On 23 July 2026, the European Union adopted its 21st package of restrictive measures against Russia. The political headline was familiar: more pressure on banks, energy revenues and the networks used to bypass sanctions. The operational change for the crypto industry is more precise and potentially more disruptive. The package extends transaction bans to 14 crypto-related service platforms established in non-EU countries and, for the first time, creates the basis for a full third-country ban covering crypto-asset services used to help Russia evade EU restrictions. The first practical consequences are now being felt because the package contains measures with different implementation dates, including the 23 August and 25 August 2026 milestones.
A French crypto-asset service provider, bank, payment institution, insurer, broker or technology company should not reduce this development to a name-screening exercise. The legal question is whether a proposed service, transfer, wallet interaction or indirect payment connects an EU operator to a listed platform, a controlled entity, a Russian sanctions-evasion route or a transaction prohibited by the amended EU instruments. French law adds its own compliance perimeter: the Code monétaire et financier provisions on asset freezes and making funds available apply to French activities and, for relevant firms, to branches and activities carried out abroad.
This analysis addresses the new transaction-ban angle. It is not the separate rule, effective on 25 August 2026, concerning Russian nationals owning, controlling or sitting on the boards of EU crypto-service companies; that governance issue has a different test and a different compliance file. The immediate priority for a French operator is to identify the prohibited counterparty, stop the transaction without creating a new circumvention route, preserve the evidence, and know whether the remedy lies with the competent national authority, the EU courts or an ordinary contractual judge.
I. What does the EU’s new third-country crypto transaction ban actually prohibit?
A. Which crypto platforms and EU operators are covered?
The starting point is the European Commission’s account of the 21st package. It describes three connected measures: a dedicated third-country ban for crypto-asset services, a transaction ban on additional third-country crypto platforms and crypto-linked firms, and an extension of the restrictions on Russian nationals holding ownership or governance positions in companies that provide crypto-asset services. These are not interchangeable. The first two target transactions and services; the third targets ownership and control.
The Council’s official press release states that the EU extended the transaction ban to 14 crypto-related service platforms based in Georgia, Panama, the United Arab Emirates, the Marshall Islands, Kyrgyzstan and Belarus. The same release describes the new instrument as a possibility of prohibiting any transaction between an EU operator and a crypto provider used by Russia to evade EU sanctions. The Council’s sanctions timeline records the 23 July package as including a transaction ban on 14 crypto-related service platforms based in non-EU countries. The legal instrument to read with the political summary is Council Regulation (EU) 2026/1848, which amends Regulation (EU) No 833/2014, together with Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/1849, which amends Decision 2014/512/CFSP.
The practical consequence is that a platform does not need to be incorporated in Russia to become a prohibited counterparty. The third-country location is part of the point. The EU is targeting the route by which a Russian bank, company or individual may reach crypto liquidity after direct dealings with Russian providers have been restricted. A French firm therefore has to record at least four facts for each relevant relationship: the legal identity of the service provider, its jurisdiction and regulatory status, the service actually supplied, and the reason the transaction is being routed through that provider.
The perimeter is wider than a French exchange. A French bank clearing a euro payment, a French payment institution holding a client-money account, a French insurer underwriting a service, a French software company providing infrastructure, a custody provider, an over-the-counter broker and a professional adviser can all become part of the factual chain. The question is not whether the company calls itself a crypto exchange. It is whether the company is an EU operator performing or facilitating a transaction or service covered by the restrictive measure.
French territorial rules reinforce that analysis. Article L. 562-4 of the Code monétaire et financier requires the persons within its scope to apply, without delay, asset-freeze measures and prohibitions on making funds or economic resources available. Its wording covers natural persons in France, the regulated persons listed in article L. 561-2, French legal persons for activities carried out abroad, including branches, and foreign legal persons for their activities carried out in France. The operative phrase is “sans délai”. A French firm’s foreign branch cannot be treated as a compliance blind spot merely because the wallet, bank account or server is outside France.
