KOHEN AVOCATS FIRM · PARIS 16
Haiti Extradited 18 Moise Assassination Suspects to Miami: Charges, Trial and What France Would Do

Hassan KOHEN acts in urgent matters, from the police station to the assize court. Initial strategic analysis: €80 incl. VAT, personal reply within 24 hours.

100% confidential · Legal professional privilege · No obligation

Article generated by artificial intelligence, through a process designed and supervised by the firm

Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

Paris Bar Police custody, investigation, assize court CNB listing avocat.fr
Maître Hassan KOHEN, avocat au Barreau de Paris
Hassan KOHEN
Attorney at the Paris Bar

Haiti Extradited 18 Moise Assassination Suspects to Miami: Charges, Trial and What France Would Do

Speak to a lawyer 06 89 11 34 45

On Sunday 20 September 2026, eighteen suspects detained in Haiti over the murder of President Jovenel Moise boarded planes for the United States. The Associated Press, PBS and The New York Times reported the same day that the men, held for years in the Haitian investigation into the killing of 7 July 2021, were being extradited to face trial in Florida, where the United States Attorney for the Southern District of Florida, Jason Reding Quinones, announced what he called the next major phase of the American prosecution. Thirty people have now been indicted in the case, several have already been convicted or sentenced in Miami, and the newly surrendered suspects include more than a dozen Colombian former soldiers and Joseph Badio, the former Haitian justice ministry official whom American defence lawyers have described as a central organiser of the plot.

The story matters well beyond Port-au-Prince and Miami. It is one of the largest extraditions for the assassination of a sitting head of state in recent decades, and it tests every classical mechanism of cross-border criminal justice: a requesting state that prosecutes murder planned partly on its own soil, a requested state with a fragile judicial system that held the suspects for years, and defence teams that will now fight the case under American federal procedure. For readers in France, the case is also a mirror. France surrenders suspects to the United States regularly, but only after a demanding judicial examination before the chambre de l’instruction, and only within strict limits built up by the Code of criminal procedure and the Court of Cassation. This analysis explains first what the eighteen men face in Florida and why Haiti surrendered them now, then what would happen if the same request landed on a French judge’s desk in Paris.

I. Can Haiti Send Its Own Nationals to Stand Trial in Miami?

A. What Charges Do the 18 Extradited Suspects Face in the Southern District of Florida?

The eighteen suspects will face trial in Florida, according to the announcement by United States Attorney Jason Reding Quinones relayed by the Associated Press on 20 September 2026. On X, Quinones described the transfer as the next major phase of the American prosecution, promising to follow the evidence wherever it leads, against those who financed, facilitated or otherwise supported the plot, and noting that five years on, defendants were still being brought before American courts. The official press release of the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Florida on the May 2026 convictions sets out the charges in detail. The Federal Bureau of Investigation confirmed multiple arrests in the United States and abroad on the same day, and the Haitian Ministry of Justice confirmed to The New York Times that the eighteen had been extradited after what it called significant advances in the legal process.

American jurisdiction over a murder committed in Port-au-Prince rests on a simple factual claim that the Miami prosecution has repeated since the first indictments: the conspiracy was prepared, financed and partly directed from South Florida. That territorial link allows federal prosecutors to charge foreign nationals for a killing committed abroad. The exact counts the eighteen will answer are set out in the federal indictment already used against thirty defendants, and their content is public because the same prosecution team has already taken part of the case to verdict. On 8 May 2026, a federal jury in Miami convicted four defendants, Arcangel Pretel Ortiz, Antonio Intriago, Walter Veintemilla and James Solages, for their roles in the assassination, as announced in an official press release of the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Florida.

