KOHEN AVOCATS FIRM · PARIS 16
Djibouti Shipwreck: Can France Try the Smugglers, and Who Must Rescue the Drowning?

Hassan KOHEN acts in urgent matters, from the police station to the assize court. Initial strategic analysis: €80 incl. VAT, personal reply within 24 hours.

100% confidential · Legal professional privilege · No obligation

Article generated by artificial intelligence, through a process designed and supervised by the firm

Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

Paris Bar Police custody, investigation, assize court CNB listing avocat.fr
Maître Hassan KOHEN, avocat au Barreau de Paris
Hassan KOHEN
Attorney at the Paris Bar

Djibouti Shipwreck: Can France Try the Smugglers, and Who Must Rescue the Drowning?

Speak to a lawyer 06 89 11 34 45

On the night of 8 to 9 October 2026, a boat carrying about 305 migrants from Djibouti toward Yemen capsized near Guehere, spelled Guhere in some reports, north of the port town of Obock. By the evening of Sunday 11 October, the International Organization for Migration put the toll at 139 dead and 84 still missing, with about 82 survivors. The first count that morning had been 109 recovered bodies, including 15 children, 52 men and 42 women, and more than 116 missing. The survivors are Ethiopian nationals. Sixty-four of them are being assisted at the IOM migrant response centre in Obock, and the Djiboutian authorities are continuing search and rescue operations while arranging medical care and burials. The route between the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula is one of the busiest migration corridors in the world, used each year by hundreds of thousands of people, mostly Ethiopians and Somalis, trying to reach the Gulf states. It is also one of the deadliest: in 2025, more than 900 people died or went missing along it, according to the IOM Missing Migrants Project, while the number of people attempting the journey rose by 18 percent. Survivor accounts describe the familiar machinery of the crossing: smugglers cramming far too many people onto an unseaworthy boat, at night, for money. Two legal questions follow every one of these disasters, and both have precise answers in French law. Can France prosecute the smugglers even though the boat sank off Africa. And who was legally required to rescue the drowning, and who answers for it when no rescue comes. This article gives the French lawyer’s answer, with the statutes and the court decisions that would actually be used.

I. Can France put the smugglers behind the Djibouti sinking on trial

A. Migrant smuggling under French law: five years in prison, and no border shield for the organisers

French criminal law punishes migrant smuggling in broad terms. Article L. 823-1 of the Code on the Entry and Stay of Foreigners and the Right of Asylum provides, subject to the exemptions set out in article L. 823-9, that “est puni de cinq ans d’emprisonnement et de 30 000 euros d’amende le fait, pour toute personne, de faciliter ou de tenter de faciliter, par aide directe ou indirecte, l’entrée, la circulation ou le séjour irréguliers d’un étranger en France”, that is, five years’ imprisonment and a 30,000 euro fine for anyone who directly or indirectly facilitates the irregular entry, movement or stay of a foreigner in France. The same article adds that it applies even where the acts are committed by a person located in another State party to the Schengen Convention, which means the network does not have to stand on French soil for French law to designate the conduct as criminal. This domestic offence is France’s implementation of the international Palermo framework against the smuggling of migrants, the protocols supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, whose programme is described by the the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime: smuggling networks are to be criminalised wherever they operate, for profit, across borders.

The first jurisdiction to act after the Obock sinking will normally be Djibouti, in whose waters the boat went down, with Yemen and Ethiopia concerned for the victims. France is not the natural forum. But French courts have three well-marked doors through which such a case can enter Paris. The first is the arrest of a suspect on French territory. Article 689 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that “Les auteurs ou complices d’infractions commises hors du territoire de la République peuvent être poursuivis et jugés par les juridictions françaises soit lorsque, conformément aux dispositions du livre Ier du code pénal ou d’un autre texte législatif, la loi française est applicable, soit lorsqu’une convention internationale ou un acte pris en application du traité instituant les Communautés européennes donne compétence aux juridictions françaises pour connaître de l’infraction”: perpetrators of offences committed outside France may be prosecuted and tried by French courts where French law applies or where an international convention gives French courts jurisdiction. The Palermo instruments are exactly that kind of convention. In practice, smuggling kingpins travel, recruit and launder money through Europe, and diaspora networks span Paris, Brussels and London. The moment an organiser, a recruiter or a money collector is arrested in France, article 689 opens the courtroom door. Within Europe, the European Arrest Warrant then allows France to request the surrender of a suspect located in another Member State, a machinery that works every week between France and its neighbours, as shown in the continuing flow of Franco-British surrender cases decided in London.

