On 2 October 2026, Eurojust announced that coordinated action by Belgium, France and the Netherlands, with Eurojust and Europol, had led to the arrest of 21 suspected members of a drug trafficking network that moved cocaine into Europe on board commercial flights. According to the Eurojust press release of 2 October 2026, a joint action day on 30 September produced 21 arrests and 27 searches across the three countries, with more than 57,000 euros in cash seized alongside crypto wallets, eight vehicles and two firearms. The French side of the operation was handled, according to the same release, by an investigative judge of the Paris specialised interregional jurisdiction (JIRS Paris), the Paris public prosecutor’s office anti-organised crime section and the Central Office Against Drug Trafficking (OFAST). For travellers, airport workers and families caught up in files of this kind, the decisive question is always the same: what does France actually do with the suitcase carrier, the baggage-hall recruit and the organiser, and when does France hand a suspect to Belgium or the Netherlands rather than trying them in Paris? This article answers those questions from the French procedure as it stands, starting from the facts as reported by Eurojust and setting out the custody, surrender and sentencing rules that govern every comparable file.
I. Arrested at a French airport for cocaine in your luggage: what happens now
A. How the baggage-hall system worked and why French courts treat every role differently
According to the Eurojust release, the investigation began when law enforcement found several sports bags containing 30 kilogrammes of cocaine left behind at Brussels Airport and traced the passenger linked to them. The method described by Eurojust is strikingly simple: members of the network travelled from Africa or the Americas with luggage containing narcotics, while another person, usually recruited through social media, collected the luggage from the baggage reclaim area. Those recruits gained access to the baggage belts by buying cheap last-minute airline tickets, then carried the luggage to an agreed location where couriers working for the network collected the drugs. During the investigation, the Belgian authorities separately arrested two suspects caught with 55 kilogrammes of cocaine and 30 kilogrammes of cannabis, and the trail led across the border into France and the Netherlands, where a joint investigation team was set up at Eurojust to share information and evidence, follow financial trails and plan the joint action. No airline is named in the official release, no finding of guilt has been made against any of the 21 arrested persons, and every one of them benefits from the presumption of innocence while the seized evidence is analysed.
The first thing a French lawyer sees in a file built on this pattern is that the criminal law does not treat the three profiles the same way at all. French law draws a sharp line between the person who directs or organises a trafficking group and the person who merely carries, holds or hands over the goods. Article 222-34 of the Criminal Code provides that “Le fait de diriger ou d’organiser un groupement ayant pour objet la production, la fabrication, l’importation, l’exportation, le transport, la détention, l’offre, la cession, l’acquisition ou l’emploi illicites de stupéfiants est puni de la réclusion criminelle à perpétuité et de 7 500 000 euros d’amende.” That is the provision aimed at the top of the pyramid, and it carries life imprisonment. One rung below, article 222-36 of the Criminal Code states that “L’importation ou l’exportation illicites de stupéfiants sont punies de dix ans d’emprisonnement et de 7 500 000 euros d’amende”, before adding that “Ces faits sont punis de trente ans de réclusion criminelle et de 7 500 000 euros d’amende lorsqu’ils sont commis en bande organisée.” The baggage-hall recruit and the suitcase carrier, meanwhile, are most often prosecuted under article 222-37 of the Criminal Code, which provides that “Le transport, la détention, l’offre, la cession, l’acquisition ou l’emploi illicites de stupéfiants sont punis de dix ans d’emprisonnement et de 7 500 000 euros d’amende.” Ten years is already a formidable sentence, but the gap between ten years and thirty years or life is exactly where the defence of a recruit or a first-time carrier is fought.
