On 13 October 2026, two merchant ships were struck by drones off the Bulgarian coast of the Black Sea. One vessel sank about 17 nautical miles east of the village of Krapets: eleven crew members are missing and one sailor was saved, according to local officials cited by the BBC. A second vessel, Ukrainian owned, was hit about 18 nautical miles from Byala; all fifteen crew were rescued, five with minor injuries. Bulgaria identified one of the vessels involved as the Maltese-flagged Chelsea 3, registered in Odesa. The strikes follow a first series of attacks on 6 October in Bulgaria’s exclusive economic zone, in which the vessel Alfa Watan sank with ten crew presumed dead, including nine Syrian nationals. Bulgarian Prime Minister Rumen Radev convened an emergency meeting, summoned the Russian ambassador, and said that although there was no conclusive evidence pointing at either side, in his words the logic suggested the outcome benefited the Russian Federation. The ambassador answered that she had no information from the Russian defence ministry and raised the possibility of a provocation by a third party. Sofia has asked NATO and the European Union for technical assistance to investigate. For shipowners, charterers, cargo interests, crews and their insurers — including those based, insured or financed in France — the same morning raises three immediate legal questions: who can prosecute, who establishes the facts, and who pays.
This article answers those questions from the French side. France has no investigative role at this stage and no French victim has been reported. But the strikes hit EU waters, an EU-flagged ship and Ukrainian owners, while the EU debates sanctions and frozen assets. Whenever policies sit with insurers operating in France, cargo is French-owned, or enforcement must reach assets in France, Paris becomes the forum that matters. What follows maps that forum honestly.
I. Who answers for drone strikes on merchant ships in European waters?
A. Can French courts prosecute a drone attack carried out off the Bulgarian coast?
The short answer is that a criminal complaint can be filed in France, but French jurisdiction over the attack itself is narrow as long as no constitutive act took place on French territory and no suspect is present in France. French criminal law starts from territoriality. Article 113-2 of the Criminal Code provides that “La loi pénale française est applicable aux infractions commises sur le territoire de la République. L’infraction est réputée commise sur le territoire de la République dès lors qu’un de ses faits constitutifs a eu lieu sur ce territoire.” In plain English: French criminal law applies to offences committed on the territory of the Republic, and an offence is deemed committed there as soon as one of its constituent acts occurred on that territory. A drone strike launched, controlled and impacting entirely in the Black Sea, against non-French ships, does not meet that test. Damage suffered later in France — for example financial loss booked by a French insurer — is a consequence, not a constitutive act, and does not by itself create territorial jurisdiction for the underlying violent offence.
Three extensions are worth examining, because families and companies often invoke them, and each fails or stalls on the facts known on 13 October. The first is the passive personality route for offences against French nationals: no French victim has been reported among the missing or rescued sailors, whose nationalities reported so far are Syrian and Ukrainian. The second is flag-state or coastal-state jurisdiction, which belongs to Malta for the Chelsea 3, to Ukraine for the Ukrainian-owned vessel, and to Bulgaria as the coastal state in whose exclusive economic zone the strikes occurred — not to France. The third is universal jurisdiction for war crimes, which French law does recognise but surrounds with strict cumulative conditions. Article 689-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure allows French courts to try “toute personne soupçonnée d’avoir commis à l’étranger” genocide, crimes against humanity, or “Les crimes et les délits de guerre définis aux articles 461-1 à 461-31 du même code” — any person suspected of having committed abroad, among others, war crimes as defined in the Criminal Code. But the same article imposes three locks: “La personne soupçonnée doit avoir une résidence habituelle sur le territoire français” (the suspect must be habitually resident in France), “La poursuite de ces crimes ne peut être exercée qu’à la requête du procureur de la République antiterroriste” (prosecution requires the anti-terrorism prosecutor), and only “si aucune juridiction internationale ou nationale ne demande la remise ou l’extradition de la personne” (if no international or national court requests surrender or extradition). With the perpetrator unidentified and nobody present in France, none of these locks can be turned today. A complaint with constitution de partie civile can still be lodged to preserve rights and trigger an investigation into related French-territory facts — for instance threats, financing or logistics routed through France — but it cannot conjure jurisdiction over the Black Sea strike itself.
