Two decisions in The Hague, twelve days apart, have just redrawn the battlefield of the Gaza cases before the International Court of Justice. From 7 to 10 September 2026, Germany pleaded that Nicaragua’s claim over German arms exports to Israel should be thrown out before any trial on the merits. On 22 September 2026, Colombia formally withdrew its intervention in South Africa’s genocide case against Israel. For readers in France — exporters, dual nationals, activists, and anyone wondering whether French courts could hear the same questions — these two events matter far beyond the Netherlands. This analysis explains what Germany actually argued, what Colombia’s exit changes, and, above all, what a French judge in Paris would do with an arms-export or genocide-complicity file today, in the current state of French statute and case law as verified on 23 September 2026.
I. Can Germany Get the Nicaragua Case Thrown Out of the ICJ?
Nicaragua sued Germany on 1 March 2024, accusing Berlin of facilitating genocide in Gaza through its military support for Israel. Germany, the second-largest supplier of arms to Israel after the United States, answered with preliminary objections — the procedural weapon that allows a respondent state to ask the Court to declare the case inadmissible or outside its jurisdiction without ever discussing the substance. The public hearings on those objections ran from Monday 7 to Thursday 10 September 2026, and the Court announced their conclusion in Press Release No. 2026/23 of 10 September 2026. A ruling on the objections is expected later this year. If Germany loses this round, the case moves to written pleadings and oral argument on the merits, a phase that observers expect to run until around 2030. Everything therefore turns on the next few months.
A. What Did Germany Argue at the 7-10 September 2026 Hearings?
Germany’s lead counsel told the fifteen judges that Nicaragua had never really tried to settle the dispute by negotiation and had simply hauled Berlin before the Court. According to the hearing reports published on 8 September 2026, counsel Julia Monar stated that Nicaragua’s conduct indicated it was not interested in hearing Germany’s view on its allegations but simply in bringing Germany before the Court. Nicaragua’s lawyers answered with documents sent to the German foreign ministry and press releases describing the dispute, arguing that the negotiation precondition had been satisfied. Behind this seemingly technical exchange lies the first real stake of the case: under the Genocide Convention and the Court’s case law, a state can only seize the ICJ once a genuine dispute exists and, where required, negotiation has been attempted. If Germany convinces the Court that no such dispute crystallised, the case dies here.
The second German objection goes to the heart of the file: the licenses. Court documents discussed at the hearings show that German export licenses for Israel worth 378 million dollars were issued in the last three months of 2023, compared with 45 million dollars in the first three months of the year — an eightfold jump after 7 October 2023. Nicaragua’s lead counsel, Carlos Jose Arguello Gomez, told the Court that it was impossible Germany had not been aware of the serious risk that acts amounting to genocide were being committed by Israel. Germany’s response, already previewed in April 2024, is that 98 percent of the exports authorised since October 2023 consisted of general equipment such as vests, helmets and binoculars rather than weapons systems. Germany also points to its own conduct: in August 2025 Berlin suspended all military exports to Israel for use in the Gaza offensive, then lifted the restrictions a few months later in November 2025 by reference to the stability of the ceasefire between Israel and Hamas — even as deadly strikes on Gaza continued.
Nicaragua’s claim builds directly on South Africa’s genocide case against Israel, in which the Court already found in January 2024 that it was plausible Israel had violated certain rights guaranteed under the Genocide Convention and ordered provisional measures. Both Nicaragua and Germany are parties to the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, which obliges states not only to refrain from genocide but to act to prevent it. It is unusual for the Court to hear a case in which neither party is directly involved in the underlying conflict, and Germany is inviting the judges to treat that oddity as a reason for restraint. Nicaragua replies that the prevention obligation is precisely designed for third states: a major arms supplier that keeps licensing deliveries while international courts and United Nations bodies warn of atrocity crimes cannot hide behind its spectator status.
Two earlier signals frame the outcome. On 30 April 2024 the Court had already declined to indicate provisional measures against Germany, finding that the circumstances did not require the exercise of that power — a decision Germany now presents as proof that the case lacks urgency and seriousness. Nicaragua presents the same order as purely provisional and without prejudice to jurisdiction. International commentary is split, but most observers note that the Court rarely throws out cases of this political magnitude at the preliminary stage when the applicant has documented licenses, deliveries and knowledge with this level of detail. The calendar is public: the hearings were convened by Press Release No. 2026/21 of 31 July 2026, and the decision on the objections should arrive before the end of the year.
