In the summer of 2026, the International Criminal Court lived through the most serious wave of departures in its history. The Associated Press reported on 11 September 2026 that the recent departure of Venezuela and Chad brings the number of countries to pull out of the court in the past year to five, joining Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. Behind these announcements stands an open American pressure campaign: Secretary of State Marco Rubio has said he will press the court’s member states to withdraw, while Washington has already sanctioned around a dozen ICC staff over the arrest warrants issued for senior Israeli officials for the Gaza war and over investigations touching American personnel in Afghanistan. The presidency of the Assembly of States Parties has taken note of the situation with concern and called on Chad and Venezuela to stay. For readers in France and abroad, the question is practical: does quitting the Court bury the cases and shield the suspects? The answer is no. Withdrawal takes a full year to take effect, it never applies retroactively, and every investigation opened before the exit date continues. France, which remains a State Party, stays fully bound: its courts must still arrest and surrender suspects found on French soil, and its universal-jurisdiction statutes let Paris prosecute atrocity crimes itself when no international court can. Part I explains what withdrawal really does under Article 127 of the Rome Statute, through the Venezuelan notification of 24 July 2026 and the precedent of the Philippines. Part II sets out what France must still do: the arrest-and-surrender procedure before the Paris courts, and prosecution by French judges under Articles 689 and 689-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as interpreted by the Assemblée plénière on 12 May 2023.
I. Can a State Simply Quit the ICC? How Withdrawal Under Article 127 Really Works
A. How Long Does ICC Withdrawal Take? The One-Year Rule After the 24 July 2026 Venezuela Notice
Yes, a State Party can leave the International Criminal Court, but it cannot leave overnight, and it cannot leave with immediate effect. The only exit door is Article 127 of the Rome Statute, and its first paragraph sets a strict timetable: A State Party may, by written notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, withdraw from this Statute. The withdrawal shall take effect one year after the date of receipt of the notification, unless the notification specifies a later date. Those two sentences decide everything about the calendar of the 2026 crisis. The notification must be written, it must be addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and the one-year clock runs from receipt, not from the political announcement. A government press release changes nothing in law until the letter reaches New York.
The Venezuelan file gives the textbook illustration. In its Questions and Answers on Venezuela’s withdrawal dated 13 August 2026, the Court records that on 24 July 2026, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela notified its decision to withdraw from the Rome Statute, the founding document of the ICC. The same document draws the consequence in plain terms: a withdrawal from the Rome Statute takes effect one year after the notification of withdrawal is presented before the Secretary General of the United Nations, and a State that notifies its withdrawal shall remain fully bound by the Rome Statute as a State Party until the date on which the withdrawal takes effect. In other words, it will remain a party to the ICC for a period of one year after the notification. Venezuela therefore stays a full State Party, with all cooperation duties, until late July 2027, and any arrest warrant, any request for assistance and any order of the Court issued before that date binds Caracas exactly as before.
The Chadian file follows the same legal frame with a more openly political chronology. According to the Associated Press account, Chad specifically cited the United States in its decision to withdraw: its foreign minister, Abdoulaye Sabre Fadoul, stated that in a phone call with an American official on 23 July, the American side expressed its concerns regarding the functioning of this institution and requested that Chad reconsider its membership, and four days later, Chad said it would leave the ICC. Whatever the motive, the legal effect is identical to Venezuela’s: a one-year waiting period during which N’Djamena owes the Court full cooperation.
The institutional reaction confirms that these departures, while lawful in form, are treated as a grave matter. The presidency of the Assembly of States Parties, in response to steps taken by the Governments of Chad and Venezuela towards withdrawal from the Rome Statute, the treaty establishing the International Criminal Court, has taken note of the situation with concern. It calls on Chad and Venezuela to remain committed States Parties to the Rome Statute and to continue engaging constructively within the framework of the Assembly of States Parties, and it recalls that Chad and Venezuela have contributed to the collective work of the Assembly of States Parties in support of the International Criminal Court as an independent and impartial judicial institution. The message is diplomatic but clear: the Assembly would rather debate grievances inside the room than count exits.
The wider context explains why five exits in twelve months is a record. The three Sahel states left first: the ruling military juntas in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger blamed selective justice, calling the ICC an instrument of neocolonial repression in the hands of imperialism. Then came Venezuela and Chad, just as Washington escalated. A spokesperson for the United States State Department told the Associated Press that five countries so far have announced plans to withdraw from the Rome Statute, and we welcome more announcements in the future. Rubio has said he will pressure the court’s 125 member states to withdraw from the institution, sanction organizations that work with the court and ban staff from traveling to the United States. Paris reads this arithmetic coldly: even five departures leave around 120 States Parties standing, and France is firmly among them.
