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Cyber Attacks: What Canadian Privacy Law Requires After Your Data Is Exposed

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Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

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Cyber Attacks: What Canadian Privacy Law Requires After Your Data Is Exposed

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By Hassan Kohen, lawyer at the Paris Bar.

“Cyber attacks” is being searched in Canada. For an ordinary customer, the question is narrower: if a company I deal with was attacked and my personal information was exposed, what must that company tell me, and what can I do about it? In Canada, the starting point is a federal statute, the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, usually called PIPEDA. Section 10.1 of PIPEDA requires an organization to report a breach of security safeguards to the Privacy Commissioner and to notify the individuals concerned when it is reasonable to believe that the breach creates a real risk of significant harm. Other provisions set out how a person can request their own information, complain and, after the Commissioner reports, apply to a court that can award damages.

The method set out here is of general scope. It describes no particular incident and draws no conclusion about any company, website or investigation. In each case, several facts still have to be established: whether personal information was actually involved, which organization had it under its control, when that organization determined that a breach had occurred, and whether the risk threshold was met. Quebec, Alberta and British Columbia have private-sector privacy statutes that displace the federal Act for some activity within their borders; this article does not analyse them. It is information on Canadian federal law, written by a lawyer who practises in France and not in Canada. The provisions discussed are those of the consolidated federal texts published on the official Justice Laws website, as consulted on 19 November 2026.

I. When a cyber attack triggers duties under federal law

A. Whether the federal Act applies, and to whom

Not every cyber attack is a privacy breach in the legal sense. PIPEDA uses a defined term, and the definition decides whether the duties discussed below are engaged at all. Section 2(1) of the Act defines a breach of security safeguards as “the loss of, unauthorized access to or unauthorized disclosure of personal information resulting from a breach of an organization’s security safeguards that are referred to in clause 4.7 of Schedule 1 or from a failure to establish those safeguards”. The same subsection defines personal information simply as information about an identifiable individual.

Two consequences follow from that wording. First, the definition is about personal information. An attack that only makes a website or an application unavailable for a few hours, without anyone obtaining, removing or exposing information about identifiable people, does not fit it. A service outage can be costly and frustrating, but the breach provisions of PIPEDA are not written for that situation. Second, the definition covers three different outcomes: loss, unauthorized access and unauthorized disclosure. Information does not have to be published online for the definition to apply. Unauthorized access by an intruder who copied a customer database is enough on the wording, provided it resulted from a breach of the organization’s safeguards or from a failure to establish them.

Whether those safeguards were adequate is a separate question. The definition refers to the safeguards in clause 4.7 of Schedule 1 to the Act. A complaint may later argue that they were insufficient. The reporting and notification duties in section 10.1 do not wait for that argument to be resolved. They depend on the breach and on the risk it creates, as explained in the next part.

The next step is to identify whether the federal Act governs the organization at all. Section 4(1) of PIPEDA applies Part 1 of the Act to every organization in respect of personal information that it collects, uses or discloses in the course of commercial activities. It also applies to information about employees and job applicants that an organization handles in connection with the operation of a federal work, undertaking or business. Section 2(1) gives “organization” a wide meaning: it includes an association, a partnership, a person and a trade union. It defines “commercial activity” as any transaction, act or conduct, or any regular course of conduct, of a commercial character. A retailer, an online marketplace, a subscription service or a booking platform dealing with customers will usually be acting in the course of commercial activities.

Section 4(2) sets out three exclusions. Part 1 does not apply to a government institution covered by the Privacy Act. It does not apply to an individual who handles personal information only for personal or domestic purposes. Nor does it apply to an organization handling information only for journalistic, artistic or literary purposes. If a federal government body is the one that was attacked, the federal private-sector regime described here is not the governing statute. That situation falls outside this article.

The provincial dimension is the point most often missed. Section 26(2)(b) of PIPEDA allows the Governor in Council, by order, to exempt an organization, a class of organizations or an activity from Part 1 where it is satisfied that substantially similar provincial legislation applies. The exemption operates “in respect of the collection, use or disclosure of personal information that occurs within that province”.

Three such exemption orders are central for consumers. The Organizations in the Province of Quebec Exemption Order concerns organizations, other than a federal work, undertaking or business, that carry on an enterprise within the meaning of article 1525 of the Civil Code of Québec and to which Quebec’s Act respecting the protection of personal information in the private sector applies. The Alberta order and the British Columbia order follow the same pattern for organizations covered by each province’s Personal Information Protection Act.