The second door is territoriality by fragment. Article 113-2 of the Criminal Code states that “L’infraction est réputée commise sur le territoire de la République dès lors qu’un de ses faits constitutifs a eu lieu sur ce territoire”: an offence is deemed committed in France as soon as one of its constituent acts took place there. If recruitment messages were sent from France, if funds transited through French accounts, if a victim was recruited among the Ethiopian or Somali communities living in France, French courts are competent over the whole network, including the sinking itself. The third door is requalification as human trafficking. Article 225-4-1 of the Criminal Code defines trafficking as “le fait de recruter une personne, de la transporter, de la transférer, de l’héberger ou de l’accueillir à des fins d’exploitation”, recruiting, transporting, transferring, harbouring or receiving a person for purposes of exploitation, and punishes it with “sept ans d’emprisonnement et de 150 000 € d’amende”, seven years and 150,000 euros, rising to ten years and 1,500,000 euros where the victim is a minor. Smuggling becomes trafficking the moment exploitation enters the picture: migrants transported in order to be handed over to employers who seize their wages, to networks imposing debt bondage for the crossing, or to forced labour on arrival in Yemen or the Gulf. Fifteen children are among the dead off Obock, and every minor in the boat aggravates the potential charges, because trafficking of a minor is constituted without any additional circumstance of threat or coercion.

None of this requires France to claim universal jurisdiction over the Red Sea. It requires one link, one suspect, one euro or one message on French soil, or one arrest at a French airport. Smuggling networks that feed the Eastern Route run on diaspora contacts, mobile money and European transit points. That is why the question of a French trial is not theoretical, and why the families of the dead, including those living in France, have a concrete interest in understanding the second half of the equation: who is protected when they help, and who is punished when they kill.

B. The humanitarian defence and its hard limit: French law protects those who shelter, never those who ferry

Every sinking relaunches the same public confusion between the smuggler who sells places on a death boat and the volunteer who hands out blankets to survivors. French law draws the line between them with precision, and three rulings of the Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation map it. The starting point is article L. 823-9 of the foreigners code, which provides that assistance with irregular movement or stay cannot be prosecuted where the act gave rise to no direct or indirect consideration and consisted in providing legal, linguistic or social advice or support, or any other aid given for an exclusively humanitarian purpose, in the words of the statute, “lorsque l’acte reproché n’a donné lieu à aucune contrepartie directe ou indirecte et a consisté à fournir des conseils ou accompagnements juridiques, linguistiques ou sociaux, ou toute autre aide apportée dans un but exclusivement humanitaire”. Two conditions, both mandatory: no payment or advantage of any kind, and a purely humanitarian motive. Anyone who took money for the Obock crossing, however small the sum, is outside this protection by definition.

The scope of that immunity was fixed in the Herrou line of cases. On 12 December 2018, in case number 17-85.736, the Criminal Chamber gave effect to the 2018 statute that widened the exemption after the Constitutional Council’s fraternity decision of 6 July 2018, holding that “il résulte du 3° de l’article L. 622-4, dans sa version nouvelle, du code de l’entrée et du séjour des étrangers et du droit d’asile (CESEDA) que ne peut donner lieu à des poursuites pénales, sur le fondement des articles L. 622-1 à L. 622-3, l’aide à la circulation et au séjour irréguliers d’un étranger lorsque l’acte reproché n’a donné lieu à aucune contrepartie directe ou indirecte et a consisté à fournir des conseils ou accompagnements juridiques, linguistiques ou sociaux, ou toute autre aide apportée dans un but exclusivement humanitaire”. The case concerned fifty-seven foreigners found in an irregular situation after being helped near the Italian border in October 2016, and the Court annulled the conviction because the appeal judges had not answered the defendant’s claim that his action was purely humanitarian. The rule for rescuers, hosts and associations in France is therefore clear: unpaid help with movement inside the country or with daily survival is covered.

But the same Court drew a hard boundary that matters enormously for sea crossings. On 26 February 2020, in case number 19-81.561, it confirmed the immunity for humanitarian aid while ruling that “la situation de détresse des migrants n’est pas un élément visé par l’article L. 622-4 3°, du CESEDA”: the distress of the migrants is not an element the statute cares about. Distress neither grants nor removes the immunity; only the absence of consideration and the exclusively humanitarian purpose count. The same ruling adds that “il ne résulte nullement de ces dispositions légales que la protection dont bénéficient les auteurs d’actes accomplis dans un but exclusivement humanitaire soit limitée aux actions purement individuelles et personnelles et qu’en soit exclue une action non spontanée et militante exercée au sein d’une association”: organised, non-spontaneous, militant humanitarian action inside an association is covered too. Then, on 25 January 2023, in case number 21-86.839, the Court closed the last loophole by holding that European law, namely article 1 of Council Directive 2002/90/EC, allows Member States to punish assistance with irregular entry without any humanitarian exception, and that “la personne qui, dans un but humanitaire, apporte une aide à l’entrée sur le territoire français, favorise la commission d’une infraction, ce qui explique qu’elle ne puisse bénéficier de l’immunité prévue en cas d’aide, poursuivant le même but, apportée au séjour et à la circulation”: a person who, even for humanitarian motives, helps someone enter French territory facilitates the commission of an offence, which is why they cannot benefit from the immunity available for help with stay or movement. The Council Directive 2002/90/EC of 28 November 2002 confirms this architecture, and the Constitutional Council’s decision number 2018-717/718 QPC of 6 July 2018, which enshrined the principle of fraternity, protected only aid to stay and movement, never the business of clandestine entry.