B. Does Leaving the ICC Kill Ongoing Cases? Why the Venezuela Investigation Goes On
No. This is the point most often misunderstood in press coverage, and Article 127 answers it in its second paragraph: a State shall not be discharged, by reason of its withdrawal, from the obligations arising from this Statute while it was a Party to the Statute, including any financial obligations which may have accrued. Its withdrawal shall not affect any cooperation with the Court in connection with criminal investigations and proceedings in relation to which the withdrawing State had a duty to cooperate and which were commenced prior to the date on which the withdrawal became effective, nor shall it prejudice in any way the continued consideration of any matter which was already under consideration by the Court prior to the date on which the withdrawal became effective. Three consequences flow from this single paragraph: money owed stays owed, cooperation files already opened stay open, and every matter already before the Court continues exactly as if no withdrawal had occurred.
Applied to Venezuela, the rule leaves no room for doubt. The Court’s Questions and Answers state the answer in one line: No. The withdrawal does not affect the investigation on the Situation in Venezuela I, which is still ongoing. The same document recalls the mechanism: according to article 127 of the Rome Statute, a withdrawal does not prejudice the continued consideration of any investigation or proceedings already under consideration by the Court prior to the date on which the withdrawal takes effect, and a withdrawal shall not affect any pre-existing cooperation obligations arising from criminal investigations or proceedings before the Court. The investigation into crimes allegedly committed by Venezuelan security forces therefore continues after July 2027 as before, arrest warrants connected to it remain fully valid, and every State Party, France included, remains under a duty to execute them.
The Philippines precedent proves the rule is not theoretical. When then-President Rodrigo Duterte announced that his country would leave the ICC, the Court had an active investigation in the Philippines, and in 2019 the Southeast Asian country became the second country to leave, after Burundi. But as withdrawal from the court is not retroactive, the investigation continued. The epilogue is reported in the same September 2026 dispatches: Duterte is now in ICC detention in the Netherlands awaiting trial on charges of crimes against humanity for deadly anti-drug crackdowns he allegedly oversaw while in office, with opening statements set for November. A head of state who denounced the treaty, took his country out of it, and was later arrested abroad now sits in a Hague cell. No clearer demonstration exists that exit does not equal impunity.
Two further scenarios show the limits of the exit strategy. First, crimes committed on the territory of a withdrawing state after the withdrawal takes effect fall outside the Court’s jurisdiction on the territorial basis, but the Security Council referral route and the nationality route through other States Parties remain available, and national prosecutions under universal jurisdiction, including in France, can fill the gap, as Part II explains. Second, the withdrawing state keeps no veto over witnesses, evidence or suspects located on the territory of States Parties: France may still receive ICC requests concerning the Venezuelan or Sahel situations and must still execute them. The Venezuelan opposition talks backed by Washington, following the reported capture of Nicolas Maduro in January by American forces, change none of this in law: a political transition does not erase an ICC investigation, and a new government inherits the cooperation duties until the one-year clock expires, and the surviving obligations after it.
The practical lesson for suspects, counsel and victims is therefore threefold. A withdrawal announcement is the start of a twelve-month countdown, not an amnesty. Every warrant and every investigation already on the docket survives the exit. And the suspects concerned would be ill-advised to transit through the some 120 states that remain parties, starting with France, where the arrest machinery described below applies in full.
II. France Stays In: Arrest, Surrender and Prosecution From Paris
A. Can France Arrest and Surrender an ICC Suspect Found on French Soil? The Paris Procedure From the First 24 Hours
Yes, and the procedure is among the fastest coercive mechanisms in French criminal law. France is not a bystander of the Rome Statute system: it wrote cooperation into the Code of Criminal Procedure, and it did so in mandatory terms. Article 627 of the Code provides that pour l’application du statut de la Cour pénale internationale signé le 18 juillet 1998, la France participe à la répression des infractions et coopère avec cette juridiction dans les conditions fixées par le présent titre. The official page of this article is published on Légifrance at Article 627 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The following provisions apply to any person prosecuted before the International Criminal Court or convicted by it for acts constituting, within the meaning of Articles 6 to 8 and 25 of the Statute, genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes. In short, when The Hague asks, Paris acts.
