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Gaza Ceasefire at One Year: Hostages Home, ICC Warrants Live, Colombia Leaves the ICJ Case — What France Can Do

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Gaza Ceasefire at One Year: Hostages Home, ICC Warrants Live, Colombia Leaves the ICJ Case — What France Can Do

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One year ago, on 9 October 2025, an agreement on a United States-brokered 20-point peace plan for Gaza was announced: the guns would fall silent, every surviving Israeli hostage would come home, and around 2,000 Palestinian prisoners would walk out of Israeli jails. The deal took effect, the exchanges happened within days, and aid convoys finally rolled into the Strip in large numbers. Twelve months later, the anniversary coverage tells a harder story. The remaining living hostages are home, yet the ceasefire has, in the words of one American assessment published this week, “failed to deliver” on its larger promises: no durable political settlement, no reconstruction worthy of the name, and no closure for the families of the dead on either side whose relatives have not been returned or identified. For lawyers, the anniversary raises a sharper question than the commemorations suggest. Ceasefires stop shooting; they do not, by themselves, settle criminal responsibility. Two cases in The Hague — the International Criminal Court prosecution in the Situation in the State of Palestine and the International Court of Justice genocide case brought by South Africa against Israel — are still on the docket. And on 22 September 2026, just weeks before the anniversary, the ICJ announced that Colombia had withdrawn its declaration of intervention in the genocide case, a quiet procedural step that says a great deal about how third States now position themselves. This article takes stock: what the one-year-old deal actually settled, what it left legally untouched, where both Hague cases stand, and — the French angle our international readers ask about most — what victims, suspects and witnesses can concretely do before the French courts.

I. One year on: what the Gaza ceasefire deal settled and what it left legally open

A. How the hostage release and the prisoner exchange actually worked

The core of the October 2025 arrangement was an exchange, not an amnesty. Under the published terms of the plan, all living hostages were to be released in exchange for Israel’s release of 2,000 Palestinian prisoners, including 250 serving life sentences and 1,700 prisoners detained since the war began, within 72 hours of the withdrawal of Israeli forces to pre-designated lines inside Gaza. A parallel clause required that within 72 hours of Israel publicly accepting the agreement, all hostages, alive and deceased, would be returned. The sequence that followed is now a matter of public record: the 20 living hostages held in Gaza were freed, Israel began releasing the Palestinian prisoners in stages, humanitarian access surged, and major military operations halted. The commemorations this week — from the anniversary statements of mediators to the retrospectives in the American and international press — all start from that factual baseline: the exchange mechanism, for all its fragility, performed the single humanitarian task it was designed for.

Three features of the mechanism matter for everything that follows. First, the exchange was reciprocal and conditional: each side’s performance was the consideration for the other’s, monitored by the mediators, with the phased Israeli withdrawal to the so-called Yellow Line serving as the physical guarantee. Lawyers will recognise the structure — closer to a heavily mediated synallagmatic arrangement than to a treaty of peace. Second, the deal said nothing about criminal liability. No clause extinguished individual responsibility for war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide; no amnesty was proclaimed for any category of perpetrator; no truth commission or reparations machinery was created. That silence was deliberate: neither the mediators nor the parties were prepared to bargain away questions that belong, under international law, to courts rather than to negotiators. Third, the agreement dealt with the living far better than with the dead. The return of remains — hostages killed in captivity and Palestinians whose bodies were retained — has remained incomplete and contested, and identification, restitution of bodies and the rights of families of the missing are still governed, where they are governed at all, by the general law of armed conflict rather than by any dedicated mechanism of the deal. Anyone advising families on either side must start here: the ceasefire gave them back movement, aid and, for twenty families, the living. It did not give them judgments, archives or reparations.

