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Netanyahu Flew Over France a Ninth Time Despite the ICC Warrant: Why Paris Says It Owes the Court Nothing for an Overflight

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Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

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Netanyahu Flew Over France a Ninth Time Despite the ICC Warrant: Why Paris Says It Owes the Court Nothing for an Overflight

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On 24 September 2026, the aircraft carrying Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to the United Nations General Assembly in New York crossed the airspace of Greece, Italy and France, on a route also crossing Greece and Italy. For France, it was the ninth overflight of its territory by a passenger wanted by the International Criminal Court since the arrest warrant of 21 November 2024, as counted by Le Monde. Paris did not hesitate. The Foreign Ministry said France had fully complied with international law, and spokesperson Pascal Confavreux told reporters that, as reported by Le Monde, the Rome Statute lays no obligation on France concerning the overflight of its territory by a foreign State aircraft carrying a person under ICC arrest warrant.

The statement is legally precise, politically explosive, and only half of the story. France is a State Party to the Rome Statute and is formally bound to cooperate with the Court, including arresting suspects who enter its territory. The warrants against Netanyahu and his then defence chief concern, in the words of the Court, whose defendant page notes an arrest warrant issued on 21 November 2024, alleged responsibility for using starvation as a method of warfare and directing attacks against civilians, and for murder, persecution and other inhumane acts committed between October 2023 and May 2024. Israel rejects the jurisdiction of the Hague-based court, denies war crimes in Gaza and is contesting the warrants. Meanwhile the judges in The Hague, in the words of international judge Gilbert Bitti quoted by Le Monde, have taken a consistent line: the Court has never asked any State to arrest a suspect mid-flight.

This article explains, from inside French procedure, why Paris believes an overflight triggers no duty to arrest, why a landing would be an entirely different legal event, and what French courts themselves decided in July 2025 about the immunity of sitting heads of state. For anyone advising a client exposed to an ICC warrant, an Interpol red notice or a European surrender file transiting through France, the distinction between the sky and the soil is the whole case.

I. Does France Have to Arrest an ICC Suspect Who Only Flies Over Its Airspace?

A. What the Rome Statute Really Requires: Territory, Arrest and Surrender

The starting point is the general duty. Article 86 of the Rome Statute sets the general duty of States Parties to cooperate fully with the Court in investigating and prosecuting its crimes. Requests travel, under Article 87, through the diplomatic channel or any other appropriate channel designated by each State Party, and may also pass through the International Criminal Police Organization. France designated its channel long ago, and its domestic machinery for answering such requests sits in the Code of Criminal Procedure, in the articles that organise cooperation with the Court, beginning with Article 627, which organises French participation in punishing these offences and French cooperation with the Court.

The operative provision for arrest is Article 89, and its wording is territorial. Paragraph 1 allows the Court to seek arrest and surrender from any State on whose territory the person may be found, and obliges States Parties to comply under their national procedure. The trigger is presence on the territory. A passenger at cruising altitude inside a foreign State aircraft is not, in the reading Paris defends, a person “found” on French territory in the sense of Article 89. No arrest request concerning an overflight has ever been transmitted through the Article 87 channel, and none was transmitted here.

The Statute does know the concept of transit, but it covers a different situation. Article 89(3)(a) covers: a State Party authorises transit through its territory of a person already being surrendered to the Court by another State, unless transit would impede or delay the surrender. That is the transfer of a detainee already surrendered by one State on the way to The Hague, documented by a Court transit request. A head of government travelling aboard his own State aircraft to New York is not a person being surrendered, and the Court issued no transit request. France’s position is therefore that neither paragraph 1 nor paragraph 3 of Article 89 was engaged on 24 September 2026.

