrast with the General Court’s RT France judgment is instructive. On 27 July 2022, the General Court, sitting as a Grand Chamber, dismissed the channel’s challenge to the EU-wide broadcast ban in case T-125/22 RT France v Council. The Court held that the purpose of the acts was the temporary prohibition of propaganda for the military assault by means of certain media under Russian control, and that any operator established in the Union was prohibited from broadcasting content produced by the listed entities. It accepted that propaganda and disinformation campaigns relating to the war in Ukraine concern the fundamental values of democratic society and form part of the modern arsenal of war, and it ruled that the information processing at issue could not benefit from the enhanced protection of Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, recalling that propaganda in favour of war is prohibited under the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 16 December 1966. The Fedorova listing extends the same logic from the company to the individual executive: where the 2022 ban silenced the channel, the 2026 designation freezes the person identified as the editorial mind behind it.
B. What an EU asset freeze means in practice: frozen funds and the ban on making resources available
The Council’s press release summarises the consequence plainly: the person listed is subject to an asset freeze, and EU citizens and companies are forbidden from making funds, financial assets or economic resources available to her. Behind that sentence sit two distinct prohibitions that every person dealing with a listed individual must understand. The freeze itself immobilises all funds and economic resources belonging to, owned, held or controlled by the designated person: bank balances cannot be moved, securities cannot be sold, rents cannot be collected and professional fees cannot be paid out of frozen accounts. The second prohibition, the ban on making funds available, binds everyone else: no EU national and no company operating in the Union may transfer money, grant a loan, pay a salary, provide free accommodation or supply services for consideration to the listed person, directly or indirectly. Even humanitarian or legal-aid payments require a prior authorisation from the competent national authority, in France the Directorate General of the Treasury, acting under the derogation clauses of the EU regulations.
The scale of the system in which this single listing sits became visible two days earlier. On 22 September 2026 the Council decided to prolong the restrictive measures targeting those responsible for undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine for another 36 months, until 22 September 2029. Its statement recalls that the current restrictive measures apply to more than 3,000 individuals and entities and include travel restrictions for natural persons, the freezing of assets, and a ban on making funds or other economic resources available to the listed individuals and entities. The legal base is Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 of 17 March 2014 adopted under Article 215 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which provides that where a decision adopted under the common foreign and security policy so provides, the Council may adopt restrictive measures against natural or legal persons, groups or non-state entities, and that the acts concerned must contain the necessary provisions on legal safeguards. In the same review the Council removed three deceased persons and declined to renew four designations, a detail worth remembering: listings are not mechanically eternal, files are re-examined, and weak files can fall away at renewal.
Recent delistings prove the point and deserve attention from anyone newly listed. Readers of this desk will recall that the Council delisted two prominent Russian businessmen this month while extending the regime around them, a sequence analysed in our companion piece on the September 2026 delistings and the extension of the sanctions until 2029. The lesson is general: each name on the list has its own statement of reasons, its own evidence and its own litigation prospects, and a wave of renewals never immunises an individual designation from annulment when its reasons are thin, outdated or factually wrong.
II. How the freeze bites in Paris and how to answer it before the courts
A. Frozen in France: banks, the Treasury, the media regulator and the criminal risk of circumvention
In France an EU asset freeze is not a diplomatic slogan but a compliance chain that starts at the bank counter. Article L. 562-4 of the Monetary and Financial Code provides that all natural persons on national territory and the institutions listed in Article L. 561-2 of the same Code, banks, payment institutions, insurers and many other professionals, must apply freeze measures and making-available prohibitions without delay and inform the Minister for the Economy immediately. Article L. 562-5 of the Code states the prohibition plainly: the persons bound by the article may not make funds or economic resources available, directly or indirectly, or use them for the benefit of persons whose assets are frozen under Articles L. 562-2, L. 562-2-1, L. 562-2-2, L. 562-3, L. 562-3-1, L. 712-4 or L. 712-10. Ministerial freeze orders are published by extract in the Official Journal and are enforceable from publication, as Article L. 562-9 of the Code recalls, and Article L. 562-10 makes the measures opposable to any third party claiming a right over the frozen funds, even where that right arose before the freeze. In practice this means that from the morning the Official Journal publishes the listing, a Paris bank that holds an account of the designated person blocks it, rejects incoming transfers, files a report and waits; a notary cannot distribute sale proceeds; an employer cannot pay wages; a landlord cannot lawfully accept rent channelled around the freeze.
