On 15 and 16 October 2026, the twenty-seven leaders of the European Union meet in Brussels for a European Council summit whose agenda includes continued support for Ukraine. Ten days before that summit, the pressure to touch the untouchable has rarely been stronger: 122 members of the European Parliament have signed a letter urging EU leaders to use the roughly 210 billion euros in frozen Russian assets to fund Ukraine, and four member states — Sweden, the Netherlands, Poland and Spain — already renewed the same call in August, arguing that the time has come to make further use of Russia’s immobilised assets for Ukraine’s benefit. Ukraine’s Defence Ministry faces a reported 23.1 billion euro funding gap for personnel, social support and weapons purchases. Against this push stand two heavyweights: Belgium, where some 185 billion euros of the assets sit with the central securities depository Euroclear, warns of legal retaliation and lawsuits from Moscow, and the European Central Bank warns that seizing sovereign reserves could weaken confidence in the euro. Meanwhile Moscow has moved first in the courts: the Russian Central Bank sued the European Union before the General Court in Luxembourg on 27 February 2026 over the indefinite freeze, and Russian courts in Moscow ordered Euroclear to pay damages to the Russian Central Bank in May 2026, rejecting Euroclear’s appeal in July. Euroclear itself filed suit in Brussels in June. For an international reader — a holder of frozen funds, a bank compliance officer in Paris, counsel for a listed entity, or simply anyone trying to understand what the Brussels summit can lawfully decide — this analysis reconstructs the money trail from official EU records, explains the legal shields that protect sovereign assets, and sets out what France, with its asset-freeze machinery and its strict law of state immunity, would do with a file like this.
I. Can the EU take Russia’s 210 billion euros and hand them to Ukraine at the October summit?
A. Where the money sits, who wants to move it, and what Brussels has already decided
Start with the figures, because they frame everything. Since February 2022, the European Union and its member states have provided 224.5 billion euros in aid to Ukraine, ranging from humanitarian assistance to weapons and defence equipment. The frozen Russian assets held in Europe amount to roughly 210 billion euros, of which about 185 billion sits in Belgium in the accounts of Euroclear, the Brussels-based international central securities depository. Using those assets in full would therefore nearly double the total aid delivered so far, which explains both the political temptation and the intensity of the current debate ahead of the 15 and 16 October summit.
The political push is documented and recent. In August 2026, Sweden, the Netherlands, Poland and Spain signed a joint letter stating that Ukraine needs more financial support in both the short and the long term and that the moment had come to revisit how Russia’s immobilised assets could be further used for Ukraine’s benefit. In September, 122 members of the European Parliament signed a letter to EU leaders calling for renewed discussion, suggesting that the assets be transferred into a new EU instrument that would assume the legal obligations towards Russia’s central bank — in other words, a structure in which the Union, rather than the custodian, would face Moscow’s claims. That suggestion matters because it shows that even the supporters of seizure take the legal risk seriously: somebody must answer to the owner on the day the freeze ends.
Other voices joined in September. Estonia’s Defence Minister argued that the Union should use the frozen assets to support Ukraine, Ireland’s Foreign Minister said the option should be kept on the table, and Portugal backed using the assets while saying it understands Belgium’s concerns. Finland, Latvia and Lithuania had already supported the call in December 2025. The other side is equally explicit. Belgium continues to oppose using the assets, warning of lawsuits and of the financial burden of bearing the risk alone, and the European Central Bank has warned that outright confiscation could damage the euro’s standing as a reserve currency. These are not abstract fears: they are priced into every draft discussed in Brussels.
What Brussels has already done, short of seizure, is substantial and worth stating precisely, because confusion between freezing, skimming profits and confiscating is widespread. In December 2025, EU leaders agreed a 90 billion euro loan to Ukraine and, earlier that month, used an emergency treaty procedure to freeze the Russian assets indefinitely, removing the six-month renewal cycle that any single member state could previously veto. The 90 billion loan was then finalised by the Council on 23 April 2026: it is financed through EU borrowing on the capital markets, backed by the EU budget headroom, and split indicatively into 30 billion euros of macroeconomic support and 60 billion for Ukraine’s defence industrial capacity, including procurement. Under the agreed terms, Ukraine repays the loan only once it receives reparations from Russia, and the Union reserves the right to use the immobilised assets to repay itself. An earlier attempt, in October 2025, to build a reparations loan directly on the frozen assets never materialised after months of negotiation. The October 2026 summit therefore inherits a precise architecture — indefinite freeze, Union borrowing against the prospect of reparations, conditional disbursement — and the open question is whether the leaders go one step further and touch the principal itself.
