KOHEN AVOCATS FIRM · PARIS 16
US Sanctions on the ICC President: What France’s Blocking Shield Means for You

Hassan KOHEN acts in urgent matters, from the police station to the assize court. Initial strategic analysis: €80 incl. VAT, personal reply within 24 hours.

100% confidential · Legal professional privilege · No obligation

Article generated by artificial intelligence, through a process designed and supervised by the firm

Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

Paris Bar Police custody, investigation, assize court CNB listing avocat.fr
Maître Hassan KOHEN, avocat au Barreau de Paris
Hassan KOHEN
Attorney at the Paris Bar

US Sanctions on the ICC President: What France’s Blocking Shield Means for You

Speak to a lawyer 06 89 11 34 45

On 19 August 2026, the International Criminal Court announced that the President of the Court herself had been placed under American sanctions. Judge Tomoko Akane of Japan, elected President of the ICC, and Abdoulaye Seye of Senegal, Senior Trial Lawyer at the Office of the Prosecutor, were designated by the United States administration, freezing any assets within United States jurisdiction and cutting them off from large parts of the international financial system. France reacted the same day: Paris condemned the designations, recalled that 125 States are Parties to the Rome Statute, and pledged to work with its European partners so the Court can keep working independently. For anyone living, banking, or doing business in France, the episode raises concrete questions. Can an American sanction stop a French bank from processing a transfer linked to the ICC? Must a company established in Paris refuse a contract because Washington listed the other party? What protection does European law actually offer? This analysis sets out what happened in August 2026, the legal machinery behind the American measures, and the French and European shields that apply on French soil, with the exact texts and the practical steps to take.

I. Can the United States sanction ICC judges? The August 2026 designations against President Akane and Prosecutor Seye

A. Who was sanctioned on 18-19 August 2026 and what the measures do

On 18 August 2026, the United States Treasury designated two new officials of the International Criminal Court, and the Court made the news public the following day. In its statement of 19 August 2026, the Court said it deplored the new American sanctions designations against its President, Judge Tomoko Akane of Japan, and against Abdoulaye Seye of Senegal, Senior Trial Lawyer at the Office of the Prosecutor. Targeting the sitting President of an international court is without precedent in the history of the Rome Statute system. Judge Akane is not a peripheral figure: she presides over the institution, represents it vis-a-vis States, and chairs the Presidency that rules on the allocation of situations and the enforcement of sentences. Mr Seye, as Senior Trial Lawyer, conducts prosecutions in the courtroom. Sanctioning both the presidency and the prosecution function at once strikes at the two ends of the judicial process.

The Court immediately quantified the scale of the campaign: the Court stated that nine of its eighteen judges, both Deputy Prosecutors, the former Prosecutor, and one staff member were then under American sanctions (ICC statement of 19 August 2026) Half the bench is now listed. The United Nations experts who examined the file a few days later gave a slightly higher consolidated figure, noting that United Nations experts gave a consolidated figure of eleven current or former ICC judges and staff sanctioned under Executive Order 14203 (OHCHR press release of 28 August 2026) The difference between the two counts comes from former officials included in the United Nations tally, but the message is identical: the American programme no longer targets isolated individuals, it covers the leadership of the Court as such. The Presidency of the Assembly of States Parties, the political body that oversees the Court on behalf of its members, described the new measures as regrettable attempts to hamper the Court and its staff in their mandated work of investigating and trying the gravest crimes (ASP Presidency statement of 19 August 2026)

Concretely, designation under the American regime blocks any property of the listed person that is within United States jurisdiction or that passes through the United States financial system, prohibits American persons from dealing with them, and exposes non-American actors to so-called secondary effects: a bank in Paris, London, or Dakar that processes a dollar payment for a listed person risks losing its own access to the American market. Entry into the United States is barred. For judges who travel to New York for the annual Assembly of States Parties, for counsel who plead in The Hague, and for witnesses and victims’ representatives who cooperate with the Office of the Prosecutor, the practical consequences extend well beyond frozen accounts. The American Society of International Law summarised the mechanism in its bulletin of 1 September 2026: assets within United States jurisdiction or touching its financial system are frozen, access to many financial services is cut off, and entry to the United States is barred. Victims are the first collateral casualties. As the Court itself warned, threats of this kind affect the ability of victims to seek justice, since they turn to the Court when all other avenues have been exhausted.