Alongside the European channel, France has built an autonomous national freeze for interference cases that mirrors the Fedorova fact pattern. Article L. 562-1 of the Monetary and Financial Code now defines an act of interference as conduct undertaken directly or indirectly at the request or on behalf of a foreign power, having as its object or effect, by any means, including through the communication of false or inaccurate information, to harm the fundamental interests of the Nation, the functioning or integrity of its essential infrastructure or the regular functioning of its democratic institutions. And Article L. 562-2-1 of the Code provides that for the sole purpose of preventing the commission of acts of interference, the Minister for the Economy and the Minister of the Interior may jointly decide, for a renewable six-month period, to freeze funds and economic resources belonging to, possessed, held or controlled by persons who commit, attempt, facilitate or finance such acts, incite them or participate in them. The older general channels remain available too: Article L. 562-2 of the Code organises joint ministerial freezes in terrorism matters, while Article L. 562-3 allows the Minister for the Economy to freeze for six renewable months the assets of persons who commit or finance actions sanctioned by United Nations Chapter VII resolutions or by acts adopted under Article 29 of the Treaty on European Union or Article 75 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, or who are designated under those instruments. A person listed by Brussels can therefore face a European freeze executed by Paris banks and, in parallel, a Paris-ordered national freeze targeting the same interference conduct, with distinct review judges and distinct clocks.
The media dimension of the Fedorova file is enforced in France through a second, specifically audiovisual mechanism that two recent Council of State rulings illustrate. On 9 December 2022, ruling in interim proceedings as Council of State, interim judge, 9 December 2022, No. 468969, the Court suspended the decision by which the president of the media regulator ARCOM had refused to open formal notice proceedings against the French satellite operator Eutelsat to stop carrying the Russian channels Rossiya 1, Perviy Kanal and NTV. The operative part reads: the enforcement of the refusal is suspended, and the Court orders the regulator to re-examine the request filed by Reporters Without Borders, without a penalty payment. Then, on 15 July 2026, the Council of State upheld the successor enforcement system in Council of State, 5th and 6th chambers combined, 15 July 2026, No. 509579, rejecting the application of the company Cloudflare against the ARCOM notification ordering it to block access to online services disseminating content contrary to the broadcast bans adopted under Article 215 TFEU through Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 of 31 July 2014 and Regulation (EU) No 269/2014: “Article 1er : La requête de la société Cloudflare est rejetée.” The Court reasoned that Article 11 of the Law of 21 June 2004 for confidence in the digital economy, as recast by the Law of 21 May 2024 on securing and regulating the digital space, was designed to give effect to temporary and reversible broadcast bans such as the Council regulation of 1 March 2022, whose stated objective was to bring to an end a continuous and concerted activity of propaganda in favour of the military aggression against Ukraine addressed to civil society in the Union and neighbouring countries. It found no disproportionate interference with freedom of enterprise or with freedom of expression under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, given the general-interest objectives and the reversible, supervised character of the device. For anyone in the Fedorova orbit, the consequence is concrete: French intermediaries, hosts, access providers and platforms can be ordered to cut off dissemination of sanctioned content within days, and the administrative judge has already validated the machinery twice.
