KOHEN AVOCATS FIRM · PARIS 16
France Wanted Him Extradited From London for Alleged Crimes in Thailand: Double Jeopardy, French Procedure, and How to Fight Surrender

Hassan KOHEN acts in urgent matters, from the police station to the assize court. Initial strategic analysis: €80 incl. VAT, personal reply within 24 hours.

100% confidential · Legal professional privilege · No obligation

Article generated by artificial intelligence, through a process designed and supervised by the firm

Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

Paris Bar Police custody, investigation, assize court CNB listing avocat.fr
Maître Hassan KOHEN, avocat au Barreau de Paris
Hassan KOHEN
Attorney at the Paris Bar

France Wanted Him Extradited From London for Alleged Crimes in Thailand: Double Jeopardy, French Procedure, and How to Fight Surrender

Speak to a lawyer 06 89 11 34 45

On 6 October 2026, a judge in London discharged a British businessman whose surrender France had requested over alleged sexual offences said to have been committed in Thailand. The Thai courts had already dealt with the case in 2019, after an investigation lasting several years with which the man had fully cooperated. The French authorities, aware of that Thai decision, pursued him anyway. After a three-day hearing and a 135-page judgment, District Judge Michelle Smith refused to send him to France on four separate grounds: dual criminality, double jeopardy, the devastating effect surrender would have on a vulnerable child, and abuse of process. The outcome was reported by the London chambers that defended him on 22 October 2026, and it deserves close attention from anyone living in France or facing a French prosecution for acts committed abroad. It shows, in real time, how France claims jurisdiction over offences committed thousands of kilometres from Paris, and exactly where such a case can be broken. This analysis explains both sides: why France considered itself entitled to prosecute, and how French law itself arms the defence when the person has already been judged abroad.

I. Why France considered itself entitled to try a man in London for alleged acts committed in Thailand

A. French criminal law follows French nationals and French victims well beyond the border

The first surprise for an international reader is that France did not need the acts to have any connection with French territory. French criminal law expressly reaches conduct committed entirely abroad, through two provisions that every cross-border defence file in Paris starts with. Article 113-6 of the Criminal Code provides that “La loi pénale française est applicable à tout crime commis par un Français hors du territoire de la République.” It adds that “Elle est applicable aux délits commis par des Français hors du territoire de la République si les faits sont punis par la législation du pays où ils ont été commis.” In other words, a French national who commits a serious offence abroad can be tried in France, and even lesser offences can be prosecuted where the foreign state punishes them too.

The second route is wider still, because it does not depend on the nationality of the suspect at all. Article 113-7 of the Criminal Code provides that “La loi pénale française est applicable à tout crime, ainsi qu’à tout délit puni d’emprisonnement, commis par un Français ou par un étranger hors du territoire de la République lorsque la victime est de nationalité française au moment de l’infraction.” Where the alleged victim holds French nationality, France claims jurisdiction over a foreign suspect for acts committed on foreign soil. In the London case, the published account states that the allegations were made by the biological father of the children, described as a French national, in the context of a highly contentious custody dispute. The configuration described therefore corresponds to the classic Article 113-7 pattern: alleged child victims connected to France through a French parent, a foreign suspect, and facts located in a third country, here Thailand. Whether the children themselves held French nationality at the time of the alleged facts is precisely the kind of point a Paris defence lawyer verifies first, because the whole jurisdictional claim turns on the exact wording of the statute: victim of French nationality at the moment of the offence.

Jurisdiction, however, is only the permission to prosecute. For lesser offences, French law adds a procedural lock before any prosecution can start. Article 113-8 of the Criminal Code provides that “la poursuite des délits ne peut être exercée qu’à la requête du ministère public. Elle doit être précédée d’une plainte de la victime ou de ses ayants droit ou d’une dénonciation officielle par l’autorité du pays où le fait a été commis.” No prosecution for a délit committed abroad without either a complaint from the victim or an official report from the authorities of the country where the acts occurred. In a file born of a custody battle, the origin of the complaint, its date, its precise content, and whether the Thai authorities ever officially reported anything to France become decisive documents. A French prosecutor who opened a case on the sole word of one parent, without either trigger required by Article 113-8, would have built on sand. This is the first file a lawyer in Paris orders up: the complaint, the official denunciation if any, and proof of the nationality of each alleged victim at the date of the alleged facts.

