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Five States Are Quitting the ICC as Washington Squeezes the Court: What Withdrawal Really Changes, and What France Still Does From Paris

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Five States Are Quitting the ICC as Washington Squeezes the Court: What Withdrawal Really Changes, and What France Still Does From Paris

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On 24 September 2026, the Associated Press reported from The Hague that the slow drip of departures from the International Criminal Court has turned into a steady file toward the exit. With Venezuela and Chad announcing they will quit the institution, five states have now started withdrawal procedures within a single year, alongside Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. The report landed the same week Washington sanctioned two more high-ranking Court staff members and publicly cheered the exodus on: a spokesperson for the United States State Department told the agency that five countries had so far announced plans to withdraw from the Rome Statute and that Washington would welcome further announcements. For anyone wanted by the Court, holding assets that finance a listed network, or simply transiting through Paris with an arrest warrant in the background, the question is immediate and practical: does a state leaving the Court end the cases, cancel the warrants, or unfreeze the money? The short answer is no, and the longer answer runs straight through French procedure. France remains a State Party, Paris remains one of the places where an ICC arrest request is executed fastest, and French courts keep a fallback jurisdiction that survives even when a suspect’s home state walks out. This analysis explains what withdrawal legally changes, what it leaves untouched, and what to do in the first hours if France becomes the place of arrest.

I. ICC Withdrawal: Does Leaving the Court End a Case Against You?

A. How does a state legally leave the ICC, and when does the exit take effect?

Leaving the International Criminal Court is a formal, slow, and entirely written procedure, not a press-conference event. The Rome Statute, the treaty that created the Court and whose authentic texts are deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, provides in its article 127, paragraph 1, that a State Party may withdraw by written notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, with effect one year after the date of receipt unless the notification specifies a later date. The full text is freely consultable on the United Nations Treaty Series page for the Rome Statute and on the official website of the International Criminal Court. Three consequences flow directly from that single sentence, and each of them matters for defence strategy. First, only a written notification to New York counts; speeches, parliamentary motions, and communiqués start the political clock but not the legal one. Second, the state remains a full member with full cooperation duties for at least twelve months after the letter arrives, and longer if it names a later date. Third, during that waiting year every investigation, every warrant, and every request for arrest keeps running as if nothing had been announced.

The recent wave illustrates the rule rather than testing it. Burundi became the first state to leave in 2017, after the Court opened an examination of the situation on its territory, and the Philippines followed in 2019 under then-President Rodrigo Duterte while an examination of the anti-drug campaign was active. South Africa and The Gambia both announced departures in 2017 and then reversed course before the year expired, which proves that the twelve-month window is also a political cooling-off period. The three Sahel states ruled by military juntas, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, announced their departures last year denouncing selective justice and calling the Court, in the words reported by the Associated Press, an instrument of neocolonial repression wielded by imperialism. Venezuela announced its exit last month while the Court’s investigation into alleged crimes by state security forces was already open, and Chad has now joined the movement. Hungary offers the mirror image: it announced it would quit in 2025, then, following the election of a new government, its parliament voted to stay. And the movement runs in both directions, because Ukraine became the Court’s most recent member in 2025, extending the Court’s reach over crimes committed on Ukrainian territory since the outbreak of hostilities with Russia in 2014. Anyone counting heads should therefore count dates instead: what matters is not the headline but the day the Secretary-General receives the letter, plus one year.

The American pressure campaign explains the timing but changes nothing in the legal mechanism. According to the Associated Press account published on 24 September 2026, Washington has sanctioned two more senior Court figures in recent weeks, urged member states to resign, and, according to press reports from 20 and 21 September, prepared court-wide sanctions measures. Our companion analysis of the American sanctions drive against the Court and what France must still do details the cooperation and blocking-statute response from Paris. For the withdrawal question, the point is narrower: foreign sanctions do not amend the Rome Statute, do not shorten the one-year period, and do not relieve any state of warrants already issued. A suspect who reads the departures as an amnesty misreads both the treaty and the calendar. The exit door exists, but it opens a year after the letter, and everything the Court had already started walks through it first.

That calendar point controls every practical decision a defence team makes this year. If your state of nationality announced withdrawal three months ago, you remain for nine more months the national of a State Party, with all the cooperation channels between that state and The Hague still formally open. If an investigation into your situation commenced before the effective date, it continues after it, as the next section shows. If no investigation had started, the Prosecutor can still open one during the waiting year for crimes committed while the state was a member. And France, for its part, applies none of this as foreign news: as long as Paris holds a valid ICC request, the French police and the Paris courts act on it, whatever flag the suspect carries. The only safe reading of an announced withdrawal is therefore a timetable, not a shield: note the notification date, add one year, and prepare every filing, surrender challenge, and asset-protection step as if the membership were still fully alive, because legally it is.

