I. How a Moscow lawsuit, a Luxembourg challenge and a Belgian blocking action fit together
On 17 September 2026, the Bank of Russia opened a second legal front against the European Union. After attacking the December 2025 indefinite freeze of roughly 230 billion dollars of its reserves before the EU General Court in March, the Russian central bank has now filed a fresh challenge against the EU regulation adopted in July 2026, the twenty-first sanctions package, which allows EU courts and Member States not to recognise or enforce decisions handed down by Russian courts. The bank describes the measure as interference in pending proceedings in Belgium, where Euroclear is asking a civil court to neutralise a Moscow judgment that ordered the depository to pay the equivalent of about 249 billion euros. For readers in France, the episode raises two brutally practical questions: can a Russian judgment ordering payment out of frozen reserves ever be enforced by a French court, and what protection does French law actually give to a foreign central bank’s money sitting in Paris? This analysis answers both, using the exact texts French enforcement judges apply and the three recent Cour de cassation rulings that decide these cases.
A. What did the Bank of Russia actually file on 17 September 2026, and which EU rule is it attacking?
Two different lawsuits, filed six months apart, must not be confused. The first action dates from the end of February 2026: in a statement published on 3 March 2026, the Bank of Russia announced that it had seized the General Court of the European Union in Luxembourg to contest the European Council’s vote of 12 December 2025, which froze Moscow’s sovereign funds for an indefinite period, until the war in Ukraine ends and Russia pays reparations. Most of the money, around 230 billion dollars, sits with the Brussels-based central securities depository Euroclear. Before that vote, EU leaders had considered handing the funds to Ukraine as a loan, then stepped back over Belgian fears that a seizure would be judged unlawful, and instead agreed a 90-billion-euro loan to Ukraine backed by EU funds. In its March statement, relayed by Courthouse News, the central bank argued that the indefinite freeze violates, in its own words, the basic and inalienable rights to access justice, inviolability of property and the principle of sovereign immunity of states and their central banks. It added a procedural argument with real weight in EU law: the decision had been adopted by majority vote, allegedly bypassing the unanimity rule that normally governs the common foreign and security policy. An EU spokesman, Balazs Ujvari, replied that the Union was fully confident about the legality of the regulation and its compatibility with EU law, noting a growing number of Russian legal challenges to the support measures for Ukraine. That first case attacks the freeze itself, and it relies on the EU act published at OJ L_202502600, the legal basis of the indefinite immobilisation.
The second action, announced on 17 September 2026 and reported the same day by Reuters, plays on different terrain. It does not ask Luxembourg to unfreeze anything. It targets the EU regulation adopted in July 2026, the twenty-first sanctions package, insofar as that text gives EU courts and Member States permission not to recognise or enforce any court decision obtained in Russian courts. The context is the parallel war of judgments around Euroclear. In December 2025 the Bank of Russia had sued Euroclear before the Moscow Arbitration Court, claiming about 232 billion dollars covering the frozen assets plus compensation for lost returns. A preliminary hearing was held behind closed doors in January 2026. In May 2026 a Moscow court upheld the claim, with lawyers putting the award at up to 249 billion euros in damages, and in July 2026 it rejected Euroclear’s appeal. Euroclear answered in June 2026 by suing the Bank of Russia before a Belgian civil court, asking the Belgian judge to block enforcement of the Russian ruling. The September challenge therefore presents the July EU non-recognition rule as, in the central bank’s words reported by Reuters, interference in the ongoing legal proceedings in Belgium. The bank’s statement adds that the measures create disproportionate restrictions on the protection of the rights of the Bank of Russia outside the EU, including the application of financial sanctions for violating relevant court prohibitions. Moscow also floated the threat that will interest every enforcement lawyer in Paris: the central bank could seek seizure of Euroclear assets in other jurisdictions, especially in countries Russia regards as friendly, naming China, the United Arab Emirates and Kazakhstan. Readers should keep the chronology in mind, because each step obeys a different court, a different law and a different logic: Luxembourg judges EU law, Moscow judges Russian law, Brussels judges Belgian law, and a Paris judge, if ever seized, would judge French law.