The London ruling also illustrates the dual-criminality test that governs every surrender. One of the French counts, described as violence against a minor, failed before the British judge because it did not satisfy the extraterritoriality test in the British statute. The French equivalent is familiar to Paris practitioners: Article 222-13 of the Criminal Code punishes violence causing little or no incapacity with three years of imprisonment and a 45,000 euro fine when committed, first on the list, “1° Sur un mineur de quinze ans”. The lesson for the defence is general. Each offence in the French request must be mapped, count by count, onto punishable conduct in both legal systems, with the aggravating circumstance proved rather than assumed. A count that collapses on dual criminality does not merely reduce the file; in the London case it formed part of a wider picture of a request the court ultimately found abusive.

B. How France transmits an extradition request outside the European Union, step by step

Because the man was in the United Kingdom, France proceeded outside the European arrest warrant system, under the post-Brexit surrender arrangements between the United Kingdom and the European Union. The British court applied its own statute and its own human-rights test. But the mirror image, a foreign state requesting France to surrender someone found on French soil, runs through a procedure every Paris extradition lawyer knows by heart, and it is worth describing because it is the procedure France itself must satisfy when it asks others to trust its files. Article 696 of the Code of Criminal Procedure sets the frame: “En l’absence de convention internationale en stipulant autrement, les conditions, la procédure et les effets de l’extradition sont déterminés par les dispositions du présent chapitre.” Treaties come first; the Code fills everything else. For a full map of that procedure, readers can consult our guide to French extradition procedure before the chambre de l’instruction and the guarantees of the requested person.

Once arrested in France, the requested person is brought before the procureur général and asked whether they consent to surrender. Refusal sends the file to the chambre de l’instruction, the senior criminal chamber of the court of appeal, which becomes the real trial of the request. Article 696-15 of the Code of Criminal Procedure organises that hearing with unusual speed: the person appears within ten working days of presentation to the procureur général, and the chamber gives its reasoned opinion within one month of the appearance unless further inquiries are ordered. The same article fixes the standard in terms every defence brief in Paris quotes: “Cet avis est défavorable si la cour estime que les conditions légales ne sont pas remplies ou qu’il y a une erreur évidente.” Unmet legal conditions or a manifest error, and the opinion must go against surrender. The article adds a strict limit on appeals: “Le pourvoi formé contre un avis de la chambre de l’instruction ne peut être fondé que sur des vices de forme de nature à priver cet avis des conditions essentielles de son existence légale.” Only formal defects capable of depriving the opinion of the essential conditions of its legal existence can support a cassation appeal, which makes the hearing before the chamber the decisive battle rather than a rehearsal.

An unfavourable opinion ends the matter. Article 696-17 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states that “Si l’avis motivé de la chambre de l’instruction repousse la demande d’extradition et que cet avis est définitif, l’extradition ne peut être accordée.” The requested person, if held for no other reason, is automatically released. Only where the opinion is favourable does the file move to the executive: Article 696-18 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that “l’extradition est autorisée par décret du Premier ministre pris sur le rapport du ministre de la justice.” That decree can itself be challenged before the Conseil d’Etat within one month, failing which the challenge is foreclosed, and if the requesting state does not collect the person within one month of notification of the decree, the person is automatically freed and can no longer be claimed on the same grounds, save for force majeure. Each of these time limits is a trap for the requesting state and a lifeline for the defence, and each must be checked against the text in force, through the official links cited here, as consulted for this article.

The same Code lists the substantive walls a request can hit. Article 696-4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that extradition is not granted, among other cases, “Lorsque les crimes ou délits, quoique commis hors du territoire de la République, y ont été poursuivis et jugés définitivement”. Read carefully, that fourth ground covers only facts prosecuted and definitively judged in France. A definitive judgment abroad, such as the 2019 Thai disposal in the London case, does not fall within the letter of that provision. The gap is striking and deliberate in its drafting, and it is exactly why the second part of this article matters: the protection against being tried twice exists in French law, but it sits elsewhere, in the provisions on extraterritorial prosecution rather than in the extradition chapter.

