KOHEN AVOCATS FIRM · PARIS 16
Turin Blocks a Texas Extradition Over the Death Penalty: What France Would Demand Before Any Surrender

Hassan KOHEN acts in urgent matters, from the police station to the assize court. Initial strategic analysis: €80 incl. VAT, personal reply within 24 hours.

100% confidential · Legal professional privilege · No obligation

Article generated by artificial intelligence, through a process designed and supervised by the firm

Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

Paris Bar Police custody, investigation, assize court CNB listing avocat.fr
Maître Hassan KOHEN, avocat au Barreau de Paris
Hassan KOHEN
Attorney at the Paris Bar

Turin Blocks a Texas Extradition Over the Death Penalty: What France Would Demand Before Any Surrender

Speak to a lawyer 06 89 11 34 45

One week after the Turin Court of Appeal was due to hold a new extradition hearing in the case of Lee Gilley, the Houston murder suspect still sits in an Italian cell, and the file still turns on a single missing page: a written American promise that he will not be executed if he is sent back to Texas. The judges in Turin paused the surrender in July and told Washington, in substance, that a prosecutor’s word is not enough. United States officials were given until August 31 to file additional documentation, with the next hearing set for September 7, according to the account of the case published by Texas Scorecard on July 22, 2026. No public decision has been reported since. That silence is itself the story. When a European court asks the United States for a formal death-penalty waiver and the paperwork does not arrive in the form the judges demanded, extradition does not move forward. It waits, and the requested person stays detained.

For an international audience, and in particular for anyone facing a United States extradition request while standing on European soil, the Gilley case is a live demonstration of how the death-penalty objection works in practice. Italy is applying the same European rule that France applies: no surrender without a reliable, specific, written assurance that the death penalty will neither be pronounced nor, at a minimum, carried out. France’s Cour de cassation has quashed surrender opinions that accepted vague or impersonal promises. It has kept American-requested fugitives in detention while the paperwork was tested. And it runs every contested extradition through the same sequence: arrest, appearance before the procureur général within forty-eight hours, a reasoned opinion of the chambre de l’instruction, and finally a decree of the Prime Minister that can itself be challenged before the Conseil d’Etat. This article explains what Turin is demanding, why the American file is stuck, and exactly what France would test if Lee Gilley, or any person wanted by the United States in a capital case, were arrested in Paris or Nice instead of Milan.

I. Turin blocks a Texas extradition until Washington signs a death-penalty waiver

The facts reported by the American press are stark. Lee Gilley is charged with murder in Harris County, Texas, in the 2024 death of his wife Christa Bauer, who was pregnant. In May 2026, weeks before his scheduled trial, he cut off his court-ordered ankle monitor while free on a one-million-dollar bond and flew to Italy using a false name and forged travel documents. He was caught by the authorities at Milan airport. The United States requested his extradition. In July, the Court of Appeal in Turin, which handles the judicial phase of extradition in Italy, temporarily blocked the surrender over concerns about the sentence he could face on return, and specifically over the death penalty. His lawyer, Dick DeGuerin, told ABC13 on July 21, 2026 that the Harris County District Attorney’s office had said verbally that it would not seek the death penalty but had not filed that position formally with the court, adding that a formal written assurance is what the Italian courts are looking for. The Fox Houston station summarized the ruling in the same terms: the Italian court blocked the extradition over sentencing concerns and wants the waiver in writing.

A. A fugitive caught in Milan and a surrender put on hold

Every extradition case has two halves: the fugitive’s conduct and the requesting state’s paperwork. The first half is not in dispute here. A murder defendant who removes an ankle monitor, boards an international flight on forged papers, and is arrested at Milan Malpensa airport presents the textbook profile of a flight risk, and continued detention during the extradition proceedings surprises no one. What makes the case legally interesting is the second half. The Turin judges did not question that Gilley is the man Washington wants, nor that murder is punishable in both countries. They stopped the case on the guarantees surrounding the sentence. Under the European Convention on Human Rights, a member state may not expose a person to a real risk of the death penalty by surrendering him, and Italy, like France, has abolished capital punishment and bound itself to the abolitionist protocols. A verbal statement by a county prosecutor, relayed through a defense lawyer to a television station, does not meet that standard. The court therefore did what European extradition judges routinely do when the file is incomplete: it paused, set a deadline of August 31 for additional American documentation, and scheduled a new hearing for September 7. The technique is identical to the French practice of ordering a supplement of information before giving any opinion, a point developed below. The practical consequence is that the burden now sits entirely with the requesting state. Until Washington files a written, competent, case-specific commitment, the surrender cannot proceed, and the fugitive character of the defendant, serious as it is, does not cure the defect. Flight proves dangerousness and justifies detention. It never justifies lowering the human-rights threshold for surrender.