The convictions document the charges that structure the whole case. The four men were found guilty of conspiracy to provide material support or resources to carry out a violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 956, resulting in death; of providing such material support resulting in death; of conspiracy to kill and kidnap a person outside the United States; of conspiracy to commit offences against the United States; and of expedition against a friendly nation, the old American charge that punishes mounting a military-style operation from American soil against a country at peace with the United States. Intriago was additionally convicted of smuggling goods from the United States and of submitting false export information. All four face life in federal prison, with sentencing entrusted to United States District Judge Jacqueline Becerra. In the same press release, Assistant Attorney General for National Security John A. Eisenberg summed up the theory of the case, saying the defendants had conspired first to replace and ultimately to assassinate the Haitian president, and that using American soil as a staging ground for a violent plot abroad gravely violated American law and sovereignty.

The financial side of the plot has already produced a heavy sentence. On 23 July 2026, Judge Becerra sentenced Keegan Harricharan, a 42-year-old fundraiser from Coral Springs, to twenty years in federal prison for laundering hundreds of thousands of dollars in fraudulently obtained COVID-19 relief funds, drawn from Paycheck Protection Program and Economic Injury Disaster Loan loans, that helped finance the assassination. Harricharan had pleaded guilty to conspiracy to engage in money laundering. The two Miami outcomes together draw the picture the eighteen extradited suspects now walk into: a prosecution that has already proved the conspiracy theory to a jury, a sentencing judge who has already imposed twenty years on the financier, and a docket where life imprisonment, not the death penalty, is the maximum punishment the convicted defendants face.

That last point will matter for the comparison with France. None of the public charging documents in the Miami case seeks a capital sentence, and the convicted defendants face life. Defence lawyers for the newly arrived suspects will therefore fight on the facts, on the admissibility of statements taken during years of Haitian detention, on the scope of American extraterritorial jurisdiction, and on individual roles, rather than on the death penalty. The Colombian detainees, whose relatives told the press on 20 September that the transfer caught the families by surprise, are expected to argue that they were hired as security guards who did not know the true objective. Badio, arrested in Haiti in October 2023 after more than two years on the run, sits at the opposite end of the anticipated defence spectrum, since American defence teams in the earlier Miami proceedings have pointed to him as the man who turned a plan to arrest the president into a plan to kill him. The Miami court will have to untangle those competing narratives across eighteen new defendants, several languages and two legal systems.

B. Why Did Port-au-Prince Surrender Them Five Years After the Murder?

Extradition is never only a legal act; it is also a confession about the state of the requested country’s justice system. Haiti held most of these suspects for years without bringing them to a full trial. The Haitian investigation into the assassination moved through successive investigative judges, prolonged pre-trial detention and repeated procedural restarts that the Associated Press has chronicled as a drawn-out judicial process. By surrendering eighteen detainees at once, the Haitian authorities effectively acknowledged that the American forum, with its completed indictments, its cooperating witnesses and its already-tested conspiracy theory, offered the only realistic path to judgment. The Haitian Ministry of Justice framed the transfer as the product of significant advances, a formulation that says as much about international cooperation as about domestic proceedings.

The legal mechanics on the Haitian side remain partly opaque, and honest reporting must say so. Neither the American nor the Haitian authorities published the surrender orders, and Quinones did not identify the eighteen by name in his announcement. What is public is the result: men detained by Haiti, including Haitian nationals, handed to a foreign power for trial. Many legal systems prohibit exactly that. France, as this article explains below, never extradites its own nationals. Haiti evidently applies no such absolute bar, or its executive found a legal basis to proceed, which already marks a first deep difference between the Haitian-American channel used here and the procedure a French judge would follow.

The timing also reflects the maturity of the American case. With thirty people indicted, four convicted by a jury in May 2026 and the financier sentenced in July 2026, the Miami prosecution no longer needs the Haitian detainees as distant witnesses; it needs them as defendants whose presence completes the accountability narrative Quinones promised to pursue “wherever it leads.” Extraditing eighteen people at once also solves a practical problem for Washington: as long as key suspects sat in Haitian cells, any Miami verdict risked looking partial, and defence lawyers could point to absent organisers. Bringing Badio and the Colombian contingent into the Southern District of Florida closes that gap and lets the prosecution present the full chain, from financing in Florida to execution in Port-au-Prince, to a single jury pool.

