Searches for Jovenel Moïse rose across the United States on the evening of November 18, 2026, as a federal prosecution in Miami over the killing of Haiti’s president drew fresh attention. The official record is clear on the core facts. President Moïse was assassinated on July 7, 2021, in Port-au-Prince. According to a release of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Florida, a federal jury in Miami convicted four defendants for their roles in that assassination, on counts that include conspiracy to kill and kidnap a person outside the United States and providing material support resulting in death. The release states that all four face life in prison and that U.S. District Judge Jacqueline Becerra will determine any sentence. The case carries number 22-cr-20104. A further jury trial in the same case reached closing arguments on November 17, 2026, according to the court’s public docket; the docket entries we read on November 19, 2026 did not yet record the jury’s decision, so this guide reports no outcome for that trial.
The discussion that follows is general in scope: it describes checks useful in comparable situations and makes no findings about the situation of any defendant in that case. It answers the questions that most coverage leaves open. How can a jury sitting in Florida try a killing carried out in another country? What do prosecutors actually have to prove? And once a jury says guilty, what happens next, on what deadlines, and how high can the sentence go under federal law?
I. How can a federal court in Miami try a killing carried out in Haiti?
A. The central count: an agreement made in the United States, plus one act here
The short answer is that the federal case does not charge the shooting in Haiti as a U.S. murder. It charges the agreement. The key statute is 18 U.S.C. § 956, a federal law titled “Conspiracy to kill, kidnap, maim, or injure persons or damage property in a foreign country.” Section 956(a)(1) reaches whoever, within the jurisdiction of the United States, conspires with one or more other persons, “regardless of where such other person or persons are located,” to commit outside the United States an act that would be murder, kidnapping, or maiming if committed within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States. The statute then adds the condition that does most of the work in practice: it applies “if any of the conspirators commits an act within the jurisdiction of the United States to effect any object of the conspiracy.”
Read closely, that sentence tells you what a federal jury has to find. There must be an agreement, entered into within the jurisdiction of the United States, whose object is a killing, a kidnapping or a maiming abroad. The other members of the agreement can be anywhere in the world. And at least one conspirator, not necessarily the defendant on trial, must have committed an act within U.S. jurisdiction to carry out the plan. The statute does not require proof that the defendant traveled abroad, held a weapon or was present when the victim died. The act that happens on American soil can be a step in the preparation rather than the violence itself.
Penalties depend on the object of the agreement. Under § 956(a)(2)(A), the punishment is “imprisonment for any term of years or for life if the offense is conspiracy to murder or kidnap.” Under § 956(a)(2)(B), it is imprisonment for not more than 35 years if the offense is conspiracy to maim. That distinction looks technical, but, as Part II explains, it decides how high a sentence can lawfully go, and it depends on what the jury was actually asked to find.
Federal appellate courts have tested this structure in full trials, and the decision that binds federal courts in Florida is United States v. Jayyousi, 657 F.3d 1085 (11th Cir. 2011), decided by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit on September 19, 2011. In United States v. Jayyousi, defendants tried in the Southern District of Florida had been convicted of conspiring in the United States to murder, kidnap, or maim persons overseas under § 956(a)(1), and of material-support offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 2339A built on that conspiracy. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the convictions in all respects. It held that intercepted calls, travel arrangements, recruiting and money transfers allowed a reasonable jury to find that the defendants shared the conspiracy’s violent objectives, even though the violence they supported was to take place overseas. For a reader following the Moïse prosecution, the useful point is that a § 956 case is proved through the agreement and its preparation, so the evidence a jury weighs is usually messages, money and travel rather than proof of who fired the shots.
The Department of Justice release describes the government’s case in exactly those terms. According to the release, the four convicted defendants embarked on a scheme in early 2021 to overthrow President Moïse and install a successor of their choosing so that they could obtain government contracts in Haiti, and recruited allies in the United States, Colombia and Haiti, including 22 former Colombian Army soldiers and Haitian gang leaders. The release attributes to the trial evidence plans to kidnap the president that changed over time, an order to Colombian mercenaries to attack the residence, and months of digital communications coordinating plans to kidnap or kill him. It also quotes the Assistant Attorney General for National Security, who said: “Using U.S. soil as a staging ground for a violent plot overseas is a grave violation of our laws and, more fundamentally, our sovereignty.” That sentence is the government’s view, not a court’s ruling, but it summarizes why § 956 exists: the statute treats planning on U.S. soil as the punishable conduct.
