On 21 September 2026, two wires moved within hours of each other. Reuters reported that the administration of President Donald Trump has prepared sanctions against the entire International Criminal Court and plans to announce them soon, citing two sources familiar with the matter. The Wall Street Journal added the detail that makes this story different from everything Washington has done before: the measures would prohibit most transactions with the Court itself after a grace period of six to seven months. For readers in France, in Europe, and for every victim, witness, counsel member or company doing business with The Hague, the question is no longer theoretical. What happens when the world’s most powerful financial system is turned, not against a judge or a prosecutor, but against an international court as an institution? This analysis explains what Washington has already sanctioned, what institution-wide measures would freeze in practice, and, above all, what France and Europe can still do: arrest and surrender suspects under the French Code of Criminal Procedure, protect operators through the European blocking regulation, and prosecute genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes before French courts when The Hague is under pressure. The facts below are drawn from the Reuters, Wall Street Journal, Al Jazeera and Jerusalem Post reporting of 21 September 2026, from the official texts of the French Criminal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure verified on Legifrance, and from the public instruments of the Court and the European Union.
I. Can the United States really sanction the entire International Criminal Court?
A. What Washington has already sanctioned, from the February 2025 executive order to the ICC president
The campaign did not start in September 2026. In February 2025, President Donald Trump signed an executive order creating the legal basis for sanctions against officials of the International Criminal Court, and Washington has since sanctioned more than a dozen ICC judges and prosecutors. In August 2026, the United States added the Court’s own President, Tomoko Akane, and senior trial lawyer Abdoulaye Seye to the sanctions list, with the restrictions taking effect on 17 September 2026. Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced in July 2026 a campaign to isolate the Court further and publicly called on other countries to withdraw from the tribunal. Chad and Venezuela moved in July 2026 to withdraw from the Court, following Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, while four United States-based rights groups sued the Trump administration in August 2026, arguing that the existing sanctions obstruct their legal and human rights work. Each of these steps targeted individuals. The September 2026 project crosses a different line because it designates the institution itself.
The stated reasons have been constant. The United States has never joined the Court, which was created in 2002 to prosecute genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity when national authorities are unable or unwilling to do so. Washington says the Court has exceeded its authority by pursuing officials of states that are not members. Relations deteriorated sharply after the Court issued arrest warrants in November 2024 for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defence Minister Yoav Gallant over alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity in Gaza, two men whose state, like the United States, rejects the Court’s jurisdiction. Washington has also always objected to the earlier ICC investigation into alleged abuses in Afghanistan involving American personnel. The Journal reports that a final decision on institution-wide sanctions could be taken during the United Nations General Assembly gathering in New York in the week of 22 September 2026 or soon afterwards, which explains why every chancery in Europe spent the weekend gaming out scenarios.
For a French lawyer, the first reflex is to locate the exact French definitions that mirror the crimes the Court prosecutes, because they determine what Paris can do on its own soil. French law defines genocide as follows: article 211-1 of the Criminal Code punishes with life imprisonment the fact, committed “en exécution d’un plan concerté tendant à la destruction totale ou partielle d’un groupe national, ethnique, racial ou religieux”, of killing members of that group, gravely harming their physical or mental integrity, submitting them to conditions of existence likely to destroy the group in whole or in part, preventing births or forcibly transferring children, and it states plainly that “Le génocide est puni de la réclusion criminelle à perpétuité.” Crimes against humanity are defined just as broadly: article 212-1 of the Criminal Code punishes with life imprisonment acts “commis en exécution d’un plan concerté à l’encontre d’un groupe de population civile dans le cadre d’une attaque généralisée ou systématique”, listing murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment in violation of fundamental rules of international law, torture, sexual violence, persecution, enforced disappearance, apartheid and other inhumane acts. War crimes follow the same logic: article 461-1 of the Criminal Code provides that war crimes and war delicts are offences committed “lors d’un conflit armé international ou non international et en relation avec ce conflit, en violation des lois et coutumes de la guerre ou des conventions internationales applicables aux conflits armés”. Even command responsibility is codified: article 462-7 of the Criminal Code treats as an accomplice the military commander who knew, or should have known in the circumstances, that subordinates under his effective authority and control were committing or about to commit such a crime and who failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures to prevent or punish it or to refer the matter to the competent authorities. These four provisions mean France does not need Washington’s permission to characterise the gravest crimes, and that vocabulary matters for everything that follows.