B. What Happens If the Court Keeps the Case and Moves to the Merits?
If the objections are rejected, Germany will have to plead the substance: did its arms-transfer policy breach the Genocide Convention, the Geneva Conventions and the customary duty to ensure respect for international humanitarian law? That trial would be the first in which the Court judges a third state’s arms exports against the prevention standard — a precedent every European defence ministry is watching. The written phase alone takes years, with a memorial, a counter-memorial, and usually replies, followed by weeks of hearings. Practitioners familiar with the Court’s docket consider 2030 a realistic horizon for a merits judgment, and any appeal is impossible: ICJ judgments are final and binding on the parties, even if enforcement runs through the United Nations Security Council, where a veto can paralyse execution.
For companies and individuals, the merits phase would change the documentary landscape. A full trial means disclosure of licensing practice, end-use monitoring, and the internal risk assessments conducted before each authorisation. German ministries would have to explain, file by file, why deliveries continued after the Court’s own plausibility finding of January 2024 in the South Africa case. Export-control lawyers across Europe already advise clients to treat every license application for a sensitive destination as a document a judge may one day read: the commercial description of the goods, the stated end user, the risk analysis and any dissenting opinion inside the administration. The Nicaragua hearings have shown that figures alone — 378 million dollars in one quarter — can carry a case past the admissibility threshold, whatever the later debate about vests versus missiles.
The parallel South Africa case against Israel continues on its own track, and this is where the second September event belongs. By Press Release No. 2026/24 of 22 September 2026, the Court recorded that Colombia had withdrawn the declaration of intervention it had filed in the proceedings under Article 63 of the Court’s Statute. Colombia had joined a long parade of intervening states — the Netherlands and Iceland in March 2026, Namibia, the United States, Hungary and Fiji the same month, alongside Belgium, Ireland, Cuba, Chile, the Maldives, Bolivia, Libya, the Comoros, Brazil, Paraguay and Belize at various stages. Israel’s foreign minister had announced the Colombian exit days earlier, presenting it as the reversal by president-elect Abelardo de la Espriella of Bogota’s 2024 pro-intervention line; the Court’s press release now gives that withdrawal its official procedural seal.
What does an Article 63 withdrawal actually change? An intervener under Article 63 argues its own reading of the convention at stake and is then bound by the Court’s construction of that convention. Withdrawal ends that participation: Colombia will file no further observations and will not be bound as an intervener, though it remains bound by the Convention itself as a party. The South Africa case loses one supporting voice, not its applicant, and the dozen other interventions stand. Politically, however, the signal is loud: coalitions behind international genocide litigation shift with elections, and yesterday’s intervener can become tomorrow’s absentee. The same docket shows how crowded Article 63 practice has become — in the newer Lithuania v. Belarus case on alleged migrant smuggling, Russia and Poland have filed Article 63 declarations while the European Union itself furnished observations under Articles 43 and 69 of the Rules of Court. States now treat ICJ intervention as an instrument of foreign policy, and litigants must price that volatility into multi-year strategies.
France is not a bystander in this system. The Court’s own list records Kohler and Paris (France v. Islamic Republic of Iran), a case France itself brought and which has since been removed from the List at France’s request — a reminder that Paris uses the ICJ when its nationals are at stake and discontinues when diplomacy takes over. The lesson for French readers is symmetrical: international litigation moves slowly and politically, while domestic courts in Paris can act on the same facts within months. That is the subject of the second part.
II. What Do the Colombia Withdrawal and French Law Change for People in France?
Suppose you are in France and the same questions arise: an export license for a country at war, a complaint naming French officials or companies for complicity in atrocities, or evidence of genocide committed abroad by someone now living in Paris. The ICJ will not help you directly — it tries states, not individuals, and only on the basis of consent. French courts, by contrast, offer three concrete paths, each with strict conditions verified below from the codes and decisions in force on 23 September 2026: the administrative route against export licenses, which is nearly closed; the criminal route for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, which is open but demanding; and the Paris forum itself, whose dedicated judges have built twenty years of practice on these files.
