On 15 September 2026, the Bank of Russia filed a claim with the General Court of the European Union in Luxembourg. The target is precise: Article 1(28) of Council Regulation (EU) 2026/1848 of 23 July 2026, the provision through which the European Union gave its own courts the power to forbid Russian litigants from enforcing Russian court orders anywhere in the world. The Russian central bank’s own press release of 17 September 2026 says the claim was filed on 15 September 2026 to annul Article 1(28), described as a mechanism allowing the courts of EU Member States to prohibit Russian persons from seeking recognition and enforcement of certain Russian court orders “in any jurisdiction”.
The judgment Brussels wants to contain is enormous. On 15 May 2026, the Arbitration Court of the City of Moscow upheld in full the central bank’s claim against Euroclear Bank SA/NV in case No. A40-345157/2025, a lawsuit which, according to the Associated Press, concerned “18.2 trillion rubles ($249.7 billion)” in damages claimed after Russia was barred from managing and disposing of its Euroclear funds and securities. Euroclear, which holds around 193 billion euros of the 210 billion euros of Russian assets frozen by the Union, answered on 18 May 2026 that it “strongly contests” the claim, “which is without merit”, that it “does not recognise” the court’s jurisdiction and that it will appeal. Moscow calls the European regulation, in the same press release, “a direct attempt” to intervene in the “current court proceedings in Belgium” and block enforcement of the Moscow order. For anyone holding frozen assets, clearing securities or litigating sanctions in Paris, the Luxembourg case will decide whether a European judge can truly switch off a foreign judgment on a planetary scale, and what remains enforceable before the French courts.
I. Bank of Russia v Council: the first direct assault on the European Union’s anti-enforcement shield
A. How does Article 1(28) of Regulation (EU) 2026/1848 block Russian judgments worldwide?
Council Regulation (EU) 2026/1848 of 23 July 2026 amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine, published in the Official Journal on 23 July 2026 and in force, is described in specialist commentary as a central piece of the 21st package of Union measures against Russia. Its Article 1 runs to dozens of points. Point 27 rewrites the non-recognition rule of Article 11c(1) of Regulation 833/2014. Point 28, the one attacked in Luxembourg, replaces Article 11ca of the same regulation with a two-limb judicial weapon: an anti-suit order and, for the first time, an anti-enforcement order with worldwide reach.
The non-recognition rule now covers Russian injunctions, orders and judgments however founded in Russian law, including those given in insolvency, bankruptcy or restructuring contexts, where they hold a covered European person liable or give effect to a claim against such a person in connection with a sanctions-affected contract: none of them shall be “recognised, given effect or enforced” in a Member State. In plain terms, a Russian judgment of the type obtained against Euroclear cannot produce effects inside the Union, whatever Russian statute it rests on, including through insolvency proceedings.
The replacement Article 11ca goes further and works outside the Union. Where a person caught by the sanctions sues a European operator before a Russian court over a sanctions-affected contract, in breach of a jurisdiction or arbitration clause, abusively under Articles 248.1 or 248.2 of the Russian Arbitration Procedure Code or any other Russian law, or in frustration of Union restrictive measures, the European operator “shall be entitled” to obtain a Member State court order with two possible limbs, the second ordering the Russian litigant “not to seek to enforce” any decision obtained in those proceedings “in any jurisdiction”. The three words “in any jurisdiction” are the whole case: a Brussels, Paris or Amsterdam judge can order a Russian litigant not to enforce its Moscow judgment in Dubai, Hong Kong, Istanbul or anywhere else. Disobedience is priced by paragraph 2 through “financial penalties” deemed “proportionate to the potential loss”, paid to the European operator that requested the order. The penalty goes to the victim operator, not to the State, which turns every European bank or clearing house into a private enforcer of the sanctions wall.
The same package completes the shield with a damages-recovery right. Amended Article 11a(1) of Regulation 833/2014 gives covered European persons a damages-recovery action before Member State courts for direct or indirect loss, including legal costs, caused by third-country claims over sanctions-affected contracts, where they have no effective access to remedies in the relevant jurisdiction, recoverable from the claimants or from those owning or controlling them. Parallel non-recognition and damages provisions were carried into the asset-freeze instrument, Regulation (EU) No 269/2014, so the mechanism bites under both sanctions tracks. For practitioners in Paris, this is the architecture every future enforcement file must be read against: non-recognition inside the Union, anti-enforcement orders reaching beyond it, financial penalties funding the European operator, and a clawback action for sanctions-related litigation costs.
