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Convicted in Your Absence? The UK’s 29 September 2026 Extradition Retrial Rules and How France Handles the Same Case

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Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

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Convicted in Your Absence? The UK’s 29 September 2026 Extradition Retrial Rules and How France Handles the Same Case

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On 29 September 2026, the rules changed in London for every person wanted by the United Kingdom after being convicted without ever entering a courtroom. Section 246 of the Crime and Policing Act 2026 rewrote the two provisions that decide whether a British judge can send a convicted absentee back to the country that sentenced him: section 20 of the Extradition Act 2003 for European surrender cases and section 85 for the rest of the world, including the United States. A conditional retrial right, an express waiver, an unexercised remedy, and even a trial attended only by a lawyer now open the door to surrender where the old law would have kept it shut. For anyone living in France under a foreign conviction entered in absence, the question is immediate and practical: if Paris received the same file tomorrow, would the chambre de l’instruction block the handover or authorise it? France answers with its own architecture — the fundamental-guarantees bar of Article 696-4, the four in-absentia gateways of Article 695-22-1, and two recent rulings of the Cour de cassation that set the exact test. This article explains both systems side by side, with the texts and the judgments quoted word for word, so that a person facing surrender — in London or in Paris — understands what his lawyers must prove and where the decisive battle will be fought.

I. Convicted abroad without appearing: what did London change on 29 September 2026?

The starting point is undisputed because it is printed on the official statute book. As the London extradition bar summarised it on 23 September 2026, New provisions affecting extradition after a conviction in the requested person’s absence are due to take effect on 29 September 2026, and Section 246 of the Crime and Policing Act 2026 amends section 20 of the Extradition Act 2003, which concerns Part 1 cases, and section 85, which concerns Part 2 cases. Part 1 covers surrender to European Union member states under the post-Brexit surrender arrangements; Part 2 covers the rest of the world, from the United States to the United Arab Emirates. The commencement instrument confirms the date in binding terms: The following provisions of the 2026 Act come into force on 29th September 2026 — (c) section 246 (extradition: cases where a person has been convicted). Six days ago, therefore, every conviction-based extradition hearing in the United Kingdom moved onto new ground. The mechanism matters far beyond Britain, because the same fact pattern — a conviction entered abroad while the defendant stayed in France — lands every week on the desks of the Paris chambre de l’instruction, and the two systems now diverge in ways a defendant must understand before choosing where to fight.

A. Can London surrender you if a retrial is only conditional, waived or already lapsed?

Under the previous law, the British judge who found that the wanted person had been convicted in his absence had essentially one question to answer: was a retrial or a review amounting to a retrial guaranteed on return? If the answer was doubtful, the judge discharged the person and the surrender failed. Section 246 replaces that single gateway with four alternative routes, any one of which lets the case proceed to the next stage. The new text of section 20 provides that the court may move forward where any of the following applies — (a) the person would be entitled to a retrial or (on appeal) to a review amounting to a retrial. That first route preserves the old guarantee. Everything that follows is new, and each addition narrows the protection.

The second route accepts a retrial right that is merely conditional: (b) the person would be so entitled unless a court in the territory concerned were to decide that they deliberately absented themselves from their trial. In practice, this reverses the burden of the argument. The defence can no longer win simply by showing that the requesting state reserves the right to declare the absence deliberate and refuse the retrial; it must now demonstrate that such a finding is likely, or that the foreign procedure for deciding deliberateness is itself unfair. Consider a French resident convicted in his absence by a court outside Europe that grants retrials to the merely unaware but not to fugitives: under the new British rule, the London judge may treat the conditional right as sufficient and order surrender, leaving the defendant to persuade the foreign court after return that his absence was not deliberate. The identical provision was inserted into section 85 for Category 2 territories, so a person resisting surrender from London to the United States faces exactly the same test.

The third and fourth routes close two further escape paths that defence lawyers have used for years. The statute now permits surrender where the person was entitled as mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b) but expressly waived that entitlement, and where having been informed that they were entitled as mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b), the person failed to exercise that entitlement before the end of the period permitted for exercising it. These two paragraphs codify, in statutory form, the European case law on waiver and diligence that the Court of Justice developed in cases such as Dworzecki: a defendant who knew of the trial, or who learned of the conviction and slept on his remedy, cannot later present himself as the victim of an unfair absence. The practical warning is blunt. A letter from a foreign court informing you of a conviction and of a thirty-day appeal, filed away and ignored, can become — months later before a London judge — the very document that authorises your surrender. Silence, once the information is proved, now counts as consent to the procedure as it stands.

