Searches for “Clarence Thomas First Amendment warning” climbed across the United States on Monday, November 16, 2026, after the Supreme Court of the United States declined to hear a challenge to California’s rule that continuing medical education (CME) courses for physicians must include curriculum on implicit bias. According to the published order and dissent in Khatibi v. Yip, the petition for a writ of certiorari was denied, Justice Gorsuch would have granted it, and Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Alito, wrote that “First Amendment protections do not give way simply because a State heavily regulates speech.”
The short answer for a California physician, CME instructor or course provider is that the rule still applies. The Supreme Court did not rule on whether California was right; it declined to review the case, which leaves standing the Ninth Circuit’s holding that credit-eligible CME courses in California are government speech, outside the reach of the Free Speech Clause. What did change in 2026 is the wider landscape: in March, the Court held that the speech of licensed professionals is not a second-class category under the First Amendment. This article explains what the denial decided, what California law requires and from whom, what the Ninth Circuit held, how the 2026 professional-speech ruling fits, and which concrete checks instructors, providers and licensees can run now. The discussion that follows is general in scope: it describes checks useful in comparable situations and makes no findings about the situation of the parties to the case.
I. Does California’s implicit bias rule for CME courses still apply after the Supreme Court declined review?
A. What a denial of certiorari decides, and what it leaves in place
Start with how a federal appeals case reaches the Supreme Court at all. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1), cases in the federal courts of appeals may be reviewed by the Supreme Court “by writ of certiorari granted upon the petition of any party to any civil or criminal case.” The word that matters is “granted.” The Court’s own Rule 10 states that “Review on a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discretion,” and adds that “A petition for a writ of certiorari will be granted only for compelling reasons.” Rule 10 then lists the kinds of reasons the Justices weigh, such as a conflict between federal courts of appeals on the same important matter, or an important question of federal law that has not been, but should be, settled by the Court. A party that loses in a court of appeals therefore has no right to a second full appeal; it can only ask.
In Khatibi v. Yip, No. 25-1240 (Nov. 16, 2026), the Supreme Court of the United States denied the petition for a writ of certiorari on November 16, 2026, and the published order states only that the petition is denied and that Justice Gorsuch would grant it; Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Alito, filed the dissent that set off the searches. According to that dissent, California-licensed physicians must complete 50 hours of approved CME every two years, credit-eligible courses are often organized by private entities, certified by private accreditors and taught by private instructors, and the State does not preapprove course content but reserves the right to audit courses for compliance. The dissent argued that the Ninth Circuit misapplied the three-factor government-speech test of Shurtleff v. Boston (2022) and wrote that “This Court should reconsider whether the Shurtleff test is the proper mode of analysis for identifying government speech.” It closed with the line now quoted across the news: “A State cannot regulate its way out of First Amendment scrutiny.” The dissent is not binding law, but it tells California instructors exactly which question two Justices want the Court to revisit: whether heavy regulation of a profession can turn a private instructor’s lecture into the government’s own speech.
The practical consequence is narrow and concrete. Nothing in the order says the Ninth Circuit was right, and nothing in it says California was wrong. The order means the Supreme Court will not review this case on the petition that was filed, so the lower courts’ judgment dismissing the complaint stands and California’s statute keeps operating as written. The same order list produced another certiorari denial, in a University of California research-grant dispute, and the pattern is the same in both matters: the court of appeals’ decision continues to govern the parties, and the reasoning that matters for the next case is the reasoning in the lower-court opinions plus any separate writings by individual Justices.
The dissent also explains why the question looks larger than one medical-education requirement. It asked whether, on the Ninth Circuit’s view, California could require a CME instructor to communicate the State’s preferred message on the availability of abortion, and whether, at a statewide legal conference offering continuing legal education, California could require a keynote speaker to oppose racial preferences in law firm hiring. Those are hypotheticals, not holdings, and the dissent framed them as questions. For a reader trying to decide what to do this week, they are useful mainly as a map of where future litigation is likely to aim: any licensing scheme that pairs mandatory continuing education with mandatory content.
B. What California law requires, and who has to comply
The rule itself sits in California Business and Professions Code § 2190.1. Subdivision (d)(1) provides: “On and after January 1, 2022, all continuing medical education courses shall contain curriculum that includes the understanding of implicit bias.” Subdivision (e) says how a course satisfies that requirement: it “shall address at least one or a combination of” two options. The first is “Examples of how implicit bias affects perceptions and treatment decisions of physicians and surgeons, leading to disparities in health outcomes.” The second is “Strategies to address how unintended biases in decisionmaking may contribute to health care disparities by shaping behavior and producing differences in medical treatment along lines of race, ethnicity, gender identity, sexual orientation, age, socioeconomic status, or other characteristics.” An instructor therefore has a choice between examples and strategies, but under the statute some implicit bias content has to be in the course.