B. Which Moscow judgment is Brussels trying to neutralise: the 249.7 billion dollar order against Euroclear?
The underlying dispute is Central Bank of the Russian Federation v. Euroclear Bank SA/NV, introduced on 12 December 2025 and followed by three recorded rulings of the Moscow Commercial Court: a first decision on 16 January 2026, the judgment of 15 May 2026 upholding the central bank’s claims, and a 26 May 2026 decision granting immediate enforcement. The Associated Press reported that the lawsuit “sought to recover” “18.2 trillion rubles ($249.7 billion)” in damages, that the Moscow Arbitration Court “heard the case behind closed doors” and “upheld the Central Bank’s claim in full”, with Euroclear’s lawyers cited as saying the clearing house intends to appeal over an alleged violation of its right to a fair trial. The Interfax breakdown put actual damages at 181.5 billion euros plus 18.6 billion euros of lost profits and potential income, roughly 200 billion euros in total, a figure consistent with the scale of the immobilised estate.
That estate is the reason the case matters far beyond Moscow. The Associated Press recalls that the Union froze “210 billion euros ($244 billion)” in Russian assets after February 2022, and that Euroclear holds “around 193 billion euros” of the seized funds. Euroclear’s official update of 18 May 2026 states the house position without ambiguity, acknowledging the Moscow ruling while stating that Euroclear “strongly contests” the claim, “which is without merit”. It adds that such claims are not recognised under EU law, that Euroclear “does not recognise the court’s jurisdiction”, and that it will appeal And it closes the circle on the assets: added that the central bank’s assets held at Euroclear Bank “remain immobilised” under international sanctions The same dispatch notes the political backdrop: the Union set aside its initial plan to use frozen Russian assets to assist Ukraine after failing to convince Belgium that it would be protected against Russian retaliation, and opted instead to borrow 90 billion euros on capital markets to fund an interest-free loan to Kyiv.
Moscow’s Luxembourg filing connects these two fronts explicitly. The Bank of Russia’s press release says the European regulation is “a direct attempt” to intervene in the “current court proceedings in Belgium” and block enforcement of the Moscow order in case No. A40-345157/2025 against Euroclear. In other words, Euroclear is expected to ask a Belgian court for an Article 11ca order telling the central bank not to enforce the Moscow judgment anywhere, backed by penalty payments, while the Belgian court is seised of the enforcement battle. The General Court action is therefore not an academic challenge to sanctions doctrine: it is a race to disarm, before it is used, the exact procedural weapon aimed at a 249.7 billion dollar judgment. Readers who follow Union delisting litigation from France will find the same Luxembourg forum and the same annulment logic as in the individual sanctions appeals already covered on this site, including the recent analysis of EU annulment and relisting practice, but here the applicant is a central bank and the prize is enforcement, not delisting.
II. Can Luxembourg really forbid enforcement in any jurisdiction, and what happens if the Moscow judgment reaches Paris?
A. What test will the General Court apply: admissibility, sovereign immunity and extraterritoriality?
A direct action for annulment by a non-privileged applicant lives or dies on Article 263, fourth paragraph, of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union: the Bank of Russia must show that Regulation 2026/1848, or at least its Article 1(28), is of direct and individual concern to it, or that it is a regulatory act of direct concern not entailing implementing measures. A Council regulation amending a sanctions regime is a legislative act, so the stricter direct-and-individual-concern test applies in principle, and the Council will certainly plead inadmissibility, arguing that the bank is affected only by reason of an objective situation, like any Russian litigant, and that the real addressees of Article 11ca orders are future national courts. The bank’s answer is already sketched in its press release: the measure names its situation with precision, since it says the regulation is “a direct attempt” to intervene in the “current court proceedings in Belgium” and block enforcement of its identified Moscow order, which supports a closed-category argument. Admissibility will be the first battlefield, and it is fought on standing, not on the merits.
On jurisdiction over sanctions substance, the bank starts from solid ground. In Case C-72/15, Rosneft, judgment of the Grand Chamber of 28 March 2017, the Court of Justice accepted that it can review the validity of restrictive measures adopted in view of Russia’s actions destabilising Ukraine. The case concerned a reference on the validity of restrictive measures over Ukraine, and the Court accepted “jurisdiction to give a ruling” on the validity of the sanctions decision at stake. The limits of Article 275 TFEU on Common Foreign and Security Policy review do not strip the Union courts of all control over sanctions, and a direct annulment action against a regulation adopted on the basis of Article 215 TFEU falls squarely within the General Court’s jurisdiction. The bank does not need Rosneft to win; it needs it to be heard, and on that point the case law is settled.