The sharpest change, however, concerns the defendant who never set foot in the courtroom but was represented there by a lawyer. New subsection (7A) provides that For the purposes of subsection (1), a person convicted at a trial at which they were legally represented (but not present in person) is to be treated as having been convicted in their presence. The legal fiction is complete: representation equals presence. Where this deeming applies, the judge does not even reach the retrial question, because the conviction is treated as an ordinary adversarial conviction. The consequences for cross-border files are considerable. Many continental systems, including France, routinely try absent defendants with court-appointed counsel present; a French jugement rendered with an avocat at the bar, the defendant detained abroad or simply untraceable, would now count in London as a conviction in presence. Conversely, a defendant who instructed a lawyer in the requesting state to observe proceedings or to plead mitigation without asserting his personal absence may discover that his own precaution extinguished his strongest shield. From 29 September 2026, the advice to anyone who learns of foreign proceedings is therefore counter-intuitive but vital: instructing counsel abroad without a clear strategy on presence can be worse than doing nothing, and every step must be coordinated between the British lawyer and the lawyer in the requesting state before anyone files anything.

B. Arrested before 29 September 2026: does the old law still protect you?

The new rules do not apply to everyone, and the boundary is drawn with unusual precision: it is the date of the arrest, not the date of the hearing, that decides which law governs. The savings regulation provides that The amendments made to section 20 of the Extradition Act 2003 (case where person has been convicted: category 1 territories) by section 246(2) of the 2026 Act do not apply where — (a) an extradition hearing arises from a person’s arrest under section 3 or 5 of the 2003 Act, and (b) the arrest took place before 29th September 2026, with a mirror saving for section 85 cases arising from arrests under sections 71, 73 or 74A before the same date. As the specialist commentary puts it, The hearing date alone does not determine which version of the law applies. A person arrested at Heathrow on 28 September 2026 whose hearing takes place in November keeps the benefit of the old, more protective test; a person arrested on 30 September on an identical warrant faces the four new gateways. In extradition practice, where dawn arrests and staged surrenders are routine, a forty-eight-hour difference in execution can therefore decide the outcome of the case.

Three practical consequences follow for anyone with a conviction abroad hanging over him. First, audit the chronology before arguing the substance: counsel must establish the exact statutory basis of the arrest and its date, because the wrong version of the law argued in court is a lost case. Second, understand that the requesting state now has an incentive to re-issue and re-arrest: where an old-regime discharge occurred on retrial grounds, nothing in the savings prevents a fresh warrant, a fresh arrest after the cut-off, and a second hearing under the new rules — the double-jeopardy protections of extradition law restrict repeated prosecution for the same facts, not repeated requests after a discharge on procedural grounds. Third, coordinate across borders immediately. The new British test turns on fine points of foreign procedure — whether a retrial right is conditional or absolute, whether a notification was effective, whether a lawyer’s mandate covered the trial — and those points can only be proved with certificates, transcripts and expert evidence from the requesting state. The same evidence, as will be seen, is exactly what the Paris chambre de l’instruction demands when the file lands in France, so a defendant who prepares a French-style proof file from day one serves both battlefields at once. Readers who want to see how a Paris court handles the arrest itself, from the prosecutor’s notification to custody and release motions, will find the method described in our analysis of how a Paris court handles an Interpol red notice followed by re-arrest, which follows the same chambre de l’instruction procedure step by step.

II. Arrested in France on a foreign conviction entered in your absence: how does Paris decide?

France never adopted the British structure, and that is precisely why the comparison matters. Where London now asks which of four retrial gateways is open, Paris asks a single deeper question, framed by the European Convention on Human Rights: would surrender expose the person to a flagrant denial of justice? The answer is built from three layers — the statutory bars of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the reasoned opinion of the chambre de l’instruction, and the control exercised by the Cour de cassation — and each layer treats convictions in absence as a red flag that the requesting state must neutralise with concrete guarantees, not general assurances.

