On 23 September 2026 the Ninth Chamber of the General Court dismissed two actions by Belarusian state-owned manufacturers and left their asset freezes in place. In Case T-240/24, the Minsk truck maker MAZ failed to annul the 2024 and 2025 acts that kept its name on the lists. In Case T-239/24, the Zhodino dump-truck maker BelAZ failed the same day, before the same judges: the action is dismissed and the applicant pays the costs. The judgments are ECLI:EU:T:2026:590 and ECLI:EU:T:2026:589, delivered in open court in Luxembourg, with H. Kanninen as rapporteur.
Two days earlier, EU governments had dropped Alisher Usmanov and Mikhail Fridman from the Russia sanctions list in exchange for a three-year rollover of the rest of that regime. That political delisting is a different event, already examined in our note on how the 22 September 2026 delisting of Usmanov and Fridman interacts with a frozen account in France. These judgments answer another question: what happens when a state-owned industrial group asks a court, rather than a capital, to come off a freeze list, and the court refuses.
For a bank, a buyer or a creditor in France, the names stay listed. Funds owned, held or controlled by those companies remain frozen in the Union. This note sets out what the Court held, and what French law then requires of the person who holds the money.
I. What the 23 September 2026 judgments held on the MAZ and BelAZ asset freeze
A. State ownership alone does not keep a company frozen
MAZ is a Belarusian motor-vehicle manufacturer established in Minsk. BelAZ, established in Zhodino, manufactures trucks and other heavy transport equipment. Both were first listed on 21 June 2021, by Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2021/1002 and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/997. The Council’s original statement of reasons, which the maintaining acts carried forward in substance, described each company as a large state-owned industrial concern, a source of revenue for the Lukashenko regime, and a provider of premises and equipment for a political rally in support of that regime. A second paragraph of reasons referred to intimidation and layoffs of employees who had joined strikes and peaceful protests after the August 2020 elections, and to workers being locked indoors so that they could not join other protesters. From those facts the Council drew two legal conclusions: the companies benefit from and support the regime, and they are responsible for the repression of civil society.
The legal hook is not a bespoke rule invented for truck makers. In the versions applicable when the contested acts were adopted, points (a) and (b) of Article 4(1) of Decision 2012/642, and paragraphs 4 and 5 of Article 2 of Regulation No 765/2006, provide that funds and economic resources owned, held or controlled by persons and entities that benefit from or support the Lukashenko regime are to be frozen, as are the funds of persons responsible for serious human-rights violations or for the repression of civil society. The applicants asked the Court to annul Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/769 and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/768 of 26 February 2024, and Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/385 and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/386 of 24 February 2025, in so far as those acts concerned them. The hearing was on 15 December 2025. Judgment came on 23 September 2026.
The central attack was that the Council had built an irrebuttable presumption. On that reading, state ownership alone would be enough, and a company wholly owned by the Republic of Belarus would be frozen without any further link to the regime. The Ninth Chamber rejected that reading of the file. In both judgments it held that the Council had not relied only on the fact that the applicant’s capital is held by the Belarusian State. It had also relied on the company’s position in the Belarusian economy, on its character as a source of revenue for the regime, and on the offer of premises and equipment for a political rally. The employee-repression paragraph was a further, separate strand. The applicants were therefore wrong to say that an irrebuttable presumption of support had been created for every state-owned undertaking.
That distinction will matter the next time a French compliance officer sees a Belarusian counterparty that is merely public. Public ownership is a fact. It is not, on these judgments, a shortcut that dispenses with evidence. The Court then asked whether the evidence that did exist was enough. For MAZ, it found that the company’s position in the Belarusian economy, the fact that it belongs to the Belarusian State, and the fact that it represents a source of revenue for the Lukashenko regime, taken together, constitute a sufficient basis for the view that the company supports that regime for the purposes of Article 4(1)(b) of Decision 2012/642. The Court noted that this provision refers in particular to persons and entities providing financial support. Those reasons, which it described as sufficiently detailed and specific, and as containing no error of assessment of the facts or error of law, constitute in themselves a sufficient basis to justify maintenance of the name on the lists in 2025.