Applied to the Djibouti disaster, the map is therefore simple. The volunteer in Obock or in Paris who feeds, houses, translates for or gives legal advice to survivors risks nothing under the smuggling statute, provided no money changes hands. The fisherman who pulls drowning people from the water commits no offence at all; he performs a duty, as the second part of this article explains. But whoever organised the crossing, loaded hundreds of people onto a boat built for a fraction of that number, collected the fares and sent them toward Yemen at night commits the smuggling offence in its most serious form, and no humanitarian motive can be invoked, because there was none: this was commerce, not charity. And where the overloaded boat predictably capsizes, the charges escalate from smuggling to endangerment and homicide, which is where French judges have already spoken in a case with an identical factual signature.

II. Who must rescue the drowning, and who answers when no one comes

A. Every captain must turn: the duty to rescue at sea binds ships, masters and coastal states

The duty to rescue at sea is the oldest humanitarian obligation in international maritime law, and it binds everyone who floats. Article 98 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea requires every flag state to order the master of its ships, so far as he can do so without serious danger to his vessel, crew or passengers, namely to render assistance to any person found at sea in danger of being lost and to proceed with all possible speed to the rescue of persons in distress once informed of their need of assistance. The same article 98 adds that every coastal state must maintain an adequate and effective search and rescue service for safety on and over the sea. Djibouti, as the coastal state off Obock, carries that search and rescue responsibility, and the IOM confirms that Djiboutian authorities are continuing operations while caring for survivors and burying the dead. The duty falls first on any vessel in the vicinity, whatever its flag: a cargo ship, a fishing boat, a patrol craft or a yacht whose master learns of people in the water must divert and assist, or at minimum relay the distress, unless doing so would seriously endanger his own ship and crew.

French domestic law converts that international duty into a criminal offence with severe penalties. Article 223-6 of the Criminal Code punishes with five years’ imprisonment and a 75,000 euro fine anyone who deliberately abstains from preventing a crime against bodily integrity that he could immediately stop without risk, and provides that “Sera puni des mêmes peines quiconque s’abstient volontairement de porter à une personne en péril l’assistance que, sans risque pour lui ou pour les tiers, il pouvait lui prêter soit par son action personnelle, soit en provoquant un secours”: the same penalties apply to anyone who deliberately fails to give a person in peril the assistance he could have provided, without risk to himself or others, either by his own action or by calling for help. The penalties rise to seven years and 100,000 euros where the person in peril is a child under fifteen. Fifteen children are counted among the recovered bodies off Obock, which gives this aggravation a direct factual anchor for any future prosecution of a master or operator who is shown to have ignored the distress. The word “quiconque”, anyone, includes the professional seaman, the coast guard officer and the smuggler himself: the smuggler who abandons his passengers to the waves commits, on top of smuggling, the failure-to-rescue offence, because nothing prevented him from alerting the coastal rescue services.

Where death follows, French law adds two further rungs. Article 223-1 punishes with one year’s imprisonment and a 15,000 euro fine “Le fait d’exposer directement autrui à un risque immédiat de mort ou de blessures de nature à entraîner une mutilation ou une infirmité permanente par la violation manifestement délibérée d’une obligation particulière de prudence ou de sécurité imposée par la loi ou le règlement”: deliberately exposing another person to an immediate risk of death or crippling injury by the manifestly deliberate breach of a specific safety obligation. Loading three hundred people onto a craft with no life jackets, no signalling or location equipment and no experienced master, then sending it out at night, is the textbook illustration of that offence, provided a French court is seized of the case. And article 221-6 defines involuntary homicide as “Le fait de causer, dans les conditions et selon les distinctions prévues” under article 121-3, “par maladresse, imprudence, inattention, négligence ou manquement à une obligation de prudence ou de sécurité imposée par la loi ou le règlement, la mort d’autrui”, causing another’s death through clumsiness, imprudence, inattention, negligence or breach of a legal safety duty, punished with three years and 45,000 euros, rising to five years and 75,000 euros for a manifestly deliberate breach. Each recovered body is then a separate count. These are not academic constructions. They are the exact charges French investigating judges retained after the last comparable disaster in waters under French rescue responsibility, and the Court of Cassation has just validated the whole edifice.