Three legal families collide on that question, and each must be kept distinct. The first is European Union sanctions law: the freeze rests on EU regulations that are directly applicable in every member state, and any move from freezing to confiscating would require a new legal basis capable of surviving review by the EU courts, where the Russian Central Bank’s action filed on 27 February 2026 is already pending. The second is the international law of state immunity: central-bank reserves are the most protected category of sovereign property in the world, and seizing them would set a precedent for the treatment of foreign sovereign assets in wartime that many capitals, well beyond Moscow, are watching with alarm. The third is the domestic law of each state where assets sit — in France, a complete machinery of administrative freezes, criminal penalties and judicial control that determines what a holder, a bank or a listed person can concretely do in Paris. The summit can decide policy; only law determines what survives the first courtroom.
B. Why sovereign assets are the hardest property in the world to seize: immunity, central banks, and the lawsuits already running
The central legal obstacle to confiscation has a name: immunity from execution enjoyed by foreign states. In France, it is not a vague principle but a codified procedure. The Code of Civil Enforcement Procedures provides that enforcement or protective measures against property belonging to a foreign state require the prior authorisation of a judge, by order issued on petition: Des mesures conservatoires ou des mesures d’exécution forcée ne peuvent être mises en œuvre sur un bien appartenant à un Etat étranger que sur autorisation préalable du juge par ordonnance rendue sur requête. Even with that authorisation, the judge may only allow the measure if one of three conditions is met: the state has expressly consented, the state has earmarked the property for the claim at issue, or a judgment or arbitral award has been rendered against the state and the property is specifically used or intended for other than non-commercial public purposes, with a link to the entity proceeded against: Des mesures conservatoires ou des mesures d’exécution forcée visant un bien appartenant à un Etat étranger ne peuvent être autorisées par le juge que si l’une des conditions suivantes est remplie : 1° L’Etat concerné a expressément consenti à l’application d’une telle mesure. Central-bank reserves sit behind an even higher wall: property used for diplomatic missions, military assets, cultural heritage, archives and state fiscal claims benefit from reinforced protection that only an express and special waiver can lift, under the article L. 111-1-3 of the same code as interpreted by the courts.
Two recent decisions of the First Civil Chamber of the Cour de cassation show how strictly French judges apply this shield, and both concerned the seizure of Congolese state property at the request of the creditor Commisimpex — the closest French case law to a frozen-sovereign-assets file. On 10 January 2018, on appeal No. 16-22.494, the Court reviewed a Paris Court of Appeal decision that had validated seizures on the ground that customary international law required no more than an express waiver and that a 1993 letter of undertaking amounted to a general waiver covering all property, diplomatic or not. The Cour de cassation annulled the decision in all its provisions, holding the case under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 18 April 1961, customary rules of state immunity from execution, and articles L. 111-1-2 and L. 111-1-3 of the enforcement code: Vu les articles 22 et 25 de la Convention de Vienne sur les relations diplomatiques du 18 avril 1961 et les règles du droit international coutumier relatives à l’immunité d’exécution des Etats, ensemble les articles L. 111-1-2 et L. 111-1-3 du code des procédures civiles d’exécution, and it quashed without remand: ANNULE, en toutes ses dispositions, l’arrêt rendu le 30 juin 2016, entre les parties, par la cour d’appel de Paris ; DIT n’y avoir lieu à renvoi. A general letter of undertaking, in other words, does not open the door to every category of state property.
Six years later, on 13 March 2024 in appeal No. 21-17.599, the same chamber refined the doctrine on the seized Falcon aircraft of the Republic of Congo and rejected the state’s appeal: PAR CES MOTIFS, la Cour : REJETTE le pourvoi. The holding draws the exact line that matters for Russian reserves: Selon les principes du droit international coutumier reflétés par la Convention des Nations Unies du 2 décembre 2004 sur les immunités des Etats et de leurs biens, la renonciation expresse à l’immunité d’exécution suffit pour que les biens d’un Etat, quels qu’ils soient, puissent faire l’objet d’une mesure d’exécution, sans que soit en outre requise une renonciation spéciale — but diplomatic property is carved out and strictly construed: doivent être interprétées strictement les dispositions de l’article L. 111-1-3 du code des procédures civiles d’exécution, selon lesquelles les biens, y compris les comptes bancaires, utilisés ou destinés à être utilisés dans l’exercice des fonctions de la mission diplomatique des Etats étrangers ou de leurs postes consulaires, de leurs missions spéciales ou de leurs missions auprès des organisations internationales ne peuvent faire l’objet de mesures conservatoires ou de mesures d’exécution forcée qu’en cas de renonciation expresse et spéciale des Etats concernés. Transposed to central-bank reserves — the paradigmatic sovereign asset held for public monetary purposes — the lesson is stark: no seizure without an express waiver, and for the most protected categories, an express and special one. Russia has consented to nothing.