The timeline matters for readers following the case day by day. Arrest at Milan airport in May 2026. Temporary block of the surrender in July over sentencing and death-penalty concerns, reported July 21 and 22 by ABC13, its Chicago sister station, Fox26 Houston, and Texas Scorecard. Deadline of August 31 for the United States to submit further documentation. Hearing set for September 7. As of September 14, no American or Italian outlet has reported the outcome of that hearing or the filing of the written waiver. Two explanations are possible, and both are common in extradition practice. Either the documentation arrived and the court reserved its decision, which often takes weeks, or the September 7 hearing produced a further adjournment because the assurance still did not satisfy the judges. In either case, the lesson for defense lawyers is the same: the period between the block and the final decision is the decisive window. It is when additional materials are filed, when the reliability of each promise is tested, and when parallel remedies, from constitutional complaints to applications to the European Court of Human Rights, must be prepared rather than improvised after an unfavorable ruling.

B. Why a prosecutor’s word is never enough without a written waiver

The Turin court’s demand reflects one of the oldest rules of European extradition law. Since the Strasbourg Court’s judgment in Soering v. the United Kingdom, a European state may not extradite a person to a country where there are substantial grounds to believe he would face a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention, and the death-row phenomenon as well as the penalty itself have been assessed through that lens ever since. The requesting state can remove the obstacle, but only with assurances that are written, specific to the individual, issued by an authority capable of binding the prosecuting jurisdiction, and verifiable by the requested court. A press statement is not an assurance. A private oral indication to defense counsel is not an assurance. Even a general diplomatic note describing a country’s moratorium practice may fail if it does not guarantee, for this defendant, that the prohibited outcome will not occur.

France applies exactly this test, and its supreme court has shown how strictly. On January 30, 2024, the criminal chamber of the Cour de cassation ruled on a Tunisian extradition request concerning a man wanted for premeditated murder, in pourvoi no. 23-83.549. The chambre de l’instruction in Aix-en-Provence had first ordered additional inquiries so that, in the event a death sentence were imposed, the Tunisian authorities would undertake not to carry it out, and Tunis answered by diplomatic note received on March 21, 2023. The Aix judges then gave a favorable opinion, noting that the assurances came from a competent authority able to bind Tunisia and that they stated, in the end, that even in the event of the pronouncement of a death sentence, that sentence would not be executed. The Cour de cassation first restated the governing principle in terms every extradition lawyer should memorize: “Le premier de ces textes prohibe l’extradition vers un autre État d’une personne dont il y a des motifs sérieux et avérés de croire qu’elle serait exposée dans le pays de destination à un risque réel d’être soumise à la peine de mort.” It then quashed the favorable opinion in its entirety, holding that general assurances about Tunisia’s moratorium practice, however well documented, did not establish that the death penalty, if imposed, would not be applied to this specific defendant, and it sent the case back to a differently composed chambre de l’instruction. The parallel with Turin is direct. The Italian judges, like the French supreme court, distinguish the existence of reassuring general practice from a binding individual guarantee, and they refuse to let the former substitute for the latter. Any American filing ahead of a rescheduled hearing will be measured against that distinction: names, signatures, competent authority, explicit coverage of both pronouncement and execution, and enforceability within the American system, where charging decisions belong to county prosecutors and formal non-capital certification must actually be placed before the court.

