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Secret Judges in the Deliberation Room: Strasbourg Rules Today in Kuijt v. the Netherlands — and What France Would Do

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Secret Judges in the Deliberation Room: Strasbourg Rules Today in Kuijt v. the Netherlands — and What France Would Do

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At 10.30 a.m. today, 23 September 2026, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights delivers its ruling in Kuijt v. the Netherlands (application no. 19365/19). The question before the seventeen judges in Strasbourg is one that every litigant in Europe should understand: can judges who were never assigned to your case take part in the secret deliberations that decide it? In the Netherlands, the answer has long been yes. Judges of the Criminal Law Division of the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad der Nederlanden) who do not form part of the formation to which a case has been assigned “may participate in the deliberations”, in the interest of legal unity. These judges are called “reservisten”. A Dutch woman sentenced to two weeks in prison for disrupting a municipal council meeting challenged that practice all the way to Strasbourg, arguing she would be denied a hearing by what she called an “independent and impartial tribunal” established by law, in violation of Article 6 § 1 (right to a fair trial) of the European Convention on Human Rights. This article explains, from the Court’s own press documents, what the case is about, what legal test the Grand Chamber applies today, and — the insider view of a French litigation firm — what French courts would do with the same file, where the rule is the exact opposite: whoever deliberates must have sat, and the judgment itself must prove it.

I. What Strasbourg Has to Decide Today: Can Judges Who Never Sat on Your Case Help Decide It?

A. How a Two-Week Prison Sentence Travelled From a Municipal Council Chamber to the Grand Chamber

The facts, as set out by the Registry of the European Court of Human Rights in its press release ECHR 222 (2026) of 16 September 2026, are strikingly ordinary at first glance. The applicant, Johanna Kuijt, described as a Dutch national born in 1964 and living in the Netherlands, was convicted in 2015 for disrupting a municipal council meeting and disobeying an official order to leave the chamber at once. The Court of Appeal imposed a prison sentence of two weeks in 2016. Ms Kuijt then lodged an appeal on points of law to the Supreme Court of the Netherlands. Nothing in that trajectory announces a Grand Chamber case. What transformed a minor public-order conviction into one of the most closely watched fair-trial cases of the year is what happened — or may have happened — behind the closed doors of the Supreme Court’s deliberation room. The full background is set out in the Registry press release announcing the forthcoming Grand Chamber ruling, and the procedural history is confirmed in the notice of relinquishment in favour of the Grand Chamber.

Ms Kuijt’s lawyer asked the Supreme Court for the names of the judges who would hear her case, and the registry supplied the names of “the three judges forming the composition”. That is the normal, reassuring part of the story: the litigant knows who will judge her. The lawyer then asked a second question, the one that detonated the case: whether “reservisten” would participate in the deliberations on her case. The registry pointed to the published Protocol on participation in the examination and deliberations of the Supreme Court, which indicates that “reservisten may participate in the deliberations” of cases. In other words, beyond the three named judges, other judges of the Criminal Law Division — judges the parties never saw, never heard, and cannot identify — are entitled to sit in the deliberation room and contribute to the discussion that produces the judgment. The Registry summarises the system in one sentence: The case concerns Mrs Kuijt’s complaint about the Dutch Supreme Court practice under which Criminal Law Division judges outside the assigned formation “may participate in the deliberations”

Ms Kuijt reacted the way any defence lawyer would advise: she challenged the assigned judges and the other judges of the Criminal Law Division. Her argument was frontal: since “one or more reservisten” could join the deliberations, she would be denied a hearing by an “independent and impartial tribunal” established by law, contrary to Article 6 § 1 (right to a fair trial) of the European Convention on Human Rights. The Dutch courts rejected the challenge. By a decision of 21 December 2018, the challenge panel of the Supreme Court dismissed it, reasoning that is worth quoting because it is the Netherlands’ entire defence in miniature. Regarding the role of reservisten, the panel referred to Section 75 of the Judiciary (Organisation) Act, which provides for decision-making in “formations of three or five judges”, and ruled that the other judges of the Division take no responsibility for deciding the case. It added a reference to section 1.2 of the Protocol, which allows reservisten to join deliberations for “safeguarding legal unity” in the Division. And it gave the policy justification that Strasbourg must weigh today: the panel invoked the importance of consistent supreme-court case-law for public confidence and legal certainty — described as fundamental aspects of the rule of law — while maintaining that “only the formation” appointed to a case examines and decides it. The appeal on points of law was then dismissed by a judgment of 8 January 2019. The application reached the European Court of Human Rights on 4 April 2019. After more than six years of proceedings, on 26 August 2025 the Chamber to which the case had been allocated “relinquished jurisdiction” in favour of the Grand Chamber, a Grand Chamber hearing on admissibility and merits was held on 21 January 2026, and the ruling is delivered today, broadcast live on the Court’s YouTube channel. Readers can follow the Convention itself on the Court’s official Convention page.