The practical consequence is visible one year on. Reconstruction has barely begun, governance of the Strip remains an open dispute among the parties and the mediators, and the “next phases” of the 20-point plan — disarmament, an international stabilisation presence, a political horizon — exist more on paper than on the ground. That is the context in which the Hague proceedings continue: not as an alternative to a completed peace, but as the only fora in which responsibility for the gravest acts committed since 7 October 2023 is still being examined on the basis of evidence and law. A ceasefire can freeze a front line. It cannot un-issue an arrest warrant, and it cannot withdraw a case from the International Court of Justice. Only the courts themselves, or the States that seised them, can do that — which is exactly why the Colombian withdrawal of September 2026 deserves a close look.

B. Which legal questions the ceasefire deliberately left untouched

The first unanswered question is the simplest to state and the hardest to resolve: who answers, criminally, for what was done? The attacks of 7 October 2023, in which some 1,200 people were killed in Israel and more than 250 taken hostage, and the ensuing Israeli military campaign in Gaza, in which the reported Palestinian death toll runs into the tens of thousands with massive destruction of housing, hospitals and infrastructure, have both generated allegations of the gravest international crimes — murder and hostage-taking as crimes against humanity, indiscriminate attacks and collective punishment as war crimes, and, in the South African application before the ICJ, genocide. A ceasefire agreement between the parties cannot, as a matter of law, dispose of any of these allegations. The Rome Statute admits no defence of “the war is over”: the International Criminal Court’s jurisdiction over crimes committed on the territory of the State of Palestine, which acceded to the Statute, or by its nationals, survives any bilateral deal. Nor can a political agreement bind the Prosecutor, who acts independently, or the judges, who decide on the evidence. Families and counsel should understand this plainly: nothing signed in October 2025 prevents an investigation, an arrest warrant or a trial in The Hague for acts covered by the ceasefire period.

The second unanswered question concerns amnesties and prisoner releases. The release of 2,000 Palestinian prisoners — including 250 people serving life sentences — was an executive and negotiated measure, comparable to the prisoner releases that accompany many conflict settlements. It was not a judicial rehabilitation: release does not erase conviction, does not establish innocence, and does not bar future prosecution for international crimes where jurisdiction exists. Symmetrically, the freeing of the hostages ended an ongoing crime but does not extinguish the criminal character of the hostage-taking itself. International law has grown increasingly hostile to blanket amnesties for core crimes — United Nations practice, the case law of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the policy of the ICC Office of the Prosecutor all point the same way — and there is no serious argument that the Gaza deal created one, since it contains no amnesty clause at all. Defence counsel sometimes hope otherwise; prosecutors and victims’ counsel should not concede the point without a text, and here there is no text.

The third unanswered question is the fate of the missing and the dead. International humanitarian law — the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols — obliges parties to search for the dead, to record identifying information, and to facilitate the return of remains to families. These obligations do not lapse with a ceasefire; if anything, the cessation of hostilities is the moment they become performable. Yet one year on, families on both sides are still waiting: some hostage bodies were returned late or remain unrecovered, and Palestinian families likewise seek the remains of relatives killed or detained during the operations. France has a direct interest here that is often overlooked: several French nationals were among the victims of 7 October 2023, French families are parties civiles in French proceedings, and the French authorities have consistently demanded the unconditional release of all hostages and full light on the fate of the missing. The legal tools available in France for these families — which we detail in Part II — are part of what the ceasefire left open, and they remain fully usable today.

II. Where international justice stands one year later, and what France can concretely do

A. The ICC arrest warrants survive the ceasefire, and the ICJ genocide case continues without Colombia

On 21 November 2024, Pre-Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court issued warrants of arrest in the Situation in the State of Palestine: against the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the former Defence Minister Yoav Gallant for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity, and against the Hamas military leader Mohammed Deif for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity arising from the 7 October 2023 attacks and the subsequent captivity. The warrants against two other Hamas leaders originally sought by the Prosecutor were not pursued after their reported deaths. The Chamber’s reasoning, set out in its decisions of that day, found reasonable grounds to believe that the named individuals bore criminal responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court, including the war crime of starvation as a method of warfare and crimes against humanity of murder, persecution and other inhumane acts in the case of the Israeli officials, and murder, extermination, torture, hostage-taking and sexual violence in the case of the Hamas leader. These warrants remain in force today. They have not been withdrawn, stayed or conditioned on the ceasefire, and the Chamber has since rejected jurisdictional challenges to the Court’s authority in the Palestine situation — a point confirmed in the Court’s own reporting on the case, which readers can follow on the Court’s Situation in the State of Palestine page and in the record of the rejection of Israel’s challenges.