The same section contains two exemptions that many readers miss. Under § 2190.1(d)(2), the implicit bias curriculum is not required for “a continuing medical education course dedicated solely to research or other issues that does not include a direct patient care component,” nor for “a course offered by a continuing medical education provider that is not located in this state.” Under § 2190.1(d)(3), the associations that accredit CME courses were directed to develop compliance standards and may update them with an advisory group that has expertise in implicit bias. And under § 2190.1(g), educational activities that meet the statute’s content standards and are accredited by the California Medical Association or the Accreditation Council for Continuing Medical Education may be deemed to meet the State’s standards. The section also carries an older requirement, in subdivision (b)(1), that courses include cultural and linguistic competency, in force since July 1, 2006. The text on the Legislature’s site notes that the section was last amended by Stats. 2023, Ch. 330 (AB 470), effective January 1, 2024.
Read together, these provisions put the content duty on courses, and therefore on the people who design and deliver them, while the credit duty falls on licensees. The Ninth Circuit described the State’s machinery in the same way: physicians must complete at least 50 hours of approved CME every two years, only programs that meet the statute and the regulations are acceptable for credit, the Board does not give prior approval to individual courses, it randomly audits courses submitted for credit and courses that draw complaints, no credit is awarded for a course found unacceptable after an audit, and the Board may waive the requirement in its discretion for reasons that include undue hardship. Those points come from the court’s description of title 16 of the California Code of Regulations; the regulations themselves should be checked in their current version before relying on any particular sentence.
Lawyers in California face a parallel requirement. Business and Professions Code § 6070.5 directs the State Bar to require, as of January 1, 2022, that the mandatory continuing legal education curriculum for all licensees include training on implicit bias and the promotion of bias-reducing strategies, and it states that a licensee must meet the requirement for each compliance period ending after January 31, 2022. The statute also sets conditions for providers: trainers must have academic training in implicit bias or experience educating legal professionals about it, the training must include a component on the impact of implicit, explicit and systemic bias on the legal system, and it must include actionable steps licensees can take to recognize and address their own implicit biases. One of the judges who dissented in the Ninth Circuit pointed to this very provision when comparing CME with continuing legal education. Whether the government-speech reasoning that upheld the medical rule would apply in the same way to the legal-education rule has not been decided in any of the decisions read for this article.
II. What did the Ninth Circuit hold, and what can still be argued after Chiles v. Salazar?
A. The government-speech holding and the failed request for rehearing
In Khatibi v. Hawkins, No. 24-3108 (9th Cir. July 25, 2025), the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in an opinion filed July 25, 2025, affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the suit brought by a physician who teaches CME courses and a nonprofit organization. The panel held that under California’s scheme, CME courses eligible for credit from the Medical Board of California are government speech, so the Free Speech Clause did not apply to the implicit bias requirement. In the court’s words, “We hold that CMEs eligible for credit under California law constitute government speech.” The panel reached that result by weighing three considerations it drew from the Supreme Court’s Shurtleff decision: history, which it found weighed decisively for the State because California has regulated medicine since the 1870s and has set CME standards since 1980; the likely perception of who is speaking, which it called a much closer call but found tilted toward the State because the CME scheme exists for licensees who know their profession is heavily regulated; and control, where it found that California controls credit-eligible courses “from beginning to end” through statutory topics, instructor qualifications, record-keeping rules and audit power. For anyone deciding what to teach in a California CME course, the operative point is simple: inside the Ninth Circuit, a First Amendment challenge to the content requirement must first overcome this government-speech holding.
The opinion also drew lines that are useful in practice. The panel wrote that “Our holding is narrow,” and explained that it recognizes that the State speaks when California, from beginning to end, dictates, controls and approves the provider, form, purpose and content of CMEs. It repeated the Supreme Court’s caution that government speech is not unlimited: it must comport with the Establishment Clause, and a government is ultimately accountable to the electorate for its advocacy. It recorded that counsel for the challengers had told the court at oral argument that compelled speech and viewpoint discrimination were “not before this court,” and, in a footnote, that it did not need to reach the challengers’ separate unconstitutional conditions claim. It also noted that the instructor remained free to teach whatever she wished in her own “expressive capacity,” and it closed by saying: “Just as California cannot compel Plaintiffs to teach subjects against their beliefs in their private capacities, Plaintiffs cannot compel California to speak against its own in its official capacity.” The constitutional text behind all of this is short. The First Amendment says that “Congress shall make no law” abridging “the freedom of speech,” and every decision discussed in this article applies that guarantee to a state law; the Ninth Circuit’s holding is about the threshold question of whose speech a credit-eligible course is.