B. The Convention Test: a Tribunal Established by Law, Independent and Impartial

The legal question is narrower — and more explosive — than it looks. Nobody disputes that deliberations are secret; secrecy of deliberations is a cornerstone of judicial systems across Europe, France included. Nobody disputes that supreme courts have a legitimate interest in the consistency of their case-law. The question is who is allowed inside the room where that consistency is produced. The Convention’s answer begins with Article 6 § 1, which guarantees a hearing by an “independent and impartial tribunal” established by law. Three adjectives, three distinct guarantees, and the reservisten practice potentially brushes against all three. “Established by law” asks whether the composition of the deciding body has a clear basis in domestic law and whether the litigant can know, in advance, which judges will decide the case. “Independent” asks whether the deliberation is free from outside influence — including, arguably, influence from judges who carry institutional authority but no responsibility for the file. “Impartial” asks what the litigant could legitimately fear: if unidentified judges take part in the discussion, the parties cannot verify their neutrality, challenge them effectively, or even know they were there.

The fact that the case reached the Grand Chamber by relinquishment rather than by ordinary Chamber judgment is itself a signal of its importance. Under Article 30 of the Convention, where a case raises what the Convention calls a “serious question” of interpretation, or risks inconsistency with previous judgments, the Chamber may “relinquish jurisdiction” to the Grand Chamber. Relinquishment is not routine. It means the Chamber considered that the reservisten question raises a serious question of interpretation — the first Grand Chamber examination of whether outside judges may join supreme-court deliberations — or that answering it might sit uneasily with existing case-law on tribunal composition and deliberation secrecy. Either way, today’s ruling will set the standard not only for The Hague but for every supreme and cassation court in the forty-six member States of the Council of Europe, because all of them use some form of enlarged deliberation, joint chambers, or advisory participation in the interest of legal unity. That is precisely why the case matters far beyond one two-week sentence: the Grand Chamber is about to draw, for the whole continent, the line between legitimate collegiality and a tribunal whose composition the litigant can no longer verify.

The Netherlands’ defence, as recorded in the Registry documents, rests on three pillars that any government lawyer would recognise. First, legality: Section 75 of the Judiciary (Organisation) Act fixes decision-making power in formations of three or five judges, so the deciding body remains exactly what the statute prescribes. Second, function: section 1.2 of the Protocol confines the reservisten to deliberation aimed at “safeguarding legal unity” in the Division, a purpose presented as serving legal certainty and public confidence — “fundamental aspects of the rule of law”. Third, responsibility: “only the formation” appointed to a case examines and decides it, so the outsiders advise but do not decide. Against those three pillars stands Ms Kuijt’s single, simple complaint, also recorded in the Registry press release: since judges from outside the panel may have deliberated on her case, her appeal was not heard by an “independent and impartial tribunal” established by law. Advising is deciding, her argument runs, when the advice is given in secret by judges the parties cannot see. Which of these two visions prevails is what the Grand Chamber announces today — and whatever it decides, the reasoning will be combed within hours by supreme-court registries across Europe, because each of them will have to audit its own deliberation practices against the new standard.

II. What French Courts Would Do With the Same File: Whoever Deliberates Must Have Sat

A. In France the Deliberation Room Is Sealed Shut — and the Judgment Must Prove It

A French lawyer reading the Kuijt file experiences something close to vertigo, because French procedural law organises the deliberation on principles that are the mirror image of the Dutch practice. The starting point is brutal in its simplicity. Article 448 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides, in five words that every French law student knows by heart: “Les délibérations des juges sont secrètes.” Only the judges who heard the case deliberate on it; nobody else enters the room, advises, or listens in. In criminal matters the sanction is nullity, and it is automatic. Article 592 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in force and applicable, states the rule in terms that leave no room for reservisten of any kind: “Ces décisions sont déclarées nulles lorsqu’elles ne sont pas rendues par le nombre de juges prescrit ou qu’elles ont été rendues par des juges qui n’ont pas assisté à toutes les audiences de la cause.” A decision is void when it is rendered by judges who did not attend all the hearings. The provision adds the presumption that covers multi-hearing cases — “Lorsque plusieurs audiences ont été consacrées à la même affaire, les juges qui ont concouru à la décision sont présumés avoir assisté à toutes ces audiences” — and extends nullity to decisions rendered without the prosecution being heard or without the required publicity. The philosophy is transparent: the judgment must be the product of exactly those judges who followed the adversarial debate, no more and no fewer. The official texts can be consulted on Légifrance, the article 448 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the article 592 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