Two practical consequences follow for potential French complainants. First, the useful French criminal lever is ancillary, not central: if money, equipment, communications or personnel linked to the attack transited through France, those French-territory acts can ground offences such as criminal association, financing of terrorism or arms offences, each assessed on its own constitutive elements. Second, evidence gathered in France — satellite imagery contracts, insurance files, banking traces, testimony of rescued sailors later treated or heard in France — can be preserved and shared through mutual legal assistance with Bulgaria, which holds primary jurisdiction, or with the flag states. The Paris prosecutor’s office can receive and transmit, even where it cannot itself prosecute the strike. Families should therefore understand the sequence honestly: Bulgaria investigates first, the flag states participate, France assists and preserves, and a French trial of the attackers would require either a French-territory act or a suspect later found and resident in France. Anything else presented as imminent would be misleading.
B. Who establishes what happened: Bulgaria, the flag state, NATO and the European Union?
Attribution is the key that unlocks every later remedy — criminal, civil and sanctions-based — and on 13 October that key is missing. Bulgaria’s prime minister said there was no conclusive evidence against either side, while adding his political reading that the outcome benefited the Russian Federation; the Russian ambassador denied any information from her defence ministry and suggested a possible third-party provocation. Under reporting by the BBC, Sofia had already asked NATO and the EU for technical assistance after the 6 October attacks, precisely because the sponsor of those strikes was unclear. For lawyers, this uncertainty is not background noise: it dictates which cause of action is available, against whom, before which court, and under which insurance clause. Suing a state before a French court for a strike it denies requires waiving or working around sovereign immunity and proving attribution; claiming under a war-risk policy requires fitting the facts into the policy’s definition of war, capture, seizure or terrorism; invoking EU sanctions requires a designation or a prohibited connection. None of these steps can be taken on the basis of a prime minister’s suggestion of logic alone.
The institutional division of labour is therefore the first thing to get right. As the coastal state, Bulgaria leads the criminal and technical investigation in its exclusive economic zone, conducts search and rescue, and controls access to the wreck, debris, radar tracks and signal intelligence. As flag state of the Chelsea 3, Malta runs the flag-state casualty inquiry alongside any Ukrainian inquiry for the Ukrainian-owned vessel, each applying its own maritime casualty rules and sharing findings through the usual IMO channels. NATO’s role, described in the Guardian’s live coverage of 13 October as a continued adjustment to new threats, is collective assessment and deterrence, not criminal attribution to a judicial standard. The EU’s role is twofold: technical assistance to the investigation at Sofia’s request, and political-legal assessment of whether the facts fit the Union’s sanctions and hybrid-threats toolbox, including the possible extension of restrictive measures. None of these bodies delivers a civil judgment. Their findings become evidence — expert, official, sometimes privileged — that parties later deploy before courts and arbitral tribunals. Preserving that evidence starts now: voyage data recorder downloads, AIS and satellite tracks, drone debris custody, crew statements taken before memories fade, and the chain of custody for every fragment recovered at sea.
For French proceedings, the lesson is sequencing. A Paris civil court asked to rule on an insurance or liability dispute will not determine who launched the drones; it will ask the parties to prove, under their contracts and the applicable law, whether the loss as documented falls inside or outside cover. If Bulgaria later attributes the strike to a state actor, that finding reshapes war-risk analysis and potentially opens state-responsibility claims before competent international fora. If attribution remains inconclusive, claims proceed as anonymous-hostility losses — terrorism or malicious-acts clauses, force majeure in charterparties, general average if declared — each turning on its own wording rather than on geopolitics. And if an EU sanctions nexus emerges, for example a vessel, operator or cargo interest later shown to be listed or controlled by a listed person, the entire payment circuit freezes under the rules examined in part II. The firms that recover fastest are the ones that treat attribution as a process to monitor through counsel, while building the documentary file that wins regardless of who is ultimately named: contracts, policies with endorsements, survey reports, casualty-inquiry filings, and every official statement kept in its original wording with its date.
II. Who pays for a ship sunk by a drone: hull, cargo, crews and insurers?
A. How do hull, cargo and crew claims reach a court in Paris?
Paris enters the picture through contracts and money, not through geography. French substantive maritime law defines the starting point for cargo claims. Article L5422-1 of the Transport Code states that “Par le contrat de transport maritime, le chargeur s’engage à payer un fret déterminé et le transporteur à acheminer une marchandise déterminée, d’un port à un autre. Ce contrat de transport s’applique depuis la prise en charge jusqu’à la livraison.” By the maritime transport contract, the shipper undertakes to pay a fixed freight and the carrier to carry specified goods from one port to another, from taking over to delivery. When the goods never arrive because the ship was sunk, the carrier’s liability, its defences — including act of war or excepted perils depending on the bill of lading or sea waybill regime — and its limitation rights become the centre of the dispute. Jurisdiction in Paris then depends on the forum clause in the transport documents, on the defendant’s domicile, or on the special heads of jurisdiction of EU Regulation Brussels I bis where the defendant is domiciled in the Union, for example an EU insurer or carrier sued where the harmful event is localised or where a branch dispute arises. Cargo owners with French affiliates, French buyers on CIF or FOB terms holding the risk at the time of the strike, and banks holding French-law security over the goods each have distinct standing questions that must be mapped before suing.
