On 9 September 2026, the General Court of the European Union threw out Hungary’s attempt to block the use of frozen Russian money for Ukraine’s defence. The Court did not rule that the scheme was lawful or unlawful. It ruled that it had no power to judge it at all. For anyone holding frozen funds in France, trying to unfreeze a bank account in Paris, or seeking payment out of assets caught by European sanctions, that distinction matters more than the headlines suggest. This analysis explains what the Luxembourg judges actually decided in Case T-457/24, why Hungary’s case failed on jurisdiction rather than on the merits, and how a private individual or company in France should challenge a freeze without repeating Budapest’s mistake. French courts apply the same European regulations every day, and the Court of Cassation has set strict conditions for touching frozen money. The Hungary judgment closes one door, the one leading to a political review of Europe’s military support for Ukraine, while leaving the other doors, annulment of an individual listing, damages, and practical authorisations, wide open for the right applicant with the right file.
I. What the General Court decided on 9 September 2026 and why Hungary lost
A. How the EU turned frozen Russian windfall profits into weapons for Ukraine
The story starts with the immobilisation of Russian central bank reserves after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Hundreds of billions of euros in assets held in European clearing houses, principally Euroclear in Belgium, stopped moving. The principal stayed where it was. The interest it kept generating, the so-called windfall or extraordinary revenues, became the target of a European plan: rather than confiscating Russian property outright, an idea fraught with legal obstacles, the Council decided to skim off the profits and direct them to Ukraine’s defence.
According to the Court’s own press release, the General Court dismisses Hungary’s action against the decision of the EPF Committee that allocated the first instalment of extraordinary revenues from frozen Russian assets to support for the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The mechanism ran through the European Peace Facility, the off-budget fund created in 2021 to finance Union military assistance. As Reuters reported on the day of the judgment, the Court dismissed Hungary’s action against the EU’s decision to use windfall profits from frozen Russian central bank assets for Ukraine’s defence, as confirmed by the judgment of the General Court of 9 September 2026 in Case T-457/24. Euronews added that the Court dismissed the action on the ground that the case did not fall within the jurisdiction of the EU judicature, as the Court stated in its press release No 123/26.
The procedural history is unusual and worth understanding, because it explains the outcome. In the words of the press release, Hungary voted in favour of the first decision but constructively abstained during the adoption of the second decision. The first decision, adopted on 21 May 2024, laid down the principle that extraordinary revenues would go to Ukraine. The second allocated them. Hungary endorsed the principle, then abstained on the allocation, and the EPF Committee later excluded Budapest from the vote on the first instalment of 21 June 2024 precisely because of that abstention. Hungary then asked the General Court to annul the allocation decision and its adoption minutes, arguing breach of voting rules and of the Union’s values, the rule of law, equality of Member States and democratic functioning.
The figures give the dispute its weight. Between 2022 and 2024 the Union mobilised 6.1 billion euros under the Facility for Ukraine’s military needs, then added a dedicated Ukraine Assistance Fund of 5 billion euros in 2024, bringing the envelope to 11.1 billion euros. The windfall-profits scheme added a self-financing stream on top. Hungary’s previous government, which had repeatedly obstructed military aid to Kyiv, sought to cut that stream. The political backdrop has since moved: after April parliamentary elections a new Hungarian government reoriented foreign policy and even expelled ten Russian diplomats, but the case brought by its predecessor ran its course to judgment.
For an international reader the key point is this. The case was never about whether one named individual deserved to be listed. It was a Member State attacking a collective strategic decision to fund a war effort from the fruits of frozen assets. That framing determined everything that followed, and it is the reason private applicants should read the judgment with care rather than despair. A state challenging war finance is not in the same position as a businessman challenging his own listing, a bank asking whether it may release funds, or a creditor seeking seizure. The Court’s answer to Hungary says almost nothing about those private situations, and the French practitioner knows that the real battles over frozen money are fought on entirely different terrain, the validity of individual designations and the daily machinery of the freeze in Paris.