What does a still-valid ICC warrant mean, concretely, one year into a ceasefire? Three things. First, the 125 States Parties to the Rome Statute — France among them — remain under the treaty obligation to cooperate with the Court, including arrest and surrender on request. The political temperature around a warrant changes with a ceasefire; the legal obligation does not. Second, travel by the persons named in the warrants through the territory of States Parties continues to carry a real risk of arrest proceedings, as the repeated controversies over official visits and overflights since November 2024 have shown — a subject we have examined in detail in our analysis of ICC arrest warrants, overflight of France and the obligations of the French authorities. Third, the Prosecutor’s investigation continues: ceasefires do not close investigations, and the Office of the Prosecutor has continued to collect testimony and forensic material relating both to the 7 October attacks and to the conduct of the Gaza campaign. For victims, this means that applications to participate in the proceedings and representations in support of the investigation remain open and meaningful. For anyone advising a person who could be a witness, a victim or a suspect in this situation, the message of the anniversary is continuity, not closure: the ICC file did not move to the archives when the hostages came home.

Before the International Court of Justice, the picture is equally one of continuity — with one notable defection. South Africa’s application of 29 December 2023, alleging violations of the Genocide Convention in Gaza, produced three sets of provisional-measures orders (26 January, 28 March and 24 May 2024) in which the Court ordered Israel, among other things, to prevent genocidal acts, to enable humanitarian assistance, and to halt the Rafah offensive. The case then entered its slow merits phase, accompanied by a wave of third-State interventions: States invoking Article 63 of the Court’s Statute — which gives parties to a convention the right to intervene on its construction — lined up to be heard on the meaning of the Genocide Convention. Then, on 22 September 2026, the Court published Press Release No. 2026/24, recording that Colombia had informed the Court on 18 September 2026 of its decision to withdraw the declaration of intervention it had filed under Article 63 of the Statute on 5 April 2024 in the genocide case Nicaragua had earlier withdrawn its own application for permission to intervene. The full docket, with every order and declaration, remains consultable on the Court’s case page for South Africa v. Israel and its intervention page.

How should readers interpret the Colombian withdrawal? Carefully, and without exaggeration. A withdrawal of an Article 63 declaration is a procedural step by a non-party: it removes Colombia’s right to be heard on the construction of the Genocide Convention and releases it from being bound by the Court’s construction, but it changes nothing in the case between South Africa and Israel, leaves the provisional-measures orders fully binding, and does not signal any finding on the merits. States withdraw interventions for many reasons — changes of government, litigation economy, diplomatic repositioning after a ceasefire — and the press release gives none. What the withdrawal does illustrate, one year after the ceasefire, is the slow diplomatic normalisation around the Gaza file: third States that rushed to intervene in 2024 are reassessing the costs and benefits of visible participation now that the hostages are home and the cameras have partly moved on. For the law, the case continues with the remaining interveners and the two parties. The provisional measures remain the strongest judicial pronouncements to date on the obligations of Israel toward the population of Gaza, and they bind regardless of who intervenes. Victims’ counsel should cite them as living law, not as history.

B. What victims, witnesses and suspects can do before the French courts right now

France is not a bystander in this file; it is one of the fora where the law can still move. French criminal law gives the national courts several distinct bases for acting on facts connected with Gaza, and the anniversary is a good moment to map them precisely — because limitation periods run, evidence disperses, and residence situations change, so waiting is itself a legal choice with consequences.