B. Can the Moscow judgment against Euroclear ever be enforced in France or Belgium?
The short answer is that enforcement inside the European Union looks currently out of reach, and the July 2026 non-recognition clause is only the newest lock on a door that French law had already bolted. Start with the mechanism. A foreign judgment has no automatic executory force in France. Article 509 of the Code of civil procedure states the rule in one sentence: foreign court judgments and instruments received by foreign officers are enforceable on the territory of the Republic in the manner and in the cases provided for by law. The manner provided by law is the exequatur: a French court must declare the foreign decision enforceable after checking, under the conditions inherited from the founding case law, that the foreign court had jurisdiction under French conflicts rules, that the decision does not contradict French international public policy, and that it is not tainted by fraud. A Moscow ruling ordering a Brussels depository to hand over frozen sovereign reserves fails that test twice over. First, it collides frontally with directly applicable EU regulations, which prime minister over any foreign judgment and which French courts apply as their own law: Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014, whose Article 2 freezes all funds and economic resources belonging to, owned, held or controlled by listed persons and entities, and the December 2025 immobilisation act published at OJ L_202502600. A French judge cannot lend the coercive power of the Republic to an order that commands the violation of an EU asset freeze in force on French territory. Second, since July 2026, the twenty-first package expressly authorises EU judges not to recognise Russian decisions at all, which gives the French or Belgian court a textual shield it did not even need: international public policy already barred enforcement of a judgment whose object is to defeat European restrictive measures.
Belgium is where the blocking battle is actually being fought, and France would reason identically. Euroclear’s June 2026 action before a Belgian civil court is a classic defensive suit, known in practice as an anti-enforcement injunction request or declaration of unenforceability: the depository asks its home judge to declare that the Moscow ruling cannot produce effects against assets held in Belgium. The July EU clause reinforces that request by converting what was already a public-policy refusal into an express permission. This is why the Bank of Russia speaks of interference: from Moscow’s perspective, a European regulation now dictates to the Belgian judge the outcome of a pending case. From the European perspective, the Union is protecting its own courts from giving effect to decisions of a jurisdiction whose rulings, in this context, would dismantle the sanctions regime. Neither side’s characterisation decides the case; what matters for a French reader is the consequence in Paris. If the Bank of Russia, or an assignee of its Moscow award, ever asked the Paris enforcement judge for an exequatur, the request would hit the same wall: EU law primacy, French international public policy, and now the express non-recognition authorisation. The realistic enforcement geography is therefore the one Moscow itself sketched: assets of Euroclear or its debtors located in states that do not apply EU restrictive measures. China, the Emirates and Kazakhstan were named, and the legal work there would start from zero under each local law of enforcement, with no assistance from any French or Belgian court. For creditors and debtors operating in France, the lesson is symmetrical and immediate: a judgment from a sanctioned-state court that contradicts an EU freeze will not cross the French border, and anyone structuring transactions through Paris custodians or French subsidiaries of European groups should treat that as settled.
II. What French judges actually do when creditors chase a foreign state’s money in Paris
A. Are a foreign central bank’s reserves seizable in France?
French law answers with a prohibition, then carves a narrow, judge-controlled exception. The prohibition sits in the Monetary and Financial Code. Article L153-1 provides, in its first paragraph: property of any kind, including foreign exchange reserve holdings, held or managed by foreign central banks or monetary authorities for their own account or for the account of the foreign State or States to which they belong, cannot be seized. Those are the exact words a bailiff, a bank and an enforcement judge in Paris read before anything else. The text then opens one door: by exception, a creditor holding an enforceable title evidencing a liquid and due claim may ask the enforcement judge for authorisation to pursue forced execution under the conditions of the legislative part of the Code of civil enforcement procedures, if the creditor establishes that the property held or managed for its own account by the foreign central bank forms part of assets assigned to a principal activity governed by private law. In practice, that exception is extremely hard to use against genuine reserve holdings, because reserves parked with European depositories are the textbook example of property assigned to a sovereign monetary function, not to private-law business.