B. Why the judges declared they had no jurisdiction over a CFSP strategic choice
The General Court’s reasoning proceeds in three steps, each of which carries a lesson for future litigants. First, the Court accepted that the European Peace Facility has legal capacity, so the action against its committee’s act belonged before the General Court rather than being reserved to the Court of Justice as an action by a Member State against the Council. That finding mattered for the allocation of jurisdiction between the two Luxembourg courts, and it shows that litigants must sue the right defendant in the right forum, a mundane point that kills a surprising number of sanctions cases.
Second, the Court recalled the treaty rule that the Court of Justice of the European Union in principle has no jurisdiction over the common foreign and security policy and the acts adopted on that basis, subject to two narrow exceptions: review of compliance with the boundary between CFSP and other Union competences, and actions against restrictive measures imposed on individuals. Hungary’s case fell into neither exception. It attacked neither an individual listing nor a competence overreach. It attacked a funding choice.
Third, and decisively, the Court characterised the contested decision as a political and strategic choice. In the press release’s formulation, The General Court does not have jurisdiction to examine the legality, including the external legality, of such a decision, since it is directly related to the political or strategic choices made in the context of the CFSP. The decision determined the allocation of funds to the purchase of military equipment for the Ukrainian Armed Forces and selected the assistance measure to which the money would go. That, the Court held following its 2024 KS and KD case law, is the core of foreign policy, shielded from judicial review. An appeal on points of law to the Court of Justice remains possible within two months and ten days, but the prospects of overturning a jurisdictional finding anchored in treaty text look thin, particularly now that the applicant government itself has changed course.
The judgment therefore belongs to a line of cases in which the Luxembourg courts police the boundary of their own power. They review individual sanctions listings intensively, names, reasons, evidence, proportionality, rights of defence. They refuse to review the strategic decision to have sanctions at all, or to fund Ukraine from their proceeds. International media sometimes present every sanctions judgment as a verdict on the policy. Lawyers must be more precise. Hungary lost because it asked judges to second-guess a war-finance choice, not because European courts always side with the Council. Only weeks earlier, the same court system had annulled listings or sent the Council back to justify them in cases brought by individuals, and the Russian central bank’s own fresh action against the indefinite freeze, reported on 9 September, will test yet another distinct question. Each procedural posture has its own standard of review, and confusing them is the costliest error a frozen-asset holder can make.
The French dimension sharpens the point. France implements European freezes directly, through banks, notaries and the Treasury, and French judges see the consequences daily. But a French court cannot annul a Council regulation either. The division of labour is strict: Luxembourg judges the European act, Paris judges its national execution and the national decisions that surround it. Hungary’s defeat changes nothing in Parisian courtrooms on that front. It confirms, if confirmation were needed, that the remedy for a bad listing is an individual annulment action in Luxembourg within the two-month time limit, with an application for interim suspension where urgency demands it, while the remedy for a blocked payment, a refused authorisation or an overzealous bank is often faster and closer to home, before the French administration and the French judge.
II. What the Hungary ruling changes, and does not change, for frozen funds in France
A. How France freezes funds in practice and why your bank will not move without Paris
European sanctions regulations apply directly in France, without any transposing statute. When the Council lists a person under Regulation 269/2014 or restricts sectors under Regulation 833/2014, every French bank, insurer, notary and company must freeze immediately. The national machinery sits on top of that European base. Under French law, Le ministre chargé de l’économie et le ministre de l’intérieur peuvent décider, conjointement, pour une durée de six mois, renouvelable, le gel des fonds et ressources économiques against persons involved in terrorism, while Le ministre chargé de l’économie peut décider, pour une durée de six mois, renouvelable, le gel des fonds et ressources économiques against persons designated under Chapter VII resolutions of the United Nations Charter or acts adopted under Article 29 of the Treaty on European Union or Article 75 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. For United Nations designations the mechanism is even faster: sont gelés à compter de la publication par le ministre chargé de l’économie des éléments d’identification de ces personnes ou entités, for an initial ten working days pending the European implementing act.