The Code surrounds that sealed room with a full system of verifiable guarantees. Article 486 of the Code of Criminal Procedure requires that the official record of the judgment be dated and state the names of the judges who rendered it, so that the composition can be checked after the event. Article 485 of the same Code requires every judgment to contain reasoning and an operative part, with the reasoning forming the basis of the decision — reasoning produced, again, only by those who heard the case. Article 510 fixes the composition of the correctional appeals chamber at a presiding judge and two judges. And at the very top of the system, article 567-1-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure organises the restricted formations by which the Criminal Chamber of the Cour de cassation itself sits — the same provision under which both the 8 October 2025 and the 21 January 2025 rulings cited in this article describe the bench as composed of the president and designated judges “after deliberating in accordance with the law”. Every link in the chain, from the trial court minute to the cassation bench, is designed so that a litigant can verify exactly who judged.

French case-law enforces that philosophy with a strictness that would make a Dutch reservist blanch. On 8 October 2025, the Criminal Chamber of the Cour de cassation quashed an entire judgment of the Bourges Court of Appeal on composition grounds alone, in a decision registered as appeal no. 24-86.173. The Court recalled the controlling principle in a sentence that deserves to be quoted in full: “Tout jugement ou arrêt doit établir la régularité de la composition de la juridiction qui l’a rendu.” Every judgment must itself establish that the court which rendered it was lawfully composed. In that case, the court of appeal’s own mentions showed that it had sat, “lors des débats et du délibéré”, with the president and two judges, the representative of the prosecution and the clerk — and then, “lors du délibéré”, with that same enlarged group. The Cour de cassation held that “En l’état de ces mentions, la Cour de cassation n’est pas en mesure de s’assurer de la régularité de la composition de la juridiction”, and concluded that “la cassation est encourue de ce chef”. The judgment was quashed in all its provisions and the case remitted to the Orléans Court of Appeal. Pause on what that means: in France, the mere presence of the prosecutor and the clerk at the deliberation stage — where they obviously do not vote — is enough to cast fatal doubt on the composition and to annul a conviction with all its penalties. The Cour de cassation, whose decisions are published on the official website of the Court, polices the deliberation room as a sealed space: the judgment must name exactly who deliberated, and anyone beyond the deciding judges contaminates the whole. A system in which unidentified judges of the division routinely join deliberations “for the purpose of safeguarding legal unity” could not survive a week under this case-law; it would be quashed as a matter of course, without any need to demonstrate concrete bias or actual influence on the outcome.

The contrast is therefore total, and it is instructive. The Netherlands justifies outside participation by the need for consistency of case-law at supreme-court level, presented as serving confidence and legal certainty. France pursues the same goals — consistency, confidence, certainty — by opposite means: joint chambers, published opinions, and the advisory conclusions of the advocate general delivered in open court and subject to adversarial reply, never by admitting silent participants into a secret deliberation. The French model accepts a cost, namely that a formation may depart from its own precedents until a joint chamber harmonises the law, in exchange for an absolute guarantee: the litigant knows the exact names of the judges who decided, those judges all heard the case, and the judgment proves it on its face. The Dutch model accepts the reverse trade: faster, quieter harmonisation inside the deliberation room, at the price that the litigant can no longer be certain who really shaped the decision. Today’s Grand Chamber ruling arbitrates between these two philosophies of what a supreme court is — a panel of named judges deciding in public responsibility, or a division thinking aloud as a collective. For practitioners across Europe, the practical consequence is immediate: every supreme court whose internal rules allow advisory participation, enlarged deliberations, or undisclosed assistance in the deliberation phase will have to re-read those rules tonight against the standard Strasbourg sets this morning.