The Cour de cassation confirmed the strength of that shield in a dispute that every Paris enforcement practitioner knows. On 12 May 2021, the First Civil Chamber rejected the appeal of the creditor Commisimpex, which held two arbitral awards against the Republic of Congo and had attempted two seizures between the hands of the French Treasury’s ministerial budgetary controller over accounts opened in the name of the Bank of Central African States, the BEAC, to the prejudice of Congo. The Paris Court of Appeal had held that the targeted funds were unseizable, and the Cour de cassation endorsed the outcome: Judgment of 12 May 2021, appeal No. 19-13.853, Commisimpex v Agent judiciaire de l’Etat, rejection of the appeal. The reasoning, reproduced in full in the official text, recalls that the provisions of Article L153-1 of the Monetary and Financial Code belong to the principles laid down for immunity from execution by customary international law, as reflected by the United Nations Convention of 2 December 2004 on jurisdictional immunities of States and their property. The creditor’s argument that a waiver of immunity authorised seizure of reserve assets failed, and the two seizures were annulled as covering unseizable property. Transposed to the Russian file, the message is direct: even armed with a final judgment, a creditor cannot simply walk into Paris and seize reserve assets held for a central bank; the enforcement judge will check the nature of the property first, and reserves lose that fight for the creditor.
The general regime for state property completes the picture. Three cumulative-looking but alternative-tested articles of the Code of civil enforcement procedures govern every conservatory or enforcement measure against property belonging to a foreign state. First, Article L111-1-1 requires the prior authorisation of the judge, by order issued on petition, before any such measure can be implemented: no authorisation, no seizure, and the authorisation is a real filter, not a rubber stamp. Second, Article L111-1-2 allows the judge to authorise the measure only if one of three conditions is met: the state expressly consented to the measure, the state reserved or earmarked the property for satisfaction of the claim at issue, or a judgment or arbitral award was rendered against the state and the property is specifically used or intended for use by that state for other than non-commercial public service purposes, with a link to the entity against which proceedings were brought. Third, Article L111-1-3 closes the door almost entirely for diplomatic property: conservatory or enforcement measures against property, including bank accounts, used or intended for use in the functions of a foreign state’s diplomatic mission, consular posts, special missions or missions to international organisations can proceed only with the express and specific renunciation of the states concerned. These three texts, in force since the Law of 9 December 2016, are the daily grammar of the Paris enforcement judge, and they explain why the Moscow award, even setting aside the EU freeze, would struggle in France: Russian reserve assets are used for sovereign monetary purposes, not for commercial ones, and the third condition of Article L111-1-2 would not be met.
B. When can a creditor break through immunity before the Paris enforcement judge?
Immunity is not absolute, and the Cour de cassation has drawn the exact line in two landmark rulings that creditors and states both cite in Paris. The first dates from 10 January 2018. The Republic of Congo challenged a Paris Court of Appeal decision that had validated seizures of bank accounts belonging to its Paris embassy and its permanent delegation to UNESCO, at the request of the same creditor, Commisimpex. The First Civil Chamber annulled the appeal decision without remand: Judgment of 10 January 2018, appeal No. 16-22.494, Republic of Congo v Commisimpex, annulment without remand. The holding matters for every waiver clause drafted in London, New York or Moscow. The Court recalled the new legislation requiring that a foreign state’s renunciation of immunity from execution be both express and specific, noted that those provisions enshrine the earlier case law of 28 September 2011 and of 28 March 2013, appeals No. 10-25.938 and No. 11-10.450, the famous Argentine bondholder trilogy, and applied the coherence objective to the pending dispute. On the facts, the account holders were the Congolese embassy in France and the state’s permanent delegation to UNESCO, so the presumption of assignment to diplomatic functions applied, comforted by the account titles, and the creditor, on whom the burden lay, had not rebutted it before any court. Result: annulment in all provisions, no remand under Article L411-3 of the Code of judicial organisation, which allows the Cour de cassation to quash without remand and, in civil matters, to rule on the merits when the proper administration of justice so justifies, and confirmation of the Nanterre judgment of 15 December 2011. For drafters, the rule is now legible: a generic waiver of immunity from jurisdiction and execution, of the kind found in bond prospectuses, does not satisfy the double requirement of express and specific renunciation for diplomatic property.