Whether the aggravated penalties for an organised gang apply depends on proof of a structured group acting together, not on the quantity alone. Thirty kilogrammes in sports bags is spectacular, and fifty-five kilogrammes plus thirty of cannabis even more so, yet quantities describe the scale of the facts, not the role of each individual. A young person recruited on social media, paid a few hundred euros to walk into an arrivals hall with a boarding pass bought the day before, could be characterised as a member of an organised gang only if the prosecution proves that person’s knowing integration into the group and its methods. Conversely, the travellers who flew in from other continents with loaded suitcases, the holders of the crypto wallets seized on 30 September, and whoever paid for the tickets, the bags and the safe locations look far more exposed to the organised-gang aggravation. Each file must therefore be taken apart person by person: telephone records showing who recruited whom, transfer slips, travel bookings, and the messages in which the job was proposed. In practice, the recruits’ phones are frequently their best defence exhibits, because the messages often show pressure, vague promises, ignorance of the contents of the bags, or a fee so small that it contradicts any claim of shared control over the operation. Nothing in the Eurojust release says what any individual knew or accepted, and no legal qualification of any arrested person’s conduct can be stated as established at this stage.
Two further features of the 30 September seizures matter for the French treatment of the file. First, the seizure of crypto wallets points to a financial investigation running alongside the narcotics case: investigators will try to turn every token movement into proof of a share in the profits, and the defence will have to demand a precise attribution of each wallet to a named person rather than accepting a collective reading. Second, the two seized firearms, if connected to identified individuals, could add weapons charges to the drugs case for those persons only; a firearm found in one searched flat does not aggravate the position of the other twenty suspects. The same individual logic governs the additional penalties. Article 222-44 of the Criminal Code provides that “I.-Les personnes physiques coupables des infractions prévues aux sections 1 à 7, à l’exception de la section 4 du présent chapitre encourent également les peines complémentaires suivantes”, a list that includes professional bans and confiscations capable of ruining a lawful business or a regulated career. A baggage handler, a driver or a student recruited online has far more to lose from a complementary professional ban than the headline prison term suggests, which is why the defence must address those penalties explicitly at trial rather than discovering them in the written judgment. Readers facing the distinct but related problem of an extradition request from the United States in a major narcotics file will find the same role-by-role method applied in our analysis of how France handles a US extradition request in a cocaine trafficking case.
B. The first 96 hours in France: custody, JIRS judge and pre-trial detention
When suspects are arrested on French soil in an operation of this kind, the clock starts with police custody, the garde à vue, run in narcotics matters under extended time limits that can reach 96 hours with judicial authorisation. The officers most likely to conduct the interviews are OFAST investigators or the judicial police working under the JIRS Paris investigative judge, since the Eurojust release places the French leg of the case expressly under a JIRS judge. From the first hour, three rights structure everything: the right to remain silent, the right to a lawyer from the outset and at each hearing, and the right to have a relative and, where needed, consular authorities informed. The single most common and most costly mistake made by suitcase carriers and baggage-hall recruits is to talk immediately in the hope of explaining the situation away. An improvised statement given at 3 a.m. in an airport police station, without knowledge of what the seized telephones already contain, becomes a fixed exhibit that no later memorandum can erase. Silence in custody is not an admission; it is the procedural condition that allows the lawyer to read the file, compare the client’s account with the surveillance and the intercepts, and choose a coherent line of defence before the first appearance before a judge.
At the end of custody, the arrested person is brought before the investigative judge for the first appearance, the mise en examen, or, where the evidence against a peripheral player is thinner, placed under the lighter status of assisted witness. The JIRS judge then decides on pre-trial measures: release under judicial supervision with obligations such as reporting to a police station, surrendering travel documents, staying away from airports and co-suspects, or pre-trial detention where the legal criteria are met. In a 21-arrest cross-border file, detention is requested almost reflexively for foreign nationals without stable ties in France, on the grounds of risks of flight, collusion and renewed offending. The defence response must be concrete and documented from the very first hearing: proof of address, employment or studies, family ties, a passport surrendered voluntarily, and a supervision package that answers each stated risk. For the social-media recruits in particular, the file often contains the very material that argues against detention and against a leading role: a modest lifestyle inconsistent with trafficking profits, a single trip rather than a pattern, and messages showing recruitment rather than command. Those points must be put on the record early, because the liberty and detention judge decides on the basis of the file as it stands that day, and a thin file argued badly produces a detention order that colours the rest of the proceedings.