The arrest-and-surrender sequence is concentrated in the hands of the Paris prosecution and the courts. Article 627-5 of the Code, published on Légifrance at Article 627-5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, provides that toute personne appréhendée en vertu d’une demande d’arrestation aux fins de remise doit être déférée dans les vingt-quatre heures au procureur de la République territorialement compétent. Within that time limit, the safeguards of Articles 63-1 to 63-7 apply, meaning custody rights from the first hour. After verifying identity, the prosecutor informs the person, in a language she understands, that she is the subject of an arrest request for surrender purposes and that she will appear, within a maximum of five days, before the prosecutor general at the Paris Court of Appeal: qu’elle comparaîtra, dans un délai maximum de cinq jours, devant le procureur général près la cour d’appel de Paris. The person is told she may be assisted by counsel of her choice or by court-appointed counsel, and that she may speak with that lawyer immediately. If the prosecutor does not release the person, she is brought before the liberty and detention judge, who orders remand, unless representation at every step of the proceedings is sufficiently guaranteed under Article 59 of the Statute, in which case release under judicial supervision remains possible.
Two companion provisions complete the arsenal. For protective measures, Article 627-3 of the Code, published on Légifrance at Article 627-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, entrusts the anti-terrorism prosecutor of Paris with ordering, at the Treasury’s advanced expense, the conservatory measures mentioned in Article 93, paragraph 1(k) of the Statute, for a maximum of two years, renewable at the Court’s request. For money, Article 627-16 of the Code, published on Légifrance at Article 627-16 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, allows the Paris criminal court, seised by the prosecutor at the Court’s request, to authorize enforcement of fines, confiscation orders and reparation decisions, while remaining bound by the ICC decision, including on third-party rights. Seizing, confiscating and transferring the proceeds of atrocity crimes can therefore be done from Paris even when the suspect himself is elsewhere.
Concretely, a person named in an ICC arrest warrant who lands at Roissy, transits through Paris or simply resides in France faces the following chain: border or judicial police apprehension on the ICC request, referral within twenty-four hours to the local prosecutor, appearance within five days before the prosecutor general in Paris, detention or supervised release ordered by the liberty judge, then surrender proceedings leading to transfer to The Hague. French nationality is no shield against surrender to the ICC, unlike classic extradition, because surrender to an international court created by a treaty France ratified follows its own regime. Counsel’s real lines of defence are narrow and technical: mistaken identity, procedural irregularities in the twenty-four-hour and five-day time limits, manifest violation of fundamental rights in the requesting process, or a genuine competing obligation. Political disagreement with the Court is not a ground for refusal, and the current withdrawal wave changes nothing for France, which has filed no notification and owes full cooperation.
B. Can French Courts Prosecute Atrocity Crimes When the ICC Cannot? Habitual Residence and the 12 May 2023 Rulings
Yes, within strict gates that the Court of Cassation polices closely. Alongside cooperation with The Hague, France gave its own courts a subsidiary universal jurisdiction for the core crimes. The general gateway is Article 689 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, published on Légifrance at Article 689 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: les auteurs ou complices d’infractions commises hors du territoire de la République peuvent être poursuivis et jugés par les juridictions françaises soit lorsque, conformément aux dispositions du livre Ier du code pénal ou d’un autre texte législatif, la loi française est applicable, soit lorsqu’une convention internationale donne compétence aux juridictions françaises pour connaître de l’infraction. The special gateway for atrocity crimes is Article 689-11, published on Légifrance at Article 689-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: peut être poursuivie et jugée par les juridictions françaises toute personne soupçonnée d’avoir commis à l’étranger l’une des infractions suivantes: 1° le crime de génocide défini au chapitre Ier du sous-titre Ier du titre Ier du livre II du code pénal; 2° les autres crimes contre l’humanité définis au chapitre II du même sous-titre Ier; 3° les crimes et les délits de guerre définis aux articles 461-1 à 461-31 du même code. The definitions sit in the Criminal Code: genocide at Article 211-1 of the Criminal Code, which punishes as genocide acts committed en exécution d’un plan concerté tendant à la destruction totale ou partielle d’un groupe national, ethnique, racial ou religieux, crimes against humanity at Article 212-1 of the Criminal Code, and war crimes at Article 461-1 of the Criminal Code.
Three cumulative locks condition this jurisdiction, and each has teeth. First, the suspect must have a habitual residence in France: la personne soupçonnée doit avoir une résidence habituelle sur le territoire français, celle-ci se définissant par un lien de rattachement suffisant avec la France. The statute lists the indicators: duration of presence, actual or foreseeable, conditions and reasons of that presence, the demonstrated wish to settle or remain, and family, social, material or professional ties. Second, prosecution requires double criminality or a Rome Statute link for the state of commission. Third, and most structurally, the monopoly belongs to the Paris anti-terrorism prosecutor, and prosecution is possible only if no international or national court seeks surrender or extradition: la poursuite de ces crimes ne peut être exercée qu’à la requête du procureur de la République antiterroriste et si aucune juridiction internationale ou nationale ne demande la remise ou l’extradition de la personne. The prosecutor must verify that the ICC has no proceedings running and that no other competent international court and no other state has requested the person. France prosecutes only when The Hague and the world do not claim priority.