There is a second dimension to the waiver that American readers sometimes underestimate. European courts examine not only who signs the assurance but what it covers. A promise not to seek the death penalty at the charging stage differs from a promise that the sentence will not be pronounced, which differs again from a promise that a pronounced sentence will not be executed. The Aix-en-Provence judges had accepted the third variant, non-execution, and the Cour de cassation still found the showing insufficient because it was not individualized. In Gilley’s case, the District Attorney’s reported position, not to seek death, sits at the first and weakest level, and it was communicated orally rather than filed. Moving from that starting point to a surrender requires climbing two ladders at once: formalizing the commitment in writing and extending its substance until the Turin court is satisfied that no realistic path to execution remains. Defense teams in comparable cases attack each rung separately, demanding proof of the signatory’s authority over the future trial prosecutor, proof that the commitment binds successor prosecutors, and proof of the remedy if the promise is broken after surrender, when the European court has lost its leverage. These are the arguments that fill the August-to-September window, and they explain why a case that looked like a routine fugitive return in May is still unresolved in September.

II. What France would test before surrendering a suspect to the United States

If Lee Gilley had landed at Roissy rather than Malpensa, the French procedure would have followed a familiar script, and each step would have offered the defense a distinct lever. France extradites to the United States regularly under the bilateral relationship, but it does so through a judicialized process in which the chambre de l’instruction gives a reasoned opinion, the Cour de cassation reviews it, and the Prime Minister decides by decree subject to judicial review. Death-penalty cases receive the strictest scrutiny in that chain. The statute, the case law, and the detention practice together form a predictable checklist, and the Gilley file can be read against it line by line.

A. How Paris checks the legal conditions and the judge’s reasoned opinion

The starting point is the list of mandatory refusal grounds in Article 696-4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which provides that extradition is not granted in eight situations, including the protection of French nationals, political offenses, prior French proceedings, limitation periods, and, critically, cases where, in the words of the statute, “Lorsque le fait à raison duquel l’extradition a été demandée est puni par la législation de l’Etat requérant d’une peine ou d’une mesure de sûreté contraire à l’ordre public français”, that is, where the act is punishable under the requesting state’s law by a penalty contrary to French public policy. The death penalty is the paradigmatic penalty contrary to French public policy, and the provision is the domestic anchor for the assurance requirement that the Cour de cassation enforces alongside Article 3 of the Convention. A French chambre de l’instruction seized with an American capital file therefore begins where Turin began: is there a punishable act in both states, is the person the one sought, and, above all, has the requesting state neutralized the death-penalty risk in a form the court can verify?

Arrest and appearance come next, and they are tightly regulated. Article 696-10 of the Code of Criminal Procedure requires that any person apprehended following an extradition request be brought within forty-eight hours before the territorially competent procureur général, who verifies identity, informs the person in a language he understands of the request and its content, and tells him he may be assisted by counsel of his choice or by court-appointed counsel. Only then does the judicial examination phase open. Where the requested person tells the procureur général that he does not consent to surrender, Article 696-15 of the Code of Criminal Procedure seizes the chambre de l’instruction without delay: the person appears within ten working days, and if he confirms his refusal, the chamber gives its reasoned opinion on the request, within one month of the appearance unless additional inquiries are ordered, The statute adds that “Cet avis est défavorable si la cour estime que les conditions légales ne sont pas remplies ou qu’il y a une erreur évidente”, meaning the opinion must be unfavorable where the legal conditions are unmet or an obvious error exists. The provision also opens a pourvoi against the chamber’s opinion, which is how cases like the Tunisian file of January 2024 reached the Cour de cassation. In practice, French chambers use the additional-inquiry power aggressively in American cases, exactly as Turin used its adjournment power: they ask Washington to clarify the charges, the sentencing exposure, and the precise content of the death-penalty commitment before opining, and they treat an incomplete answer as a ground for delay rather than a reason to surrender first and verify later.