The stated American grievance is jurisdictional. Washington alleges that the Court has overstepped its mandate by investigating and prosecuting nationals of States that never joined the Rome Statute. The Court answers with its mandate: the Court called the sanctions a flagrant attack on the independence of an impartial judicial institution acting under the mandate given by its States Parties across regions (ICC statement of 19 August 2026) And it refuses to stop: the Court pledged to keep discharging its mandate independently and impartially, in full accordance with the Rome Statute and in the interests of victims (ICC statement of 19 August 2026) Two readings of international law now face each other, and France, as a State Party that hosts no ICC organ but cooperates with all of them, is directly concerned by the collision.

B. The wider campaign behind the listings: Executive Order 14203, the July 2026 escalation, and the chilling effect on banks and NGOs

The August designations did not come out of nowhere. They are the latest step of a sanctions programme created in February 2025, when the American President signed Executive Order 14203, establishing a standing legal basis to list ICC officials, and thereby anyone materially supporting the Court’s work. On 13 July 2026, according to the International Federation for Human Rights, the administration announced a coordinated whole-of-government campaign to dismantle the Court, combining pressure on States Parties to withdraw from the Rome Statute, expanded sanctions against the institution and organisations that cooperate with it, and additional listings of officials. The Federation, headquartered in Paris, called it the most serious attack to date on the world’s only permanent international criminal court, and noted that the sanctions already imposed against judges, prosecutors, and cooperating organisations prove that independent investigations have real consequences.

The campaign has deliberately moved beyond the Court’s staff. Palestinian human rights organisations supporting victims before the Court have been listed, and in a parallel development the United States sanctioned Francesca Albanese, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territory occupied since 1967, in response to her United Nations work, a step the United Nations experts condemned in the same breath as the ICC listings. The logic is one of encirclement: list the judges, list the prosecutors, list the organisations that bring evidence and the victims who testify, until cooperation with the Court looks too dangerous for banks, insurers, cloud providers, travel agencies, and law firms. Over the past eighteen months, sanctions have already disrupted banking services and reduced funding for human rights organisations, creating what practitioners call a chilling effect that extends far beyond the persons formally designated. A French bank that closes the account of an NGO merely because the NGO is active in ICC-related litigation, although no European text requires it, engages in over-compliance: it applies an American prohibition that European law does not recognise and may itself violate.

France’s official response came within hours. On 19 August 2026 in Paris, the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs announced that France had learned of the new American sanctions against the ICC President and a member of the Office of the Prosecutor, adding to those already imposed on eleven judges of the institution The sentence framing the whole French position is its condemnation of all threats and coercive measures against the Court, its staff, and the civil society organisations supporting it (French Foreign Ministry statement, Paris, 19 August 2026) It characterised the measures as an attack on the Court and on all 125 States Parties to the Rome Statute, contrary to the principle of judicial independence (French Foreign Ministry statement, Paris, 19 August 2026) Paris also recalled that the Minister had reaffirmed France’s support directly to the Court’s President in September 2025 and to the Deputy Prosecutor in July 2026, and that France is working actively with its European partners and the States Parties to keep the Court able to fulfil its mission independently and impartially, delivering justice to victims of the most serious crimes (French Foreign Ministry statement, Paris, 19 August 2026) For practitioners, that final phrase matters: it is the political announcement of European legal countermeasures, first among them the EU Blocking Statute that the United Nations experts expressly asked Brussels to activate.

II. What French and EU law do when a foreign sanction hits an international court: cooperation duties and the blocking shield in France

A. Does France have to cooperate with the ICC despite US sanctions? The Code of Criminal Procedure and the French courts

France is not a spectator of the Rome Statute system; it is one of its most integrated members. The Code of Criminal Procedure devotes an entire title to cooperation with the International Criminal Court, and its opening article states the principle without ambiguity: “Pour l’application du statut de la Cour pénale internationale signé le 18 juillet 1998, la France participe à la répression des infractions et coopère avec cette juridiction dans les conditions fixées par le présent titre.” Every subsequent provision organises that cooperation in practice. Requests for assistance from the Court are channelled to the French authorities competent under article 87 of the Statute: “Les demandes d’entraide émanant de la Cour pénale internationale sont adressées aux autorités compétentes en vertu de l’article 87 du statut en original ou en copie certifiée conforme accompagnées de toutes pièces justificatives. Ces documents sont transmis au procureur de la République antiterroriste qui leur donne toutes suites utiles.” Since the 2019 reform of the national prosecution service, the addressee is the Anti-Terrorism Prosecutor of Paris, who acts as the national gateway for ICC requests, including in emergencies where documents may be sent directly by any means.