B. Why do past crimes stay under ICC jurisdiction after a state walks out?

The reason past cases survive is written into the very article that authorises departure. Article 127, paragraph 2 of the Rome Statute then locks in continuity: a withdrawing State is not discharged from obligations that arose while it was a Party, including accrued financial obligations; its withdrawal does not affect cooperation in criminal investigations and proceedings commenced before the effective date where a duty to cooperate existed; and it does not prejudice matters already under consideration by the Court. Every word of that paragraph was drafted for exactly the situations unfolding now. Financial contributions already due stay due. Cooperation duties for investigations already commenced survive the exit. Matters already under consideration stay under consideration. Withdrawal operates for the future; it has no retroactive effect on jurisdiction, on warrants, or on the duty to arrest and surrender.

The Duterte file is the living demonstration. The Court had an active examination of the Philippines when President Duterte announced the withdrawal, the country left in 2019 as the second state ever to do so, and the case continued regardless because withdrawal is not retroactive. The former president is today detained in The Hague facing charges of crimes against humanity over the deadly anti-drug crackdowns he allegedly oversaw, with opening statements expected in November, as the Associated Press reports. The Venezuela file follows the same track: the investigation into possible crimes by security forces under former President Maduro was already open when Caracas announced its departure last month, so it continues on the same legal basis, while the country has separately entered United States-backed talks between the ruling party and the opposition following Maduro’s capture in January by American forces. The lesson for any suspect, witness, or counsel reading these headlines is blunt: if the Court was already looking at the situation before the exit became effective, the exit changes nothing for you. Warrants remain valid, states that stayed members must still execute them, and the passage of the one-year mark validates no new defence.

French domestic law mirrors that continuity and gives Paris its own independent grip on the same facts. The French definition of genocide provides in article 211-1 of the Criminal Code: “Constitue un génocide le fait, en exécution d’un plan concerté tendant à la destruction totale ou partielle d’un groupe national, ethnique, racial ou religieux, ou d’un groupe déterminé à partir de tout autre critère arbitraire, de commettre ou de faire commettre, à l’encontre de membres de ce groupe, l’un des actes suivants”. Crimes against humanity are defined in article 212-1 of the Criminal Code: “Constitue également un crime contre l’humanité et est puni de la réclusion criminelle à perpétuité l’un des actes ci-après commis en exécution d’un plan concerté à l’encontre d’un groupe de population civile dans le cadre d’une attaque généralisée ou systématique”. These definitions allow French courts to characterise the same conduct the ICC pursues, and they feed both the cooperation channel with The Hague and the autonomous French prosecutions described in Part II. A withdrawal by the territorial state therefore never creates a legal vacuum around a suspect present in France: either the ICC request arrives and France surrenders, or the French prosecutor opens a domestic file on the same facts.

Critics of the Court argue that this design proves the selectivity charge, while defenders read it as proof of endurance. The Sahel juntas frame the institution as a neocolonial instrument; Burundi made the same argument in 2017 when it accused the Court of fixating on Africa, even though most of the early African situations were referred by the African governments themselves. Mel O’Brien, associate professor of international law at the University of Western Australia, told the agency that these countries were ruled by authoritarian leaders seeking to avoid accountability for harm inflicted on their own people. A Paris lawyer does not need to settle that debate to advise a client. Whichever narrative history retains, the procedural reality for the next twelve months is fixed: investigations already opened continue, warrants already issued stay executable in every state that remains a member, and France, which has never wavered in its membership, executes them through a dedicated surrender procedure that the next part dissects step by step. Withdrawal is a sovereign choice with real political meaning; as a defence against an existing ICC case, it is an empty file.

II. Wanted, Arrested or Listed While States Quit: What France Still Does From Paris

A. How does France surrender a suspect to the ICC from Paris?

France does not extradite to the International Criminal Court; it surrenders, and the difference is decisive. Extradition between states carries classic bars such as the political-offence exception, nationality protections, and double-criminality debates. Surrender to the ICC runs on a separate statutory track built for speed and stripped of those bars. The founding principle is stated in article 627 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: “Pour l’application du statut de la Cour pénale internationale signé le 18 juillet 1998, la France participe à la répression des infractions et coopère avec cette juridiction dans les conditions fixées par le présent titre.” Everything that follows in the statute is the machinery of that promise. For a person arrested at Roissy, in a Paris hotel, or at a prefecture appointment, this means the file moves to Paris immediately, the review is narrow, and the calendar is counted in days, not months.

