On 2 October 2026, sanctions specialists Maya Lester KC and Michael O’Kane reported on 2 October 2026 that the EU General Court has annulled the 2024 listing of Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) on the EU’s Iran military support sanctions list, while leaving its 2025 relisting intact. The report’s core finding is that the 2024 listing is annulled while the 2025 relisting survives, so the company remains subject to an asset freeze. For companies, banks, charterers and intermediaries operating through Paris, the message is double-edged. A Luxembourg court has once again found fault with the Council’s reasoning, yet not a euro has moved: the funds stay frozen under the newer listing. This pattern of annul-and-relist has defined the IRISL file for over a decade, and it dictates the only strategy that works — challenge each listing act within its own deadline in Luxembourg, while managing the freeze day to day in France under the Monetary and Financial Code. This article explains what the 2 October 2026 ruling changes, what it leaves untouched, and how a listed person or an exposed counterparty fights an EU asset freeze from Paris.
I. The 2 October 2026 Ruling: the 2024 Listing Falls, the 2025 Freeze Stands
A. Why the 2024 IRISL listing was annulled
The listing at issue dates from 18 November 2024, when the Council widened its Iran sanctions framework to target Tehran’s military support for Russia’s war against Ukraine and listed one individual and four entities. The Council’s own press release of that day is explicit: that the designations cover both IRISL and its director Mohammad Reza Khiabani. The Council’s stated allegation is that IRISL, as Iran’s national maritime carrier, has for years used its ships to transport drones on behalf of the EU-listed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy. The same release adds three Russian shipping companies, MG Flot, VTS Broker and Arapax, whose vessels are said to move Iranian-made weapons and ammunition, including drone components, across the Caspian Sea to resupply Russian troops fighting in Ukraine. The legal vehicle was Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/2894 of 18 November 2024 amending the Iran military-support framework, published in the Official Journal as OJ L_202402894.
According to the Global Sanctions report of 2 October 2026, the General Court annulled that 2024 listing. The full reasoning is not yet widely circulated, but the ground will surprise no specialist: EU courts annul listings when the Council’s statement of reasons is too vague, too derivative, or unsupported by sufficiently solid evidence. The IRISL file is the textbook illustration. In the earliest round, the General Court held on 16 September 2013, in Case T-489/10, with France intervening in support of the Council, that the Council had failed to substantiate its case — and the operative part is worth reading in full: the Court annulled, so far as IRISL and seventeen related applicants were concerned, the relevant annexes of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP of 26 July 2010, Implementing Regulation (EU) No 668/2010, Council Decision 2010/644/CFSP, Regulation (EU) No 961/2010 and Regulation (EU) No 267/2012. The Court even ordered a transitional effect: the effects of the annulled decision were temporarily maintained until the annulment of the successor regulation took effect. That 2013 judgment exposed the Council’s method at the time: IRISL had been identified essentially because UN Security Council Resolutions 1803 and 1929 had called on states to inspect its vessels where proliferation-sensitive cargo was suspected, while an affiliated company was accused of facilitating repeated violations of Resolution 1747. Broad references to UN resolutions, without individualised evidence tying the listed entity to the prohibited conduct, do not survive judicial review in Luxembourg. The 2024 listing appears to have failed the same test: a carrier designated for what its ships allegedly transported, on reasoning the Court found insufficiently particularised or evidenced.
Three practical consequences follow from the annulment itself. First, the annulment is retrospective in principle: the 2024 acts are declared void as far as IRISL is concerned, which matters for any enforcement measure, contractual dispute or damages claim anchored specifically in the 2024 listing period. Second, the annulment does not rewrite history for third parties who complied in good faith: banks and counterparties that froze funds under the 2024 listing were obeying binding EU law at the time, and the annulment does not retroactively make their compliance wrongful. Third, and most importantly, the annulment binds only the annulled acts. It says nothing about the parallel 2025 listing — which is why the practical victory is, for now, purely declaratory.
B. Why the funds stay frozen: the 2025 relisting and the annul-and-relist cycle
The decisive fact, reported alongside the annulment, is that the Court left the 2025 relisting in place, so the freeze continues. Anyone who has followed EU sanctions litigation will recognise the mechanism. When the General Court annuls a listing, the Council routinely adopts a fresh listing act covering the same entity on supplemented or reformulated grounds. The new act must then be challenged separately, within its own time limit, and until a court annuls it, the freeze continues uninterrupted. The IRISL saga demonstrates the cycle across fifteen years: listed in 2010, annulled in 2013 by the General Court in T-489/10, relisted, challenged again — and when IRISL appealed to the Court of Justice against a subsequent General Court ruling, the Fourth Chamber closed that round on 31 January 2019 in Case C-225/17 P with an operative part dismissing the appeal and ordering IRISL and its co-appellants to bear their own costs and those of the Council. That 2019 judgment on the appeal brought in April 2017 confirmed that relisting on amended criteria, even on evidence dating from before the first listing, can survive review when the Council repairs its reasoning. The lesson for listed persons is structural: winning the annulment of listing N does not prevent listing N+1, and each round must be fought on its own statement of reasons.