Three practical checks follow for anyone trying to understand how much exposure a particular person faces in a case of this kind. First, where and when did that person join the agreement, and was it within U.S. jurisdiction? Second, which act inside the United States does the government rely on to satisfy the statute, and who committed it? Third, which object, murder, kidnapping or maiming, does the indictment allege and does the jury’s verdict actually find? The answers to those three questions shape the trial, and the third one shapes the sentence.
B. Money, equipment and people: the support, export and laundering counts
Prosecutors rarely stop at the conspiracy count. The second pillar of a foreign-plot case is 18 U.S.C. § 2339A, the federal material-support statute. It punishes whoever provides material support or resources, or conceals or disguises their nature, location, source or ownership, “knowing or intending that they are to be used in preparation for, or in carrying out, a violation of” a list of federal offenses that expressly includes section 956. Attempts and conspiracies are covered. The basic penalty is a fine, imprisonment of not more than 15 years, or both, “and, if the death of any person results, shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life.” The death-results clause is what turns a support charge into a life-exposure charge when the plot succeeds.
The definition of “material support or resources” in § 2339A(b)(1) is broad. It covers any property, tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or monetary instruments, financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, false documentation, communications equipment, weapons, personnel and transportation, with an exception for medicine or religious materials. The statute also contains its own venue rule: “A violation of this section may be prosecuted in any Federal judicial district in which the underlying offense was committed, or in any other Federal judicial district as provided by law.” In practical terms, money wired from Florida, protective gear shipped from Miami or a person recruited in the United States can each be the support that the statute describes, provided the government proves the required knowledge or intent.
The official releases in the Moïse case show how these counts are used. According to the U.S. Attorney’s Office, the four defendants convicted at trial were convicted of conspiracy to provide material support or resources to carry out a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 956, resulting in death; providing material support and resources to carry out a violation of § 956, resulting in death; conspiracy to kill and kidnap a person outside the United States; conspiracy to commit offenses against the United States; and expedition against a friendly nation. One of them, according to the same release, was also convicted of smuggling goods from the United States and submitting false or misleading export information; the release separately states that this defendant helped smuggle bulletproof vests and other tactical equipment from Miami to Haiti on June 10, 2021. The release names the four as Arcangel Pretel Ortiz, Antonio Intriago, Walter Veintemilla and James Solages.
Money tells the same story from another angle. A separate release of the U.S. Attorney’s Office states that Keegan Harricharan was sentenced by Judge Becerra to 20 years in federal prison after pleading guilty to conspiracy to engage in money laundering, and that the laundered funds came from Paycheck Protection Program and Economic Injury Disaster Loan proceeds. That release states that the four trial defendants were convicted following a nine-week jury trial in May. Another release states that Rodolphe Jaar was sentenced to life in federal prison by U.S. District Judge Jose E. Martinez after pleading guilty, and that he helped secure weapons and provided other support. Those are reported outcomes for specific defendants on the record of their own cases; they do not predict what any other defendant will receive.
The appellate law fits the same pattern. In Jayyousi, one of the counts the Eleventh Circuit upheld was a substantive § 2339A offense “based upon an underlying 18 U.S.C. § 956(a)(1) conspiracy,” and the court found the evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that the defendants provided support knowing it would be used for a conspiracy to murder, kidnap or maim overseas. That is the link a reader should look for in any indictment of this type: the support count borrows its object from the conspiracy count, so a jury that accepts the conspiracy theory will usually be asked whether the money, equipment or people were supplied knowing or intending that use.
For a person whose role was financial or logistical, the contested element is almost always knowledge or intent. The statute does not punish lending money or selling equipment as such. It punishes doing so knowing or intending that the support will be used to prepare or carry out one of the listed offenses. That is why, in cases of this kind, the defense usually concentrates on what the person was told, when, and by whom, and why the government concentrates on messages, meetings and the timing of payments. A separate money-laundering charge, as in the Harricharan case, turns on its own elements and can carry its own sentence even when the person is not charged under § 956.
II. What a guilty verdict means in such a case, and what comes next
A. How the evidence is tested at a multi-defendant trial
Large conspiracy trials are built on two kinds of evidence: the participants’ own communications and the testimony of co-conspirators who have pleaded guilty. The Moïse prosecution is no exception. According to the conviction release, eight co-conspirators, including two of the Colombian mercenaries and several of the group’s Haitian and American allies, pleaded guilty, and six of them testified at trial; the release adds that extensive digital communications were introduced. Federal law gives defendants specific tools to test both kinds of evidence, and the Supreme Court has recently defined the limits of one of them.