A. How Does France Control Arms Exports — and Can You Challenge a License in Paris?
French law starts from prohibition. Article L2335-2 of the Defence Code provides, in its exact terms: “L’exportation sans autorisation préalable de matériels de guerre et matériels assimilés vers des Etats non membres de l’Union européenne ainsi que des territoires exclus du territoire douanier de l’Union européenne est prohibée.” Every export of war material outside the European Union therefore needs prior authorisation. Article L2335-3 of the same code organises that authorisation as an export license granted by the administrative authority, in the form of general licenses, global licenses notified to the exporter, or individual licenses. In practice the file is examined by the interministerial commission for the study of war-material exports, known as the CIEEMG, and the decision is taken at the level of the Prime Minister, under the cover of defence secrecy. The exporter gets a license; the public gets no reasons.
Can an association or a victim challenge that license before the administrative judge in Paris? The answer, since the leading decision of the Conseil d’Etat, is almost always no. On 27 January 2023, in cases 436098 and 436099, the associations ASER, ACAT, Action contre la faim, Medecins du monde, Salam for Yemen and Sherpa asked the administrative courts to order the declassification of the licenses granted to the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen and to annul the Prime Minister’s implied refusal to suspend them. The Conseil d’Etat rejected both appeals. Its key holding deserves quotation in full: “Le refus implicite opposé à cette demande de portée générale n’est pas détachable de la conduite des relations internationales de la France, sans que puissent être utilement invoquées à cet égard les stipulations des articles 6 et 7 du traité sur le commerce des armes, de l’article 2 de la charte des Nations-Unies et de l’article 47 de la charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne, ainsi que les dispositions des articles 1 et 2 de la position commune n° 2008/944/PESC du Conseil du 8 décembre 2008 et de l’article L. 2335-4 du code de la défense.” The full decision is published at Conseil d’Etat, 27 January 2023, No. 436098. Translation: a general request to suspend export licenses is an act of government, inseparable from the conduct of France’s international relations, and the administrative court has no jurisdiction to hear it — even when the applicants invoke the Arms Trade Treaty, the UN Charter, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, the EU Common Position 2008/944/CFSP or the Defence Code itself.
The practical consequences for Paris litigants are stark. A direct action for annulment of a license, or an injunction ordering the Prime Minister to suspend a category of licenses, will be declared inadmissible. Requests for declassification of CIEEMG opinions and for referral of preliminary questions to the Court of Justice of the European Union were likewise refused in the same decision. The earlier Paris proceedings — the judgment of the Paris administrative tribunal of 8 July 2019, No. 1807203, recalled in the Conseil d’Etat’s ruling — had already rejected ASER’s claims at first instance. NGOs that want results in France therefore work around the administrative blockade: parliamentary questions, media disclosure, complaints to the European Commission, and above all criminal complaints, where the judge is not the administrative court and the act-of-government shield does not apply in the same way.
Exporters face the mirror risk. A license protects against the criminal prohibition of unauthorised export, but it does not immunise a company or its managers against complicity charges if the exported goods are used to commit international crimes — the very theory Nicaragua advances against Germany and that French investigating judges have tested for decades. Compliance files should therefore document, for each sensitive destination, the end-use assurances obtained, the international warnings reviewed, and the reasons the risk of diversion or atrocity use was judged acceptable at the date of shipment. When the ICJ itself finds it plausible that genocide-related rights are being violated, as it did in January 2024, every license granted afterwards will be read in that light.
