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Washington Prepares Blanket Sanctions on the Entire ICC: What the Assault on The Hague Changes and What France Must Do

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Washington Prepares Blanket Sanctions on the Entire ICC: What the Assault on The Hague Changes and What France Must Do

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On 20 September 2026, American press reports revealed that the Trump administration has prepared sanctions against the entire International Criminal Court and plans to announce them soon, possibly during the United Nations General Assembly week. After sanctioning individual judges and prosecutors, Washington would move to an entity-wide embargo: any American person or company providing funds, goods or services to the Court without a licence from the Office of Foreign Assets Control would be in violation of United States law. Banks, insurers, IT providers and investigators would walk away, and the payment of the Court’s own American staff would become an offence. This analysis explains what Washington has actually prepared, whether the Court can survive it, what France’s binding duty to cooperate with the Court requires under French criminal law, and how banks, companies, NGOs and witnesses exposed in Paris can protect themselves between American sanctions and European law.

I. US sanctions against the ICC: what Washington has prepared and what it changes

A. From targeted designations to an entity-wide OFAC embargo: how the strangulation works

The 20 September 2026 American press reports marks a decisive escalation. Until now, Washington sanctioned individuals: ICC President Tomoko Akane and senior trial lawyer Abdoulaye Seye were designated in August 2026, four judges had been sanctioned weeks earlier, and Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced in July 2026 an open campaign to isolate the Court, calling on other countries to withdraw from the tribunal. The step now prepared is of a different nature. Citing two sources familiar with the matter, Reuters reported that sanctions against the Court itself have been prepared, even though the exact timing of an announcement remains unclear, and that the Wall Street Journal cited officials saying the decision could be finalised as soon as this week during the United Nations General Assembly meeting. The objective, stated without ambiguity by American officials, is to make the Court drop its arrest warrants against Israeli leaders as well as a past investigation into American troops in Afghanistan.

The mechanism is the classic American secondary-sanctions machine. Any entity-wide measure imposed by the United States Treasury would prohibit American citizens and companies from providing funds, goods or services to the Court without a licence from the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control. Experience shows that banks over-comply with such measures because they depend on access to the American financial system, so the legal prohibition on American persons quickly becomes a de facto global banking blockade. The Court’s registrar and president have publicly warned about the operations that would be affected: the purchase of IT services and insurance, the hiring of investigators, everyday financial transactions, and the payment of dozens of American employees working for the institution. An international criminal court that cannot pay its staff, insure its premises, run its servers or hire investigators is not formally closed, but it is operationally strangled.

This strategy did not appear overnight. In February 2025, President Trump issued Executive Order 14203, establishing a sweeping sanctions programme targeting the ICC. The order accuses the Court of illegitimate action against the United States and Israel, denounces the arrest warrants issued against the Israeli prime minister and former defence minister, and asserts that neither country recognises the jurisdiction of the Court. In July 2026 the administration moved to the political stage with an open campaign to isolate the Court, and in August 2026 it struck the top of the institution: the Court’s president and a senior trial lawyer were designated, bringing the American blacklist to nine of the ICC’s eighteen judges, both deputy prosecutors, the former chief prosecutor and a prosecution staffer. The Associated Press, which has followed the sanctioned officials for months, reports that judges and prosecutors must now live and work under American financial and travel restrictions of a severity normally reserved for figures such as the Russian president or terrorist leaders, restrictions that bar them and their families from the United States, cut them off from basic banking and intrude into everyday life. The Court denounced the designations as an attack on its independence and vowed to continue its work. Civil society answered in court: in August 2026, Human Rights Watch and three other advocacy groups sued the Trump administration to challenge its campaign against the Court. That lawsuit is still pending, and it is the first judicial test of the entire sanctions edifice.

Europe has answered with words, and now must answer with instruments. After the August 2026 designations, the presidents of the European Commission and the European Council publicly stated their support for the Court and its mission of justice for victims of the world’s most horrific crimes. France condemned the American sanctions, expressed its solidarity with the targeted judges and restated its full support for the Court and its staff. The Netherlands, the host State, opened discussions with Dutch banks about the conditions under which they would continue processing transactions for the Court, while admitting that the country is too small to protect the banks alone and that the issue must be handled at European level. The instrument everybody names is the European Union’s blocking statute: an instrument designed to shield European individuals and companies from the extraterritorial reach of foreign laws, notably by depriving foreign court decisions based on those laws of effect within the Union and by opening a right to compensation before European courts. The Commission recalls that the protection covers lawful international trade and capital movements but applies only to the foreign measures listed in the annex of the regulation, an annex that currently covers only American measures concerning Cuba and Iran. Applying it to protect the ICC would therefore require unprecedented legislative action, and even an activated statute would be difficult to enforce against multinational groups operating simultaneously in the United States and in Europe, because their American branches remain subject to American law. Added to this is the American legislative threat: the Illegitimate Court Counter Act, which would extend sanctions to anyone who otherwise aided the Court and was only narrowly blocked, could return in a revised bipartisan version.