For the suspects, the transfer changes everything about their daily reality and their defence. Haitian pre-trial detention, in overcrowded facilities and under a Code of criminal procedure inherited from the French tradition, gives way to American federal detention, federal discovery, federal plea bargaining and federal sentencing guidelines. The relatives interviewed from Colombia on the day of the transfer expressed shock and hope that the men could prove their innocence, a reaction that shows how little the families had been prepared for the move. Experienced extradition counsel would add a colder observation: once eighteen defendants land in the same district where four co-conspirators have already been convicted on the same theory, the pressure to cooperate and plead guilty becomes immense, because the first cooperators obtain the best agreements and the last defendants face a jury that has already heard the story. The next months in Miami will therefore test not only the evidence, but the bargaining structure of American federal justice, applied to foreign nationals who began their journey in a Haitian cell.

II. Would France Surrender Assassination Suspects to the United States?

A. What Bars Extradition From France: Death Penalty, Political Offence and Unfair Courts?

Suppose the same American request arrived in Paris, with suspects found on French territory. The starting point is set by Article 696 of the French Code of criminal procedure, which provides that in the absence of an international convention stipulating otherwise, the conditions, procedure and effects of extradition are governed by French statute, as explained on the official Legifrance page for Article 696 of the Code of criminal procedure. The France-United States relationship is treaty-based, but the Code remains the backbone of the judicial examination, and its first filter is nationality. Under Article 696-2 of the Code of criminal procedure, “Le gouvernement français peut remettre, sur leur demande, aux gouvernements étrangers, toute personne n’ayant pas la nationalité française qui, étant l’objet d’une poursuite intentée au nom de l’Etat requérant ou d’une condamnation prononcée par ses tribunaux, est trouvée sur le territoire de la République.” French nationals are therefore never extradited, full stop, and Article 696-4 of the Code of criminal procedure confirms the bar in its first refusal ground: “Lorsque la personne réclamée a la nationalité française, cette dernière étant appréciée à l’époque de l’infraction pour laquelle l’extradition est requise”. Had any of the eighteen been French, France would have prosecuted them at home rather than surrender them, which is already a sharper protection than anything the Haitian detainees enjoyed.

The second filter is double criminality with a demanding threshold. Article 696-3 of the Code of criminal procedure lists the extraditable offences and adds the decisive sentence: “En aucun cas l’extradition n’est accordée par le gouvernement français si le fait n’est pas puni par la loi française d’une peine criminelle ou correctionnelle.” Assassination, conspiracy to murder and money laundering are all punishable under French law, so an American request modelled on the Miami indictment would pass this test without difficulty. Attempt and complicity follow the same rules. The threshold therefore screens out minor offending, not grave violent crime, and a presidential assassination sits at the very core of extraditable conduct.

The real battles in Paris would be fought on the refusal grounds of Article 696-4, and three of them map directly onto the Moise facts. The political-offence exception, in the second ground, blocks surrender where the crime has a political character or where the circumstances show the request pursues a political goal. An assassination of a head of state is inherently political in motive, yet French extradition judges examine each file concretely rather than granting or refusing the label automatically, weighing the nature of the acts, the context and the guarantees of the requesting state. The sixth ground, public policy, covers punishments contrary to French fundamental values, above all the death penalty. And the seventh ground blocks surrender where the person would be tried by a court that does not ensure the fundamental guarantees of procedure and defence rights. An American federal court in Miami, with public jury trial, defence counsel, exclusionary rules and appellate review, would satisfy that seventh ground without serious debate, which is why the fairness-of-tribunal argument that sometimes defeats requests aimed at other destinations would carry no weight here.