Where a State Party sees a problem executing a request, Article 97 requires it to consult with the Court without delay to resolve the difficulty, listing among possible problems insufficient information, an unlocatable person, or a conflict with a pre-existing treaty obligation toward another State. France did not invoke Article 97 consultations here, for a simple reason: in its analysis there was no request to execute. That reading is consistent with the practice of the Court itself. As judge Bitti put it in remarks reported by Le Monde, what counts is the practical capacity to arrest, hence enforcement of the warrant once the wanted person is on State territory. The precedent he cites is telling: former Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir, also indicted by the ICC, flew over dozens of countries without the Court ever censuring the States overflown. When the Court did find non-compliance, it was about physical presence: on 24 October 2024, Pre-Trial Chamber II concluded that by failing to arrest Vladimir Putin while he was on its territory and surrender him to the Court, Mongolia had failed to comply with the Court’s request to cooperate in this regard contrary to the provisions of the Rome Statute (Statute), thereby preventing the Court from exercising its functions and powers under Article 87(7) of the Statute. Overflight has never produced such a finding, and the judges, as Le Monde notes, made no arrest request to the countries overflown and are not expected to demand explanations from them.

B. Why Paris Still Had to Clear the Flight: State Aircraft, French Airspace and Political Cost

saying there is no duty to arrest is not the same as saying France did nothing. Every crossing of national airspace by a foreign State aircraft requires the permission of the overflown State, and France granted it. The Foreign Ministry presents that permission as routine air-traffic administration, fully separate from ICC cooperation. Critics read it as a political choice dressed up as legal necessity, and the contrast with the previous year feeds their case: in 2025, according to media reports, Netanyahu flew a circuitous route to New York skirting the airspace of several European countries, including France. This time the direct route crossed French airspace without incident, and Italy’s Foreign Ministry, when asked whether Israeli authorities had even sought permission for the overflight, said it could not immediately answer. The procedure looks discretionary precisely because States treat it as discretionary.

The political backdrop explains why each clearance now makes headlines. Days before the flight, The United States President publicly urged ICC member States to quit the Court, in media’ reporting, as Washington pressed a campaign to isolate the Court. France has said it condemns the threats against the Court. Granting the overflight while verbally defending the institution is the balancing act Paris has chosen: full rhetorical support for the ICC, strict textual reading of its own obligations. Whether that balance holds depends on a question the overflight itself does not answer, which is what France would do if the aircraft landed. French non-governmental organisations already fought that battle in November 2024. After Paris pledged on 26 November 2024 to give full effect to the warrants, the Foreign Ministry stated the following day that the immunity of leaders of States not party to the Statute applied. The International Federation for Human Rights and the Ligue des droits de l’Homme publicly rejected that reading, arguing that Article 27 of the Rome Statute excludes any immunity defence and that France owes the Court full cooperation, including the arrest and surrender of any wanted person present on its territory. The landing scenario, in other words, is where French law would finally have to choose between the two readings, and French judges have since given important indications of how they think about immunity. But before reaching Paris courtrooms, the immunity knot has to be untied at its source, in the tension between two articles of the Statute itself.

II. Could France Arrest Netanyahu If His Plane Landed in Paris?

A. Two Immunities, Two Courts: Article 27 Against Article 98

The Rome Statute speaks about immunity with two voices, and each side of the French debate quotes a different one. The first voice is Article 27, titled “Irrelevance of official capacity”. Its first paragraph applies the Statute equally to all persons without distinction of official capacity, so that holding office as head of State or government never exempts from criminal responsibility nor mitigates sentence. Its second paragraph adds that immunities attaching to official capacity, under national or international law, cannot bar the Court from exercising jurisdiction. Read alone, Article 27 leaves no room for a sitting-prime-minister exception before the Court, and the Federation’s press release quotes it at length to accuse Paris of inventing an immunity the Statute expressly discards.

The second voice is Article 98 on cooperation, waiver of immunity and consent to surrender. Its first paragraph bars the Court from pursuing a surrender request that would force the requested State to breach its international-law obligations toward the State or diplomatic immunity of a third State, unless that third State first agrees to waive immunity. France’s November 2024 reasoning runs through this article: Israel is not a State Party, the sitting prime minister of a non-party State enjoys personal immunity under customary international law in bilateral relations between States, and ordering his arrest on French soil would require France to breach that obligation unless the immunity is waived. The Court itself acknowledged the problem exists in principle: in its October 2024 Mongolia ruling, Pre-Trial Chamber II recalled that personal immunity, even of a head of State, cannot be raised against the Court itself and requires no waiver, while States Parties must arrest and surrender wanted persons regardless of office or nationality. Note the careful distinction: immunity is not opposable before the ICC, but the requested State’s own international obligations toward a third State are a separate question governed by Article 98.