Standing itself is often the first battle, and French case law gives shippers a clear weapon. In a maritime cargo dispute between a Mexican shipper and the French carrier CMA CGM, the Cour de cassation held, in its judgment of 23 March 2022, appeal no. 19-16.466, that “Il résulte de ce texte que l’intérêt à agir n’est pas subordonné à la démonstration préalable du bien-fondé de l’action. En conséquence, le chargeur, partie au contrat de transport, est recevable à agir en responsabilité contre le transporteur maritime, en invoquant le préjudice qu’il subit du fait d’une avarie de transport, la preuve de l’existence de ce préjudice n’étant que la condition du succès de son action en réparation.” Interest to sue is not conditional on proving the merits in advance: the shipper, as party to the transport contract, may sue the sea carrier for damage to the goods, with proof of loss going to success rather than admissibility. The Court added that the shipper derives this contractual action from the contract itself and not from the document recording it, so “il n’y a pas lieu, pour apprécier l’ouverture de ce droit, de distinguer selon que le transport a donné lieu à l’émission d’un connaissement ou d’une lettre de transport maritime” — no distinction according to whether a bill of lading or a sea waybill was issued. For Black Sea cargo interests suing in France, often under sea waybills rather than bills of lading, that holding removes a classic admissibility objection at the threshold, leaving the fight where it belongs: causation, excepted perils, and quantum.
Hull and war-risk insurance follow a parallel but harsher logic. Standard hull policies exclude war, strikes and terrorism unless war-risk cover was separately subscribed, and war-risk wordings define their trigger — war, civil war, hostile act by or against a belligerent power, capture, seizure, terrorist act — with precision that decides everything when attribution is unknown. An owner who can show a hostile act recovers under war risks; an owner who cannot may fall back on marine perils or an all-risks framing, depending on the wording and the law governing the policy. Where the policy is subject to French law or placed with an insurer established in France, coverage litigation can be brought before the French courts under the policy’s jurisdiction clause or the defendant’s domicile, with survey and casualty evidence from the Bulgarian and flag-state inquiries feeding the expert debate. Crew and family claims run on a third track: employment contracts and the law of the flag, collective agreements, and P and I cover for death, injury, repatriation and unpaid wages. The eleven missing sailors off Krapets and the ten presumed dead from the Alfa Watan sinking of 6 October put fatal-accident presumptions, death declarations and limitation periods at the forefront — matters governed by the seafarers’ national laws and contracts, where French counsel typically intervenes to coordinate, to secure advances from P and I clubs, and to channel claims toward the forum that pays fastest rather than the forum that symbolises most.
B. Can sanctions and frozen assets compensate the victims in France?
Sanctions enter the file through the payment circuit, and in France they bite immediately. Where an owner, operator, charterer or cargo interest connected to a Black Sea casualty is designated under EU restrictive measures, every French bank, insurer and company must freeze without delay. Article L562-3 of the Monetary and Financial Code empowers the Minister for the Economy to freeze, for six months renewable, funds and economic resources that belong to, are held or controlled by persons designated under United Nations Chapter VII resolutions or acts adopted under Article 29 of the Treaty on European Union or Article 75 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union: “Le ministre chargé de l’économie peut décider, pour une durée de six mois, renouvelable, le gel des fonds et ressources économiques : 1° Qui appartiennent à, sont possédés, détenus ou contrôlés par des personnes physiques ou morales, ou toute autre entité qui commettent, tentent de commettre, facilitent ou financent des actions sanctionnées ou prohibées par les résolutions adoptées dans le cadre du chapitre VII de la charte des Nations unies ou les actes pris en application de l’article 29 du traité sur l’Union européenne ou de l’article 75 du traité sur le fonctionnement de l’Union européenne, y participent ou qui sont désignées sur le fondement de ces résolutions ou ces actes”. The obligation then spreads across the whole French economy: Article L562-4 of the same Code provides that “Sont tenus d’appliquer sans délai les mesures de gel et les interdictions de mise à disposition ou d’utilisation prévues au présent chapitre” — all persons in France, and French companies for their activities abroad, must apply the freeze and the prohibitions on making funds available without delay and inform the minister. At EU level, the anchor is Article 2 of Regulation (EU) No 269/2014, which freezes all funds and economic resources belonging to, owned, held or controlled by the persons and entities listed in its Annex I and those associated with them. For a fuller map of the current EU listings, their scale and how challenges and Treasury authorisations work from France, readers can consult our analysis of the EU’s largest sanctions package, its 1,569 listings and the routes to challenge frozen funds from France.