The defence work in the days after the arrest is largely technical and invisible to the client, but it determines the trial. Counsel must obtain the full inventory of seals, especially telephones, computers, crypto devices and the boarding passes bought for the baggage-hall entries, and verify the regularity of every search, interception and period of custody across the three countries. Evidence gathered abroad and transmitted through the joint investigation team does not arrive in the French file immunised against challenge: each measure must have a legal basis, and the defence can contest irregular cross-border transmissions, incomplete translations of foreign reports, and expert analyses of narcotics or telephones that overstate their conclusions. The sports bags left at Brussels Airport illustrate the point: forensic links between the bags, the passenger and the network must be established lot by lot, weighing by weighing, and a global presentation that mixes the 30 kilogrammes of Brussels, the 55 kilogrammes of cocaine and the 30 kilogrammes of cannabis seized elsewhere proves nothing against a recruit who carried one bag once. Finally, families should understand that the investigation continues long after the action day: Eurojust stated that analysis of the seized evidence will continue, which means further arrests, further EAWs and further hearings are to be expected over the coming months, and anyone questioned as a witness today may need a defence strategy tomorrow.
II. Surrendered to Belgium or the Netherlands or tried in Paris: the cross-border defence
A. European Arrest Warrant and joint investigation team evidence: when France surrenders and when it refuses
The Eurojust release describes a textbook joint investigation team: Belgian, French and Dutch authorities sharing information and evidence and planning joint action under Eurojust coordination, with Europol support. In French law, that mechanism has an explicit statutory home. Article 695-2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that “Avec l’accord préalable du ministre de la justice et le consentement du ou des autres Etats membres concernés, l’autorité judiciaire compétente peut créer une équipe commune d’enquête, soit lorsqu’il y a lieu d’effectuer, dans le cadre d’une procédure française, des enquêtes complexes impliquant la mobilisation d’importants moyens et qui concernent d’autres Etats membres, soit lorsque plusieurs Etats membres effectuent des enquêtes relatives à des infractions exigeant une action coordonnée et concertée entre les Etats membres concernés.” The provision goes on to authorise seconded foreign officers to record offences, take statements, assist French judicial police officers and carry out surveillance on national territory under the direction of the competent judicial authority. Its companion, article 695-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, adds that “Dans le cadre de l’équipe commune d’enquête, les officiers et agents de police judiciaire français détachés auprès d’une équipe commune d’enquête peuvent procéder aux opérations prescrites par le responsable d’équipe, sur toute l’étendue du territoire de l’Etat où ils interviennent, dans la limite des pouvoirs qui leur sont reconnus par le présent code.” For the defence, these texts are double-edged: they give the prosecution a clean channel for Belgian airport seizures and Dutch intercepts to enter the French file, but they also impose traceable formalities, ministerial agreement, defined missions and territorial limits, each of which can be checked and, where breached, challenged before the French courts.
Where suspects are wanted by Belgium or the Netherlands rather than by France, the instrument is the European Arrest Warrant. Article 695-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure defines it in these terms: “Le mandat d’arrêt européen est une décision judiciaire émise par un Etat membre de l’Union européenne, appelé Etat membre d’émission, en vue de l’arrestation et de la remise par un autre Etat membre, appelé Etat membre d’exécution, d’une personne recherchée pour l’exercice de poursuites pénales ou pour l’exécution d’une peine ou d’une mesure de sûreté privative de liberté.” In France, surrender proceedings run before the investigating chamber of the court of appeal, which verifies identity, the validity of the warrant and the applicable grounds, while the requested person is heard with a lawyer and an interpreter. Drug trafficking belongs to the list of offences for which the old double-criminality verification is set aside, so arguing that the conduct is described differently in Belgian or Dutch law will not stop a surrender. The serious defences lie elsewhere: a warrant that does not identify the person or the facts with the required precision, proceedings already definitively judged in France or in another Member State for the same facts, amnesty extinguishing the French prosecution, a minor whose age excludes surrender, or a real risk of inhuman or degrading detention conditions in the issuing state documented by current European reports rather than general assertions.