The leading case on co-defendant statements in this setting is Samia v. United States, 599 U.S. 635 (2023), decided by the Supreme Court of the United States on June 23, 2023. It came out of a joint trial in the Southern District of New York over a killing in the Philippines, and the charges included conspiracy to murder and kidnap in a foreign country under § 956(a)(1). A co-defendant who did not testify had confessed; the government introduced the confession through a DEA agent who replaced the defendant’s name with references to the “other person,” and the judge told the jury to consider it only against the confessing co-defendant. The Court held: “The Confrontation Clause was not violated by the admission of a nontestifying codefendant’s confession that did not directly inculpate the defendant and was subject to a proper limiting instruction.” In a multi-defendant foreign-plot prosecution, this means an objection to a co-defendant’s out-of-court statement turns on whether the statement names or directly points to the defendant, and on whether the judge gave a proper limiting instruction.
Cooperating witnesses who take the stand raise a different issue, because the defense can cross-examine them about their agreements with the government. Messages raise a third. In Jayyousi, the Eleventh Circuit approved a technique that matters in message-heavy cases: an FBI agent who had reviewed thousands of wiretap summaries and hundreds of verbatim transcripts was allowed to testify, as a lay witness under Federal Rule of Evidence 701, about what code words in the intercepted calls meant, because that testimony was rationally based on the agent’s own perception of the evidence. In a prosecution built on months of chats, that ruling explains how an investigator can explain coded language to a Miami jury without being qualified as an expert.
That holding is still applied in the same courthouse. In Lugo v. United States, No. 1:24-cv-22321 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 6, 2025), a magistrate judge of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida, recommending denial of a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 brought after a cocaine-conspiracy conviction, cited Jayyousi, 657 F.3d at 1103, for the rule that a lay witness may interpret code words whose meaning is not perfectly clear without the witness’s explanation. The same report recorded that defense counsel had cross-examined the cooperating witnesses about the benefits they hoped to receive, which is the ordinary way the defense tests a cooperator’s account.
Three checks follow for anyone assessing a trial record of this kind. Did any out-of-court statement of a non-testifying co-defendant name the defendant or point directly to the defendant, and was a limiting instruction given? Were cooperating witnesses cross-examined about their plea agreements and the benefits they expected? And when an agent interpreted coded messages, was the interpretation grounded in the agent’s own review of the evidence, as Jayyousi requires, or did it drift into expert opinion without the safeguards that come with it? Those are the points on which post-trial motions and appeals in conspiracy cases usually turn.
B. Sentencing, supervised release and the deadlines that follow a verdict
The first deadlines arrive quickly. Under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended to December 1, 2024, Rule 29(c)(1) allows a defendant to move for a judgment of acquittal, or renew such a motion, “within 14 days after a guilty verdict or after the court discharges the jury, whichever is later.” Rule 33(b)(2) requires a motion for a new trial grounded on any reason other than newly discovered evidence to be filed within 14 days after the verdict or finding of guilty, while Rule 33(b)(1) allows a motion grounded on newly discovered evidence within 3 years after the verdict. Rule 34(b) sets a 14-day limit for a motion to arrest judgment. These are federal rules; a state prosecution follows its own state rules.
Sentencing comes later. Rule 32(b)(1) says the court must impose sentence without unnecessary delay, and Rule 32(c)(1)(A) generally requires a probation officer to conduct a presentence investigation and submit a report before sentence is imposed. Under Rule 32(d)(1), that report must calculate the defendant’s offense level and criminal history category and state the resulting sentencing range. The judge then applies 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), which requires a sentence “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to serve the purposes of sentencing, and lists the factors the court must consider, including the nature of the offense, the defendant’s history, the guidelines range and the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.
The object of the conspiracy becomes decisive at this stage, and a recent appellate decision shows why. In United States v. Sherifi, No. 22-4317 (4th Cir. July 9, 2024), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed a resentencing in a terrorism conspiracy case that included a count under § 956(a). The defendant received 516 months. The court accepted that a plain Apprendi error had occurred, because the jury had not been asked to find whether the object of the § 956 conspiracy was murder or kidnapping, which carries up to life, or maiming, which is capped at 35 years, and the sentence on that count exceeded the 420-month maximum for a conspiracy to maim. It nonetheless affirmed, because the same 516-month term ran concurrently on another count and because the evidence that the conspiracy aimed to kill was overwhelming and essentially uncontroverted. For anyone reviewing a § 956 verdict, the first document to read is the verdict form: if it does not specify the object of the conspiracy, a sentence above 35 years on that count is open to challenge, although the outcome then depends on the other counts and on the trial record.