Two recent rulings illustrate how the system handles American requests at the pre-opinion stage. On April 8, 2025, the criminal chamber decided pourvoi no. 25-80.279, concerning a man arrested on October 23, 2024 in execution of a provisional arrest request issued by the United States government for prosecution on wire-fraud and identity-theft charges on the basis of an arrest warrant of October 22, 2024. The Paris chambre de l’instruction had rejected his application for release, and the Cour de cassation rejected his appeal. The file shows the standard American-request architecture in France: a provisional arrest request, rapid apprehension, notification, non-consent, and continued detention while the merits of surrender are examined. On March 30, 2021, the chamber decided pourvoi no. 21-80.421, where the American government had sought the provisional arrest of a Russian national for money-laundering conspiracy carrying twenty years’ imprisonment, and the man was stopped on November 15, 2020 at Paris Roissy-Charles de Gaulle airport arriving from Brazil, told the procureur général the next day that he did not consent to surrender, and was placed in extradition detention. Roissy, like Malpensa, functions as a filter: fugitives in transit are intercepted, the forty-eight-hour clock starts, and the assurance litigation begins. And on October 11, 2022, in pourvoi no. 22-80.654, the court reviewed a Nancy case in which a Luxembourg national had been provisionally arrested on April 29, 2021 on a New York district judge’s warrant for wire-fraud and money-laundering conspiracy, placed under extradition committal the same day, and notified of the American extradition request on July 2, 2021 after declaring he did not consent. Before ruling, the chambre de l’instruction had ordered further inquiries so that, on the one hand, the Luxembourg authorities would be consulted on the extradition of their national, and on the other, the American authorities would specify the prosecution arrangements and the sentencing regime for the offenses charged. That passage deserves quotation in full because it is the French equivalent of Turin’s August 31 deadline: “la chambre de l’instruction a ordonné, avant dire droit, un complément d’information pour que, d’une part, les autorités luxembourgeoises soient consultées sur l’extradition de leur ressortissant, d’autre part, les autorités américaines précisent les modalités de poursuite et d’exécution des peines relatives aux infractions reprochées”. Where nationality, sentencing exposure, or the reliability of foreign paperwork is unclear, the French judge stops the clock and demands answers. A Turin-style file, with only an oral prosecutorial indication on the capital question, would not survive that examination.

One contrast helps locate the Gilley case within European surrender law. Had Gilley been arrested in another European Union member state on a European Arrest Warrant rather than in Italy on an American request transmitted to Italy, the death-penalty question could not even arise between member states, since Union law excludes capital punishment entirely, but different technical battles would replace it. On March 11, 2025, the criminal chamber decided pourvoi no. 25-81.051, upholding the surrender to Romania of a Romanian national wanted under a European Arrest Warrant of May 30, 2024 for the enforcement of a one-year-and-eight-month prison sentence imposed in his absence on April 11, 2023 for threats. The Aix-en-Provence chambre de l’instruction had authorized surrender after verifying that the decision, though rendered in absentia, would be notified after surrender with an express information of the right to a retrial or a remedy allowing full re-examination, noting that an arrest warrant had been issued and that the decision, not served personally, would be notified after surrender with the right to a new trial. The Cour de cassation approved that reasoning and rejected the appeal. The comparison is instructive. Inside the Union, surrender litigation turns on retrial rights, specialty, and prison conditions. Outside it, facing the United States, the death penalty dominates everything, and the assurance must be built from scratch in each file. Gilley’s lawyers are litigating the harder, classic-extradition version of the problem, where no mutual-trust presumption assists the requesting state.

B. Detention, decrees, and remedies when Washington asks Paris for a fugitive

American-requested defendants in France should expect detention, not release, while the file is examined. The three American-request rulings cited above share a common procedural spine: provisional arrest, notification by the procureur général, declaration of non-consent, and placement under extradition committal, with applications for release rejected and those rejections upheld on appeal. The Cour de cassation treats extradition detention as the default compatible with the Convention where the person has already demonstrated, by international flight, that less restrictive measures would not secure surrender. A defendant who cut off an ankle monitor and crossed the Atlantic on forged documents would find it nearly impossible to rebut that logic in Paris, just as in Turin. Detention litigation therefore serves a secondary but real purpose: it keeps the defendant before the court while the assurance battle is fought, and each rejection of release extends the window in which the requesting state must perfect its file. Defense strategy inverts the apparent defeat. Every month of lawful detention is a month in which Washington must produce the written waiver, specify the sentencing regime, and answer the chamber’s questions, with the chambre de l’instruction watching the calendar.