The obligation weighs on the entire private sector. French law provides that Sont tenus d’appliquer sans délai les mesures de gel et les interdictions de mise à disposition ou d’utilisation prévues au présent chapitre et aux articles L. 712-4 et L. 712-10 et d’en informer immédiatement le ministre chargé de l’économie, a duty covering resident individuals, regulated professionals, companies operating in France and French companies for their foreign activity. In practice the bank’s compliance department freezes first and asks questions later, files a report with the Treasury’s sanctions unit, and refuses any movement on the account, including incoming payments that would make funds available to the listed person. Real estate can be tied up too, since freeze decisions peuvent, à la demande du ministre chargé de l’économie, être publiées au fichier immobilier ou au livre foncier dont dépend le bien immobilier appartenant à la personne dont les fonds et ressources économiques sont gelés, and vehicles can be blocked from transfer. Ministerial freeze orders Les décisions des ministres arrêtées en application des articles L. 562-2 , L. 562-2-1 , L. 562-2-2 et L. 562-3 sont publiées par extrait au Journal officiel et sont exécutoires à compter de leur date de publication, so publication itself triggers enforceability.
Violating the freeze is a criminal gamble. French law punishes anyone who seeks de se soustraire aux obligations en résultant ou de faire obstacle à sa mise en oeuvre, with customs-code penalties and Treasury enforcement on top. Banks know this, which is why polite letters invoking hardship almost never move them. The file must be directed to the authority that can lawfully authorise the movement, the Directorate General of the Treasury for national measures, or the competent authority designated by the European regulation, with a precise legal basis: basic needs, legal fees, pre-existing contractual obligation, humanitarian purpose, or release of funds that are demonstrably outside the scope of the designation.
Creditors face a parallel wall. Suppose a company wins an arbitration or holds a judgment against a sanctioned debtor and spots frozen money in Paris. French enforcement judges will not validate seizure of frozen assets without the Treasury’s prior authorisation. The Court of Cassation held on 5 February 2026 that à défaut d’autorisation préalable du directeur du Trésor, aucune mesure de saisie-attribution, laquelle emporte, à concurrence des sommes pour lesquelles elle est pratiquée, attribution immédiate au profit du saisissant de la créance saisie disponible entre les mains du tiers et de ses accessoires, ne peut être autorisée ou validée par le juge de l’exécution. That decision, given on pourvoi number 23-15.936 in a dispute between a Kuwaiti contractor and the Libyan Investment Authority over Libyan funds frozen under Regulation 2016/44, restates a firm line: no Treasury authorisation, no attachment, even where the creditor’s claim is undisputed. And where the asset belongs to a foreign state itself, an additional shield applies, since Des mesures conservatoires ou des mesures d’exécution forcée ne peuvent être mises en œuvre sur un bien appartenant à un Etat étranger que sur autorisation préalable du juge par ordonnance rendue sur requête.
The deeper precedent runs through the Bank Sepah saga, the Iranian bank whose European funds were frozen under the non-proliferation sanctions. The full Assembly of the Court of Cassation took the joined cases on 10 July 2020, recalling that par la résolution 1737 (2006) du 23 décembre 2006, le Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies a décidé que la République islamique d’Iran devait suspendre toutes les activités liées à l’enrichissement et au retraitement, and referred questions to the Court of Justice before ruling finally on 29 April 2022 on the interplay between European freeze regulations, force majeure and conservatory measures. The lesson of that six-year litigation is sobering for creditors and debtors alike: European freeze law overrides ordinary enforcement reflexes, and only the authorisation channels written into the regulations reopen movement. Hungary’s defeat in Luxembourg does not alter any of this Parisian machinery by a single comma. It confirms that the political decision to redirect windfall profits sits above it, untouchable, while the individual situations governed by these French texts remain fully justiciable.
B. How to challenge a freeze from France without repeating Hungary’s mistake
Hungary asked the wrong question in the wrong posture and received a jurisdictional answer. A private applicant must ask the right question in the right forum. Three tracks exist, and they can run in parallel. The first is the individual annulment action in Luxembourg against the listing regulation as it applies to the applicant, within two months of publication or notification, pleading defective statement of reasons, manifest error of assessment, disproportionality, breach of rights of defence and of the right to effective judicial protection. This is where individuals win. The General Court annuls listings where the Council recycles press articles instead of evidence, where the reasons describe ageneric category rather than the applicant’s own conduct, or where the Council fails to update its file. Interim measures, suspension of the listing’s effects pending judgment, are available in urgent cases, though the bar is high and the applicant must show both a prima facie case and irreparable harm.