A. Will the Paris chambre de l’instruction block your extradition if the requesting state offers no real retrial?

In classic extradition — a request from a state outside the European Union, such as the United States, the United Arab Emirates or the United Kingdom itself — the shield is Article 696-4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Among the eight mandatory bars to surrender, the seventh provides that extradition is refused Lorsque la personne réclamée serait jugée dans l’Etat requérant par un tribunal n’assurant pas les garanties fondamentales de procédure et de protection des droits de la défense. A conviction entered in absence, with no genuine possibility of a fresh hearing after surrender, falls squarely within this text: a court that condemns without hearing and refuses to rehear does not secure the fundamental guarantees of procedure. The provision is not discretionary. Where the condition is met, the chambre de l’instruction must give an unfavourable opinion, and the French government, which decides by decree, cannot lawfully authorise a surrender that the statute forbids.

The Cour de cassation gave this architecture its definitive modern form on 28 March 2023, in a case that deserves to be known by every lawyer who handles in-absentia files. Italy had requested the extradition of one of its nationals to serve a sentence of life imprisonment imposed by the Milan assize court of appeal on 28 November 1985, enforceable since 4 November 1986, for a terrorist attack committed in 1980. The Paris chambre de l’instruction gave an unfavourable opinion, and the Court of Cassation rejected the prosecutor general’s appeal. Its holding is the controlling statement of French law: Il se déduit de l’article 6 de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme relatif au droit à un procès équitable qu’un Etat partie à la Convention, requis aux fins d’extradition d’une personne, a l’obligation de s’assurer que celle-ci ne sera pas exposée, dans l’Etat requérant, à un déni de justice flagrant pouvant résulter, notamment, de l’impossibilité d’obtenir qu’une juridiction statue à nouveau sur le bien-fondé de l’accusation, alors qu’elle a fait l’objet d’une condamnation in abstentia au sens de la jurisprudence de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme. The test is therefore identical in spirit to the old British guarantee, but framed as a prohibition on flagrant injustice rather than as a checklist: no fresh adjudication on the merits after hearing the person, no surrender.

The same judgment distributes the work between the two levels of court with rare clarity. It holds that il appartient à la chambre de l’instruction, saisie d’un grief pris d’un déni de justice flagrant, de vérifier si la personne réclamée qui a été jugée en son absence, alors qu’il n’est pas établi qu’elle a renoncé à son droit de comparaître et de se défendre ou qu’elle a eu l’intention de se soustraire à la justice, aura la possibilité, si elle le souhaite, d’obtenir qu’une juridiction statue à nouveau, après l’avoir entendue, sur le bien-fondé de l’accusation en fait comme en droit. Three elements must therefore be proved, and the burden is concrete: first, that the person did not waive the right to appear and did not intend to evade justice — summonses sent to an old address, notifications never personally served, proceedings the defendant never knew existed; second, that the requesting state’s law, as it stands and as the foreign authorities themselves describe it in response to a request for additional information, does not guarantee a full rehearing on fact and law after hearing the person; third, that these findings rest on documents, because the chambre decides on the file. Where the chamber is not convinced, it may order a complément d’information to interrogate the requesting state — as it did in the Italian case — and the Court of Cassation will only censure a refusal to order such a measure for reasoning that is insufficient or contradictory. Defence strategy follows directly: never plead absence in the abstract, but file the summonses, the proof of residence elsewhere, the foreign code provisions, and, where possible, a legal opinion from a lawyer of the requesting state certifying that no retrial exists.

Two procedural features of the French system strengthen this defence in ways the British reform does not replicate. First, the requested person is heard quickly and the chamber gives a reasoned opinion within a short clock: Si, lors de sa comparution, la personne réclamée déclare ne pas consentir à être extradée, la chambre de l’instruction donne son avis motivé sur la demande d’extradition, with appearance within ten working days of presentation to the prosecutor general and an opinion, absent further inquiries, within one month of that appearance. Non-consent is therefore the trigger of the full adversarial examination, and it must be stated clearly at the first presentation — a consent given lightly to “get it over with” waives the very procedure in which the retrial argument would have been heard. Second, the requesting state is not a party to the Paris proceedings and cannot plead before the Court of Cassation: in the Italian case the Court declared that N’étant pas partie à la procédure, l’Etat requérant à l’extradition ne tire d’aucune disposition légale la faculté de déposer un mémoire ou des observations devant la Cour de cassation. The foreign state speaks only through the diplomatic file and its answers to additional-information requests; it cannot lobby the judges. For the defence, this is a structural advantage worth exploiting: contradictions between the warrant, the judgment and the foreign ministry’s explanations stay on the record unanswered, and the chamber draws the inferences.