The death-penalty ground deserves close attention because it shows how exacting the French judge has become, even though the Miami case, where the convicted face life rather than execution, would not trigger it. On 30 January 2024 the Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation quashed a decision of the Aix-en-Provence investigating chamber that had approved surrender to Tunisia for premeditated murder subject only to a reservation that an eventual death sentence would not be carried out, as published on Court of Cassation, Criminal Chamber, 30 January 2024, No. 23-83.549. The Court recalled the European rule first: “Le premier de ces textes prohibe l’extradition vers un autre État d’une personne dont il y a des motifs sérieux et avérés de croire qu’elle serait exposée dans le pays de destination à un risque réel d’être soumise à la peine de mort.” It then set the operative standard, word for word: “lorsque la peine de mort est encourue à raison des faits pour lesquels l’extradition est demandée, il appartient à la chambre de l’instruction de s’assurer que l’Etat requérant prend l’engagement dénué de toute ambiguïté que cette peine ne sera pas appliquée à la personne réclamée.” General considerations, a thirty-year moratorium, international commitments described by the lower court itself as symbolic, were not enough, because they could not ensure that the penalty, if pronounced, would not be applied specifically to that person. The decision closes with the sanction: “l’arrêt attaqué ne satisfait pas, en la forme, aux conditions essentielles de son existence légale”. The reasoning is fully transposable: any future American request carrying a capital charge would have to include an unambiguous, person-specific assurance, and the French chamber would have to verify it effectively rather than rubber-stamp it. The rule flows from Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which prohibits torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

Two practical consequences follow for a Moise-type file in France. First, because the Miami prosecution seeks life sentences and not death, the American request would survive the public-policy filter, and the defence would have to look elsewhere, toward the political-offence ground or procedural challenges. Second, the specialty principle would protect the surrendered person after transfer: France surrenders for specified facts, and the requesting state may not quietly add unrelated charges afterwards without consent. The Court of Cassation restated the principle on 28 May 2024 in a transfer case, holding that, apart from narrow statutory exceptions, a transferred person may not be investigated, prosecuted, convicted or detained for any earlier fact other than the one that justified the transfer without the express consent of the sentencing state’s authority, as published on Court of Cassation, Criminal Chamber, 28 May 2024, No. 24-81.539: “hors les cas prévus aux 1° à 6° de l’article 728-62 précité, la personne transférée sur le territoire français pour la mise à exécution d’une condamnation à une peine ou une mesure de sûreté privative de liberté prononcée par une juridiction d’un Etat membre ne peut être recherchée, poursuivie, condamnée ou détenue pour un fait quelconque antérieur à son transfèrement autre que celui qui a motivé celui-ci, sauf si l’autorité compétente de l’Etat de condamnation y a expressément consenti.” The statutory anchor is Article 728-62 of the Code of criminal procedure. For defence teams, specialty is often the most concrete shield after surrender, because it lets counsel challenge any new count that was not in the extradition file.

B. How Does the Chambre de l’Instruction Rule, and What Happens After a Refusal?

French extradition procedure places a real judge, not the executive alone, at the centre of the decision. The request travels through the diplomatic channel under Article 696-8 of the Code of criminal procedure, the person found in France is brought before the general prosecutor, and the question of liberty pending the examination is decided under Article 696-11 of the Code of criminal procedure, which allows detention or judicial supervision rather than automatic release. The decisive step follows when the requested person refuses to consent. Article 696-15 of the Code of criminal procedure provides that the investigating chamber is seized without delay, that the person appears within ten working days, and that the chamber delivers a reasoned opinion within one month unless further inquiries are ordered. The statute sets the refusal standard in plain terms: “Cet avis est défavorable si la cour estime que les conditions légales ne sont pas remplies ou qu’il y a une erreur évidente.” And it narrows appellate review strictly: “Le pourvoi formé contre un avis de la chambre de l’instruction ne peut être fondé que sur des vices de forme de nature à priver cet avis des conditions essentielles de son existence légale.”