The same cross-border logic appears in article L. 562-4-1. The article requires regulated persons to establish “une organisation et des procédures internes” for asset freezes, prohibitions on making funds or economic resources available, and the prohibition on circumvention. It also requires French parent companies to organise the group-level control framework and to apply the framework through relevant foreign branches. A group that screens only the French booking entity but allows an overseas affiliate to execute the same transaction has not addressed the legal problem; it has moved the execution point.
There is also a MiCA classification question. The amended EU text uses the concept of crypto-asset services, while the Commission’s summary refers to crypto-asset service providers and platforms. A French operator should map the service against Regulation (EU) 2023/1114 on markets in crypto-assets, then separately test the sanctions rule. MiCA authorisation is not a safe harbour from sanctions. Conversely, the absence of a MiCA authorisation does not make a third-country counterparty irrelevant: an unlicensed platform may still be the prohibited or high-risk node in the transaction chain.
The most useful French judicial reference is the Conseil d’État’s decision of 15 November 2019, no. 428292, La Banque Postale. The court explained that the French asset-freeze system includes the freeze itself and the “interdiction d’effectuer tout mouvement ou transfert d’avoirs” for the benefit of designated persons. It also held that financial institutions must maintain preventive systems capable of detecting transfers before execution. The case concerned cash mandates, not crypto-assets, but the compliance lesson travels directly: a control that discovers the problem only after a transaction has settled is an exposed control.
B. Why is this not the same as an asset freeze or a Russian-ownership rule?
Three legal mechanisms must be kept apart. An asset freeze immobilises funds or economic resources belonging to, owned by, held by or controlled by a designated person or entity. A transaction ban prohibits defined dealings with a named counterparty or category of service provider. An ownership or governance restriction prevents a person from owning, controlling or occupying a position in a company. The same business group may be affected by all three, but the evidence and the remedy are not the same.
The French statutory vocabulary is useful. Article L. 562-1 defines funds broadly, including cash, claims, deposits, financial instruments, dividends, credit arrangements and letters of credit. It defines economic resources as assets that can be used to obtain funds, goods or services. The definition matters when a frozen relationship involves shares, a wallet, a claim for payment, a custody arrangement or a contractual right rather than a simple bank balance. A firm should not assume that a transaction is outside the freeze framework because the asset is represented by a token or because the value is held through a smart-contract structure.
Article L. 562-5 separately says that the persons covered by article L. 562-4 may not make funds or economic resources available, directly or indirectly, for the benefit of persons whose assets are frozen. Article L. 562-6 prohibits participating, knowingly and voluntarily, in activities intended to circumvent the measures. Those two provisions are why a firm should not respond to a blocked platform by creating a mirror account, using an affiliate, splitting the transfer, changing the label of the service or asking a client to route the same value through an apparently unrelated wallet.
The Conseil d’État has treated the anti-circumvention logic as a real compliance obligation, not a formal warning. In no. 428292, the court accepted that preventive detection must cover transfers made for the benefit of a designated person even where neither the sender nor the beneficiary has an account with the institution performing the transfer. For a crypto operator, that supports a network view of compliance: the counterparty, beneficiary, ultimate controller, payment rail, wallet cluster and service provider may all be relevant.
The transaction ban under the 21st package may therefore apply even where the French customer is not personally listed. The prohibited fact can be the EU operator’s dealing with a listed third-country platform. The firm’s question is not simply “Is my customer on a list?” It is “Is the service provider named, controlled, used for circumvention, or reached through a transaction that the amended regulation prohibits?” That is a different screen and it requires a transaction-level decision.
It is also different from the governance rule concerning Russian ownership and board positions in French crypto businesses. A company may pass the ownership test and still fail the transaction test because it deals with a newly listed third-country platform. The opposite is also possible: a business may stop a transaction with a listed provider while having a separate governance problem involving a Russian controller. For the wider French framework on frozen assets, Treasury authorisations and release applications, the two files should be read together without being merged. Combining them into one screen creates false comfort and makes later litigation harder.
The difference from a United States sanctions programme is equally important. A French firm does not need an American nexus before the EU transaction ban becomes relevant. The controlling law is the EU regulation and decision, as implemented and supervised within the Member States. The firm may also face United States exposure in the same transaction, but the absence of an OFAC designation does not authorise conduct prohibited by EU law. A compliance memorandum should identify the legal source for each refusal rather than describe every restriction as “sanctions” without specifying the regime.