The Eleventh Circuit, whose decisions bind the federal courts in Miami, has also limited the arguments that can bring a sentence down in this kind of case. In Jayyousi, it vacated one defendant’s sentence as substantively unreasonable after the government cross-appealed. The district court had reduced the sentence in part because the defendant did not personally harm anyone and the crimes did not target the United States, and the Eleventh Circuit answered: “The jury convicted Padilla of violating a statute that prohibits any conspiracy to murder, kidnap, or maim outside the United States.” On comparisons with other cases, it instructed that the district court “should not draw comparisons to cases involving defendants who were convicted of less serious offenses, pleaded guilty, or who lacked extensive criminal histories.” The court did allow some downward variance for harsh pretrial confinement, but not on the scale the district court had granted.
That comparison rule remains current in the Eleventh Circuit. In United States v. Mullings, No. 24-11822 (11th Cir. Feb. 10, 2026), a published money-laundering appeal, the court cited Jayyousi, 657 F.3d at 1117–18, and held that co-defendants who had received reductions for providing substantial assistance to the government, and who had lower criminal history categories, were not proper comparators. In a case where several participants pleaded guilty and testified, that rule matters: a defendant convicted at trial generally cannot rely on a cooperator’s lower sentence to argue that the defendant’s own sentence creates an unwarranted disparity. Cooperators, for their part, can benefit from Rule 35(b), which allows the court, on the government’s motion made within one year of sentencing, to reduce a sentence for substantial assistance provided after sentencing, with later motions permitted only in the circumstances the rule lists. A guilty plea is not a guarantee of leniency, as the life sentence reported for one defendant who pleaded guilty in the Moïse case shows.
Prison is not the end of the sentence. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(j), the authorized term of supervised release for any offense listed in section 2332b(g)(5)(B) is any term of years or life, notwithstanding the ordinary five-year ceiling in § 3583(b). The list in 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(B) expressly includes section 956(a)(1), described as “relating to conspiracy to murder, kidnap, or maim persons abroad,” and section 2339A, within the definition of a federal crime of terrorism. If supervision is later revoked or modified, § 3583(e) directs the court to the factors in § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D), (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6) and (a)(7), a list that leaves out § 3553(a)(2)(A).
The Supreme Court gave that omission effect in Esteras v. United States, No. 23-7483 (June 20, 2025), decided by the Supreme Court of the United States. It held that a district court considering whether to revoke a defendant’s term of supervised release may not consider § 3553(a)(2)(A), the provision on the seriousness of the offense, respect for the law and just punishment. Answering the objection that judges cannot put one consideration out of mind, the Court cited Samia, 599 U.S. at 646, for the presumption that jurors follow limiting instructions, and wrote: “We routinely require judges and juries to attend to some considerations while ignoring others.” For a person facing a long or lifetime term of supervision, Esteras means that a later revocation decision may rest on deterrence, protection of the public and the person’s correctional needs, but not on retribution for the original offense.
The appeal clock runs from the judgment, not from the verdict. Rule 32(k)(1) provides that, in the judgment of conviction, the court must set forth the plea, the jury verdict or the court’s findings, the adjudication, and the sentence. Under Rule 4(b)(1)(A) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, as amended to December 1, 2024, “a defendant’s notice of appeal must be filed in the district court within 14 days after the later of” the entry of the judgment or order being appealed, or the filing of the government’s notice of appeal. Rule 4(b)(3) adjusts that period when a defendant has timely filed a motion for judgment of acquittal, for a new trial, or to arrest judgment (a new-trial motion based on newly discovered evidence counts only if it is made no later than 14 days after the entry of the judgment): the notice is then due within 14 days after the entry of the order disposing of the last such motion, or within 14 days after the entry of the judgment of conviction, whichever period ends later. For the earlier stages of a federal case, including pretrial detention after an arrest and the way U.S. courts reach drug conduct abroad, our guide to what an accused trafficking leader faces after a U.S. arrest in federal court walks through the steps that come before trial.
Conclusion
A federal jury in Miami can try a killing carried out abroad because federal law does not charge the killing itself as a U.S. murder; it charges an agreement made within U.S. jurisdiction to kill, kidnap or maim abroad, completed by one act here, together with the money, equipment and people supplied for that purpose. Section 956 sets the penalty by the object of the agreement, up to life for murder or kidnapping and up to 35 years for maiming, and § 2339A raises a support charge to life when death results. After a guilty verdict, the first fourteen days matter for post-trial motions, the sentence is built under § 3553(a) on a presentence report, the verdict form’s description of the conspiracy’s object can cap the sentence, comparisons with cooperators are limited, supervised release can extend for life, and the notice of appeal is due within fourteen days of the judgment. Each of those points is a check to make on the actual record of a case, not a prediction about any one defendant.