B. Can Washington switch the Court off? Arrest warrants, trials and the limits of American power

The short answer is no, but the honest answer is that Washington can slow the Court down considerably without ever having the legal power to close it. The International Criminal Court was established in 2002 by the international community to prosecute war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity, and it asserts jurisdiction only where a member State is unable or unwilling to prosecute atrocities itself. American sanctions do not repeal the Rome Statute, do not bind the 125 States Parties, and do not erase a single arrest warrant. The warrants issued against Israeli leaders remain valid law in every State Party, the Afghanistan file remains open, and the Court’s current docket continues: from the Darfur cases to the proceedings concerning former Philippine president Rodrigo Duterte, whose trial schedule for November 2026 this desk has already analysed, and the verdicts and reparations phases followed by victims’ counsel in Paris. What sanctions attack is not the law but the logistics of justice: money, people and evidence.

Three pressure points deserve a clear-eyed assessment. First, the arrest warrants. A warrant lives or dies by State cooperation, and cooperation is a political act before it is a legal one. The States Parties most exposed to American pressure could hesitate to arrest, transfer or fund. But the obligation to cooperate does not disappear because a third State threatens retaliation, and several European governments, France included, have publicly recommitted to it since August 2026. Every arrest carried out after the announcement of entity-wide sanctions would therefore carry a double meaning: a judicial act and a political signal that intimidation failed. Defence teams should expect the Prosecutor to prioritise cases where custody is already secured or voluntary appearance is credible, and to sequence new warrant applications according to the realistic cooperation map rather than the legal merits alone.

Second, the trials. A trial needs witnesses, and witnesses need protection, travel and money. Investigators need contracts, forensic tools and secure communications. Victims need legal representation and a functioning Trust Fund. If American cloud providers, insurers and payment processors withdraw, the Registry will have to rebuild its supply chains inside jurisdictions shielded by the European blocking statute or willing to defy Washington. That transition costs months, and months in international criminal proceedings mean dead witnesses, faded memories and released suspects. The realistic scenario is therefore not a spectacular shutdown but a slowdown: delayed confirmations of charges, postponed trial openings, stretched reparations phases. The Darfur reparations hearings and the Libya files, including the first Libyan case committed to trial after the confirmation of all charges against Khaled El Hishri, illustrate what is at stake: these proceedings survive on Registry logistics that sanctions precisely target.

Third, the American courts themselves. The lawsuit filed by ICC judges in June 2026 against the Trump administration is the wild card. If a federal court holds that designations under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act exceeded presidential authority or lacked a genuine emergency predicate, the legal foundation of the individual sanctions crumbles, and any entity-wide designation built on the same authority falls with it. Conversely, a dismissal on political-question or standing grounds would hand Washington a judicial blessing to escalate. European litigators should watch this case as closely as the sanctions lists themselves, because its outcome determines whether the American judiciary remains a check or becomes an accomplice. Meanwhile, the United Nations General Assembly week is the diplomatic theatre where the announcement may fall: a sanctions announcement timed for the General Assembly would maximise humiliation of the Court’s supporters and test, in real time, which foreign ministers still dare to be photographed with the Prosecutor.

II. ICC sanctions and France: what Paris must do to keep cooperation alive

A. France’s duty to cooperate with the ICC: arrest, surrender and French criminal law

France is not a spectator of this crisis. It is a State Party to the Rome Statute, the host of one of the largest diplomatic communities supporting the Court, and a country whose own criminal code mirrors the core crimes of the Statute. Whatever Washington decides, French authorities remain bound to receive, arrest and surrender persons sought by the Court, to freeze and transfer their assets for victims, and to prosecute these crimes themselves when the Court does not act. That duty is written in French law in terms that leave no room for American sanctions as an excuse.