Finally, a transaction ban does not automatically prohibit every relationship with every Russian customer. The legal result depends on the list entry, the operative article, the service, the dates, the exemptions and the evidence of control or circumvention. Overblocking can damage a lawful customer and expose the firm to contractual claims; underblocking can expose the firm and its managers to regulatory and criminal consequences. The right answer is a documented decision tree, not a slogan.
II. What must a French crypto firm do now to avoid a sanctions breach?
A. How should screening, ownership and transaction controls be documented?
The first step is to freeze the firm’s own legal map before attempting to automate the answer. The compliance team should list every entity in the group, every French establishment, every branch outside France, every outsourced execution provider and every product through which crypto-assets, fiat currency or economic resources can move. It should then identify which entity is the contracting party, which entity holds the customer relationship, which entity controls the wallet or account, and which entity can actually stop the transfer. A policy that names only the French parent is incomplete if a foreign branch or service company can execute the same transaction.
The second step is counterparty identification. For each third-country crypto service provider, obtain the exact legal name, trading name, registration number, jurisdiction, regulatory licence, ownership chart, directors, controlling persons, wallet addresses, bank accounts and service description. Keep the source documents and the date on which they were checked. A platform’s website, brand or mobile application is not enough. Sanctions lists frequently use legal names, aliases and addresses that do not appear in marketing material. The control must be able to explain why two names refer to the same legal person or why they do not.
The third step is beneficial ownership and control. The 21st package is aimed at evasion through third-country routes; a listed name is not the only risk. The file should test direct and indirect ownership, voting arrangements, nominee directors, common controllers, common wallet infrastructure, unusual changes of corporate address, shared technology, and payment instructions that point to a different entity. This is not a demand for perfect intelligence. It is a demand for proportionate evidence showing what was checked, what remained uncertain and why the firm accepted, rejected or escalated the transaction.
Article L. 561-4-1 of the Code monétaire et financier requires a risk-based framework that takes account of products, services, transaction conditions, distribution channels, customers and the country or territory from which funds originate or to which they are sent. Its language supports a geographic and technological risk model rather than a flat list. The platform’s country, the customer’s country, the wallet’s exposure, the use of a mixer or bridge, the stablecoin issuer, the payment intermediary and the destination of the proceeds should be combined into a risk score with a human escalation path.
For a crypto firm, a useful transaction file should answer five questions before release. First, who is sending value and who ultimately receives it? Second, which platform, custodian, broker, bank or payment institution is involved at each leg? Third, what service is being supplied and what is the commercial purpose? Fourth, does any party appear on an EU list, fall within a transaction ban or create a control or circumvention concern? Fifth, what evidence supports the conclusion and who approved it?
The control should be capable of stopping a transfer before settlement. The Conseil d’État’s no. 428292 decision is a warning against post-event screening. The court upheld a serious view of a financial institution that lacked an a priori control over cash mandates. In a crypto environment, an a posteriori review of a blockchain transaction may preserve evidence, but it cannot necessarily undo a transfer, recover a token or prevent a platform from forwarding value.
The fourth step is the escalation protocol. A possible match should trigger a temporary hold, not an improvised rejection message that identifies a way around the control. The firm should preserve the order, wallet address, IP and device data where lawfully retained, KYC documents, screening result, list version, blockchain analysis, internal notes and communications. It should identify whether a report or notification must be made to the French Treasury or another competent authority. The client-facing message should be accurate and restrained: the firm can state that the transaction is under regulatory review without disclosing confidential detection methods or giving the customer a map of the control perimeter.
Article L. 562-12 is relevant to group investigations. It provides that banking or professional secrecy does not prevent information exchange between covered persons and State services when the information is needed to verify identities or monitor transactions involving frozen funds and economic resources. The official wording begins “Le secret bancaire ou professionnel ne fait pas obstacle”. A French group should therefore design a lawful information-sharing channel rather than allow secrecy arguments to block the sanctions investigation. The data-use purpose and access permissions should still be documented.