B. The Channel precedent: how French judges treated the same disaster when the boat sank off France

On 4 November 2025, the Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation, in case number 24-86.781, ruled on the investigation opened after a migrant boat sank off the French coast, in which the smugglers were investigated for involuntary homicide and military personnel of the maritime rescue coordination centre, the CROSS, were investigated for failure to rescue. The person under investigation challenged the jurisdiction of the Paris specialised court, and the Court rejected the appeal in terms that now form the reference framework for every overloaded-boat disaster with a rescue failure. The decision describes the factual matrix in words that could have been written about Obock: “l’acheminement et le départ des côtes françaises par le biais d’un réseau de passeurs de migrants sur une embarcation de fortune, surchargée, sans gilets de sauvetage suffisants et adaptés, sans aucun moyen de signalisation et de localisation, sans même un capitaine aguerri, et l’absence de secours efficaces portés par les militaires du CROSS aux passagers de ladite embarcation, une fois ceux-ci s’étant signalés en danger, constituent bien un ensemble de circonstances concrètes indissociablement liées entre elles dans le temps et dans l’espace”: the transport and departure organised by a migrant-smuggling network on a makeshift, overloaded craft, without sufficient life jackets, without any signalling or location equipment, without even an experienced captain, combined with the absence of effective rescue by the CROSS military personnel once the passengers had signalled their distress, form a single set of concrete circumstances inseparably linked in time and space. Overloading, absence of safety equipment, absence of a competent master, distress signal, failed rescue: every element of the Djibouti sinking is there.

From that factual unity the Court drew two legal consequences of general reach. First, causation: “l’omission de porter secours n’aurait pas eu lieu d’être sans l’infraction initiale d’aide à l’entrée et au séjour irrégulier en bande organisée”, the failure to rescue would not have occurred without the initial organised smuggling offence, and the smugglers’ offences and the rescuers’ omission led to a common result, which establishes the connected nature of the charges. Smuggling and rescue failure are not two separate stories; they are one criminal sequence, from the beach where the fares are collected to the operations room where the distress call arrives. Second, jurisdiction: the investigating judge of the Paris specialised unit for military and related offences was competent over the whole connected case, because article 706-75 of the Code of Criminal Procedure extends specialised jurisdiction to connected offences, and the Court approved the finding of close links analogous to those the statute specifically provides for. The lesson for practitioners is structural. Wherever a French court is seized, whether through an arrest in France, a European Arrest Warrant, or a complaint by victims’ families, it can hold the entire chain together: the network that loaded the boat answers for involuntary homicide, and anyone whose duty was to rescue answers for the omission, in a single proceedings before a single judge.

For the Djibouti families, the practical conclusion is threefold. Djibouti leads the criminal response, and any complaint or testimony should go first to the Djiboutian investigators and to the IOM teams in Obock who are identifying the dead and assisting the survivors. France enters the picture as soon as a French link appears: a suspect present in France or elsewhere in Europe, funds or messages passing through France, a French-flagged vessel that failed to divert, or relatives living in France who wish to file a criminal complaint if a suspect is identified on French soil. And the rescuers, volunteers and host families have nothing to fear from French law, which punishes only those who profit from the crossing and those who look away from the drowning. The sea off Obock will keep its dead, but the law on both shores now speaks with one voice about who loaded the boat and who failed to turn toward it.

Conclusion

The sinking off Obock in the night of 8 to 9 October 2026, with 139 dead, 84 missing and some 82 survivors, is the deadliest episode to date on a corridor that killed or disappeared more than 900 people in 2025. The legal reading of the disaster under French law is settled on every point that matters. Organising the crossing for money is migrant smuggling punishable by five years’ imprisonment, and France can try the organisers as soon as one of them is arrested on its soil or one fragment of the network touches its territory. No humanitarian cloak covers the fare-collectors, because the immunity protects only unpaid help with stay and movement, never assistance with clandestine entry. Everyone at sea must rescue, and French law punishes with up to seven years those who deliberately look away from a person in peril, a child among them. And since the Court of Cassation’s ruling of 4 November 2025, smuggling and rescue failure are judged as one connected sequence, from the overloaded beach departure to the unanswered distress call. For the Ethiopian families who lost children, brothers and sisters between Obock and Yemen, including those now living in France, the path runs through identification and testimony in Djibouti, family tracing with the IOM, and, where a French link exists, a complaint before the French courts. The boats will sail again. The law, at least, is ready for the next crossing.

📄 Official circular