The pleas themselves are announced in the press release, and each maps onto an established line of Union case law. First, access to justice and effective judicial protection: the bank invokes “access to justice”, “legal certainty” and the “sovereign immunity” of states and central banks. An order that forbids a litigant from asking any court in the world to recognise its judgment, on pain of penalty payments to its opponent, is the most aggressive restriction on the right to a court the sanctions practice has produced, and the General Court will have to test its proportionality against the objective of preventing circumvention of restrictive measures. Second, legal certainty: the trigger concepts, proceedings brought “abusively” or “in frustration of the Union’s restrictive measures”, and the retroactive-looking reach toward judgments “that was or might be obtained”, give national judges a wide discretion that the bank will attack as unforeseeable in its application to pending cases such as its own Belgian proceedings. Third, sovereign immunity: central bank property enjoys a reinforced protection in international law, and the bank argues that a Union mechanism organising the worldwide non-enforcement of its judgment, plus penalties for seeking enforcement, disregards the immunity of states and their central banks. The Council’s reply will be that the regulation does not authorise seizure of central bank assets but organises the non-recognition of judgments that would frustrate sanctions, a regulatory act of the forum, not an enforcement measure against immune property, and that Union law already survived far-reaching immunity objections in the sanctions field.
Fourth, extraterritoriality, the plea with the widest resonance: the bank calls the worldwide litigation ban “extraterritorial in nature”, which in its view “cannot be considered lawful”. The Union has long accused third countries of unlawful extraterritorial sanctions, and it arms its own operators against them with the blocking statute; being told by Luxembourg that Brussels may forbid enforcement in any jurisdiction will force the General Court to explain the difference between an anti-enforcement injunction addressed to a litigant within the reach of a Member State court and a claim of worldwide prescriptive jurisdiction. Expect the Council to answer that the order binds only persons subject to Member State jurisdiction, that it protects assets and operators inside the Union, and that effects abroad are incidental, a reasoning familiar from competition-law and data-protection case law. Expect the bank to answer that a prohibition on seising the courts of Dubai or Singapore over assets held there is regulation of foreign proceedings as such. Whichever side prevails, the judgment will become the reference on how far Union sanctions law can project judicial power beyond Union territory, and every cross-border finance practice in Paris will have to read it. Timing matters: General Court sanctions annulment cases typically run eighteen months to two years before judgment, with appeal to the Court of Justice available on points of law, so the Belgian enforcement battle will almost certainly be fought and decided before Luxembourg speaks, unless interim relief suspends the application of Article 1(28) to the bank in the meantime. The press release closes with a line litigators should take seriously: it “reserves all rights, claims, counterclaims, and defences” in connection with the regulation and related measures. This file will run on several tracks at once, and Paris may become one of them.
B. If the Moscow judgment is brought to France, which doors are open and which are shut?
Start with the ordinary French gateway for foreign judgments. Article 509 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: “Les jugements rendus par les tribunaux étrangers et les actes reçus par les officiers étrangers sont exécutoires sur le territoire de la République de la manière et dans les cas prévus par la loi.” The manner provided by French private international law is the exequatur: a Moscow judgment has no executory force in France until a French court declares it enforceable, after verifying the indirect jurisdiction of the foreign court, the absence of fraud, and compatibility with French international public policy. A judgment rendered behind closed doors, upheld in full for 18.2 trillion rubles against a Brussels clearing house that says its right to a fair trial was violated, would face a searching public-policy review in Paris, centred on defence rights and on the exclusive or quasi-exclusive connection of the dispute with France. The baseline is set by Article 501 of the Code of Civil Procedure: “Le jugement est exécutoire, sous les conditions qui suivent”. Moscow anticipated the point by granting immediate enforcement on 26 May 2026, but immediate at home does not mean executory abroad. Even before substance, the applicant would have to explain why the courts of Paris rather than Brussels should declare enforceable a judgment against a Belgian bank over assets immobilised in Belgium, and the answer would have to survive the indirect-jurisdiction test, which looks at the link between the dispute and the foreign forum as well as the absence of fraud in the choice of forum.
Above that national gateway sits the European lock, which applies directly in France. Article 11c(1) of Regulation 833/2014 as rewritten by point 27 of Regulation 2026/1848 provides that a Russian judgment of this type shall not be “recognised, given effect or enforced” in a Member State, with no exception for France, and a regulation needs no transposition: the Paris enforcement judge must refuse exequatur to a judgment falling within its terms, by virtue of the primacy of Union law, whatever French private international law would otherwise allow. Symmetrically, Euroclear or any French operator sued or threatened in connection with the Moscow judgment could petition the Paris courts for an Article 11ca order directing the Bank of Russia not to seek enforcement, recognition or reliance on that judgment in any jurisdiction, with penalty payments payable to the operator for breach. France therefore offers the bank no enforcement forum for this judgment while the regulation stands, and offers its adversaries an injunction forum against worldwide enforcement efforts. That double asymmetry is precisely what the Luxembourg action seeks to break.