This is the context in which the running lawsuits must be read. The Russian Central Bank’s action before the General Court in Luxembourg challenges the indefinite freeze itself; if the freeze were unlawful, everything built on it would tremble, which is why the December 2025 shift to an indefinite immobilisation was paired with the 90 billion loan structure that keeps the principal formally intact. In Moscow, courts ordered Euroclear to compensate the Russian Central Bank in May 2026 and rejected Euroclear’s appeal in July, while Euroclear filed its own action in Brussels in June — a mirror litigation in which each side seeks a judgment it can brandish, knowing that enforcement across the jurisdictional divide is, as observers note, deeply uncertain. Russian judgments do not enforce themselves in Paris, and European freezes do not enforce themselves in Moscow. Between the two stands the oldest question of private international law: which judge’s order crosses the border, and on what conditions. That question leads directly to France.
II. What would France do with a frozen-assets file: freeze, challenge, or enforce?
A. How France freezes assets in Paris and how a listed person fights back from France
European sanctions do not apply themselves: in each member state, a domestic machinery gives them teeth, and France’s is among the most complete. The Monetary and Financial Code defines the very object of a freeze in the broadest terms: Pour l’application du présent chapitre, on entend par : 1° Acte de terrorisme, and the definition of funds covers financial assets and economic benefits of every kind — cash, deposits, savings products, insurance contracts, receivables, financial instruments and their foreign equivalents, interest and dividends. The operational lever is interministerial: Le ministre chargé de l’économie et le ministre de l’intérieur peuvent décider, conjointement, pour une durée de six mois, renouvelable, le gel des fonds et ressources économiques : 1° Qui appartiennent à, sont possédés, détenus ou contrôlés par des personnes physiques ou morales, ou toute autre entité qui commettent, tentent de commettre, facilitent ou financent des actes de terrorisme, y incitent ou y participent. In practice, the national register of frozen assets is maintained by the Directorate General of the Treasury, banks and insurers screen their books against European and national lists, and any transaction involving frozen funds without authorisation exposes the holder and the intermediary to severe criminal and administrative penalties. A Paris bank that releases frozen money on its own initiative does not commit a technical breach; it commits an offence.
The hierarchy of norms decides who can undo what. European Union freezing regulations apply directly in France, and the Monetary and Financial Code turns every person on national territory into their enforcer: Sont tenus d’appliquer sans délai les mesures de gel et les interdictions de mise à disposition ou d’utilisation prévues au présent chapitre et aux articles L. 712-4 et L. 712-10 et d’en informer immédiatement le ministre chargé de l’économie : 1° Toute personne physique, ressortissante nationale ou ressortissante étrangère se trouvant sur le territoire national. A European freeze therefore cannot be set aside by a domestic court on grounds of national law alone. But direct applicability is not immunity from review: listings of named persons and entities can be challenged before the General Court of the European Union in Luxembourg within strict time limits, on grounds including manifest error of assessment, breach of the rights of the defence, failure to state reasons, and disproportionality. France’s own courts control the national implementing measures — the scope of a freeze, refusal of an authorisation to release funds for basic needs or legal fees, and criminal prosecutions for circumvention — while the validity of the European listing itself belongs to Luxembourg. Counsel who confuses the two fora loses twice: the wrong court declares itself without jurisdiction, and the time limit in the right court expires.
For a person or company frozen in France, the practical sequence is therefore threefold. First, map exactly what is frozen and under which instrument: a European regulation, a national designation, or both, because the remedy follows the source. Second, use the administrative path without delay: applications for release authorisations for essential expenditure, humanitarian needs or legal representation, documented euro by euro, since judges on both levels expect the applicant to have exhausted what the administration could grant. Third, file the annulment action in Luxembourg against the listing, supported by evidence that the grounds — control by a designated person, material support, circumvention — are factually wrong or legally insufficient, and seek interim relief where the listing threatens the survival of a business. This is precisely the litigation path examined in our analysis of the European Union’s delisting of sanctioned businessmen and how to challenge a listing or a frozen account from France: delistings happen, but they are won on files, not on press releases. The October summit changes nothing to these deadlines: whatever the leaders announce, existing listings remain in force until a court annuls them or the Council itself lifts them.