The cooperation extends to coercive measures on French territory. Protective measures ordered by the Court, such as the freezing of assets for future reparations, are executed in France at the request of the ICC: “L’exécution sur le territoire français des mesures conservatoires mentionnées au k du paragraphe 1 de l’article 93 du statut est ordonnée, aux frais avancés du Trésor et selon les modalités prévues par le présent code, par le procureur de la République antiterroriste.” The statute caps these measures at two years renewable, which gives French counsel a precise lever: any ICC-related freeze executed in France must be re-examined at least every two years, and the Prosecutor must transmit any enforcement difficulty back to the Court. Symmetrically, France enforces the financial end of ICC judgments: “Lorsque la Cour pénale internationale en fait la demande, l’exécution des peines d’amende et de confiscation ou des décisions concernant les réparations prononcées par celle-ci est autorisée par le tribunal correctionnel de Paris saisi, à cette fin, par le procureur de la République.” The Paris criminal court is bound by the ICC decision, including on third-party rights, and may order any measure to recover the value of the proceeds. A foreign sanction, American or otherwise, has no place in this chain: the Prosecutor and the Paris court apply the Statute and the Code, not Executive Order 14203.

Beyond cooperation with The Hague, French courts can prosecute the underlying crimes themselves. The general rule of extraterritorial jurisdiction provides that “Les auteurs ou complices d’infractions commises hors du territoire de la République peuvent être poursuivis et jugés par les juridictions françaises soit lorsque, conformément aux dispositions du livre Ier du code pénal ou d’un autre texte législatif, la loi française est applicable, soit lorsqu’une convention internationale ou un acte pris en application du traité instituant les Communautés européennes donne compétence aux juridictions françaises pour connaître de l’infraction.” For the core international crimes, a dedicated provision goes further: outside the ICC-cooperation framework, “peut être poursuivie et jugée par les juridictions françaises toute personne soupçonnée d’avoir commis à l’étranger l’une des infractions suivantes : 1° Le crime de génocide défini au chapitre Ier du sous-titre Ier du titre Ier du livre II du code pénal ; 2° Les autres crimes contre l’humanité définis au chapitre II du même sous-titre Ier ; 3° Les crimes et les délits de guerre définis aux articles” that follow in the Code. Genocide itself is defined in French law as “le fait, en exécution d’un plan concerté tendant à la destruction totale ou partielle d’un groupe national, ethnique, racial ou religieux, ou d’un groupe déterminé à partir de tout autre critère arbitraire, de commettre ou de faire commettre, à l’encontre de membres de ce groupe, l’un des actes suivants : – atteinte volontaire à la vie ; – atteinte grave à l’intégrité physique ou psychique”, followed by the other listed acts. The French practitioner therefore works on two tracks that American sanctions cannot interrupt: France must assist the ICC under its own Code, and France may prosecute genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes before its own courts when the statutory conditions are met.

Two practical consequences follow for persons in France. First, no French authority may refuse ICC cooperation on the ground that the ICC official handling the file is under American sanctions; the Code gives no such exception, and the Ministry’s 19 August statement confirms the opposite policy. Second, counsel assisting victims, witnesses, or NGOs cooperating with the Court should document everything: requests transmitted to the Anti-Terrorism Prosecutor, acknowledgements of receipt, and any refusal or delay by a bank or service provider. That paper trail is the raw material for the second shield, the European one, because it proves the concrete interference of the foreign sanction with activity protected in France.

B. Can a French bank or company refuse ICC-related business because of US sanctions? The EU Blocking Statute, over-compliance, and remedies in Paris

The European Union has possessed, since 1996, a legal instrument designed exactly for this type of conflict: Council Regulation (EC) No 2271/96, known as the Blocking Statute, which shields European operators against the extraterritorial reach of the foreign sanctions laws listed in its annex wherever they affect trade and capital movements between the Union and third countries. The Court of Justice interprets this shield strictly, as its Bank Melli judgment of 21 December 2021 (case C-124/20) demonstrates. The United Nations experts explicitly demanded its use in the ICC context, since they urged the European Union to activate the Blocking Statute against third-country sanctions that breach international law, warning States to make sure businesses under their jurisdiction do not over-comply with unilateral sanctions

The core prohibition is drafted in absolute terms: no EU operator may comply, directly or through a subsidiary or intermediary, actively or by deliberate omission, with any prohibition deriving from a listed foreign sanctions law, including requests from foreign courts. The personal scope covers any natural person resident in the Union, any company incorporated in a Member State, and any business conducted in whole or in part within the Union: in practice, every bank, insurer, employer, university, cloud host, and payment processor operating in France. The mirror rule neutralises foreign judgments: no court judgment or administrative decision from outside the Union that gives effect to such a foreign sanctions law can be recognised or enforced within the Union. An American court order penalising a French company for dealing with a sanctioned ICC official is therefore unenforceable in France as a matter of European law. The Regulation adds a clawback right allowing European operators to recover damages caused by the foreign law, and an authorisation mechanism by which the Commission may exceptionally permit compliance where non-compliance would seriously damage the operator’s interests: the procedure runs through Brussels, not through Washington.