B. Challenging a listing or living under one: the General Court, the French judge and the evidence strategy
The principal remedy against an EU listing is the action for annulment before the General Court of the European Union in Luxembourg. Article 263 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union provides that the Court of Justice of the European Union reviews the legality of acts of the Council intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties, and that any natural or legal person may bring proceedings against acts addressed to them or of direct and individual concern to them. A listing regulation with an annex naming the person meets that test. Time is short: the action must be lodged within the strict statutory period running from publication of the listing act in the Official Journal or its notification, extended by the standard period on account of distance, so the file must be assembled in weeks, not months. The pleas that succeed in this field are well mapped: breach of the duty to state reasons, manifest error of assessment in the facts relied upon, disproportionality, breach of the rights of the defence and of effective judicial protection, and breach of fundamental rights including property, reputation and freedom of expression. The Council must communicate the statement of reasons individually and place the evidence supporting it on the Court’s file; general press clippings, undated screenshots or assertions contradicted by the person’s verifiable conduct rarely survive adversarial examination. RT France’s own defeat in T-125/22 sharpens the strategy rather than closing it: the Grand Chamber accepted the broadcast ban because the Council had documented a continuous propaganda activity attributable to a state-controlled outlet in wartime, while expressly tying the restriction to a temporary, reversible sanctions act. An individual FIMI listing built on television appearances and opinion journalism, without proof of direction, financing or coordination by a foreign power, is a different file, and the Court examines each file on its own reasons.
Relisting risk shapes every tactical choice. Because the individual sanctions regimes are renewed periodically, most recently until 22 September 2029, the Council routinely adopts fresh acts re-listing the same names with updated reasons, and each new act can be challenged separately. Experienced counsel therefore run two tracks at once: the annulment action against the current act, and a delisting request to the Council supported by evidence that the reasons have become outdated, for example the end of the functions relied upon, the closure of the outlet, the absence of any recent conduct, or contradictions between the statement of reasons and public records. The September 2026 delistings show that reasoned, documented requests filed at the right moment in the renewal cycle can succeed. Parallel relief before the French authorities matters for daily life while the cases run: applications to the Directorate General of the Treasury for authorisations to release frozen funds for basic needs, legal fees, medical care or humanitarian purposes, and, where a distinct national freeze exists, a separate challenge before the French administrative courts.
French judicial review of national freezes is demanding but real, and one Paris precedent sets the evidentiary tone. In Paris Administrative Court of Appeal, 3rd chamber, 27 October 2020, No. 19PA02587, the Court examined a six-month ministerial freeze adopted on the basis of Articles L. 562-3 and following of the Monetary and Financial Code. It recalled that by an order of 18 January 2018 the minister had frozen the assets possessed, held or controlled by the applicant for six months and prohibited funds from being made available to him, then verified the statement of reasons against the file: the designation referred to the United Nations Security Council resolution, to the Council decisions designating the entity said to develop non-conventional weapons, and to the applicant’s conscious role on behalf of that entity, so that the applicant, from reading the decision alone, could know the reasons for the measure against him. On secret evidence the Court drew a clear line that every future applicant should weigh: no legislative provision and no principle prevents facts reported in unsigned intelligence memoranda produced by the minister, which were placed in adversarial debate, from being taken into consideration by the administrative judge, and such memoranda, which protect source confidentiality, do not in themselves breach the fair-trial guarantees of Article 16 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen and Article 6-1 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the equality of arms or the presumption of innocence, provided the applicant could usefully contest their content, accuracy and precision. The application was rejected, the measure found neither vitiated by manifest error nor disproportionate. The practical teaching for a person in Fedorova’s position is symmetrical: French judges accept classified material but require that the person be able to debate it, and they enforce the duty to give reasons strictly, which means the defence must demand the full file, answer every factual allegation with dated exhibits, employment records, contracts, broadcast transcripts and bank statements, and attack each link in the chain between the person, the foreign power and the alleged interference.
Conclusion
The 24 September 2026 listing of Xenia Fedorova turns a media controversy into a sanctions file: an 81-person hybrid regime, a Union-wide freeze plus a ban on making any resource available, and enforcement in Paris through banks, the Treasury and the media regulator whose powers the Council of State has twice confirmed. Two days earlier the Council locked the wider individual regime in place until 2029, so the pressure will not lift by itself, but the same instruments that freeze also organise review: reasoned statements, periodic renewals, Treasury authorisations and two judges, in Luxembourg and in Paris, before whom reasons, evidence and proportionality are tested. Anyone listed, employed by a listed person or advising one should therefore move fast, map every account and contract touched by the freeze, seek the necessary authorisations for basic needs and legal defence, and build the annulment file while the facts are fresh. Sanctions files are won on documents, dates and contradictions, and the first weeks after publication decide most of what follows.