A second French wall protects foreign State property specifically. Article L111-1-1 of the Code of Civil Enforcement Procedures provides that enforcement against foreign State property requires prior judicial leave: “ne peuvent être mises en œuvre sur un bien appartenant à un Etat étranger que sur autorisation préalable du juge”. Article L111-1-2 allows that authorisation only in three cases: the State expressly consented to the measure, the State reserved or earmarked the asset for satisfaction of the claim, or a judgment or arbitral award was rendered against the State and the asset is specifically used or intended for use for other than non-commercial public service purposes with a link to the entity proceeded against, with diplomatic, military, cultural-heritage and exhibition property expressly treated as serving non-commercial public purposes. The starting point is Article L111-1 of the same Code: “Tout créancier peut pratiquer une mesure conservatoire pour assurer la sauvegarde de ses droits.” Article L111-1-3 adds an absolute shield for diplomatic property, including bank accounts: “ne peuvent être mises en œuvre sur les biens, y compris les comptes bancaires” Central bank reserves held for monetary-policy purposes sit at the core of the protected category, and any creditor dreaming of attaching Russian State property in Paris, whether the central bank’s or another entity’s, must pass this prior-authorisation filter before any bailiff moves. The provision cuts both ways in the present saga: it shields Russian State assets in France from private enforcement, while doing nothing to help Moscow enforce its own judgment here, since exequatur remains blocked upstream by the European non-recognition rule.
A third layer is the administrative freeze itself. Article L562-4 of the Monetary and Financial Code obliges without delay all persons on national territory, credit institutions and legal persons operating in France to apply the freeze measures and prohibitions on making funds available and to inform the Minister for the Economy, applying without delay “les mesures de gel et les interdictions de mise” provided for in that chapter, a duty backed by criminal sanctions in the same chapter. The national freeze machinery mirrors the European one: Article L562-3 of the Monetary and Financial Code empowers the Minister for the Economy to order, for renewable six-month periods, “le gel des fonds et ressources économiques” belonging to or controlled by persons designated under United Nations Chapter VII resolutions or acts adopted under Article 29 of the Treaty on European Union or Article 75 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. So even a creditor armed with a French exequatur order would collide, at the bank counter, with the freeze: the funds cannot be made available to the listed or designated owner, and the institution that released them would commit an offence. For a Paris strategy session, the honest map is therefore the following: no exequatur for the Moscow judgment while Article 11c(1) stands, exposure to an Article 11ca anti-enforcement injunction with penalties if enforcement is attempted from or through France, prior judicial authorisation plus earmarked non-sovereign assets as the only path for any enforcement against Russian State property, and an administrative freeze that paralyses payment even if a court order were obtained. The only doors that remain genuinely open in Paris are defensive and procedural: challenging the scope of an Article 11ca order sought by the opponent, seeking authorisations to access frozen funds for legal defence and essential needs under the sanctions regulations, preparing the annulment arguments that Luxembourg will eventually judge, and watching the Belgian proceedings, whose outcome will show how the first Article 11ca orders in this saga are actually drafted, served and priced.
Conclusion
The Bank of Russia’s Luxembourg filing turns a 249.7 billion dollar Moscow judgment into a test case for the outer limits of European sanctions power. The Union claims the right to order a litigant, through any Member State court, not to enforce its judgment in any jurisdiction, with penalties paid to the opponent for disobedience; the central bank answers access to justice, legal certainty, sovereign immunity of states and central banks, and the unlawfulness of extraterritorial bans. Both positions are now before the General Court, and the reasoning of that judgment will outlive this dispute, because the mechanism is drafted for every future Russian judgment against every European operator, not for Euroclear alone. In France, the practical consequence is already fixed for the duration of the case: the Moscow order cannot be declared enforceable by the Paris courts while the non-recognition rule stands, attempts to route around it expose their author to a French-issued worldwide enforcement ban with penalty payments, and Russian State property remains behind the prior-authorisation wall of the enforcement judge and the administrative freeze of the Monetary and Financial Code. Watch three dates: the publication of the Bank of Russia’s action in the Official Journal, which will reveal its exact pleas and the case number; the first Belgian ruling on an Article 11ca order in the Euroclear enforcement battle, which will show the price of disobedience in practice; and the Moscow appeal, which will decide whether the 18.2 trillion ruble judgment survives at home. Until Luxembourg rules, Paris is a fortress for the frozen assets and a trapdoor for anyone trying to enforce the Moscow judgment through it.