B. How a Defendant in France Raises the Same Complaint — Step by Step

Suppose the Kuijt facts transplanted to Paris: a defendant fined or imprisoned by the court of appeal, an appeal on points of law before the Cour de cassation, and a suspicion that judges outside the assigned formation took part in the deliberations. The French procedural reflex would unfold in three stages, each of them stricter than its Dutch equivalent. First, information. In France the composition is not a matter of registry courtesy; it is a validity requirement inscribed in the judgment itself. Because “Tout jugement ou arrêt doit établir la régularité de la composition de la juridiction qui l’a rendu”, defence counsel reads the mentions of the decision first: which chamber, which president, which judges, who was present at the hearings and at the deliberation. Any gap, any ambiguity, any extra name is a ground of cassation in itself, as the Bourges case decided on 8 October 2025 demonstrates. A French lawyer would not need to ask, as Ms Kuijt’s lawyer had to ask, whether outsiders participated; if the mentions suggest that anyone beyond the deciding judges was present at the deliberation, cassation follows without proof of influence.

Second, challenge. French law allows a litigant who doubts the impartiality of a judge to act before the decision, through the formal challenge procedure — article 668 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that any judge may be challenged on the listed grounds — and after the decision, through the composition-based ground of cassation. Ms Kuijt did exactly the equivalent in the Netherlands — she challenged the assigned judges and the other judges of the Criminal Law Division — and the challenge panel dismissed her application on 21 December 2018 on the ground that the outsiders take no part in deciding cases. In France that answer would be unavailable, because responsibility is not the test: presence is. Under article 592 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, decisions “rendues par des juges qui n’ont pas assisté à toutes les audiences de la cause” are void, whether or not those judges voted, signed, or influenced anything. The nullity is a matter of composition, not of proven bias. That is the decisive practical difference clients must grasp: in Paris, you do not have to prove that the unidentified judge changed the outcome; you have to show that someone who should not have been in the room was there, or that the judgment does not allow the Cour de cassation to verify who was there. The 8 October 2025 ruling is the living proof — cassation granted “sans qu’il y ait lieu d’examiner les autres griefs”, without even reaching the merits of the conviction.

Third, Strasbourg. Ms Kuijt’s itinerary shows the route exactly as it must be travelled: domestic challenge first, appeal on points of law with the Convention argument raised, dismissal on 8 January 2019, then the application lodged on 4 April 2019, relinquishment on 26 August 2025, hearing on 21 January 2026, Grand Chamber ruling today. For a French litigant the itinerary would be identical in structure: exhaust the domestic remedies by raising the Article 6 § 1 complaint — denial of a hearing by an “independent and impartial tribunal” — before the French courts, obtain the final domestic decision, and only then bring the case to Strasbourg within the applicable time-limit. The lesson of Kuijt for French practitioners is therefore double. Domestically, the French system already offers stronger protection than the minimum Strasbourg may define today, since French nullity rules seal the deliberation room more tightly than Article 6 arguably requires. But conventionally, today’s ruling fixes the European floor: if the Grand Chamber finds a violation, every supreme court with reservisten-style practices must reform, and French counsel defending clients in cross-border cases — extradition, European arrest warrant surrenders, enforcement of foreign judgments — gain a fresh, Grand Chamber-stamped argument whenever the issuing court’s deliberation composition looks opaque. If the Court finds no violation, the ruling will instead define the conditions under which outside participation stays Convention-compliant — statutory basis, published protocol, no decision-making power — and French lawyers will cite those conditions to test foreign procedures against them. Either outcome is usable; what matters is that, from this morning, the argument speaks with the voice of the Grand Chamber. The Court’s reasoning, together with the enterprise of challenging foreign decisions in France, is where specialised advice earns its fee.

Conclusion

At 10.30 this morning the Grand Chamber answers a question that goes to the heart of what judging means: is a judgment the act of the named judges who heard you, or the product of a division thinking together behind closed doors? The Dutch courts answered with legal unity — Section 75 formations decide, reservisten merely deliberate under section 1.2 of the Protocol, and consistency serves the rule of law. Ms Kuijt answered with Article 6 § 1 — a tribunal must be one the litigant can see, verify, and challenge. France, as this article has shown, chose its side long ago: “Les délibérations des juges sont secrètes”, only those who sat may decide, and any judgment that cannot prove its composition is void. Whatever Strasbourg decides today — violation, no violation, or a conditional approval hedged with safeguards — three consequences follow for international readers. First, supreme-court registries across Europe will audit their deliberation protocols within days. Second, defence teams in cross-border criminal cases gain or lose a Convention argument about opaque deliberations, depending on the outcome. Third, the contrast between the French sealed-room model and the Dutch collegial model becomes a litigation tool: counsel can now frame composition challenges in the language the Grand Chamber itself used this morning. Our firm follows Strasbourg rulings the day they fall and converts them into defence strategy before French courts. If a foreign judgment, a surrender request, or an appeal on points of law in your case raises the slightest doubt about who really decided, that doubt is now a Grand Chamber question — and it should be raised as one.

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