The 2025 context makes the point sharper still. On 29 September 2025, the Council agreed to reimpose a broad set of restrictive measures against Iran after the E3 triggered the JCPOA snapback mechanism, reinstating travel bans and asset freezes for listed individuals and entities, together with the prohibition on making funds or economic resources available to them, alongside arms and proliferation-related bans. Whether IRISL’s 2025 listing sits under the military-support framework, the renewed nuclear-proliferation framework, or both, the consequence is identical: at least one valid listing act currently designates the company, and EU asset freezes apply per act, not per entity in the abstract. A bank in Paris checking its filters sees a name on a list in force today; the fact that yesterday’s list was defective changes nothing for today’s compliance obligation. This is precisely why this publication has covered each successful challenge as its own case — from the annulment obtained for Oleg Tkach for the 2024 and 2025 Russia listings to the September 2026 Yabloko delistings — while stressing that every annulment must be converted into an operational unfreeze before it has any value. An annulment judgment is a legal title; the unfreeze is an administrative and banking operation; confusing the two is the most expensive mistake a listed person can make.
Two further cautions apply to readers tempted to treat the 2 October 2026 ruling as a green light for resuming business with IRISL-linked structures. First, the US dimension is untouched: American secondary sanctions and OFAC designations operate independently of Luxembourg judgments, and a European annulment offers no shelter against dollar-clearing or US enforcement exposure. Second, the relisting means that any making-available of funds or economic resources to IRISL today remains prohibited under the EU regulation in force, with the criminal and administrative penalties of each Member State attached. The annulment opens a legal path; it does not open the commercial one.
II. Listed in Luxembourg, Frozen in Paris: How to Fight an EU Freeze From France
A. Suing in Luxembourg before the clock runs out
An EU listing is an EU act, and only the EU courts can annul it. The action for annulment is brought before the General Court in Luxembourg, and the time limit is strict and short. Article 263 TFEU sets a two-month time limit running from publication of the measure, its notification to the applicant, or the day it came to the applicant’s knowledge. In practice, for a listed entity, the clock starts with the communication of the listing or its publication in the Official Journal, extended by the standard ten-day distance period. Missing the deadline is usually fatal to the annulment claim for that act — which is exactly how the Council’s relisting strategy capitalises on inertia: each new act needs a new action, and a company that celebrated the annulment of the 2024 listing without immediately attacking the 2025 relisting would find itself frozen with no case pending. The first operational rule is therefore to docket every listing and relisting act separately and to file against each within its own two-month window, while requesting access to the Council’s file and contesting the statement of reasons point by point: lack of individualised grounds, reliance on stale or undisclosed evidence, error of assessment, breach of the rights of the defence and of effective judicial protection.
Alongside the annulment action, two complementary remedies deserve systematic attention. The first is interim relief: an application to suspend the operation of the listing pending judgment. Suspension is rarely granted in sanctions cases because the applicant must show urgency and serious, irreparable harm plus a prima facie case, and courts weigh the Council’s public-security objectives heavily — but where a freeze threatens the survival of a going concern, destroys perishable commercial positions, or blocks humanitarian or safety-critical operations, the application frames the file early and signals seriousness. The second is the damages action for non-contractual liability of the EU: after an annulment, the listed person may claim compensation for the loss caused by an unlawful listing, though the threshold — a sufficiently serious breach of a rule conferring rights on individuals — is demanding, and success requires careful quantification of the loss attributable to the annulled period as distinct from concurrent listings such as US measures. Both remedies presuppose what the IRISL chronology proves: keep litigating every act, because only a judgment on a specific act produces legal effects for that act’s period.
A prior step, often neglected, is the administrative request for delisting addressed to the Council before or alongside the court action: updated evidence that the grounds no longer hold, corporate changes severing the alleged links, verifiable compliance programmes. The Council is not obliged to delist on request, and silence or refusal then feeds the court file — but a reasoned request creates the paper trail on which disproportionality and manifest-error arguments are built. For entities with French operations, the request and the action should be coordinated with the Paris-side measures described below, so that the Luxembourg timeline and the French banking reality reinforce rather than contradict each other.