International practice does not settle the dispute cleanly. Mongolia’s failure to arrest a sitting head of State present on its territory was condemned under Article 87(7), which suggests State Party tolerance for Article 98 arguments has limits when the person is physically present. South Africa’s litigation over al-Bashir’s 2015 visit pointed the same way. But neither precedent involved an overflight, and neither involved France, whose courts have now spoken on immunity in terms that any counsel preparing a Paris surrender file must master. The decisive French authority is less than fifteen months old, comes from the highest formation of the Court of Cassation, and concerns a case Paris prosecutors know well: the Syrian chemical-attacks file.

B. What French Judges Just Ruled About Sitting Heads of State

On 25 July 2025, the Court of Cassation sitting as its full Assembly, its most solemn formation, handed down two published rulings that now frame every French discussion of foreign-leader immunity. Both arose from the Syrian file. After chemical attacks with sarin gas against civilians in Syria in August 2013, French investigating judges issued an arrest warrant on 13 November 2023 against the sitting Syrian head of State for complicity in crimes against humanity and war crimes, and the National Anti-Terrorism Prosecutor asked the Paris investigating chamber to rule on its regularity. In pourvoi No. 24-84.393, reported as judgment No. 685 B+R with reference ECLI:FR:CCASS:2025:CR90685, as recorded in the open-data records of the Court of Cassation, the Assembly quashed the Paris ruling, held with no remand that the 13 November 2023 warrant was void, and restated the customary-law foundations of personal immunity before national courts. In the companion case, pourvoi No. 24-84.071, reference ECLI:FR:CCASS:2025:CR90684, it drew the line that matters for the future: functional immunity can no longer be opposed to prosecutions for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes once the leader has left office.

The reasoning of the 24-84.393 ruling deserves close reading because it maps exactly onto the Netanyahu debate. The Court begins from sovereign equality: criminal jurisdictional immunity flows from the equality of States, it applies before national courts, and the principle of immunity cannot be opposed before international courts, whose statutes expressly set aside all immunity and which act in the name of the international community. Personal immunity, distinct from functional immunity, is recognised only for the sitting head of State, head of government and minister for foreign affairs, and it covers all acts, private or official. Because it is a manifest procedural obstacle to a national court exercising jurisdiction, the Court holds that personal immunity must be examined by the judge of his or her own motion. Its purpose is to allow the exercise of sovereign functions of international representation and to shield a sovereign State from foreign interference, and it does not depend on whether the forum State recognises the leader: a unilateral act of derecognition cannot derogate from customary international law. The regularity of a warrant, the Court adds, is assessed on the facts as they stood on the day it was issued, so a later loss of office cannot retroactively validate a warrant that was void when signed.

The core holding follows, and the Court states it without ambiguity: as international law currently stands, crimes against humanity and war crimes are no exception to the jurisdictional immunity of a sitting foreign head of State. The judgment walks through each candidate exception and rejects it. International crimes cannot be carved out on the theory that they fall outside legitimate official functions, because criminal immunity by definition covers acts outside normal functions, and some international crimes necessarily involve the exercise of State prerogatives. The peremptory-norms argument fails because international law currently admits no personal-immunity exception based on the prohibitory peremptory character of the crime, a conclusion the Court supports with the International Court of Justice reasoning that immunity rules merely decide whether a State’s courts may exercise jurisdiction, not whether the conduct was lawful, and with the European Court of Human Rights’ characterisation of immunity as a procedural obstacle to jurisdiction rather than a qualification of a substantive right. The Court recalls that it has never concretely recognised an exception to personal immunity, that its earlier rulings concerned neither crimes against humanity nor war crimes, and that the International Law Commission’s work discloses no customary rule or trend toward limiting personal immunity. Hence the published summary of the ruling: personal immunity of a sitting leader must be examined by the national judge of his or her own motion, derecognition has no effect on it, a warrant’s regularity is judged at its date of issue, and grave international crimes do not displace it.