The conventional framework reinforces the statute. The Court recalled that L’article 3 du deuxième protocole à la Convention européenne d’extradition stipule que, dans le cas où l’extradition est demandée aux fins d’exécution d’une peine résultant d’une décision rendue par défaut, la partie requise peut refuser d’extrader si, à son avis, la procédure de jugement n’a pas satisfait aux droits minimaux de la défense reconnus à toute personne accusée d’une infraction. Refusal is therefore doubly founded: mandatory under Article 696-4 where fundamental guarantees are missing, and expressly permitted by the extradition convention itself where minimum defence rights were not respected. Against this wall, the British novelties — conditional retrials, waivers, lapsed remedies, deemed presence through counsel — would cut no ice in Paris: a conditional retrial that depends on a foreign finding of deliberate absence is precisely the kind of uncertainty that produces an unfavourable opinion, and a lawyer’s silent presence at a trial the defendant never knew about proves neither waiver nor evasion.

B. Wanted under a European arrest warrant for a sentence imposed without you: can Paris still refuse or condition surrender?

Inside the European Union, surrender runs on mutual recognition, and the French transposition of Article 4a of Framework Decision 2002/584 — the European Arrest Warrant Framework Decision available on EUR-Lex — is Article 695-22-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Its mechanism is an optional refusal framed as four safe harbours: Lorsque le mandat d’arrêt européen est émis aux fins d’exécution d’une peine ou d’une mesure de sûreté privative de liberté, son exécution peut être refusée dans le cas où l’intéressé n’a pas comparu en personne lors du procès à l’issue duquel la peine ou la mesure de sûreté a été prononcée sauf si, selon les indications portées par l’Etat membre d’émission dans le mandat d’arrêt européen, il se trouve dans l’un des cas suivants. The four cases that follow mirror the European standard. The first covers the defendant duly and unequivocally informed, in good time, of the date and place of the trial and of the possibility of a decision in his absence: Il a été informé dans les formes légales et effectivement, de manière non équivoque, en temps utile, par voie de citation ou par tout autre moyen, de la date et du lieu fixés pour le procès et de la possibilité qu’une décision puisse être rendue à son encontre en cas de non-comparution. The second covers the defendant who, knowing of the trial, mandated counsel to defend him. The third covers the defendant who was served with the decision, expressly informed of a remedy allowing a full rehearing in his presence, and either stated that he did not contest it or let the time limit expire. The fourth covers the decision not yet served, which must be served on surrender together with information on the remedy and its deadline. Box D of the warrant form is therefore the battlefield: the issuing authority’s own ticks and explanations determine whether any safe harbour is established, and a vague or contradictory Box D is the defence’s strongest exhibit.

The Cour de cassation applied this scheme with instructive strictness on 11 March 2025. Romania had issued a European arrest warrant for one of its nationals to serve one year and eight months’ imprisonment for threats, imposed in his absence on 11 April 2023; the man had not appeared, had not been personally summoned but only convoked at his last known addresses, a warrant had been issued to compel his appearance, and the decision, never personally served, would be notified after surrender with express information on the right to a fresh trial or a full-review appeal. The Aix-en-Provence chambre de l’instruction authorised surrender, and the Court of Cassation rejected the appeal. Its reasoning maps the entire defensive terrain. On the facts, the Court approved the finding that the case fell within the fourth safe harbour — notification after surrender with a genuine remedy — noting that it had verified exactement relevé que M. [B] est recherché pour l’exécution d’une condamnation prononcée en son absence, qui doit lui être notifiée, ce dernier disposant d’un recours dans un délai d’un mois à compter de cette notification. The lesson is symmetrical to the British lapse rule: a post-surrender notification plus a real one-month remedy satisfies the European standard, just as an ignored notification can now authorise surrender from London. Defence lawyers must therefore attack the remedy’s reality, not its existence — is the one-month period practicable from detention, does the appeal suspend enforcement, does the rehearing cover fact as well as law, who pays for counsel — because a merely theoretical remedy increasingly fails to convince no court at all.