In Khatibi v. Hawkins, No. 24-3108 (9th Cir. Dec. 29, 2025), the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit issued an order filed December 29, 2025, denying the petitions for panel rehearing and rehearing en banc. The order records that the panel unanimously voted to deny panel rehearing, that a judge requested a vote on rehearing en banc, and that the matter failed to receive a majority of the votes of the nonrecused active judges. Judge VanDyke, joined by Judges Bumatay and Tung, dissented, writing that the panel’s approach “boils down to a single-factor analysis” and that the decision puts the circuit out of step with Supreme Court precedent and with other circuits. Judge Tung, joined by the same two judges, wrote that private CME instructors do not engage in government speech “for the simple reason that they are not the government and they do not speak for the government.” This order matters to readers because it confirms that the full Ninth Circuit declined to revisit the panel opinion, which remains that court’s published answer on California’s CME rule, with three active judges on record against it.
Two further points follow from the procedural posture. First, the case ended at the pleading stage: the district court dismissed the complaint, the panel reviewed that dismissal de novo, and the Supreme Court declined review, so no court made factual findings about how CME attendees actually perceive their instructors. The panel itself acknowledged that the instructor had plausibly alleged facts suggesting that attendees treat her as the person responsible for course content, and held that the other two factors decided the case regardless. Second, this challenge, like the Colorado case discussed below, was brought against state officials. The federal statute that creates that kind of action against officials acting under state law, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, makes every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of any State, subjects another person to the deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution “liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.” In this case the defendants were Medical Board of California officials named in their official capacities, as the caption of each opinion shows.
B. Chiles v. Salazar, other states and the checks to run now
In Chiles v. Salazar, No. 24-539 (Mar. 31, 2026), the Supreme Court of the United States held in its opinion of March 31, 2026 that Colorado’s law banning conversion therapy, as applied to a licensed counselor who offers only talk therapy, regulates speech based on viewpoint, and that the lower courts erred by failing to apply sufficiently rigorous First Amendment scrutiny. Justice Gorsuch wrote for the Court, joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Thomas, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh and Barrett; Justice Kagan concurred, joined by Justice Sotomayor; Justice Jackson dissented. The Court rejected the idea that professional speech is a separate category with diminished protection, explained that its precedents recognize only two narrow situations in which professionals’ speech gets less searching review (compelled disclosure of factual, noncontroversial information in commercial speech, and regulation of conduct that only incidentally burdens speech), and wrote that “Her speech does not become conduct just because the State may call it that.” It also observed that licensing laws have traditionally addressed what qualifications a professional must possess, and that this interest does not automatically entail a right to dictate a professional’s point of view. For a California instructor, Chiles strengthens the argument that a licensed professional’s own words receive full First Amendment protection, but it does not decide whether a state-credited CME course is the instructor’s speech or the State’s.
That gap is the heart of the matter. The Ninth Circuit’s panel opinion (July 2025) and its order denying rehearing (December 2025) both came before Chiles (March 2026). None of the opinions in Chiles discusses the government-speech doctrine; Chiles involved a law restricting what a counselor could say to her own clients, and Colorado defended it as a regulation of conduct, not as the State’s own message. The Khatibi dissent at the Supreme Court cited Chiles in one of its hypotheticals, and the Court still declined review in November 2026. On the sources read for this article, no court has yet decided whether Chiles undercuts the Ninth Circuit’s government-speech reasoning for credit-eligible courses. Anyone planning a new challenge would have to confront that question directly. Rule 10 lists a conflict between federal courts of appeals on the same important matter among the reasons the Court considers when deciding whether to grant review, which is why a contrary ruling from another circuit would change the picture more than any single dissent.
Chiles is also useful on a procedural point that matters to anyone thinking about a pre-enforcement challenge. The Court agreed that the counselor had standing to bring her as-applied challenge before any enforcement action, and it relied on the fact that Colorado had fought the suit through three courts and, at oral argument, expressly declined to disavow enforcement against her. That reasoning, set out in the same opinion, concerned a law that threatened fines, probation and the loss of a license for expressing a particular view. Whether a CME instructor faces a comparable threat depends on how the specific rule is enforced against instructors or providers, which is a fact-specific question the decisions read here do not resolve.