The first basis is the ordinary territorial and personal jurisdiction of the French courts. French law starts from a broad principle: where French criminal law is made applicable to acts committed abroad — by statute or by international convention — the French courts may try the perpetrators and accomplices even though the facts occurred outside the Republic. In practice, this covers French victims directly: murders, kidnappings, hostage-taking and acts of terrorism committed abroad against French nationals found French criminal law applicable, and the Paris prosecutor’s office — including its anti-terrorism section — opened investigations after 7 October 2023 in which French families constituted themselves parties civiles. If you are a French national who lost a relative on 7 October, or the relative of a hostage, a complaint with constitution de partie civile before the Paris judicial court remains the natural first step, and the ceasefire changes nothing about its admissibility. The facts are documented, the victims identified, and the French courts have already asserted their role.

The second basis is universal jurisdiction over torture. Article 689-2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides, in the very words recalled by the Assemblée plénière: “Aux termes de l’article 689-2 du même code, pour l’application de la Convention contre la torture et autres peines ou traitements cruels, inhumains ou dégradants, adoptée à New York le 10 décembre 1984, peut être poursuivie et jugée dans les conditions prévues à l’article 689-1 toute personne coupable de tortures au sens de l’article 1er de la Convention.” The scope of this provision was fixed at the highest level by the Assemblée plénière of the Cour de cassation on 12 May 2023 (appeal No. U 22-82.468), which recalled: “Selon l’article 689-1 du code de procédure pénale, peut être poursuivie et jugée par les juridictions françaises, si elle se trouve en France, toute personne qui s’est rendue coupable, hors du territoire de la République, de l’une des infractions énumérées par les articles suivants.” The condition is presence on French territory — a person merely transiting through France can, in principle, suffice — and the offence must meet the Convention definition of torture. Documented allegations of torture of detainees and hostages on all sides of the Gaza conflict fall squarely within the field this provision was written for. Any person present in France who credibly reports having been tortured in connection with the conflict, or any association acting on their behalf, can bring facts to the Paris prosecutor or to an investigating judge; the 2023 plenary ruling confirms that the courts will examine jurisdiction on the Convention’s own terms rather than on restrictive glosses. The decision is published by the Court itself at courdecassation.fr/decision/645dd86cd1cd71d0f828667b.

The third basis is the broader universal jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Article 689-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Article 689-11) states: “Hors les cas prévus au sous-titre Ier du titre Ier du livre IV pour l’application de la convention portant statut de la Cour pénale internationale, ouverte à la signature à Rome le 18 juillet 1998, peut être poursuivie et jugée par les juridictions françaises toute personne soupçonnée d’avoir commis à l’étranger l’une des infractions suivantes : 1° Le crime de génocide défini au chapitre Ier du sous-titre Ier du titre Ier du livre II du code pénal ; 2° Les autres crimes contre l’humanité définis au chapitre II du même sous-titre Ier ; 3° Les crimes et les délits de guerre définis aux articles 461-1 à 461-31 du même code.” The provision adds the well-known residence condition — the suspect must have habitual residence in France, assessed through a sufficient connecting link — and a subsidiarity mechanism giving, in effect, priority to the courts of the place of commission and to international courts. These are real filters, and counsel must assess them honestly: Article 689-11 was designed for the exile-or-refuge scenario, not for absent foreign officials with no French link. But the filter is not a wall. Residents, dual nationals, former fighters, contractors, and any person with a durable French attachment who is suspected of core crimes connected with the conflict can fall within it, and the Cour de cassation has repeatedly clarified the substantive definitions that then apply — for example, in its ruling of 24 November 2021 (No. 21-81.344), which recalled that crimes against humanity are necessarily committed pursuant to a concerted plan against a civilian population group in the context of a widespread or systematic attack, published at courdecassation.fr/decision/619de43eb458df69d4022a18. The substantive French definitions themselves track the international ones: Article 211-1 of the Criminal Code provides that “Constitue un génocide le fait, en exécution d’un plan concerté tendant à la destruction totale ou partielle d’un groupe national, ethnique, racial ou religieux, ou d’un groupe déterminé à partir de tout autre critère arbitraire, de commettre ou de faire commettre, à l’encontre de membres de ce groupe, l’un des actes suivants”, while Article 212-1 provides that “Constitue également un crime contre l’humanité et est puni de la réclusion criminelle à perpétuité l’un des actes ci-après commis en exécution d’un plan concerté à l’encontre d’un groupe de population civile dans le cadre d’une attaque généralisée ou systématique”, and Article 461-1 defines war crimes as offences “commises, lors d’un conflit armé international ou non international et en relation avec ce conflit, en violation des lois et coutumes de la guerre ou des conventions internationales applicables aux conflits armés, à l’encontre des personnes ou des biens visés aux articles 461-2 à 461-31”. Each of these texts is freely consultable with its official reference: Article 211-1, Article 212-1, Article 461-1, Article 689-2. Torture as such is punished by Article 222-1 of the Criminal Code: “Le fait de soumettre une personne à des tortures ou à des actes de barbarie est puni de quinze ans de réclusion criminelle” (Article 222-1).