The starting point is the definition of the crimes. Article 211-1 of the French Criminal Code provides that “Constitue un génocide le fait, en exécution d’un plan concerté tendant à la destruction totale ou partielle d’un groupe national, ethnique, racial ou religieux, ou d’un groupe déterminé à partir de tout autre critère arbitraire, de commettre ou de faire commettre, à l’encontre de membres de ce groupe, l’un des actes suivants”, followed by the list of covered acts, and punishes genocide with life imprisonment (“Le génocide est puni de la réclusion criminelle à perpétuité”). Article 212-1 punishes as a crime against humanity, also with life imprisonment, acts “commis en exécution d’un plan concerté à l’encontre d’un groupe de population civile dans le cadre d’une attaque généralisée ou systématique”, including murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, torture and sexual violence. Article 212-2 extends the same punishment of life imprisonment when these acts are committed in wartime. War crimes are defined by Article 461-1, which covers offences “commises, lors d’un conflit armé international ou non international et en relation avec ce conflit, en violation des lois et coutumes de la guerre ou des conventions internationales applicables aux conflits armés”, committed against persons protected by the law of armed conflict as detailed in Article 461-2, which protects persons against murder, attacks on physical or psychological integrity, abduction and sequestration. The penalty architecture follows: Article 462-1 raises the maximum custodial sentence step by step, up to life imprisonment (“Il est porté à la réclusion criminelle à perpétuité lorsque l’infraction est punie de trente ans de réclusion criminelle”). Complementary penalties are severe: Article 213-1 imposes on convicted individuals the loss of civic rights for up to fifteen years (“Toutefois, le maximum de l’interdiction est porté à quinze ans”), bans from public office and from professional activity, residence bans and confiscation of property, while Article 213-3 extends fines, the penalties of Article 131-39 and confiscation (“La confiscation de tout ou partie des biens leur appartenant”) to legal entities convicted of crimes against humanity. And Article 213-4 closes the classic escape route: a perpetrator or accomplice “ne peut être exonéré de sa responsabilité du seul fait qu’il a accompli un acte prescrit ou autorisé par des dispositions législatives ou réglementaires ou un acte commandé par l’autorité légitime”, even if the court takes that circumstance into account when fixing the sentence. In plain terms, neither an American sanctions order nor any foreign instruction exonerates anyone before a French court.

The procedural bridge between Paris and The Hague is the Act of 26 February 2002 on cooperation with the International Criminal Court, which created a dedicated surrender regime distinct from ordinary extradition. Under that regime, arrest-and-surrender requests issued by the Court travel through the Paris prosecutor’s office, the person sought is brought before the Paris judicial authorities, and surrender is ordered by the courts, not negotiated by diplomats. If an ICC suspect sets foot on French territory while American sanctions purport to forbid any service to the Court, the French judge applies French law: verify identity, verify the warrant, verify rights, order surrender. An American designation of the Court cannot appear in that reasoning except as a fact to be disregarded, because a foreign sanctions measure has no normative rank in the French courtroom. The same logic governs assets: confiscated property and the proceeds of fines can be transferred to the Court or to the victims’ fund, and disputes over allocation are referred back to the Court itself. A French bank that froze the funds of a sanctioned suspect at the request of the French authorities for the benefit of ICC proceedings would be executing a French judicial order, not providing a voluntary service to a sanctioned entity, and American secondary sanctions cannot criminalise obedience to a French judge on French soil.

France can also prosecute these crimes itself. Because genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes are defined in the Criminal Code with universal-jurisdiction gateways developed over two decades of case law, the Paris specialised war-crimes unit can open files that The Hague cannot staff under sanctions pressure. Complementarity, the principle that the Court acts only where States are unable or unwilling, then works in reverse: when the Court is strangled, willing States must genuinely investigate. Paris has the statutes, the specialised prosecutors and the investigating judges. What it needs now is the political instruction to use them at full capacity, precisely while Washington tries to make international justice unfundable.

B. Caught between OFAC and European law: how to protect your bank, company or NGO in Paris

The most immediate victims of entity-wide sanctions will not be diplomats but private actors in Paris: banks holding ICC accounts, software vendors hosting evidence, insurers covering missions, NGOs channelling witness support, law firms advising the parties, and even landlords renting office space to Court-related entities. Each of them will receive the same message from American correspondents and compliance departments: cut all ties or lose access to the dollar system. Each of them will face the opposite message from European law: the blocking statute forbids EU operators from complying with the listed foreign sanctions measures, nullifies the effect within the Union of foreign judgments giving them effect, and entitles European companies to recover damages caused by their application. Doing nothing is therefore not neutral: obeying Washington violates Brussels, and obeying Brussels exposes the American business. This is the conflict that will fill Paris law offices in the coming months, and it must be prepared now, before the designation falls.