The political backdrop also includes cases your readers already know. The Court held a first high-profile appearance in September 2026 in the proceedings concerning the anti-drug campaign in the Philippines, a reminder that the institution’s docket keeps growing even as pressure mounts. And the American complaint about the Afghanistan file shows the dispute is structural, not personal: any Court that claims the power to examine conduct by nationals of non-member states will collide with Washington sooner or later. Understanding that collision as institutional rather than anecdotal is the key to measuring what entity-wide sanctions would actually freeze.
B. What institution-wide sanctions would freeze in practice: dollars, banks, software and American staff
The mechanism reported by the Journal is familiar to any sanctions practitioner. Once the designation takes effect, United States citizens and companies would be barred from providing the Court with money, goods or services without a licence from the United States Treasury, after a wind-down grace period of six to seven months. On paper, that looks like a bilateral American measure. In practice, as the Al Jazeera summary of the reporting notes, banks and companies worldwide take an especially cautious approach to United States sanctions because they rely on access to the American financial system. This is the over-compliance effect every practitioner in Paris knows: a French bank, insurer, cloud provider or travel agency that has any dollar exposure will often refuse the transaction rather than risk secondary consequences, even where European law would allow it. The president and the registrar of the Court have already warned publicly that sanctions on the organisation as a whole could interfere with buying information technology and insurance services, hiring investigators, and making routine payments, including salaries for American employees of the Court.
Concretely, four channels would feel the freeze first. First, money: voluntary contributions, trust funds for victims, counsel fees paid through dollar-clearing banks, and even staff salaries routed via American correspondent banks could be delayed or blocked during the grace period and stopped afterwards absent a Treasury licence. Second, services: cloud hosting, databases, forensic software licences, insurance policies and travel bookings supplied by American vendors, or by European vendors whose contracts contain United States sanctions clauses, could be suspended. Third, people: American investigators, analysts and counsel working for or with the Court would need licences to continue, and recruitment of United States nationals would become a compliance maze. Fourth, cooperation partners: non-governmental organisations, experts and subcontractors that assist the Office of the Prosecutor could find their own banks closing accounts, which is exactly what the four American rights groups complained about in their August 2026 lawsuit. None of this formally binds a Paris bank under French law, yet every compliance officer in La Défense will recognise the pattern from the Iran, Russia and Syria programmes: when Washington speaks, correspondent banking listens.
Two legal nuances deserve attention because the press sometimes blurs them. First, these would be American domestic measures with extraterritorial bite, not United Nations Security Council sanctions and not European Union restrictive measures. No resolution of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter underpins them, and no European regulation implements them, so they do not create obligations for French persons under French or European law. That distinction is the whole foundation of the European response described below. Second, the grace period of six to seven months reported by the Journal is a wind-down window, not a negotiation. It lets American persons terminate contracts and lets the Court seek licences, but it does not suspend the political signal: any entity signing a fresh long-term contract with the Court during that window prices in the risk of designation. Suppliers of interpretation, transcription, victim support and field logistics in situation countries should therefore review their contracts now, map every dollar touchpoint, and identify substitute providers inside the euro area before the window closes.
The third nuance concerns the arrest warrants themselves. Sanctioning the institution does not vacate the November 2024 warrants against Netanyahu and Gallant, nor any other warrant the judges have issued or will issue. A warrant remains a judicial act of an international court whose statute France has ratified; American sanctions do not erase it, they complicate its material execution by squeezing budgets, personnel and vendors. That is why the French response must be read on two levels at once: shielding operators who work with the Court, and keeping the judicial machinery of arrest, surrender and domestic prosecution fully operational. Both levels already exist in French and European law, and both will now be tested.
II. How France and Europe can keep ICC cases alive despite American sanctions
A. How France arrests and surrenders suspects to The Hague under articles 627 and following
France is not a bystander of the Rome system. It signed the Statute, ratified it, and wrote a full cooperation title into its own Code of Criminal Procedure. The opening provision sets the tone: article 627 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states that “Pour l’application du statut de la Cour pénale internationale signé le 18 juillet 1998, la France participe à la répression des infractions et coopère avec cette juridiction dans les conditions fixées par le présent titre.” The provisions that follow apply to any person prosecuted before the Court or convicted by it for acts constituting genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes within the meaning of the Statute. In plain terms, cooperation with the Court is not a favour Paris grants case by case; it is a standing statutory duty, and American sanctions do not amend the French Code of Criminal Procedure.