The fourth basis is France’s cooperation with the International Criminal Court itself. French procedure dedicates an entire architecture to it: Article 627-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that “Les demandes d’entraide émanant de la Cour pénale internationale sont adressées aux autorités compétentes en vertu de l’article 87 du statut en original ou en copie certifiée conforme accompagnées de toutes pièces justificatives”, and Article 627-3 adds that “L’exécution sur le territoire français des mesures conservatoires mentionnées au k du paragraphe 1 de l’article 93 du statut est ordonnée, aux frais avancés du Trésor et selon les modalités prévues par le présent code, par le procureur de la République antiterroriste” (Article 627-1, Article 627-3). In plain terms: the Paris anti-terrorism prosecutor is the French gateway for ICC requests — mutual assistance, protective measures, and, where the statute and treaties apply, arrest and surrender. This is the same gateway examined in our earlier analysis of how France enforces ICC decisions, from arrest to reparations. Victims’ counsel can therefore work both ends of the system at once: support the Hague investigation with evidence and victim applications, and seise the French courts where French jurisdictional bases exist. The two tracks are complementary, not alternative, and experienced counsel run them in parallel.

A final practical word on method, because this file generates more heat than most. Anyone acting — victim, witness or suspect — needs three things from the outset: secured evidence (medical certificates, photographs, messages, flight and detention records, obtained and preserved lawfully), a precise jurisdictional memo (which French basis, which condition, which competing forum, which limitation period), and realistic expectations about time (universal-jurisdiction investigations in France are measured in years, not months, and ICC proceedings slower still). The ceasefire anniversary does not shorten any of these timelines, but it does offer one forensic advantage: with access improved and the exchanges documented, facts that were unreachable in wartime can now be established. The year since October 2025 has produced archives — mediator records, exchange lists, aid manifests, satellite imagery, press investigations — that did not exist when the first complaints were filed. Good counsel will be re-reading old files against these new materials now.

Conclusion

One year after the Gaza ceasefire, the balance sheet is split. The exchange at the heart of the October 2025 deal worked: twenty living hostages came home, some 2,000 Palestinian prisoners were freed, and the Strip breathed again. Everything else — political settlement, reconstruction, governance — lags badly, and the anniversary press says so openly. But the legal balance sheet is clearer than the political one, and it favours persistence over resignation. The ICC warrants of November 2024 are still in force and still obligate the States Parties; the ICJ’s provisional measures still bind regardless of Colombia’s September 2026 withdrawal; no amnesty was ever proclaimed and none can be implied; and the French courts remain open on at least four distinct bases, from complaints by French victims to universal jurisdiction and ICC cooperation through the Paris anti-terrorism prosecutor. Ceasefires end wars between armies. They do not end cases before judges. For the families still waiting for remains, for the victims still waiting for a courtroom, and for the suspects and witnesses who need to know where they stand, the second year of the ceasefire should be the year the files move — in The Hague, and in Paris.

📄 Official circular