The request itself travels directly to the Paris prosecutor’s office. Article 627-4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides: “Les demandes d’arrestation aux fins de remise délivrées par la Cour pénale internationale sont adressées, en original et accompagnées de toutes pièces justificatives, aux autorités compétentes en vertu de l’article 87 du statut”. Those authorities verify formal regularity, forward the request to the prosecutor general at the Paris Court of Appeal, and execute it across the whole national territory; in urgent cases the request may even arrive through rapid channels before the original follows. Concretely, an ICC warrant can therefore turn into a French arrest within hours, anywhere in the country, without passing through the diplomatic extradition circuit. Anyone who learns that a warrant may exist should assume the Paris prosecutor already holds it or will hold it within the day, and should organise the defence before the knock on the door rather than after.

The first hours after arrest follow a strict ritual that counsel must police minute by minute. Article 627-5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure requires: “Toute personne appréhendée en vertu d’une demande d’arrestation aux fins de remise doit être déférée dans les vingt-quatre heures au procureur de la République territorialement compétent.” Within that window the safeguards of police custody apply, identity is verified, and the person is informed, in a language he or she understands, that an ICC arrest request exists and that appearance before the prosecutor general at the Paris Court of Appeal will follow within a maximum of five days. Practical advice matters more here than theory: give counsel’s telephone number to family members in advance, carry proof of identity and medical prescriptions, say nothing about the merits before counsel arrives, and ask immediately for the warrant, its translation, and the statement of facts. Errors at this stage, a wrong identity, a missing translation, an unrecorded request for a lawyer, are among the few issues the French judge will actually examine, so they must be documented from hour one.

The judicial review in Paris is fast and deliberately narrow, which is exactly why preparation must be early. Article 627-8 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states: “Lorsque la chambre de l’instruction constate qu’il n’y a pas d’erreur évidente, elle ordonne la remise de la personne réclamée et, si celle-ci est libre, son incarcération à cette fin.” The same article adds: “La chambre de l’instruction statue dans les quinze jours de la comparution devant elle de la personne réclamée.” Any other argument is referred to the ICC itself for appropriate action. An appeal lies to the Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation, which rules within two months of receiving the file. The test is therefore not guilt, not the strength of the Prosecutor’s evidence, and not the politics of the withdrawing state; it is the absence of manifest error on identity, on the warrant, and on procedure. Interim release exists but is tightly framed, and article 627-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure extends the same surrender rules where the person is also prosecuted or convicted in France on other counts: “Les dispositions des articles 627-4 à 627-10 sont également applicables si la personne réclamée est poursuivie ou condamnée en France pour d’autres chefs que ceux visés par la demande de la Cour pénale internationale.” Domestic cases do not block surrender; at most they organise its timing, while the ICC proceedings suspend limitation periods. A defence built on contesting the merits belongs in The Hague, not in Paris; the Paris defence wins on papers, deadlines, translations, and demonstrable error, filed within days.

B. What happens to frozen assets, seized evidence and French fallback trials?

Arrest is only half the file; the other half is money, papers, and hard drives. ICC cooperation covers conservatory measures on French soil, and the French prosecutor acts quickly. Article 627-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides: “L’exécution sur le territoire français des mesures conservatoires mentionnées au k du paragraphe 1 de l’article 93 du statut est ordonnée, aux frais avancés du Trésor et selon les modalités prévues par le présent code, par le procureur de la République antiterroriste.” The maximum duration is two years, renewable at the Court’s request before expiry, with difficulties transmitted through the article 87 channel. In practice this covers the freezing of bank accounts, the seizure of property, and the preservation of evidence located in France, ordered by the anti-terrorism prosecutor in Paris and executed nationwide. Anyone whose funds or documents sit in France should therefore treat an ICC investigation as an imminent freezing risk, map every account, company share, and safe-deposit box now, and prepare the proof of lawful origin and living-expense needs before the order lands rather than afterwards.