The Court of Justice has already given teeth to this scheme. In Bank Melli (C-124/20), decided 21 December 2021, the Court held that the prohibition on complying with listed foreign sanctions applies even without a prior administrative order, that a contract terminated solely to comply with American sanctions can be set aside by a national court, and that the burden of proving a different motive falls on the party that broke the contract. For a French litigator, the translation is direct: if a bank closes an NGO account, if an insurer cancels a policy, or if a venue refuses to host a victims’ conference, and the only plausible explanation is fear of American ICC sanctions, the affected party can seize the Paris courts, demand reinstatement or damages, and force the counterparty to demonstrate an independent justification. Documentary evidence of the kind described above, internal emails mentioning OFAC, compliance memos citing Executive Order 14203, sudden termination letters dated days after a designation, becomes decisive.

French domestic law reinforces the shield on the financial side. The Monetary and Financial Code allows the Ministers of the Economy and of the Interior to freeze funds only on French authority and for defined purposes, notably terrorism financing: “Le ministre chargé de l’économie et le ministre de l’intérieur peuvent décider, conjointement, pour une durée de six mois, renouvelable, le gel des fonds et ressources économiques : 1° Qui appartiennent à, sont possédés, détenus ou contrôlés par des personnes physiques ou morales, ou toute autre entité qui commettent, tentent de commettre, facilitent ou financent des actes de terrorisme, y incitent ou y participent”, with the symmetrical extension to entities they control. No French minister has frozen the assets of ICC judges, and no French legal basis would allow a private bank to do so on American instructions. A freeze applied in France at the behest of a foreign sanction, outside the European Union’s own restrictive-measures regulations and outside the French ministerial procedure, is an act without legal foundation that the account holder can challenge before the French courts and the banking mediator, while reporting the incident to the Treasury’s sanctions unit and, under the Blocking Statute, to the European Commission within thirty days of learning of the interference.

The operational advice that follows from this architecture is straightforward. Companies and associations in France should adapt their compliance manuals so that American ICC listings are flagged as non-applicable in the Union absent a matching European measure, train front-line teams to distinguish European Union restrictive measures from foreign designations, and never cite an American listing as the reason for a refusal in writing without clearance from counsel. Individuals targeted or affected, counsel, witnesses, NGO staff, should keep exhaustive records, request written reasons for every refusal of service, and consult a lawyer before diverting payments through opaque intermediaries, since clumsy circumvention can create money-laundering exposure that the sanctions themselves never created. And where the interference persists, the remedies run through Paris and Luxembourg: French civil courts for contract and liability, the Commission’s authorisation and reporting channels under the Blocking Statute, and ultimately the Court of Justice, whose Bank Melli case law already shows which way the wind blows. The United Nations experts insist that sanctions on ICC judicial staff must not stand (OHCHR, 28 August 2026), and in France the legal tools to give effect to that call already exist.

Conclusion

The August 2026 American designations against President Akane and Trial Lawyer Seye mark a threshold: for the first time, the presidency of an international criminal court sits on a sanctions list, alongside half its bench and the leadership of its prosecution. The campaign behind the listings, rooted in Executive Order 14203 and escalated in July 2026, aims beyond the individuals to everyone who makes international justice work, from victims’ associations to the banks that hold their accounts. France has answered at both levels that matter. Diplomatically, Paris condemned the measures as an attack on all 125 States Parties and on judicial independence, and pledged to act with its European partners so the Court continues its mission. Legally, the French Code of Criminal Procedure commands cooperation with the Court through the Paris Anti-Terrorism Prosecutor and the Paris criminal court, while the EU Blocking Statute forbids operators in France from obeying the foreign prohibition and deprives foreign judgments giving it effect of any enforceability. The remaining question is practical rather than theoretical: whether banks, insurers, and service providers in France will apply the European shield or drift into over-compliance. The United Nations experts have named the duty, the Court of Justice has drawn the remedy, and French courts are competent to enforce both. Victims, witnesses, counsel, and organisations affected by an ICC-related refusal of service in France should have the incident assessed quickly, preserve the evidence of the foreign motive, and use the reporting and judicial channels that French and European law already place at their disposal.

📄 Official circular