II. How a surrender requested by France can still be defeated when the person was already judged abroad

A. Already judged abroad means France itself could not prosecute, and the requesting state must prove otherwise

The strongest French-law argument in a case like the London file is also the simplest: if the Thai decision definitively judged the same facts, France is forbidden from prosecuting them itself. Article 113-9 of the Criminal Code provides that “aucune poursuite ne peut être exercée contre une personne justifiant qu’elle a été jugée définitivement à l’étranger pour les mêmes faits et, en cas de condamnation, que la peine a été subie ou prescrite.” No prosecution where the person shows a definitive foreign judgment on the same facts, and, after a conviction, service or limitation of the sentence. The British judge applied the same idea under her own statute, finding that the Thai dismissal amounted to a genuine acquittal with no special circumstances justifying a second prosecution. Under French law, the question would be put in Article 113-9 terms: is the Thai disposal a definitive judgment, does it cover the same facts as the French file, and, if it was a conviction, was the sentence served or time-barred. Each element is proved with paper, not rhetoric: the full Thai decision with a certified translation, the certificate that it became final, and, where relevant, proof of service of the sentence.

Very recent French case law sharpens the point inside the European surrender system. On 30 September 2026, the criminal chamber of the Cour de cassation ruled on successive European arrest warrants issued by two different Member States for the same facts, after France had refused the first one over fair-trial concerns (Crim., 30 September 2026, no. 26-85.654). On the double-jeopardy argument, the Court approved the Paris chambre de l’instruction for refusing further inquiries where nothing in the file suggested a definitive decision existed in the first state, and it recalled the governing principle in clear terms: “le respect du principe ne bis in idem incombe au premier chef à l’Etat d’émission, en l’espèce l’Allemagne.” Respect for ne bis in idem lies first and foremost with the issuing state. The practical consequence for anyone facing a French request is direct. The defence must force the issuing authority to answer, in writing and before surrender, whether a definitive judgment exists anywhere for the same facts, and must place the foreign judgment itself before the executing judge. A bare assertion is not enough, in either direction: in that same ruling, the Court held that mere allegations, without any material in the file, do not establish that proceedings were even opened in the other state, let alone definitively judged.

The same ruling contains a warning that cuts both ways. The Court accepted that where a first warrant was refused over systemic fair-trial failures in one Member State, a second warrant from a different Member State without such failures represents a change of circumstances allowing surrender, with responsibility for fundamental rights lying principally with the new issuing state, citing the Court of Justice of the European Union (Crim., 30 September 2026, no. 26-85.654). A refusal won in one country on the state of its prisons or its courts does not automatically vaccinate the person against a fresh request from another state for the same facts. The durable shield is a definitive judgment on the merits, not a refusal based on conditions of detention or trial. That is why, in the London file, the double-jeopardy finding mattered more than any other ground: it went to the merits, to a Thai court having disposed of the case, and it is the kind of finding that travels across borders far better than a ruling about prison conditions.

For the defence in Paris, the method that follows from these texts is methodical rather than theatrical. First, obtain the complete foreign file and its final decision, with a sworn translation, and establish under the foreign law, proved by an expert if needed, as was done in London with a Thai lawyer, that the decision is final and covers the same acts. Second, serve that decision on the French prosecutor and the chambre de l’instruction with a reasoned memorandum mapping each French count onto the foreign counts, because Article 113-9 protects against prosecution for the same facts, and identity of facts is argued count by count. Third, where the foreign outcome was a conviction, add proof that the sentence was served or is time-barred. Fourth, demand that the requesting authority confirm in writing the absence of any other definitive decision, since the Cour de cassation places that responsibility first on the issuing state. Handled this way, a French file built on facts already judged abroad can be stopped before it ever reaches an extradition hearing, at the prosecution stage itself.

B. Health, family life and defective requests: what French judges verify before surrendering anyone

Beyond double jeopardy, the London judgment rested on the human cost of surrender and on the quality of the French request, and French courts examine both with equal seriousness, though with their own strict rules. On family and private life, the Cour de cassation set the current doctrine less than a year ago. In a ruling of 16 December 2025 concerning a European arrest warrant from Romania (Crim., 16 December 2025, no. 25-87.663), the Court recalled that “la remise de la personne recherchée ne peut être refusée que pour les motifs de refus, obligatoires ou facultatifs, qui y sont limitativement énoncés. Ne constitue pas un tel motif l’atteinte à la vie privée et familiale en France que causerait à la personne recherchée l’exécution dudit mandat.” Surrender can only be refused on the exhaustively listed grounds, and harm to private and family life in France is not one of them. The door is not shut, but it is narrow: the Court added that where such harm is alleged, the chamber must determine whether “le demandeur établit l’existence de circonstances exceptionnelles permettant de faire prévaloir le droit au respect de sa vie privée et familiale en France sur le but légitime poursuivi par sa remise en exécution du mandat d’arrêt européen, notamment au regard de la gravité des faits.” Exceptional circumstances, proved by the requested person, capable of outweighing the legitimate aim of surrender, weighed notably against the seriousness of the facts.