B. Managing the freeze in France while the case runs
While Luxembourg judges the listing, Paris enforces the freeze — automatically, since EU regulations are directly applicable, and through the French national machinery of the Monetary and Financial Code. The architecture starts with definitions: Article L562-1 of the Monetary and Financial Code defines, for the freeze chapter, concepts including terrorist acts by reference to Council Regulation (EU) No 2580/2001 of 27 December 2001, alongside interference acts and drug trafficking. The national designation power sits in Article L562-2, under which “Le ministre chargé de l’économie et le ministre de l’intérieur peuvent décider, conjointement, pour une durée de six mois, renouvelable, le gel des fonds et ressources économiques : 1° Qui appartiennent à, sont possédés, détenus ou contrôlés par des personnes physiques ou morales, ou toute autre entité qui commettent, tentent de commettre, facilitent ou financent des actes de terrorisme, y incitent ou y participent”, and in Article L562-3, under which “Le ministre chargé de l’économie peut décider, pour une durée de six mois, renouvelable, le gel des fonds et ressources économiques : 1° Qui appartiennent à, sont possédés, détenus ou contrôlés par des personnes physiques ou morales, ou toute autre entité qui commettent, tentent de commettre, facilitent ou financent des actions sanctionnées ou prohibées par les résolutions adoptées dans le cadre du chapitre VII de la charte des Nations unies ou les actes pris en application de l’article 29 du traité sur l’Union européenne ou de l’article 75 du traité sur le fonctionnement de l’Union européenne, y participent ou qui sont désignées sur le fondement de ces résolutions ou ces actes”. In other words, where an EU act designates a person, the French system relays and operationalises the freeze; ministerial decisions under these articles are, per Article L562-9, “publiées par extrait au Journal officiel et sont exécutoires à compter de leur date de publication”.
For banks, insurers, port operators, charterers and their counsel in Paris, the compliance duty is immediate and territorial. Article L562-4 provides that “Sont tenus d’appliquer sans délai les mesures de gel et les interdictions de mise à disposition ou d’utilisation prévues au présent chapitre”, binding both individuals on national territory and the entities listed in Article L561-2 as well as any legal person carrying out operations in France — including, for head offices situated in France, their foreign activities, and for foreign head offices, their French activities. Internally, Article R562-1 requires that “L’organisation et les procédures internes prévues par l’article L. 562-4-1 doivent permettre l’application sans délai des mesures de gel et d’interdiction de mise à disposition conformément à l’article L. 562-4”, with staffing, training and information access scaled to the business. The core prohibition is then stated without ambiguity in Article L562-5: “Il est interdit aux personnes mentionnées à l’article L. 562-4 de mettre à disposition directement ou indirectement, ou d’utiliser des fonds ou ressources économiques au profit des personnes dont les fonds et ressources économiques font l’objet d’une mesure de gel”. For a Paris bank holding an IRISL-linked balance, for a charterer asked to pay freight to a designated carrier, for an insurer covering a listed fleet, this is the provision that bites daily — and it bites per listing act in force, so the 2025 relisting alone sustains the full prohibition regardless of the 2024 annulment.
The freeze is not, however, a legal black hole: French law organises exemptions and authorisations. Article L562-11 provides that “Le ministre chargé de l’économie peut autoriser le déblocage et la mise à disposition d’une partie des fonds ou ressources économiques faisant l’objet d’une mesure de gel en vertu des articles L. 562-3 , L. 562-3-1 , L. 712-4 ou L. 712-10 ou d’un acte pris en application de l’article 29 du traité sur l’Union européenne ou de l’article 75 du traité sur le fonctionnement de l’Union européenne, si leur utilisation est compatible avec la sauvegarde de l’ordre public et avec les décisions et les actes à l’origine de la décision de gel”, mirroring the derogations that EU sanctions regulations themselves provide for basic needs, legal fees, routine holding costs, humanitarian purposes and prior contractual obligations. In practice, the Paris workflow for a listed person or its counterparty runs through the Directorate General of the Treasury: identify precisely which listing act founds each frozen position, apply for the applicable authorisation with documentary proof that the payment fits a derogation, and align the request with the bank’s own compliance committee, which will not move on a Luxembourg judgment alone but will move on a Treasury authorisation. Where the bank maintains the freeze despite an authorisation, or where it over-freezes by treating a non-designated subsidiary as designated, the dispute shifts to evidence — corporate registers, ownership chains, control analysis — and, if needed, to the French courts for interim release or liability. Counterparties should also remember the mirror risk: paying out in breach of Article L562-5 exposes the payer, while wrongfully freezing a non-designated person’s funds exposes the freezer. Both errors are litigated in Paris, and both are avoided by tying every operational decision to a specific listing act verified on the day, not to headlines about annulments.
Conclusion
The 2 October 2026 ruling adds another chapter to the longest-running sanctions duel in Luxembourg: the General Court has annulled IRISL’s 2024 listing on the EU’s Iran military-support list, yet the company’s funds stay frozen under the 2025 relisting. The judgment matters — it confirms that the Council’s evidence and reasoning remain reviewable act by act, and it creates a legal title for the annulled period — but it changes nothing on the ground until the relisting is itself challenged and the banking positions are individually unfrozen. The IRISL chronology, from the 2013 annulment in T-489/10 through the 2019 dismissal of the appeal in C-225/17 P to the present split decision, teaches a single discipline: attack every listing act within its two-month window in Luxembourg, pursue interim relief and damages where the conditions are met, and in parallel run the Paris machinery of authorisations, derogations and evidenced ownership analysis under Articles L562-3 to L562-11 of the Monetary and Financial Code. Annulments are won with reasoning; unfreezings are obtained with paperwork. In sanctions litigation, only those who fight on both fronts recover their funds.