The arrest procedure is precise and fast, which matters when a suspect transits through Roissy or resides in France. Article 627-5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that “Toute personne appréhendée en vertu d’une demande d’arrestation aux fins de remise doit être déférée dans les vingt-quatre heures au procureur de la République territorialement compétent”, with the safeguards of police custody notification applying, identity verification by the prosecutor, information in a language the person understands, and appearance within a maximum of five days before the prosecutor general at the Paris Court of Appeal. Surrender to the Court then follows a dedicated judicial track before the Paris courts, distinct from classic extradition to a foreign state, because the requesting party is an international court France is bound to assist. Defence teams should note the practical consequence: challenges run through the French judges designated by the cooperation title, on the identity of the person, the regularity of the request and the rights of the defence, not through political discretion. For families and counsel calling our office from abroad, the message is operational: if a relative is arrested in France on an ICC request, the first twenty-four hours and the Paris hearing within five days are the decisive windows, and a lawyer admitted in Paris must be instructed immediately.
Cooperation also covers money, which is where the American sanctions bite hardest and where French law offers a symmetrical answer. Article 627-17 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that the enforcement authorisation issued by the criminal court entails, according to the decision of the International Criminal Court, “transfert du produit des amendes et des biens confisqués ou du produit de leur vente à la cour ou au fonds en faveur des victimes”, adding that these assets or sums may also be awarded to the victims where the Court so decides. In other words, fines and confiscated property identified or seized in France flow to the Court or to the victims’ fund through a French judicial decision. A United States designation cannot seize or redirect assets held under French judicial control; at most it complicates dollar-denominated transfers, which can be re-routed in euros through European channels. Prosecutors, investigating judges and victim counsel should therefore keep tracing and seizing assets in France without assuming the sanctions have frozen the French track. The general foundation of extraterritorial French action confirms the same logic: article 689 of the Code of Criminal Procedure allows French courts to try perpetrators or accomplices of offences committed outside France where French law applies or where an international convention, such as the Rome Statute system implemented in the cooperation title, gives French courts jurisdiction. The statutory chain from definitions to cooperation to enforcement is complete, and none of its links sits in Washington.
On the European side, the shield has a name: Council Regulation (EC) No 2271/96, the blocking regulation, which prohibits European operators from complying with certain third-country sanctions, nullifies the effect in Europe of foreign court decisions giving them effect, and allows affected operators to recover resulting damages. The instrument was built for the Cuba and Iran embargoes and was reactivated for cases of extraterritorial sanctions; its logic applies whenever a foreign measure purports to dictate the conduct of European persons beyond its borders. A French bank, insurer or software company that suspends services to the Court or to its counsel solely to satisfy American sanctions exposes itself, in principle, to the blocking regulation and to French domestic implementation, while an operator that continues in euros to serve the Court acts in line with French statutory cooperation duties. The Commission also maintains guidance and authorisation procedures for situations where compliance conflicts genuinely threaten an operator’s viability, so the answer is never panic termination. It is documented compliance: map the American nexus, ring-fence euro-only channels, record that continued service honours a French statutory duty and a European authorisation where needed, and seek prior advice before cutting a contract whose rupture could itself engage liability. European institutions already publish the sanctions timeline and the asset-freeze framework for the Russia programme through the Council of the European Union and the Commission’s finance pages; the same institutional reflex now needs to extend publicly to Court-related cooperation, with clear statements that European restrictive measures are the only sanctions with legal force inside the Union.
B. How French courts can try genocide and war crimes themselves when The Hague is slowed down
The second French answer is even more strategic: where the Court is slowed, French courts can prosecute. Since the Act of 9 August 2010 adapting French criminal law to the Rome Statute, France exercises a form of universal jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes committed abroad, under conditions codified at article 689-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The text provides that, outside the cases already covered by the cooperation title with the Court, “peut être poursuivie et jugée par les juridictions françaises toute personne soupçonnée d’avoir commis à l’étranger l’une des infractions suivantes”: genocide as defined in the Criminal Code, other crimes against humanity, and war crimes defined at articles 461-1 to 461-31. Three filters frame this jurisdiction, and each of them matters for cases that can no longer advance normally in The Hague. First, the suspect must have habitual residence in France, assessed through a sufficient connecting link such as the length of presence, its conditions and reasons, the demonstrated wish to settle or remain, and family, social, material or professional ties. Second, prosecution can only be launched at the request of the anti-terrorism prosecutor of Paris, now the national parquet for crimes against humanity and war crimes, which centralises expertise in one office. Third, the prosecutor must verify that no international court has requested surrender and that no state has requested extradition: the provision states that “La poursuite de ces crimes ne peut être exercée qu’à la requête du procureur de la République antiterroriste et si aucune juridiction internationale ou nationale ne demande la remise ou l’extradition de la personne”, with the prosecutor ensuring that the International Criminal Court is not already prosecuting and that no competent international court or state has claimed the person. Where a victim’s complaint has been shelved, the Paris prosecutor general hears the complainant on appeal under article 40-3. This is complementarity in action, exactly as the Rome system designed it: The Hague first where it can act, Paris where it must.