The freeze does not only hit the designated person: it reaches non-listed companies they own or control, and it blocks claims connected with sanctioned transactions. EU case law in 2026 has widened that net in ways maritime operators must understand. As analysed by Freshfields in May 2026, the Court of Justice confirmed in cases C-483/23, C-428/24 and C-476/24 a substance-over-form reading of ownership and control reaching behind trust structures, and held in C-84/24 that a fifty-percent shareholding triggers a rebuttable presumption of ownership or control. Meanwhile the no-claims clause of the Russia sanctions — Article 11 of Regulation (EU) No 833/2014, which bars satisfaction of claims linked to contracts or transactions affected by the sanctions where they are brought by Russian persons or those acting for them — is now argued, in Advocate General Biondi’s pending opinion in case C-802/24, to form part of EU public policy, with a reversed burden placing on the claimant the task of showing that payment is not prohibited. And on 9 October 2026 the trade press reported that the EU General Court dismissed challenges by Russian investors against the investment-arbitration provisions of the sanctions legislation, closing the investor-state escape route. None of this proves any sanctions nexus in the Black Sea sinkings — no such link has been reported — but it fixes the framework every Paris payment must pass through: screen, freeze where required, seek a Treasury authorisation for any release, and expect any court or tribunal to verify the clause of its own motion.
Where charterparty, insurance or sale disputes from these casualties go to arbitration, France offers a well-tested enforcement stage — and sanctions form part of its public-policy control. Article 1487 of the Code of Civil Procedure requires exequatur from the judicial court for forced execution of a domestic award, while Article 1514 provides that foreign awards “sont reconnues ou exécutées en France si leur existence est établie par celui qui s’en prévaut et si cette reconnaissance ou cette exécution n’est pas manifestement contraire à l’ordre public international” — recognised or enforced if their existence is proved and recognition is not manifestly contrary to international public policy. Annulment and refusal grounds are closed-listed in Article 1520: lack of jurisdiction, irregular constitution, excess of mission, breach of adversarial principle, or contrariety to international public policy — “Le recours en annulation n’est ouvert que si : 1° Le tribunal arbitral s’est déclaré à tort compétent ou incompétent ; ou 2° Le tribunal arbitral a été irrégulièrement constitué ; ou 3° Le tribunal arbitral a statué sans se conformer à la mission qui lui avait été confiée ; ou 4° Le principe de la contradiction n’a pas été respecté ; ou 5° La reconnaissance ou l’exécution de la sentence est contraire à l’ordre public international.” Article 1525 opens an appeal against decisions on foreign awards, limited to those same cases. The Cour de cassation polices the boundary strictly: in its judgment of 17 May 2023, appeal no. 21-24.106, it held that “Il résulte de la combinaison de ces textes que l’exequatur n’est refusé sur le fondement du premier que lorsque la solution donnée au litige, et non le raisonnement suivi par les arbitres, heurte concrètement et de manière caractérisée l’ordre public international” — refusal only where the outcome itself, not the arbitrators’ reasoning, concretely and characteristically offends international public policy. A French exequatur judge will therefore enforce a maritime award swiftly where no sanctions lock applies, and will refuse or stay where satisfaction would violate the freeze or the no-claims clause. Victims should not expect frozen Russian assets to convert into compensation by shortcut: release requires a specific authorisation, and courts verify.
Conclusion
The Black Sea strikes of 13 October 2026 leave eleven sailors missing off Krapets, a second vessel damaged off Byala, and a grieving echo of the Alfa Watan sinking of 6 October — but no established perpetrator, no French victim reported, and no French prosecution available over the strike itself. What France does offer, honestly delimited, is threefold: criminal cooperation and evidence preservation while Bulgaria, the flag states, NATO and the EU establish the facts; a competent civil forum in Paris whenever contracts, policies or assets connect the loss to France, with shipper standing secured by the Cour de cassation and carrier liability framed by the Transport Code; and a sanctions-enforcement machinery — freeze, control of ownership, no-claims clause, exequatur review — that blocks any payment touching designated interests unless the Treasury authorises it. Owners should notify hull and war-risk underwriters today and align casualty-inquiry filings; cargo interests should map risk transfer and forum clauses before suing; families should secure P and I advances and preserve employment records; all should monitor attribution without building their case on it. The sea will give up its evidence slowly. The files that recover are the ones opened now.