The fifth step is evidence retention and governance. The compliance committee should approve the list sources, screening frequency, materiality thresholds, model changes, false-positive process and emergency contact with the competent authority. Management should know which transactions were stopped because of an exact listing, which were stopped because of a control or circumvention concern, and which were released after additional evidence. The distinctions matter if the firm later challenges a decision, responds to an ACPR inspection or defends a contractual claim from a customer whose transfer was delayed.
Contracts should be updated as well. A French platform should reserve the right to suspend or terminate a service where performance would breach EU restrictive measures, require ownership and transaction information from intermediaries, prohibit subcontracting through an undisclosed affiliate, and require the counterparty to preserve records. The clause should not promise an absolute right to exit every Russia-linked relationship. It should describe the legal triggers, the information duty, the temporary hold mechanism and the procedure for a reassessment when a list entry is removed or an authority grants an authorisation.
The boundary between a regulatory hold and a commercial refusal must also be respected. If a bank or crypto provider blocks a customer because an automated tool produced a weak name match, the customer may need a reasoned review and an opportunity to provide identity documents. If the platform is expressly listed or the transaction is prohibited, the firm cannot release the value merely because the customer is unhappy. A strong file makes that distinction visible.
B. What remedy exists when a compliant transaction or account is blocked?
The remedy depends on the legal act that caused the block. A national French asset-freeze decision can be challenged before the administrative courts, sometimes with an urgent application where the statutory conditions are met. A directly applicable EU transaction ban may require an interpretation of the relevant regulation, an application to the competent national authority for an authorisation or derogation, and, where the listing or EU act is challenged, proceedings within the EU judicial system. A private contractual dispute with a bank or service provider is a further layer. The first procedural mistake is to file the wrong challenge against the wrong decision-maker.
The Conseil d’État’s decision of 16 May 2024, no. 492346, sets out the French litigation framework for an asset freeze and a request to release funds. The court examined the legal basis of the freeze, the information supporting it, the possibility of authorising funds needed for a person’s material needs or for preserving property, and the urgency required for interim relief. The decision is not a general licence to release a sanctioned transfer. It shows instead that the applicant must identify the precise legal basis, establish the need for the requested release and address the administration’s response.
For a corporate crypto operator, the evidence will be different from the evidence of an individual seeking living expenses. The firm may need to show the corporate chain, the customer identity, the exact transaction, the absence of control by a listed person, the source and destination of funds, the service agreement and the consequences of the block. If the request concerns fees, payroll, custody, security or winding down a relationship, the firm should explain why the requested action is compatible with the applicable regulation rather than describe it as a commercial convenience.
The Conseil d’État’s decision of 24 February 2026, no. 505079, illustrates the control question in an EU sanctions dispute involving frozen real estate. The court held that the administration could not treat companies that were not themselves listed as irrelevant when it assessed whether their property was controlled by a listed person. It required a real examination of control rather than an automatic assumption. That reasoning is valuable for a French company whose wallet, account or platform appears near a listed entity but whose own legal identity and control must be assessed separately.
The same decision also shows the limits of urgent relief. A company that says a freeze creates operating costs or threatens a contractual deadline must provide concrete evidence of the immediate harm. General financial inconvenience may not establish the urgency required for interim suspension. A litigation file should therefore include bank statements, payment deadlines, payroll evidence, custody obligations, tax liabilities, contractual default notices and a technical explanation of what cannot be done while the block remains in place.
Where the dispute concerns the legality of an EU listing or transaction measure, the applicant must preserve the procedural route for judicial review. The European Commission’s summary of the 21st package also announces legal protection for EU operators against abusive lawsuits used in retaliation for EU sanctions, including the possibility for EU firms to seek damages from non-Russian contractual parties and for EU courts to issue injunctions against the enforcement of unlawful Russian judgments. Those measures do not automatically award damages to every firm that has suffered a loss. They signal that a French company should analyse governing law, jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement before complying with a Russian judgment that appears designed to punish sanctions compliance.