American sanctions against the Court make this domestic track more important, not less. If budgets, investigators or software licences in The Hague are squeezed, cases with a French nexus, a suspect residing in France, victims present on French soil, evidence located in Paris hospitals, corporate servers or diaspora archives, become natural candidates for the French specialised pole. Non-governmental organisations documenting atrocities should therefore file structured criminal complaints in Paris, with identified victims, dated facts, named suspects and annexed evidence, rather than waiting for the international calendar to clear. Defence counsel, symmetrically, should prepare residence, surrender and extradition arguments early, because the 689-11 filters are cumulative and each one can be litigated: habitual residence is a facts-based assessment, the absence of a competing international request must be verified at the date prosecution starts, and the characterisation of the facts under articles 211-1, 212-1 and 461-1 must hold. The commander-responsibility provision of article 462-7 quoted above will often be the battlefield for cases against hierarchical superiors, since it requires proof of effective authority and control, knowledge or reason to know, and failure to prevent, punish or refer. None of this work depends on a Treasury licence in Washington. It depends on complaints, evidence and French magistrates, and it can start this week.
Victims and witnesses deserve a dedicated paragraph, because sanctions debates too often treat them as background. The Trust Fund for Victims, counsel fees, psychological support, relocation costs and transcription of testimony all transit through payment systems that American sanctions can disturb. French practitioners can mitigate this in four practical ways: keep victim representation funded through euro-denominated legal aid and French counsel structures that do not depend on dollar clearing; request that French seizing and confiscating judges prioritise the victims’ allocation expressly provided by article 627-17, so that assets on French soil are judicially earmarked before any transfer friction arises; document every banking refusal in writing, since a written refusal citing American sanctions is the exhibit that activates the European blocking regulation and any subsequent claim; and use the French universal-jurisdiction complaint as a parallel vehicle, because a Paris investigation generates its own victim-status rights, expert assessments and compensation claims independent of the pace in The Hague. Witnesses residing in France benefit in addition from French witness-protection provisions and from the ordinary powers of French investigating judges to hear testimony, order expertise and preserve evidence, all outside the sanctioned perimeter.
Companies need a parallel checklist. Any group headquartered or operating in France that supplies the Court, its organs, its counsel or its grantees should audit three things before the grace period expires: the sanctions clauses in its own contracts, which often promise compliance with American measures far beyond what European law requires; the payment rails, replacing dollar clearing with euro settlement wherever the counterparty accepts it; and the licensing footprint, identifying which products genuinely contain American-origin technology subject to United States export controls versus ordinary services a European substitute can provide. Renegotiating an overbroad sanctions clause today is cheaper than breaching a contract tomorrow, and the European blocking regulation gives legal backbone to that renegotiation. Banks face the mirror exercise: continuing to process euro payments for the Court honours French statutory cooperation and European law, while a blanket de-risking that closes the accounts of counsel, experts or victim associations invites litigation and regulatory scrutiny. The institutions that prepared written, reasoned compliance files during the Russia sanctions waves already know the method; they must now apply it to a new designated name, the Court itself.
Conclusion
The September 2026 project is unprecedented in form but familiar in substance. Unprecedented, because no American administration has ever tried to designate the International Criminal Court as an institution, with a six-to-seven-month wind-down and a blanket ban on funds, goods and services absent a Treasury licence. Familiar, because the playbook, executive order, individual designations, isolation campaign, withdrawal calls, pressure on vendors and banks, is the standard repertoire of extraterritorial economic statecraft that European lawyers have handled from Havana to Tehran to Moscow. The warrants of November 2024 stand, the definitions of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes in French law stand, and the French cooperation title from article 627 to the enforcement provisions stands. What changes is the friction on money, software, personnel and partnerships, and friction is fought with paperwork: euro rails, blocking-regulation files, Paris complaints, seizure requests and reasoned compliance opinions. For suspects, the Paris surrender track under articles 627 and following remains the decisive arena, with its twenty-four-hour presentation and its five-day Paris hearing. For victims, the French asset-allocation route and the universal-jurisdiction complaint offer two paths that no foreign designation can close. For the Court, the message from Paris should be unambiguous: France cooperates by statute, European operators are protected when they honour that cooperation in euros, and French courts stand ready to try the gravest crimes where The Hague is slowed. In a week when the General Assembly meets in New York, that clarity is itself a form of support, and it is the one our office applies to every cross-border file it accepts, from the first telephone consultation at 80 EUR including VAT to the hearing room.