The same 2025 ruling settled a question that directly protects French residents. The wanted man had asked to serve any sentence in France, and the Court confirmed that l’article 695-32 du code de procédure pénale, qui permet de subordonner la remise de la personne recherchée à la garantie qu’elle effectuera en France la peine qui sera éventuellement prononcée par l’autorité judiciaire de l’Etat d’émission pour les faits objet du mandat, est applicable à la personne recherchée sur le fondement d’un mandat d’arrêt européen émis pour l’exécution d’une condamnation prononcée en son absence et susceptible de recours, sa situation étant comparable à celle d’une personne qui fait l’objet d’un mandat d’arrêt européen aux fins de poursuites. The statute itself states the condition: Lorsque la personne recherchée est de nationalité française ou réside régulièrement sur le territoire national de façon ininterrompue depuis au moins cinq ans, l’exécution du mandat d’arrêt européen peut être subordonnée à la vérification qu’elle peut être renvoyée en France pour y effectuer la peine qui sera éventuellement prononcée par l’autorité judiciaire de l’Etat d’émission pour les faits faisant l’objet du mandat. In the Romanian case the guarantee was refused only because the claimant proved no five years of uninterrupted regular residence. The message for settled residents is therefore clear: five years of regular, uninterrupted presence in France converts a surrender file into a conditional-surrender file, with the sentence ultimately served on French soil. A parallel provision, Article 695-24 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, allows refusal where a French national or resident would serve the sentence in France under the transfer-of-sentences mechanism — two distinct doors, return guarantee and domestic execution, that counsel should plead together and document with residence permits, tax notices, employment contracts and school certificates.

One final French specificity closes the circle for defendants whose default conviction is itself French. Where a Paris court has condemned an absent defendant, the judgment is not a wall but a door: Le jugement par défaut est non avenu dans toutes ses dispositions, si le prévenu forme opposition à son exécution. Opposition wipes the default judgment out in all its provisions and reopens a full adversarial trial — the strongest retrial guarantee in Europe, automatic on a simple declaration within the time limit. This is why foreign authorities requesting surrender from France so often stumble: they invoke a final-looking conviction that French law would have treated as provisional, and they offer no rehearing where France would have offered one by right. The mandatory refusal grounds of Article 695-22 — amnesty, ne bis in idem, minority, discriminatory prosecution — then operate as the outer fence around the file, each capable of blocking surrender independently of the absence question.

From these two systems a single practical method emerges, and it should be applied the day the client walks into the office, before any arrest, because the British cut-off and the French clocks both reward speed. First, reconstruct the foreign trial paper by paper: summonses, proofs of service, mandates given to any lawyer, notifications of the decision, and the exact foreign code provisions on retrial, with a sworn translation and, wherever possible, an opinion from counsel in the issuing state. Second, classify the absence honestly: unawareness, failed notification, deliberate evasion, or instructed representation — because London now treats the last category as presence, and Paris treats the first two as the core of the flagrant-denial argument. Third, test every notification for effectiveness and every remedy for reality: a registered letter to a former address, a thirty-day appeal running from detention abroad, a rehearing limited to points of law, are the pressure points where both the new section 20 and Article 695-22-1 can still be defeated. Fourth, in France, state non-consent at the first presentation to open the full chamber procedure, request additional information from the issuing state wherever its file contradicts itself, and plead the return guarantee early with five years of residence proved by documents rather than assertions. Fifth, remember the calendar: a London arrest dated 28 September 2026 is tried under the old protective law, a Paris surrender executed today is judged under Articles 696-4 and 695-22-1 as the Court of Cassation reads them this year, and in both cities the hearing rewards the party that arrives with exhibits rather than arguments.

Conclusion

The reform that entered into force in London on 29 September 2026 makes surrender easier where the conviction was entered in absence: conditional retrials now suffice, express waivers and lapsed remedies authorise handover, and a trial attended only by counsel counts as presence. Paris holds the opposite line. A requesting state that cannot guarantee a genuine rehearing on fact and law, after hearing the defendant, faces an unfavourable opinion in classic extradition and an optional but well-armed refusal under a European arrest warrant — with the return guarantee converting surrender into domestic enforcement for settled residents. Between the two stands the defendant, who will usually be judged where he is arrested rather than where he lives. The file that wins is therefore the file prepared for both courts at once: foreign procedure proved document by document, absence explained rather than asserted, notifications tested for effectiveness, remedies tested for reality, and residence established for the guarantee of return. Convictions entered in absence are no longer decided by slogans about fair trials; they are decided by paper, dates and proof — and the party that masters all three keeps its liberty.

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