The first line of defence is contractual and documentary. Every contract linking a Paris-based actor to the Court, to counsel, to victims’ representatives or to suppliers of the ICC ecosystem should be reviewed for sanctions clauses, change-of-law clauses and termination rights that an American counterparty could trigger. Where contracts allow suspension on sanctions grounds, renegotiate them now to carve out measures taken under the European blocking statute and under French judicial orders, so that compliance with European law cannot be characterised as a voluntary breach. Map every dollar touchpoint: correspondent banking, American cloud hosting, insurance placed in London or Bermuda with American reinsurers, payroll processed through American providers. For each touchpoint, identify a European substitute capable of taking over within weeks, because any transition period attached to the measures will pass quickly once the clock starts. NGOs supporting victims should segregate ICC-related funds from other programmes, document the strictly humanitarian and judicial purpose of each transfer, and secure written confirmations from their banks that the accounts serve cooperation with an international court headquartered in a European Union Member State.

The second line of defence is procedural. Any person or company that suffers loss because a counterparty complies with the American measures against European law can seek compensation under the blocking statute and can ask European courts to disregard foreign judgments based on those measures. In practice, this means: never accept a termination or a freeze without a reasoned written decision, demand the exact legal basis invoked, preserve all correspondence with compliance departments, and obtain counsel’s written analysis that performance remains lawful under French and European law. If a bank closes the account of an NGO assisting ICC victims, that closure must be challenged before the French courts with the blocking statute pleaded explicitly, and the banking regulator and the French Treasury’s sanctions unit should be seized in parallel. If an employer, insurer or supplier invokes American sanctions to suspend an ICC-related contract, the answer is a formal notice requiring performance, followed by interim proceedings where urgency justifies it. The Dutch experience is instructive: The Hague obtained from its parliament a mandate to advocate activation of the blocking statute at European level precisely because individual negotiations between ministries and banks proved insufficient. Paris should draw the lesson and prepare collective solutions, including the designation of one or several European banks with minimal American exposure to handle Court-related flows, a solution already discussed in Dutch banking circles.

The third line of defence concerns individuals: witnesses, experts, counsel and staff. An ICC witness residing in France who cooperates with the Prosecutor commits no offence under French law; on the contrary, obstructing that cooperation could itself engage criminal liability. Counsel appearing before the Court, including French advocates on the ICC List of Counsel, exercise defence rights guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights, and no foreign sanctions measure can suspend those rights in France. American employees of the Court face the hardest dilemma, since the sanctions directly target their employment relationship, and each situation will require individual analysis of nationality, residence, tax exposure and the applicable sanctions licences or general authorisations the Treasury may issue. What must be refused categorically is self-censorship by anticipation: resigning, destroying documents, cutting contact with protected witnesses or withdrawing from victim representation before any binding European measure requires it would be both legally unnecessary and evidentially disastrous. Every protective step should be traceable, dated and reasoned in writing, because the files opened today will be litigated tomorrow before French courts, European courts and possibly American courts seized by the judges’ pending lawsuit.

Conclusion

The prepared American sanctions against the entire International Criminal Court are the most serious attack ever mounted against international criminal justice, precisely because they target the institution rather than its office-holders. If announced during the General Assembly week, they will confront every European State with a binary choice that admits no comfortable middle ground: enforce the law of cooperation or submit to the law of intimidation. The Court will not legally disappear, its warrants will not lapse, and its trials need not stop, but only if States, banks and civil society refuse the slowdown that sanctions are designed to produce. France holds more cards than most: a complete criminal-law arsenal from genocide to war crimes with penalties up to life imprisonment, a dedicated surrender regime built by the 2002 cooperation act, specialised prosecutors and judges, and the European blocking statute as a shield for its economic operators. The test is no longer doctrinal but practical: keep the money flowing to The Hague through European channels, keep executing ICC warrants in Paris without asking Washington’s permission, keep prosecuting atrocity crimes in French courts when the international court is under siege, and document every act of compliance with European law so that it can be defended before any judge. Intimidation only works on those who improvise. Prepare now.

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