Readers outside California should not assume that their state has a similar rule. The Ninth Circuit’s own opinion, in footnotes, stated that not all states share California’s history or requirements: it reported that Colorado began imposing CME requirements only in 2024 and had expressly barred them until 2023, that Montana and South Dakota impose no CME requirements on physicians, that Maryland imposes no comparable specific content requirements, and that Indiana imposes no CME requirements on physician-licensees. Those statements describe the law as the court found it in 2025 and should be confirmed against current state statutes before anyone relies on them. They also explain why the panel stressed that its analysis was about “circumstances specific to California”: the same three-factor test could come out differently where a state’s history and control of continuing education are thinner.
With that framework, a CME course provider operating in California can run five concrete checks. First, location: § 2190.1(d)(2) exempts a course offered by a provider that is not located in California, so confirm where the provider entity is actually located before assuming the implicit bias requirement applies or does not apply. Second, subject matter: the same subdivision exempts a course dedicated solely to research or other issues without a direct patient care component, which calls for an honest look at whether the course really has no patient-care content. Third, the method of compliance: subdivision (e) allows either examples or strategies, or both, and the accrediting association’s standards under subdivision (d)(3) will usually say what a reviewer expects to see. Fourth, documentation: the regulations described by the Ninth Circuit require a stated course rationale, educational objectives, a description of teaching methods, an evaluation and attendance records, and the Board may audit any course submitted for credit. Fifth, accreditation: under subdivision (g), activities accredited by the California Medical Association or the Accreditation Council for Continuing Medical Education may be deemed to meet the State’s standards, so the accreditor’s current requirements deserve a careful read.
An individual instructor who disagrees with the requirement faces a narrower set of choices after the denial. Inside credit-eligible California courses, the content requirement applies as written, and the Ninth Circuit has held that a free-speech objection to it fails at the threshold because the required content is government speech. Outside those courses, the panel itself recognized that an instructor remains free to teach whatever she wishes in her own expressive capacity, and the district court, as quoted by the panel, observed that instructors may choose to stop teaching courses for credit or pursue change through the political process. The unconstitutional conditions theory that the panel did not reach, and the question whether Chiles changes the analysis, are the arguments that remain open for a future case; neither has been decided in the opinions read here.
Physicians who simply need credits have the most straightforward position. The denial does not change the 50-hour requirement or the rule that only acceptable courses earn credit, as described by the Ninth Circuit. The useful checks are whether a course is accredited by a body the State recognizes, whether the provider is located in California (because out-of-state providers are exempt from the implicit bias curriculum and from the cultural and linguistic competency curriculum under the statute’s own text), and whether records of completion are kept in case the Board audits a physician’s reported compliance. A physician who cannot meet the requirement for reasons such as undue hardship should read the waiver regulation the Ninth Circuit described, in its current form, and ask the Board how it applies.
Other licensed professionals in California should read the statute that governs their own field rather than the medical statute. Lawyers have § 6070.5. Other healing-arts licensees may be covered by separate provisions: Judge Tung’s dissent from the denial of rehearing listed the 2019 bill as codified in sections 2190.1, 2736.5 and 3524.5 of the Business and Professions Code. For any profession, the question to ask is the one the courts asked here: does the state require a private provider or instructor to include specified content, and does the state control credit-eligible courses closely enough that the courts in that circuit would treat them as the state’s own speech? Where a rule instead restricts what a licensee may say to clients, Chiles is the more directly relevant decision, and it calls for rigorous scrutiny of viewpoint-based restrictions.
Conclusion
California’s implicit bias requirement for continuing medical education still applies. The Supreme Court’s November 16, 2026 order declined review without deciding the constitutional question, which leaves the Ninth Circuit’s published holding in place: credit-eligible CME courses in California are government speech, so the Free Speech Clause does not govern their required content. The dissent from that order, and the professional-speech decision of March 2026, show that the issue is far from settled nationally, but neither changes what a California course has to contain today. Providers should confirm whether the statute’s location and patient-care exemptions apply, choose and document a compliant method under subdivision (e), and read their accreditor’s current standards. Physicians should verify that their courses carry credit the State recognizes and keep their records. Lawyers and other licensees should read the statute for their own profession. Anyone weighing a new challenge should start from the questions the courts left open: whether the March 2026 decision on professional speech changes the government-speech analysis, and whether conditioning credit on required content can be attacked as an unconstitutional condition.