That issue has a specifically French cross-border dimension. The French blocking statute, article 1 bis of Law no. 68-678 of 26 July 1968, prohibits a person from requesting, searching for or communicating economic, commercial, industrial, financial or technical information intended to establish evidence for foreign judicial or administrative proceedings, subject to treaties and applicable law. The provision is available in its official form on Légifrance. Article 3 of the same law provides the sanction for violating articles 1 and 1 bis; it is also reproduced on Légifrance. A French firm should not use the blocking statute as a reason to ignore an EU sanctions request, but it should not hand over sensitive evidence to a foreign claimant without analysing the French rules on the communication of documents.
The French courts have also recognised that good-faith implementation matters. Article L. 562-13 of the Code monétaire et financier states that the State is responsible for the harmful consequences of good-faith implementation of freezes and prohibitions by the persons covered by article L. 562-4. That protection is not a blanket immunity for negligence, bad faith or a refusal unrelated to a legal measure. It is a reason to maintain a documented, proportionate and auditable process. A firm that can show the list checked, the facts considered, the escalation followed and the reason for the decision is in a stronger position than a firm that offers only an automated screenshot.
There is a corresponding downside for deliberate or reckless non-compliance. Article L. 574-3 of the Code monétaire et financier provides that evading the obligations arising from an asset freeze or obstructing implementation is punished by the penalties referred to in article 459 of the Customs Code. The text covers the persons within article L. 562-4, their managers and employees, and persons subject to the freeze or prohibition. It is reproduced in the official Légifrance version of article L. 574-3. A compliance failure is therefore not merely a policy breach that can be corrected by changing an internal spreadsheet.
The Constitutional Council’s decision no. 2015-524 QPC of 2 March 2016, concerning administrative asset freezes, is another useful safeguard against overstatement. The Council accepted the preventive purpose of the regime but rejected an excessively broad basis for freezing property merely because a person might, by virtue of functions, be likely to commit a prohibited act. The decision illustrates a general point for current disputes: the administration and the firm must identify the legal criteria actually satisfied. A vague reference to “Russia risk” is not a substitute for the list entry, control analysis or prohibited transaction identified in the file.
A firm challenging a false positive should therefore request the minimum information needed to make the review meaningful: the affected account or wallet, the date and type of block, the legal regime invoked, the identity data that produced the match, the information required to clear it, and whether the block is temporary or final. It should submit a clean corporate chart, identity documents, proof of control, source-of-funds material, wallet ownership evidence, commercial contracts and a chronology. If confidential intelligence cannot be disclosed, the firm should still ask the authority or institution to explain the procedural route for a review.
Clients should avoid self-help. Moving funds through a friend, a newly formed entity, an offshore wallet or a decentralised application may create evidence of circumvention rather than solve the false positive. The safest response is a controlled hold, a written request for clarification, and a legal assessment of any available derogation. Where the relationship has to end, the firm should document how it will return or preserve value without making funds available to a designated person and without creating a new prohibited transaction.
Conclusion
The 21st EU Russia sanctions package changes the compliance question for crypto businesses because the target is no longer only the Russian platform or the listed person. The EU is also targeting the third-country infrastructure used to preserve access to crypto services and to move value around direct restrictions. The package lists additional third-country platforms, introduces a route toward a full third-country crypto-service ban and operates alongside existing asset freezes, anti-circumvention duties and the separate 25 August governance rule.
For a French operator, the immediate checklist is concrete: identify every entity and branch, map every service and transaction leg, screen legal identity and control, test the provider against the current EU instruments, stop the transaction before settlement when a prohibition is credible, preserve the evidence, notify or seek authorisation through the correct channel, and keep the contractual and litigation route open. Articles L. 562-4, L. 562-4-1, L. 562-5 and L. 562-6 of the Code monétaire et financier make the French perimeter deliberately cross-border. The answer is not to block every customer connected to Russia and not to assume that a non-EU platform is outside the rule. The answer is a transaction-specific decision that can be defended before a regulator, a bank, a court and the client.
Because the package contains staged dates and list-based restrictions, a control that was adequate in July may be inadequate after the August implementation steps. Firms should re-run the screening of open accounts, counterparties, wallets, service providers and governance files, retain the version of the legal sources used, and escalate any mismatch between the commercial description of the service and the legal identity of the platform.