Each of those orders expressly excludes a federal work, undertaking or business. Section 2(1) of PIPEDA lists what that expression includes. Among other things, it covers a bank, aerodromes, aircraft or a line of air transportation, a radio broadcasting station, and a railway, canal, telegraph or other work or undertaking that connects one province with another or extends beyond a province. A customer of a bank in Montreal or Calgary therefore remains within the federal Act, even though a local shop in the same city may fall under the provincial statute for information it handles within the province. Each exemption is also limited to collection, use or disclosure that occurs within the province concerned. The orders do not, on their wording, extend to activity that occurs outside it.

The practical lesson is to identify two things before relying on any particular statute: which organization held your information, and where that organization collected, used or disclosed it. Section 10.1 places the duties on the organization that has the personal information “under its control”. Where a business used an outside provider, for example to process payments or host its website, the question of which entity had control is a matter of fact. The answer determines who owed you a notice and against whom a complaint should be directed.

B. What the organization must do, and how quickly

Section 10.1 contains two duties with the same threshold. Under section 10.1(1), an organization must report to the Commissioner any breach of security safeguards involving personal information under its control if it is reasonable in the circumstances to believe that the breach creates a real risk of significant harm to an individual. Under section 10.1(3), unless otherwise prohibited by law, it must notify an individual of a breach involving that individual’s personal information “if it is reasonable in the circumstances to believe that the breach creates a real risk of significant harm to the individual”.

The threshold has two components. The first is significant harm. Section 10.1(7) provides that “significant harm includes bodily harm, humiliation, damage to reputation or relationships, loss of employment, business or professional opportunities, financial loss, identity theft, negative effects on the credit record and damage to or loss of property”. The list is broad and is introduced by the word “includes”. Financial loss and identity theft are the forms of harm most readers will think of after a cyber attack, but humiliation and damage to relationships are on the same footing. That matters where the exposed information is personal rather than financial, for example details of purchases, messages or health-related data.

The second component is a real risk. Section 10.1(8) lists the factors relevant to whether a breach creates a real risk of significant harm. They include the sensitivity of the personal information involved and the probability that it has been, is being or will be misused, together with any other prescribed factor. The wording ties the test to what is reasonable to believe in the circumstances. It does not require certainty that harm will occur, nor proof that the information has already been misused. On those factors, a breach involving payment data, identity documents or login credentials, combined with signs that the intruder deliberately targeted that data, would tend to weigh towards the threshold. A breach limited to information that is already public, with no indication of misuse, may weigh the other way. Each case turns on its own facts, and this article does not apply the test to any real incident.

Timing is governed by a standard rather than a fixed number of days. Under sections 10.1(2) and 10.1(6), both the report to the Commissioner and the notification to individuals must be made “as soon as feasible” after the organization determines that the breach has occurred. The provisions read for this article set no specific deadline in days. The reference point is the organization’s own determination. For an affected person, that makes dates important. The date on which you received a notice is not necessarily the date on which the organization determined that the breach occurred, and the gap between the two may become relevant in a later complaint.

The content of the notice is also prescribed. Section 10.1(4) requires the notification to contain “sufficient information to allow the individual to understand the significance to them of the breach and to take steps, if any are possible, to reduce the risk of harm that could result from it or to mitigate that harm”. The Breach of Security Safeguards Regulations add a list. Under section 3 of those Regulations, a notification to an affected individual must contain a description of the circumstances of the breach, the day or period during which it occurred (or an approximate period if neither is known), a description of the personal information involved to the extent known, a description of the steps the organization has taken to reduce the risk of harm, a description of the steps the individual could take to reduce or mitigate the risk, and information the individual can use to obtain further details about the breach.

Section 10.1(5) requires the notification to be conspicuous and, as a rule, given directly to the individual. Section 4 of the Regulations states that direct notification must be given in person, by telephone, mail, email or any other form of communication that a reasonable person would consider appropriate in the circumstances. Indirect notification is the exception. Section 5 of the Regulations allows it only where direct notification would be likely to cause further harm to the affected individual, where it would be likely to cause undue hardship for the organization, or where the organization does not have contact information for the individual. In those cases, it must be given by public communication or a similar measure that could reasonably be expected to reach the people affected. A general statement on a company website is therefore not the default method under the Regulations when the organization holds your email address or postal address.

The report to the Commissioner has its own content. Section 2 of the Regulations requires a written report describing the circumstances of the breach and, if known, its cause, the day or period when it occurred, the personal information involved, the number of individuals affected or an approximate number, the steps taken to reduce or mitigate the risk of harm, the steps taken or intended to notify affected individuals, and the name and contact details of a person who can answer the Commissioner’s questions. The organization may submit new information after making the report.