One warning belongs here for holders and intermediaries in France. A freeze is conservatory, not confiscatory: the funds still belong to their owner, the owner simply cannot move them. Any structure designed to let the economic benefit of frozen assets slip to the owner — opaque trusts, back-to-back loans, sudden changes of beneficial ownership, payments routed through non-cooperative jurisdictions — exposes its architects to prosecution for circumvention of restrictive measures, money laundering and, where the amounts finance a war effort, far graver charges. The compliance reflex must therefore be symmetrical: banks must freeze broadly and release only on written authorisation, while listed persons must challenge lawfully rather than engineer around the freeze. Both sides need the same thing — a readable, dated, reasoned paper trail — because both sides will one day have to show it to a judge.
B. Could a Moscow court order against Euroclear ever be enforced by a French judge?
The mirror question — what happens in France if the holder of a Russian judgment arrives in Paris seeking enforcement — is governed by the classic regime for foreign decisions. The Code of Civil Procedure states the principle in one sentence: Les jugements rendus par les tribunaux étrangers et les actes reçus par les officiers étrangers sont exécutoires sur le territoire de la République de la manière et dans les cas prévus par la loi. In plain terms, a foreign judgment has no executory force in France until a French court grants exequatur, verifying the international jurisdiction of the foreign court, the regularity of the procedure, the absence of fraud, and above all compatibility with French international public policy. To this general filter, the state-immunity rules add a special one: even an exequatur judgment against a foreign state cannot be enforced against sovereign property without the prior judicial authorisation and the substantive conditions described above. And where the targeted property consists of central-bank reserves held for sovereign monetary purposes, the reinforced protection applies.
Applied to the Moscow decisions ordering Euroclear to pay damages to the Russian Central Bank, the obstacles in Paris would therefore stack four high. First, exequatur itself: the French judge would examine whether the Moscow court had international jurisdiction over a Brussels custodian for assets immobilised under European law, and whether the proceedings respected due process — questions on which the political context of retaliatory litigation weighs heavily in the public-policy assessment. Second, the nature of the debtor’s property: the funds are frozen under European regulations directly applicable in France, and no French enforcement judge can authorise a measure that would order a custodian to violate a European freeze binding in France; Union law primacy, flowing from the constitutional rule recalled above, closes that door. Third, state immunity: to the extent enforcement would touch property of the Russian Federation or its central bank held for public purposes, the express-waiver regime and the strict construction of exceptions confirmed by the Cour de cassation in 2018 and 2024 would apply in full. Fourth, reciprocity of non-enforcement is already the factual norm: just as European freezes do not execute themselves in Moscow, Moscow compensation orders do not execute themselves in Paris.
None of this means the litigation is theatre. Mirror judgments have real uses short of enforcement: they anchor diplomatic narratives, they supply arguments in the Luxembourg proceedings over the freeze itself, they complicate settlement discussions, and they create contingent liabilities that custodians must provision and disclose. For counsel advising a French holder, bank or company caught between the two orders — a European freeze on one side, a foreign payment order on the other — the working method is defensive and documentary: identify the exact legal basis of each obligation, obtain written instructions and authorisations from the competent authority for every movement, never execute a foreign order that contradicts a European freeze without a French court decision, and calendar the Luxembourg time limits for challenging the European measure itself. The October summit may redraw the political map, but it will not redraw these procedural obligations: they flow from statutes and treaties that a summit conclusions document does not amend.
Conclusion
The Brussels summit of 15 and 16 October 2026 will decide whether Europe moves from freezing Russia’s 210 billion euros to spending them. The political arithmetic favours boldness — a 23.1 billion funding gap, 122 parliamentarians and a growing group of states pushing, a reparations-loan precedent that failed in 2025 and a 90 billion Union loan that keeps the principal formally untouched. The legal arithmetic favours caution — directly applicable European regulations reviewable only in Luxembourg, central-bank reserves behind the highest wall of state immunity, a Russian Central Bank action pending before the General Court since 27 February 2026, mirror judgments in Moscow and Brussels that neither side can enforce on the other’s territory, and a European Central Bank warning that the euro itself is at stake. France illustrates the equilibrium: a fast, interministerial freeze machinery for listed assets, full judicial control over enforcement against sovereign property, and no exequatur for foreign orders that contradict European law or international public policy. Whatever the summit announces, the disputes will be settled where they have already begun — in courtrooms in Luxembourg, Brussels, Paris and Moscow — and the parties who win there will be those whose files were built, dated and reasoned long before the leaders sat down.