The second ruling, dated 13 March 2024, shows the mirror image: where property is not diplomatic, an express waiver is enough. Congo again, Commisimpex again, but this time the seized asset was an aircraft assigned to the presidency of the Republic. The Court of Appeal had authorised execution, and the First Civil Chamber rejected Congo’s appeal: Judgment of 13 March 2024, appeal No. 21-17.599, Republic of Congo v Commisimpex, rejection of the appeal. The motifs deserve quotation because they state the current law. The Court recalled that under Article 22, paragraph 3 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 18 April 1961, the premises of the mission, their furnishings and other property thereon, and the mission’s means of transport cannot be subject to any seizure or measure of execution. It deduced that the provisions of Article L111-1-3 must be interpreted strictly, and, finding that it was neither argued nor shown that the seized aircraft formed part of the means placed at the disposal of Congo’s diplomatic mission in France, it approved the Court of Appeal for holding that the functions of a diplomatic mission must be distinguished from diplomatic activity exercised by a head of state, so that the express renunciation of immunity from execution consented by that state sufficed for the asset assigned to the presidency to be seized, without any additional specific renunciation. Put simply: diplomatic property needs express plus specific waiver; other state property used for non-sovereign purposes can be taken on an express waiver alone, provided one of the Article L111-1-2 gateways is open and the prior judicial authorisation under Article L111-1-1 was obtained.
Two practical consequences follow for anyone operating in Paris. First, the third-party holder is not a bystander. When a creditor serves a seizure between the hands of a French bank, a custodian or the Treasury, that garnishee must answer accurately, because Article R211-5 of the Code of civil enforcement procedures provides that a garnishee who, without lawful reason, fails to supply the required information is ordered, at the creditor’s request, to pay the sums due, and may be ordered to pay damages for negligent fault or for an inaccurate or false declaration. In the 2021 BEAC litigation, the ministerial controller’s declaration that no sums belonging to the debtor could be individualised in its accounts, and that the operating-account convention accounts cited in the seizure reports were unknown in its books, framed the entire dispute. Banks and custodians in Paris holding frozen Russian-linked funds therefore face a double bind they must manage with counsel: declare precisely, refuse nothing without a legal basis, and never release what an EU freeze immobilises. Second, France also operates its own domestic freeze machinery alongside EU regulations: Article L562-2 of the Monetary and Financial Code allows the ministers for the economy and the interior to order jointly, for six months renewable, the freezing of funds and economic resources belonging to, possessed, held or controlled by persons who commit, attempt, facilitate or finance terrorism, or entities owned or controlled by them. That domestic tool, terrorism-focused, shows the French method: freezes are executive acts with defined duration and judicial review, while EU sanctions apply directly and immediately. A creditor, a bank or a company whose funds are caught should therefore identify on day one which freeze bites, national or European, because the challenge route differs completely: administrative judge and time-limited renewal for the former, Luxembourg annulment action within two months of publication for the latter, the very route the Bank of Russia took in March and again in September 2026.
Conclusion
The September 2026 filing changes the legal geography of the frozen-assets war without changing its likely outcome inside the Union. The Bank of Russia’s first Luxembourg action attacks the substance of the indefinite freeze and the majority vote that imposed it; the Court will test the Council’s competence, proportionality and respect for the right to effective judicial protection, the classic pleas in sanctions annulment cases, and the Union arrives with the confidence its spokesman expressed in March. The second action attacks the July 2026 non-recognition rule as interference with the Belgian proceedings against Euroclear; it asks the General Court to arbitrate between the effectiveness of EU restrictive measures and the right of a foreign central bank to defend its property before a Member State judge. Whichever way Luxembourg rules, years will pass: General Court, then appeal to the Court of Justice, while the funds stay frozen and the Moscow award stays unenforceable in Paris, Brussels and every Member State court. French law, meanwhile, holds its line with unusual clarity. Central-bank reserves are unseizable under Article L153-1, state property needs prior judicial authorisation plus one of three narrow gateways, diplomatic property needs an express and specific waiver, and a foreign judgment that orders the breach of an EU freeze will not survive exequatur. The decisive battles will be fought at the margins: the drafting of waiver clauses, the accuracy of garnishee declarations, the choice of Luxembourg pleas, and, as Moscow openly threatens, enforcement attempts in jurisdictions beyond EU law. Anyone exposed on any side of that map, creditor holding an award, bank holding frozen funds, or company fearing a seizure at Roissy funds level or at a Paris custodian, should have the file reviewed now, before the next hearing sets the timetable.