Two further obligations complete the picture. Under section 10.2 of PIPEDA, an organization that notifies individuals must also notify any other organization or government institution that it believes may be able to reduce the risk of harm or mitigate it, or where prescribed conditions are met, again as soon as feasible. Section 10.2(3) allows it to disclose personal information to that other body without the individual’s knowledge or consent, but solely for the purpose of reducing or mitigating the risk of harm. An illustration would be an organization alerting another business that can cancel or reissue a compromised credential. Under section 10.3, an organization must keep a record of every breach of security safeguards involving personal information under its control, not only those that meet the reporting threshold, and must give the Commissioner access to that record on request. Section 6 of the Regulations requires the record to be kept for 24 months after the day on which the organization determines that the breach occurred, and to contain any information that enables the Commissioner to verify compliance with the reporting and notification duties.

These record-keeping rules matter for an individual even though they do not give you direct access to the breach record. They mean that an organization which decided not to notify should be able to show the Commissioner how it reached that decision. If you learn of an incident from another source and receive no notice, that is a point to raise in a complaint.

II. What an affected person can do under federal law

A. Use the notice, request your information and keep a record

The first practical step is to read any notice you have received against the checklist in section 3 of the Regulations. Does it describe the circumstances? Does it give a date or period? Does it say which categories of your personal information were involved? Does it describe what the organization has done and what you could do? Does it tell you how to obtain further information? If an element is missing, a short written request for the missing information creates a dated record of what you asked and when. Keep the original notice, including the email headers or envelope showing the date of receipt and the channel used.

The Act also provides a formal route for obtaining your own information. Section 8 of PIPEDA governs the handling of an access request made under clause 4.9 of Schedule 1. Such a request must be in writing, and the organization must assist anyone who says they need help preparing it. The organization must respond “with due diligence and in any case not later than thirty days after receipt of the request”. It may extend that limit by up to thirty days, but only on grounds listed in the section, such as unreasonable interference with its activities or consultations that make the original limit impracticable. It may also extend the limit for the time needed to convert the information into an alternative format. In either case, it must send a notice of extension within thirty days of the request, stating the new limit, the reasons and the right to complain to the Commissioner.

Three further rules in section 8 are useful after a breach. If the organization does not respond within the time limit, it is deemed to have refused the request. It may charge for responding only if it has told the individual the approximate cost and the individual has confirmed that the request is maintained. If it refuses within the time limit, it must give written reasons and state the recourse available. Section 8(8) also requires an organization holding personal information that is the subject of a request to retain it for as long as necessary to allow the individual to exhaust any recourse under the Act. A request made soon after a breach therefore helps to preserve the information needed for any later complaint. Under section 11(3), a complaint arising from the refusal of an access request must be filed within six months of the refusal or of the expiry of the time limit for responding, or within any longer period the Commissioner allows.

Alongside these formal steps, a chronology is the most useful document an affected person can prepare. Note the date the notice arrived and by what means, the categories of information it mentioned, and each step you took in response: changing passwords, contacting a card issuer, monitoring accounts or placing alerts with a credit bureau. Record the time spent and any costs incurred, with receipts. If you notice unfamiliar transactions, unexpected credit inquiries or attempts to log in to your accounts, record each one with its date. These entries correspond to the forms of harm listed in section 10.1(7), including financial loss, identity theft and negative effects on the credit record. They may also become the evidence for a claim under section 16, discussed below. A chronology also keeps facts separate from assumptions: unusual activity on an account does not prove that it came from a particular breach, and the record should say what is known and what is only suspected.

The person responsible for the attack is a separate matter, governed by criminal law. Section 342.1 of the Criminal Code makes it an offence, among other things, to fraudulently and without colour of right obtain a computer service, to intercept a function of a computer system, or to use, possess or traffic in a computer password that would enable such an offence. It is punishable by up to 10 years’ imprisonment on indictment, or on summary conviction. Section 430(1.1) creates the offence of mischief in relation to computer data, which covers wilfully destroying or altering computer data, rendering it meaningless, useless or ineffective, or interfering with its lawful use. Under section 430(5), it is punishable by up to 10 years’ imprisonment on indictment, or on summary conviction. These provisions concern the attacker, not the organization that was attacked. A police report and a privacy complaint pursue different aims and can run in parallel. The notification duty in section 10.1(3) is expressed to apply “unless otherwise prohibited by law”. That is the only exception stated in the subsection. The existence of a criminal investigation does not, by itself, appear in the text as a ground for not notifying.

This discussion concerns Canadian federal law. The author’s English-language legal practice in Paris operates in a different jurisdiction. A Canadian file involving a breach needs to be assessed under the statute that actually governs the organization concerned, which may be provincial, and on the basis of the documents described above.