The Assemblée plénière gave this scheme its authoritative reading on 12 May 2023 in two landmark rulings on Syrian cases, Pourvois No. 22-82.468 and No. 22-80.057, published on the Court of Cassation website at Assemblée plénière, 12 May 2023, No. 22-82.468 and Assemblée plénière, 12 May 2023, No. 22-80.057. The Court restated the rule as modified by the Act of 23 March 2019: selon l’article 689-11 du code de procédure pénale, modifié par la loi n° 2019-222 du 23 mars 2019, en vigueur à compter du 25 mars 2019, peut être poursuivie et jugée par les juridictions françaises, si elle réside habituellement sur le territoire de la République, toute personne soupçonnée d’avoir commis à l’étranger les crimes contre l’humanité, autres que le génocide, prévus par les articles 212-1 à 212-3 du code pénal, ainsi que les crimes et les délits de guerre définis aux articles 461-1 à 461-31 du même code. Then came the decisive interpretation of habitual residence: la condition de résidence habituelle, au sens de l’article 689-11 du code de procédure pénale, qui suppose un lien de rattachement suffisant avec la France, doit être appréciée en prenant en compte un faisceau d’indices, tels que la durée, actuelle ou prévisible, les conditions et les raisons de la présence de l’intéressé sur le territoire français, la volonté manifestée par celui-ci de s’y installer ou de s’y maintenir, ou ses liens familiaux, sociaux, matériels ou professionnels. No single factor decides: duration, reasons for presence, intention to stay and personal ties are weighed together as a bundle of indicators, inspired by the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union on this functional and protean notion. Both pourvois were rejected, and the Syrian investigations in Paris continued.
The same chamber shows the gates are real by closing them when the conditions fail. On 24 November 2021, the Criminal Chamber, No. 21-81.344, published at Criminal Chamber, 24 November 2021, No. 21-81.344, quashed a Paris investigating chamber decision and declared the French courts incompetent over a Syrian suspect, holding that peut être poursuivie et jugée par les juridictions françaises, si elle réside habituellement sur le territoire de la République, toute personne soupçonnée d’avoir commis à l’étranger le crime de génocide, prévu par le code pénal, les autres crimes contre l’humanité définis par ce code, and finding the residence and subsidiarity conditions unmet: CASSE et ANNULE, en toutes ses dispositions, l’arrêt susvisé de la chambre de l’instruction de la cour d’appel de Paris, en date du 18 février 2021, and DÉCLARE INCOMPÉTENTES les juridictions françaises pour connaître des poursuites engagées contre le demandeur. Universal jurisdiction in France is therefore a working tool, not a slogan: it catches suspects genuinely anchored in France, and it releases those who are not.
For the withdrawal wave, the consequence is direct. If Caracas, N’Djamena or a Sahel capital shelters suspects after its exit takes effect, and those suspects travel, settle or hold assets in France, Paris offers the ICC two services at once: immediate arrest and surrender under Articles 627 to 627-20, and, where surrender is not requested, autonomous prosecution under Article 689-11 at the sole initiative of the Paris anti-terrorism prosecutor. Victims’ associations can file complaints with constitution de partie civile to trigger the opening of a judicial investigation, and the prosecutor general in Paris hears complainants who appeal a dismissal. In a fragmenting ICC membership, France functions as both the Court’s enforcement arm and its backup courtroom.
Conclusion
The 2026 withdrawal wave is a political earthquake with limited legal effects. Five states have announced their exit in a year, Washington openly recruits more, and the Assembly of States Parties answers with concern and calls to stay. But Article 127 means every announced exit is a twelve-month countdown during which all duties survive, and paragraph 2 means every investigation already opened, from Venezuela I to the Sahel situations, continues to judgment regardless of the exit. Duterte’s cell in Scheveningen is the living proof. For France, nothing changes except the workload: Paris must still arrest and surrender any ICC suspect found on its territory within the twenty-four-hour and five-day framework of Article 627-5, still seize and transfer assets under Articles 627-3 and 627-16, and still stands ready to prosecute under Article 689-11 whenever a suspect puts down sufficient roots in France and no other court claims him. States may walk out of the Rome Statute; the warrants do not walk out with them, and in Paris they remain enforceable the morning after.