Final orders follow the same Paris-centred route, and confiscated value flows back to The Hague or to the victims. Article 627-17 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states: “L’autorisation d’exécution rendue par le tribunal correctionnel en vertu de l’article précédent entraîne, selon la décision de la Cour pénale internationale, transfert du produit des amendes et des biens confisqués ou du produit de leur vente à la cour ou au fonds en faveur des victimes.” The same mechanism can attribute property or sums directly to victims designated by the Court, with disputes over allocation reserved to the ICC. This matters far beyond convicted persons: relatives holding transferred apartments, companies receiving redirected dividends, and banks executing the freeze all sit inside the enforcement chain. Challenges run against the execution authorisation before the Paris criminal court, on regularity and proportionality grounds, and must be filed fast with complete banking and title records. Waiting until the transfer order is signed means fighting over an empty account.

alongside the ICC track runs the American sanctions track, and the two must never be confused. United States sanctions freeze dollar flows and threaten secondary measures against foreign banks; European Union and French freezes rest on Council regulations and national execution orders that can be challenged before the EU General Court in Luxembourg and, for implementing acts, before French administrative courts. Our companion piece on American sanctions against the Court and the French cooperation and blocking-statute response sets out the full toolkit: continued French cooperation with The Hague, protection of European operators against foreign prohibitions, and separate challenges to listings and freezes. The withdrawal wave adds one practical twist: as some states leave the Court politically, banks sometimes over-comply, freezing more broadly than any text requires. Every freeze letter must therefore be read against the exact legal basis cited, dollar-clearing risk separated from EU-law obligation, and each challenge filed in the right forum within its own deadline. A file that mixes the ICC surrender, the American designation, and the European freeze into a single protest loses all three; a file that splits them wins each on its own terrain.

And if the ICC route ever stalled, France keeps its own courtroom open. Beyond the cooperation title, French courts hold an autonomous universal jurisdiction over the gravest crimes. Article 689-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides: “Hors les cas prévus au sous-titre Ier du titre Ier du livre IV pour l’application de la convention portant statut de la Cour pénale internationale, ouverte à la signature à Rome le 18 juillet 1998, peut être poursuivie et jugée par les juridictions françaises toute personne soupçonnée d’avoir commis à l’étranger l’une des infractions suivantes”. The general gateway is article 689 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: “Les auteurs ou complices d’infractions commises hors du territoire de la République peuvent être poursuivis et jugés par les juridictions françaises soit lorsque, conformément aux dispositions du livre Ier du code pénal ou d’un autre texte législatif, la loi française est applicable, soit lorsqu’une convention internationale ou un acte pris en application du traité instituant les Communautés européennes donne compétence aux juridictions françaises pour connaître de l’infraction.” Combined with the definitions of genocide and crimes against humanity in articles 211-1 and 212-1 of the Criminal Code, this gives Paris prosecutors a domestic path over foreign atrocity facts whenever the suspect is present and the statutory conditions, including the presence and complementarity requirements the case law refines, are met. Withdrawal by the territorial state does not close this door; if anything, the withdrawing state’s demonstrated unwillingness to prosecute is the classic trigger that opens it. A suspect celebrating his government’s exit from the Rome Statute while sitting in Paris may therefore trade an international surrender for a French trial, which is rarely the bargain he imagined.

Conclusion

The September 2026 withdrawal wave is politically spectacular and legally narrow. Five states starting the exit procedure within one year, two more Court officials sanctioned within weeks, and Washington openly inviting further departures make headlines that suggest the Court is emptying; the treaty says otherwise. Article 127 of the Rome Statute keeps every departing state bound for a full year after its written notification, preserves every investigation already commenced, and leaves every warrant already issued fully executable in the states that remain. Duterte’s detention in The Hague with trial opening statements expected in November, after the Philippines left in 2019, and the continuing Venezuela investigation despite last month’s announced exit, prove the point beyond argument. France sits firmly on the enforcement side of that line: surrender from Paris runs in days through the prosecutor general, the investigation chamber, and, on appeal, the Court of Cassation, on a manifest-error test with no political-offence shelter; conservatory freezes deploy for renewable two-year terms; confiscated value flows to the Court or the victims; and autonomous French prosecutions wait behind the cooperation channel for cases the international route cannot reach. Anyone named, frozen, or arrested in this climate should act on the calendar the treaty sets: verify the notification date, assume the warrant survives it, secure counsel in Paris within hours of arrest, split the surrender, sanctions, and freeze files into their proper forums, and argue the merits where they belong, in The Hague, while Paris decides only the papers, the deadlines, and the error file. Exits make noise; jurisdiction keeps working.

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