That narrow review explains the quashing in the Tunisian case: the Court of Cassation does not reweigh the facts but verifies that the chamber effectively controlled the legal conditions, including the clarity of death-penalty assurances. The same formal discipline governs the effects of a refusal. Under Article 696-17 of the Code of criminal procedure, a reasoned opinion rejecting the request, once final, bars the surrender and triggers release. But finality is the trap many families misunderstand. On 9 August 2023 the Criminal Chamber rejected a complaint by a Ukrainian national whose judicial supervision had been maintained after the Chambery investigating chamber issued an unfavourable opinion, because the general prosecutor had appealed, as published on Court of Cassation, Criminal Chamber, 9 August 2023, No. 23-83.192. Since an appeal to the Court of Cassation suspends enforcement, the Court held “qu’en application de l’article 569 du code de procédure pénale, le pourvoi en cassation emporte le sursis à exécution de l’arrêt de la cour d’appel jusqu’au prononcé de l’arrêt de la Cour de cassation, il s’induit des dispositions de l’article 696-17 du même code que la mainlevée de la mesure de contrôle judiciaire dont fait l’objet la personne réclamée ne saurait être acquise dès le prononcé d’un arrêt de la chambre de l’instruction qui a émis un avis défavorable à son extradition.” An unfavourable opinion therefore does not open the cell door the same day when the prosecution appeals, a point worth stating plainly because extradition clients and their families so often expect the opposite.

Applied to a Moise-type request in Paris, the roadmap is now clear. Consent would allow a fast simplified surrender; refusal would trigger the full chamber procedure with adversarial argument on nationality, thresholds, double criminality, political character, public policy and tribunal guarantees; an unfavourable opinion, once final, would kill the surrender, while a favourable opinion would send the file to the government for the extradition decree, itself open to challenge before the administrative courts. Each of those stages is a genuine opportunity for the defence, which is precisely why experienced counsel in Paris treat the chamber phase, not the later decree, as the decisive battle. The Haitian detainees never had an equivalent independent judicial filter with reasoned opinions, suspensive appeals and specialty protection; they were held for years, then transferred by executive-led cooperation. Whatever one thinks of the outcome, the procedural contrast could hardly be sharper, and it explains why France remains one of the hardest requesting environments for states that cannot offer clean assurances.

Conclusion

The eighteen extraditions of 20 September 2026 close the Haitian chapter of the Moise assassination and open the decisive American one. In Miami, a prosecution that has already convicted four conspirators and sent the financier to prison for twenty years will now try to prove the same conspiracy against eighteen more defendants, including the alleged organiser Joseph Badio and the Colombian contingent whose families insist the men were mere guards. With thirty people indicted and the United States Attorney promising the investigation is not finished, further arrests and further guilty pleas are likelier than an early trial date, and Judge Becerra’s courtroom will become, for the coming year, the world capital of this case. The defence fights available there, over extraterritorial jurisdiction, the admissibility of years-old statements, individual roles and sentencing exposure to life imprisonment, are substantial, but they unfold inside a system structurally favourable to a prosecution that has already won the same theory before a jury.

The French comparison drawn in this analysis carries a double lesson. For states and suspects alike, France offers the most judicialised extradition procedure in the Western world: no surrender of nationals, a demanding double-criminality threshold, eight statutory refusal grounds, effective verification of death-penalty assurances down to the unambiguous commitment for the specific person, suspensive appeals and specialty protection after transfer. Anyone facing an American request while present in France should therefore treat the chambre de l’instruction as the forum where the case is truly won or lost, and should build the file early, with evidence on the requesting state’s charges, on penalty exposure and on procedural guarantees. And for observers of the Moise case, the lesson runs the other way: Haiti’s mass surrender shows what happens when the requested state cannot credibly try the suspects itself. Extradition then becomes less a choice between two courts than a transfer from a justice system that has stalled to one that is ready. Whether Miami will deliver judgments history accepts as fair now depends on the ordinary virtues of criminal justice, evidence tested in public, defences heard in full and sentences proportioned to individual guilt, applied to eighteen men whose journey began with gunfire in Port-au-Prince on 7 July 2021.

📄 Official circular