In that case, the Paris chamber had refused surrender for a seventy-seven-year-old man settled in France, father of a schooled fifteen-year-old, with a fragile state of health on both sides of the couple and a recent stroke, and the Cour de cassation quashed the refusal: health risks had been examined under Article 8 of the European Convention instead of Article 3, and no exceptional circumstances outweighing a warrant issued for influence-trafficking and related offences had been established (Crim., 16 December 2025, no. 25-87.663). The contrast with the London outcome is instructive rather than contradictory. The British judge found an exceptionally severe impact, a psychologically vulnerable daughter exposed to a serious risk of self-harm or suicide as a triggering event, with no safe alternative care plan, and she weighed it against allegations she had already found doubly barred. Before a French chamber, the same file would need the same ingredients presented the French way: independent medical evidence, proof that no alternative care exists in the requesting state, and a proportionality argument tied to the gravity of the counts that survive the other challenges. Health and family arguments almost never win alone; they win when the criminal file is already crumbling.

The quality of the request itself is the third battlefield, and here the most recent French ruling is only weeks old. On 6 October 2026, the very day of the London judgment, the criminal chamber quashed a favourable extradition opinion given for North Macedonia because the Colmar chambre de l’instruction had checked limitation only against the requesting state’s law (Crim., 6 October 2026, no. 26-80.296). The Court recalled the European Extradition Convention rule that surrender is refused where the prosecution or sentence is time-barred under either the requesting or the requested state’s legislation, then held that “alors qu’il appartenait à la chambre de l’instruction de vérifier, au besoin d’office, si, à la date de l’arrestation de l’intéressé, la prescription de la peine ne s’était pas trouvée acquise au regard tant de la législation macédonienne que de la législation française, l’arrêt ne remplit pas les conditions essentielles de son existence légale.” The chamber must verify, of its own motion if needed, as of the date of arrest, whether limitation was acquired under both laws; failure to do so deprives the opinion of the essential conditions of its legal existence. For the defence, the message is concrete: limitation is pleaded under both legal systems from the first memorandum, with dates, full statutory references and the arrest date pinned down, because the chamber must answer the point even if nobody raises it (Crim., 6 October 2026, no. 26-80.296).

Finally, the London court added a finding of abuse of process, concluding that pursuing extradition while aware of the Thai disposal made the proceedings themselves abusive. French procedure has its own vocabulary for the same idea: manifest error under Article 696-15, quoted above, and the line of cases annulling opinions that fail the essential conditions of their legal existence, as the 6 October 2026 ruling demonstrates. A request that conceals the foreign acquittal, misstates the charges, or recycles counts already judged invites exactly that finding. The file to assemble in Paris therefore mirrors the London bundle: the foreign judgment and its finality, the complaint and its exact origin, the limitation analysis under both laws, the dual-criminality mapping count by count, and, only then, the medical and family evidence with independent reports. Each layer is argued in the order a French chamber thinks: jurisdiction first, then the bars to surrender, then proportionality. That order is also the order of this article, because it is the order in which extradition cases are won.

Conclusion

The London discharge of 6 October 2026 does not declare anyone innocent, and it does not prevent France from continuing its own proceedings under its own rules. What it does is expose, in a single file, the full anatomy of a cross-border French prosecution: extraterritorial jurisdiction claimed over acts in Thailand, a request pursued despite a 2019 foreign disposal, and four independent grounds on which surrender can fail. French law confirms each lesson from the inside. Articles 113-6 and 113-7 explain why France believed it could prosecute, Article 113-8 constrains how such a prosecution for lesser offences may begin, Article 113-9 forbids prosecuting facts definitively judged abroad, and Articles 696-4, 696-15, 696-17 and 696-18 organise the judicial control that can stop a surrender in Paris as surely as in London. The rulings of 30 September and 6 October 2026 add the finishing touches: ne bis in idem is first the issuing state’s responsibility, limitation must be verified under both laws of the court’s own motion, and family life blocks surrender only through proved exceptional circumstances. Anyone who learns that France seeks them, from London or from anywhere else, should have these texts checked against their own file within days, starting with the foreign judgment, because in extradition law the oldest paper in the file is often the one that ends the case.

📄 Official circular