If the chamber’s reasoned opinion is favorable, the file passes from the judges to the executive, and a new layer of review opens. Article 696-18 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that, outside the specific case of Article 696-17, extradition is authorized by decree of the Prime Minister on the report of the Minister of Justice, that the person must be handed to the requesting state’s agents within one month of notification of the decree failing which he is released as of right and cannot be claimed again for the same cause except in case of force majeure, and that the action for excess of power against the decree must be brought within one month on pain of foreclosure, with a prior administrative appeal having no suspensive effect on that time limit. In the words of the statute, “l’extradition est autorisée par décret du Premier ministre pris sur le rapport du ministre de la justice”, and “Le recours pour excès de pouvoir contre le décret mentionné à l’alinéa précédent doit, à peine de forclusion, être formé dans le délai d’un mois.” The Conseil d’Etat reviews the decree for errors of law, including violations of the Convention and of Article 696-4, and it has annulled surrenders where the political-purpose exception or the protection of fundamental rights so required. For an American capital file, the decree stage is where the written waiver is tested one final time: a decree authorizing surrender to a death-penalty jurisdiction without a sufficient, specific, binding assurance would be exposed to annulment, and experienced counsel prepare the excess-of-power application in parallel with the chamber proceedings rather than after the decree is signed. A further European layer exists above that. Where surrender appears imminent and the assurance dispute unresolved, an application to the Strasbourg Court with a request for interim measures can suspend the transfer while the Court examines the Article 3 complaint, and the French authorities respect such indications. The Gilley timeline shows why early preparation matters: by the time a court sets a decisive hearing, whether September 7 in Turin or a future date in Aix or Paris, the remedies must already be drafted, because post-decision windows are measured in days.

Practically, anyone in Gilley’s position in France would organize the defense around four documents. First, the American charging instruments and the exact sentencing exposure under Texas law, so that the chamber can see precisely where the death penalty could enter the case. Second, the written assurance itself, signed by the authority competent to bind the prosecution, covering non-seeking, non-pronouncement, and non-execution in explicit terms, with evidence of its binding force on successor prosecutors. Third, proof of what happens if the assurance is breached after surrender, since a promise without a remedy is an argument, not a guarantee. Fourth, the personal file: nationality, residence, family ties, and any asylum or protection history, because the chamber examines the individual risk, not an abstract country profile, as the January 2024 quashing demonstrates. Turin is asking for the same dossier in substance. The August 31 deadline and the September 7 hearing were the Italian version of the French additional-inquiry procedure, and the reported absence of a formal filing explains the reported absence of a surrender. When the paperwork is right, European courts surrender to the United States every month, including from France, as the detention rulings above confirm. When the death-penalty page is missing or unsigned, they wait, and the defendant waits with the case.

Conclusion

The Gilley case, one week after its scheduled September hearing, stands for a simple proposition that unites Turin and Paris. Europe does not refuse extradition to the United States out of hostility to American justice. It surrenders fugitives to face trial, including murderers caught at airports with forged papers, but it conditions surrender in capital cases on a written, specific, binding assurance that the death penalty will not be carried out, and it verifies that assurance person by person rather than accepting general descriptions of prosecutorial practice. The Turin judges paused a Texas murder case on exactly that ground. The French Cour de cassation quashed a Tunisian murder-case opinion on exactly that ground. The same test would apply in Paris, Aix, or Nancy if the file arrived tomorrow: provisional arrest, forty-eight-hour appearance, reasoned opinion after adversarial examination, possible additional inquiries, decree, and judicial review, with detention maintained throughout and the burden of the missing page resting on the requesting state. For defense lawyers, the practical message is to build the assurance challenge from the first appearance, not the last hearing. For prosecutors, it is to file the waiver early, in writing, signed by the competent authority, covering the individual defendant. And for observers of the September 7 hearing, the question to watch is narrow and decisive: did Washington finally put its promise on paper in the form Turin demanded, or does Lee Gilley remain in Italy because a prosecutor’s word, however sincere, is not an extradition assurance?

📄 Official circular