B. Can French Criminal Courts Try Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity Themselves?
Yes — and the definitions French judges apply are written in the Penal Code, not in The Hague. Article 211-1 of the Penal Code states: “”Constitue un génocide le fait, en exécution d’un plan concerté tendant à la destruction totale ou partielle d’un groupe national, ethnique, racial ou religieux, ou d’un groupe déterminé à partir de tout autre critère arbitraire, de commettre ou de faire commettre, à l’encontre de membres de ce groupe, l’un des actes suivants : – atteinte volontaire à la vie ; – atteinte grave à l’intégrité physique ou psychique ; – soumission à des conditions d’existence de nature à entraîner la destruction totale ou partielle du groupe ; – mesures visant à entraver les naissances ; – transfert forcé d’enfants. Le génocide est puni de la réclusion criminelle à perpétuité..” Article 212-1 provides: “Constitue également un crime contre l’humanité et est puni de la réclusion criminelle à perpétuité l’un des actes ci-après commis en exécution d’un plan concerté à l’encontre d’un groupe de population civile dans le cadre d’une attaque généralisée ou systématique : 1° L’atteinte volontaire à la vie ; 2° L’extermination ; 3° La réduction en esclavage ; 4° La déportation ou le transfert forcé de population ; 5° L’emprisonnement ou toute autre forme de privation grave de liberté physique en violation des dispositions fondamentales du droit international ; 6° La torture ; 7° Le viol, la prostitution forcée, la grossesse forcée, la stérilisation forcée ou toute autre forme de violence sexuelle de gravité comparable ; 8° La persécution de tout groupe ou de toute collectivité identifiable pour des motifs d’ordre politique, racial, national, ethnique, culturel, religieux ou sexiste ou en fonction d’autres critères universellement reconnus comme inadmissibles en droit international ; 9° La disparition forcée ; 10° Les actes de ségrégation commis dans le cadre d’un régime institutionnalisé d’oppression systématique et de domination d’un groupe racial sur tout autre groupe racial ou tous autres groupes raciaux et dans l’intention de maintenir ce régime ; 11° Les autres actes inhumains de caractère analogue causant intentionnellement de grandes souffrances ou des atteintes graves à l’intégrité physique ou psychique. Les deux premiers alinéas de l’article 132-23 relatif à la période de sûreté sont applicables aux crimes prévus par le présent article.” Article 461-1 provides: “Constituent des crimes ou des délits de guerre les infractions définies par le présent livre commises, lors d’un conflit armé international ou non international et en relation avec ce conflit, en violation des lois et coutumes de la guerre ou des conventions internationales applicables aux conflits armés, à l’encontre des personnes ou des biens visés aux articles 461-2 à 461-31 .” Three contextual elements — concerted plan for genocide and crimes against humanity, armed conflict nexus for war crimes — do all the work of distinguishing international crimes from ordinary offences.
Complicity follows the ordinary law, and French courts have confirmed it repeatedly. Article 121-7, paragraph 1, of the Penal Code provides: “Est complice d’un crime ou d’un délit la personne qui sciemment, par aide ou assistance, en a facilité la préparation ou la consommation.” On 9 September 2026 — two weeks before this article — the Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation applied that text to the most sensitive complicity file in French judicial history: the complaint lodged in 2005 against unnamed persons for complicity in genocide and crimes against humanity allegedly committed with the assistance of French forces deployed in Rwanda under United Nations Security Council Resolution 929 of 22 June 1994, in the framework of Operation Turquoise (Court of Cassation, Criminal Chamber, 9 September 2026, appeal No. 25-81.154). The investigating judges had issued a dismissal (non-lieu) on 17 October 2023, confirmed by the Paris investigating chamber on 11 December 2024; the Court of Cassation rejected the civil parties’ appeals.
The reasoning, which binds future Paris files, holds three lessons. First, the offences had to be prosecuted under French law, not under the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. Second, complicity by aid and assistance is punishable only where the aid was knowingly given to the principal for the acts that prepared or consummated the offence — knowledge plus facilitation, nothing more, nothing less. The Court recalled its settled formula, laid down on 7 September 2021 (appeal No. 19-87.367, published in the Bulletin), that complicity in crimes against humanity requires neither membership of the criminal organisation, nor adherence to the concerted plan, nor approval of the underlying ordinary-law crimes: it suffices that the accomplice knew the principals were committing or about to commit such a crime and, by aid or assistance, facilitated its preparation or consummation. The Court added that the same analysis applies to complicity in genocide. Third, the absence of sufficient charges is a sovereign assessment of the trial judges; the Court of Cassation verifies only that the reasoning is sufficient, consistent and responsive. In the Rwanda file, the chamber had found no evidence of intent by the officers to facilitate the crimes, no order from the hierarchy to act differently, and a three-day delay explained by battlefield confusion and a strictly humanitarian mandate with reduced troops — so the dismissal stood.