French statute organises refusals narrowly, and counsel must plead them exactly. Article 695-22 of the Code of Criminal Procedure opens with the words “L’exécution d’un mandat d’arrêt européen est refusée dans les cas suivants”, listing mandatory refusal grounds including amnesty and a prior final decision for the same facts handed down by the French authorities or by another Member State where the sentence has been served, is being served or can no longer be enforced. The non bis in idem ground matters concretely in baggage-hall files: a recruit already finally convicted or acquitted in France for the same bag cannot be surrendered to Belgium for that bag, and the chronology of the French and Belgian proceedings must therefore be reconstructed exhibit by exhibit. A recent decision of the criminal chamber illustrates how strictly French courts apply the neighbouring return-guarantee logic. In its judgment of 25 February 2025, appeal no. 25-80.670, concerning a surrender to Italy for drug offences, the Court of Cassation approved judges who had held that “Ils retiennent que l’exécution du mandat d’arrêt européen n’a pas à être refusée en vertu des dispositions de l’article 695-24, 2°, du même code, dont les conditions d’application ne sont pas réunies, la peine n’étant pas définitive” (full text on the official Cour de cassation website, decision 67c1c6210843e7271ec2922b). The same ruling confirms the scope of the guarantee of return after trial or conviction, noting that “s’agissant de la garantie pour la personne poursuivie d’un retour après avoir été entendue ou condamnée, les dispositions de l’article 5, 3°, de la décision-cadre du 13 juin 2002 ont été reprises à l’article 695-32 du code de procédure pénale, qui s’applique également lorsque la peine n’est pas définitive, ce qui est le cas en l’espèce.”
That guarantee is the pivotal provision for French nationals and long-term residents caught in a Belgian or Dutch warrant. Article 695-32 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states that “Lorsque la personne recherchée est de nationalité française ou réside régulièrement sur le territoire national de façon ininterrompue depuis au moins cinq ans, l’exécution du mandat d’arrêt européen peut être subordonnée à la vérification qu’elle peut être renvoyée en France pour y effectuer la peine qui sera éventuellement prononcée par l’autorité judiciaire de l’Etat d’émission pour les faits faisant l’objet du mandat.” In plain terms, a French suspect surrendered to Brussels or Amsterdam for trial could in the qualifying cases come home to serve the sentence, which transforms the surrender hearing from a yes-or-no battle into a negotiation about the aftermath. Defence strategy in the investigating chamber should therefore run on two tracks at once: contest every contestable point of the warrant itself, from identity to specialty and proportionality, and simultaneously build the documented personal file, nationality or five years of uninterrupted lawful residence, family and employment records, that secures the return guarantee. Where France is instead the state prosecuting, the mirror question arises: French courts can try acts committed abroad where jurisdiction rules allow, and a suspect already surrendered once is protected by the specialty rule against being passed on to a third state for other facts without consent. Every movement of the person between Brussels, Paris and Amsterdam must be mapped against these rules before it happens, not after.
B. How many years for airport cocaine trafficking and how to serve the sentence in France
Once the forum is settled, the arithmetic of punishment begins, and it is severe by design. A carrier convicted of the basic importation offence faces ten years’ imprisonment, the same ten years that article 222-37 attaches to transport and detention. If the prosecution proves commission by an organised gang, article 222-36 raises the maximum to thirty years of criminal imprisonment. If the accused is characterised as having directed or organised the group, article 222-34 opens the scale to life imprisonment with a 7.5 million euro fine. French courts then individualise within those ceilings by weighing quantities, duration, hierarchy, profits and criminal history, which is why the distinction between the organiser who financed the tickets and the recruit who carried one bag is not rhetoric but the central sentencing battle. A first-time offender recruited online, who pleaded guilty early, surrendered the telephone codes and demonstrated modest means, will be presented for a sentence at the bottom of the applicable range with a strong case for a partially suspended term and structured supervision. An accused shown by the financial investigation to have controlled wallets, paid couriers and organised rotations between three countries faces the top of the range, a lengthy security period and confiscation of the assets traced to the trafficking.