B. Complaint, the Commissioner’s report and the court hearing

Under section 11(1) of PIPEDA, an individual may file a written complaint with the Commissioner against an organization for contravening a provision of Division 1 or Division 1.1 of Part 1, or for not following a recommendation set out in Schedule 1. Division 1.1, headed “Breaches of Security Safeguards”, contains sections 10.1 to 10.3. A complaint may therefore concern a failure to report, a failure to notify, a deficient or late notice, or a failure to keep records. It may also concern the adequacy of the safeguards themselves under clause 4.7 of Schedule 1. Section 11(2) allows the Commissioner to initiate a complaint where there are reasonable grounds to investigate a matter, and section 11(4) requires the Commissioner to give the organization notice of the complaint.

The Commissioner is generally required to investigate, but section 12(1) sets out three situations in which the Commissioner may decline. The first is where the complainant ought first to exhaust grievance or review procedures that are otherwise reasonably available. The second is where the complaint could more appropriately be dealt with, initially or completely, by a procedure under other federal law or under the laws of a province. The third is where the complaint was not filed within a reasonable period after the day on which its subject matter arose. Each of these has a practical consequence. If the organization offers an internal complaint procedure, using it first and keeping the correspondence may avoid an objection under the first ground. If the provincial statute governs, the second ground may apply. And a complaint should not be left for months after the notice was received. Section 12(3) requires the Commissioner to give reasons for a decision not to investigate, and section 12(4) allows that decision to be reconsidered where the complainant establishes compelling reasons.

The investigation ends in a report. Under section 13(1), the Commissioner must prepare it within one year after the day on which the complaint was filed or initiated. It contains the Commissioner’s findings and recommendations, any settlement reached, where appropriate a request that the organization state what it has done or will do to implement the recommendations, and the recourse available under section 14. Section 13(3) requires the report to be sent to the complainant and to the organization without delay.

The report is not the end of the route. Under section 14(1), a complainant who has received the Commissioner’s report, or a notice that the investigation was discontinued, may apply to the Court for a hearing on the matters covered by the complaint or referred to in the report, provided they fall within the provisions listed in that subsection. The list includes clause 4.7 of Schedule 1, the safeguards clause, and Division 1.1, the breach provisions. “Court” is a defined term in section 2(1) of the Act, which designates the court that hears these applications. Section 14 does not provide for an application to that court before the complaint has gone through the Commissioner. The deadline is set by section 14(2): the application must be made within one year after the report or notification is sent, or within any longer period the Court may allow, before or after that year has expired. The year runs from the sending of the report, not from the date of the breach or of the notice.

Section 16 of PIPEDA sets out what the Court may do, in addition to any other remedy it may give. It may order the organization to correct its practices in order to comply with Divisions 1 and 1.1. It may order the organization to publish a notice of any action taken or proposed to correct its practices. And it may “award damages to the complainant, including damages for any humiliation that the complainant has suffered”. The section does not set an amount or a formula. Whether damages are awarded, and in what amount, depends on the evidence placed before the Court. This is where the chronology described above becomes important: costs incurred, time spent, documented misuse and the personal effect of the breach all need to be supported by records rather than general assertions.

The federal route is therefore sequential: notice and access request, complaint to the Commissioner, report within one year of the complaint, then an application to the Court within one year of the report. Each stage has its own conditions and time limits. Other routes may exist alongside it, including claims in contract or negligence, provincial statutes and group proceedings. They are governed by other rules, often provincial, which this article does not cover. In Quebec, Alberta and British Columbia, where an exemption order applies, the provincial statute and its own procedures may replace the federal steps described here for activity within the province.

Conclusion

Under Canadian federal law, a cyber attack becomes a legal privacy matter when it results in the loss of, or unauthorized access to or disclosure of, personal information following a breach of an organization’s security safeguards. Where it is reasonable to believe that the breach creates a real risk of significant harm, section 10.1 of PIPEDA requires the organization that controls the information to report to the Commissioner and to notify the individuals concerned as soon as feasible. The notice must contain the information listed in the Regulations and must, as a rule, be given directly. Every breach must be recorded and the record kept for 24 months.

An affected person can check the notice against that list, make a written access request that must be answered within thirty days unless validly extended, and file a complaint with the Commissioner without undue delay. After the Commissioner’s report, an application to the Court must be made within one year. The Court may order corrective measures and award damages, including for humiliation. The first questions in any case remain factual: whether personal information was actually involved, which organization controlled it, where it was handled, when the breach was determined, and what harm can be documented. Until those facts are established, no conclusion can be drawn about any particular incident.

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