None of this means impunity, and the Assembly says so expressly: immunity is not the same as lack of accountability, it does not exonerate the beneficiary from criminal responsibility. The crimes may be tried before the courts of the leader’s own country or before an international or ad hoc criminal court, and personal immunity is temporary, limited to the time in office. After functions end, only functional immunity may remain, and the companion ruling of the same day closes that door for the gravest crimes: properly read in English translation, the combined provisions of French procedure and criminal law allow French courts to hear complicity committed abroad by a French national even with a foreign principal perpetrator, and, subject to treaty provisions on diplomatic and consular relations, functional criminal immunity of State agents acting in an official capacity cannot be opposed to prosecutions for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. That is the French position today: total procedural protection while in office before national judges, no functional shelter afterwards for international crimes, and full effect for international courts whose statutes exclude immunity.

Transposed to a hypothetical landing at Roissy, the French sequence would therefore run as follows, and counsel should know it by heart. Requests for arrest with a view to surrender issued by the ICC are sent, with supporting documents, to the competent authorities, which check their formal regularity and then transmit them to the prosecutor general at the Paris Court of Appeal while simultaneously executing them across the whole territory of the Republic; the governing text is Article 627-4, which orders execution across the whole territory of the Republic and thus makes physical presence the trigger, mirroring Article 89 of the Statute. Anyone arrested on such a request must be brought within twenty-four hours before the locally competent public prosecutor, with the safeguards of Articles 63-1 to 63-7 applying in the meantime; the prosecutor verifies identity, notifies the person in a language he or she understands of the surrender-arrest request and of appearance within five days at most before the prosecutor general at the Paris Court of Appeal, and guarantees immediate access to counsel of choice or court-appointed counsel, all recorded in a report at once transmitted to Paris. That is Article 627-5. If liberty is not granted, the liberty and custody judge orders detention, or supervision measures where representation at every step of the proceedings appears sufficiently secured. Transfer to the Paris Court of Appeal district and committal follow within five days of presentation, failing which the investigating chamber’s president orders immediate release absent insurmountable circumstances, under Article 627-6. The investigating chamber then rules within fifteen days of appearance: where it finds no manifest error it orders surrender, and any other question raised is referred to the ICC for appropriate action; on further appeal the Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation decides within two months of receiving the file. That is Article 627-8. Note the architecture: the Paris judges check identity and manifest error only, and every substantive dispute, including an Article 98 immunity objection, goes back to The Hague. Mutual-assistance requests flow through the National Anti-Terrorism Prosecutor under Article 627-1 and are executed by that prosecutor or the Paris investigating judge acting across the national territory under Article 627-2, while protective measures ordered at ICC request run for a maximum of two years renewable under Article 627-3, and fines and confiscated property can be transferred to the Court or the victims’ fund under Article 627-17. France’s enforcement machinery is therefore complete and operational, as the recent French-language analysis of how France enforces ICC reparation awards after the Yekatom and Ngaissona hearing of 1 October 2026 illustrates on the civil side of ICC cooperation. The machine simply starts on the ground, not in the sky.

Conclusion

France’s ninth overflight clearance is legally coherent on its own terms: the Rome Statute commands arrest and surrender of persons found on a State Party’s territory, organises transit for detainees already surrendered, and says nothing about passengers of a foreign State aircraft crossing the sky. The Court has never asked States to intercept a plane, its non-compliance findings concern physical presence, and Paris executed no request because none was transmitted. That textual answer, however, coexists with an unresolved immunity dispute that a single landing would force into the open. Before the ICC, Article 27 excludes immunity; in State-to-State relations with a non-party State, Article 98 preserves the problem of conflicting obligations; and before French national courts, the Assembly’s July 2025 rulings protect a sitting leader absolutely while in office and withdraw functional shelter afterwards for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Practitioners should therefore treat French airspace and French soil as two different jurisdictions for ICC purposes: the first governed by air-traffic clearance and airspace sovereignty of the overflown State, the second by the Paris-centred surrender machinery of Articles 627-4 to 627-8, with twenty-four hours to see a prosecutor, five days to reach Paris, fifteen days for the investigating chamber, two months on further appeal, and every immunity question ultimately referred to The Hague. Immunity delays accountability; under the Statute it was never meant to extinguish it.

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