The second track is damages. After annulment, or alongside it, the applicant can claim compensation for the harm caused by an unlawful listing, before the same Luxembourg courts. Awards remain modest and the limitation rules strict, but the action matters commercially: it forces disclosure, creates settlement leverage, and preserves the record for insurers and correspondent banks. Hungary sought neither annulment of an individual measure nor damages. It sought the political reversal of a funding stream. No private litigant should draw from its failure any conclusion about the prospects of a well-evidenced individual case.
The third track is national and often the fastest. In Paris, the Treasury grants or refuses authorisations to release frozen funds for defined purposes: essential needs, reasonable legal fees, pre-existing debts, humanitarian operations, diplomatic expenses. A refusal can be challenged before the French administrative courts, which review competence, procedure, reasoning and manifest error without trespassing on the CFSP reservation that defeated Hungary, because they judge the national execution, not the European strategy. Banks that freeze beyond the scope of the designation, accounts of non-listed subsidiaries, funds of homonyms, post-designation earnings arguably outside the freeze, can be pressed through summary proceedings and through complaints to the supervisory authorities, with documented evidence of ownership chains, control, and the absence of making-available to the listed person. Each of these steps requires a file built like a trial exhibit from day one: corporate registers, shareholder ledgers, bank statements showing the origin of funds, contracts predating the designation, and correspondence proving that no economic resource reaches the sanctioned party.
Timing discipline decides outcomes. The two-month Luxembourg deadline runs from publication in the Official Journal and is not extended by correspondence with the Council. A request for reconsideration addressed to the Council, which the regulations invite, does not suspend the deadline for judicial review, so counsel files the annulment action protectively while pursuing the administrative reconsideration in parallel. In France, Treasury authorisation requests should specify the exact regulation and derogation article invoked, quantify the sums, identify the accounts by IBAN, and attach the supporting documents the Treasury’s checklist requires, because incomplete requests stall for months. Where criminal exposure exists, for circumvention, for dealings through intermediaries, or for export-control overlap, the file must be structured so that civil recovery steps do not create admissions usable in a criminal investigation. Coordination between the Luxembourg action, the Paris authorisation track and any criminal-risk advice is the core added value of counsel in these cases.
Hungary’s case also teaches a forum lesson by negative example. The Member State sued the Facility committee and the Council over minutes and voting procedure, inviting the jurisdictional objection it received. A private applicant sues over his own designation and his own money, invoking rights the treaties expressly reserve to judges. The difference is not rhetorical. It is the difference between Article 24 of the Treaty on European Union, which withdraws CFSP strategy from the Court, and Article 275 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which expressly preserves review of restrictive measures against natural and legal persons. France’s courts live on the second side of that line every week, authorising or refusing enforcement, checking Treasury paperwork, and applying the Cassation’s requirement of prior authorisation. Nothing in the 9 September judgment narrows that review. If anything, by pushing political challenges out of the courtroom, the General Court clarified that individual challenges belong there more firmly than ever.
Conclusion
The General Court’s judgment of 9 September 2026 in Case T-457/24 is a landmark about the limits of judicial power, not a ruling that frozen Russian assets may never be recovered or that every freeze is unassailable. Hungary challenged a strategic wartime funding decision and the Court answered that such decisions belong to governments, not judges. The reasoning leaves intact the three remedies that matter for private parties: individual annulment in Luxembourg within the strict deadline, damages for unlawful listing, and targeted authorisation and enforcement litigation in Paris under the French freeze code and the Court of Cassation’s authorisation requirement. Anyone with funds frozen in France should therefore read the Hungary headlines, set them aside, and audit his own position: the exact legal basis of his designation, the regulation’s derogations, the state of his Luxembourg deadline, and the completeness of his Treasury file. Political litigation about the proceeds of frozen billions will continue between states. Individual cases are won elsewhere, document by document, before the judges who kept their jurisdiction.