Transposed to an arms-export scenario, the message is double-edged. Prosecutors and civil parties can invoke complicity in genocide on French soil against suppliers who knowingly facilitate atrocities; the legal vehicle exists and the 2026 decision confirms its doctrinal content. But they must prove, person by person, knowing facilitation of the specific criminal acts — general knowledge of a conflict, commercial volumes, or even licenses granted after international warnings do not by themselves establish the intent the Criminal Chamber requires. That is a far heavier burden than Nicaragua’s state-responsibility theory in The Hague, where the question is whether Germany failed to prevent, not whether an individual German official intended to facilitate.
France also claims universal jurisdiction over perpetrators found on its territory. The general gateway is Article 689 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: French courts may try the perpetrators of or accomplices to offences committed abroad where French law applies or where an international convention gives them jurisdiction. The workhorse for atrocity crimes is Article 689-11 of the same code, covers genocide, other crimes against humanity and war crimes committed abroad. Its current wording states: “La personne soupçonnée doit avoir une résidence habituelle sur le territoire français, celle-ci se définissant par un lien de rattachement suffisant avec la France.” Prosecution is fenced in twice: “La poursuite de ces crimes ne peut être exercée qu’à la requête du procureur de la République antiterroriste et si aucune juridiction internationale ou nationale ne demande la remise ou l’extradition de la personne.” Three cumulative locks therefore govern the Paris route today: habitual residence in France, the monopoly of the anti-terrorism prosecutor, and subsidiarity — no competing surrender or extradition request. The plenary assembly of the Court of Cassation had already dissected this mechanism on 12 May 2023 (appeal No. 22-82.468), interpreting habitual residence functionally as a bundle of factual indicators inspired by European Union case law and examining, under the wording then in force, the double-criminality condition article by article. The Court noted that international crimes contain a contextual element — concerted plan, widespread or systematic attack, armed-conflict nexus — that foreign statutes punishing only the underlying murder or torture may not reproduce. Anyone present in Paris who meets these tests can therefore be investigated by the dedicated atrocity-crimes unit of the Paris judicial tribunal, regardless of what the ICJ decides about states.
Our firm has already analysed the neighbouring international-criminal procedures from the French angle: the recognition debates around Palestinian statehood and their effects before French courts and the ICC (see France Recognises Palestine: Effects Before French Courts, the ICC and Extradition), the American sanctions offensive against the Court itself (see Trump Readies Sanctions Against the Entire ICC), and the surrender mechanics illustrated by the Said verdict (see ICC Said Verdict: War Crimes and Surrender from France). Today’s ICJ double-header belongs to the same continuum: international courts allocate state responsibility over years, while Paris judges allocate individual responsibility within months — and the two tracks increasingly read each other’s files.
Conclusion
September 2026 will be remembered in The Hague as the month Germany fought to stop the Gaza arms case before trial while Colombia walked away from the genocide case against Israel. The ICJ’s ruling on Germany’s preliminary objections, expected before the end of the year, will decide whether a third state’s arms-transfer policy can be judged against the duty to prevent genocide — a question whose answer will echo in every European defence ministry and every export-control department. Colombia’s withdrawal, sealed by the Court on 22 September, changes little in strict procedure and much in politics: intervention coalitions are fragile, and multi-year strategies must survive elections. For those in France, the decisive lesson is domestic. Administrative challenges to export licenses die at the act-of-government threshold set by the Conseil d’Etat in January 2023; criminal complaints for complicity in genocide or crimes against humanity live or die on proof of knowing, individual facilitation, as the Court of Cassation restated on 9 September 2026; and universal jurisdiction under Article 689-11 opens the Paris courts to perpetrators habitually resident in France whenever double criminality and subsidiarity are satisfied. States plead in The Hague for a decade; individuals answer in Paris far sooner. Anyone holding a license file, a supply contract, or evidence of atrocities connected to France should have that file reviewed now — before the ICJ’s next order, or a Paris investigating judge, does it for them.