The security period deserves separate attention because clients consistently underestimate it. Article 132-23 of the Criminal Code provides that “En cas de condamnation à une peine privative de liberté, non assortie du sursis, dont la durée est égale ou supérieure à dix ans, prononcée pour les infractions spécialement prévues par la loi, le condamné ne peut bénéficier, pendant une période de sûreté, des dispositions concernant la suspension ou le fractionnement de la peine, le placement à l’extérieur, les permissions de sortir, la semi-liberté et la libération conditionnelle.” Drug trafficking in an organised gang belongs to the offences for which these provisions bite, and articles 222-34 and 222-36 expressly refer to the security-period mechanism. In practice, this means that a fifteen-year sentence for organised importation is not a sentence from which early adjustments can be expected in its first years: the security period locks the door to sentence adjustments for a fixed fraction of the term, and the defence must explain that calendar honestly to the client and the family before the trial, then fight at sentencing for the lowest lawful term and the most favourable adjustment prospects afterwards. Fines of up to 7.5 million euros, though rarely recovered in full from small players, allow the state to pursue collection for years, and the complementary penalties of article 222-44 can bar the convicted person from public office, regulated professions or commercial management. For a young recruit, the professional ban may punish harder than the prison years.
Serving the sentence is the final chapter of the strategy and the one most often neglected until it is too late. A French national convicted in Belgium or the Netherlands can in the standard cases seek transfer to France under the European framework for the mutual recognition of custodial sentences, and the return guarantee of article 695-32, quoted above, should have been secured as early as the surrender hearing. A foreign national convicted in France may conversely request transfer to the home state, or face expulsion measures upon release that must be anticipated with immigration counsel. Confiscation orders follow the person across borders through mutual recognition of freezing and confiscation decisions, which means the crypto wallets, vehicles and cash seized on 30 September could be definitively confiscated by whichever court tries the case and enforced in the state where the assets sit. The practical lesson is to treat enforcement as part of the trial strategy from day one: identify the state where the client has genuine prospects of reintegration, secure the legal conditions for serving the sentence there, quantify the confiscation exposure asset by asset, and avoid procedural choices, such as an ill-prepared consent to surrender, that close those doors permanently. Sentencing advocacy that ends with the number of years pronounced is only half the job.
Conclusion
The Eurojust operation of 30 September 2026, announced on 2 October, shows how European cocaine prosecutions now work: a suitcase abandoned at Brussels Airport, recruits approached on social media and sent into baggage halls with last-minute tickets, a joint investigation team pooling Belgian, French and Dutch evidence, and a single coordinated action day producing 21 arrests, 27 searches and seizures of cash, crypto, vehicles and firearms. At the date of writing, those facts rest solely on the official Eurojust release; no court has established any individual’s guilt, no responsibility of any airline or airport operator has been found by any official source, and every legal characterisation of individual conduct remains conditional on proof at trial. What is certain is the French procedural frame that will govern the French leg of the file: JIRS investigation and OFAST inquiries, custody running up to 96 hours, first appearance and detention decisions within days, European Arrest Warrant proceedings before the investigating chamber with refusal grounds and a return guarantee for qualifying French nationals and residents, and a sentencing scale running from ten years to thirty years and up to life depending on the proven role, with security periods and complementary bans attached. Anyone questioned, arrested or sought in a file of this type should have a lawyer before giving any substantive account, preserve every recruitment message and travel document, and have the surrender-versus-trial choice analysed with the file in hand rather than decided in panic. In cross-border narcotics cases, the battle is won in the first hearings, person by person and exhibit by exhibit.