The BelAZ judgment uses the same structure, with the adjective the Council had used in the original reasons. The company’s position in the Belarusian economy, state ownership, and its character as a significant source of revenue, taken together, were a sufficient basis for support within Article 4(1)(b). Those reasons were themselves a sufficient basis to justify maintenance of the listing in 2024, and again in 2025. The Court accepted, for the 2025 review, that news reports from the autumn of 2024 recorded deliveries of trucks to Russian regions and further orders, and that other published items recorded significant income in 2023 and described the company as one of the most profitable undertakings in Belarus. For MAZ, the Court treated continued commercial operations, increased production, exports and sales, together with earlier payments to the State by way of mandatory contributions or dividends, as a sufficiently concrete, precise and consistent body of evidence that the company remained a source of revenue in the period before the 2025 acts.
Two limits follow, and both should be stated plainly. First, the Court did not hold that every state-owned Belarusian company is frozen. It held that this combination of position, ownership and revenue was enough for these two applicants, on these files. A smaller public body, a company that has ceased to generate revenue, or an entity whose capital has passed out of state hands, is a different case. Second, because the revenue and position reasons were themselves sufficient, the Court held that it was not necessary to examine the applicants’ arguments against the other reasons. Paragraph 173 of the MAZ judgment says that complaints of an error of assessment vitiating the 2025 maintaining acts should be rejected as unfounded, and that it is not necessary to examine arguments directed against the other reasons, since the fact of those reasons not being substantiated could not give rise to annulment. A reader who treats the lock-in and layoff allegations as judicially proved goes beyond the text. The Court left those complaints unexamined because it did not need them.
The same paragraph also closes a familiar litigation tactic. Listed companies often try to knock out one sentence of the statement of reasons and treat the whole listing as fallen. Where one set of reasons is sufficiently detailed, specific, substantiated, and itself sufficient, the failure of another set does not annul the act. That is preventive-measure logic. It is not a licence for a thin file. The Council still had to prove the revenue and position strand to the requisite legal standard, and the Court reviewed that proof. What the applicants could not do was force the Court to retry every sentence once one sufficient strand stood.
B. A renewed freeze is not permanent, and harm to workers does not annul it
The second line of attack was about time and proportion. Both companies said that a freeze first imposed in 2021, and then maintained in 2022, 2023, 2024 and 2025, had ceased to be provisional. They said the reviews were formal, that their observations were ignored, and that reasons which had not changed could not justify another year of paralysis. They also said the measures destroyed the essence of the right to property and the freedom to conduct a business, harmed thousands of employees, and did not increase pressure on the regime, because the companies were not part of the state apparatus and could not influence it. They added that the freeze pushed Belarus further toward Russia, which cut against the Council’s aim.
The Ninth Chamber rejected that reading of renewal. The mere fact that a name was included by the initial acts and then maintained does not mean the measures have ceased to be provisional and precautionary. In the periodic reviews the Council found that the circumstances which justified the initial inclusion continued to apply, and the Court found no error of assessment in that finding at the time of the contested acts. Repeated renewal therefore does not make the measures permanent and irreversible, and does not mean the applicant could not later secure removal from the list or an authorisation to release funds. The Court pointed, for that proposition, to the judgment of 13 March 2025 in Shuvalov v Council, C-271/24 P.
That sentence is easy to misread in a bank. It does not mean the freeze is about to expire, or that a French account should be unblocked because the listing is old. It means the legal character of the measure remains a reviewable, reversible restriction, even after several renewals. The practical duration is whatever the next maintaining act provides, unless a court annuls it or a competent authority authorises a release. On 23 September 2026 the Court refused annulment. The 2025 maintaining acts stand.
The Court was equally direct about employees and about the Russia argument. Restrictive measures affecting large undertakings owned by the Belarusian State, which constitute a source of revenue for that State, are such as to limit the resources available to the Government of the Republic of Belarus, thereby increasing the cost of its actions against democracy, the rule of law and human rights, and consequently the pressure exerted on it. The mere fact that the measures further foster economic ties between Belarus and Russia does not refute that finding. The importance of the aim is such as to justify possible, even substantial, negative consequences for the applicant, including where those consequences also fall on its employees. The Court cited its judgment of 7 June 2023 in Skryba v Council, T-581/21, for that last point.
The rights analysis is conventional Charter law, applied to these facts. Articles 16 and 17 of the Charter protect the freedom to conduct a business and the right to property. An asset freeze restricts both. A limitation is lawful if it is provided for by law, pursues an objective of general interest, and is necessary and proportionate without impairing the essence of the right. The Court held that the measures are provided for by law: the decisions rest on Article 29 TEU, and the implementing regulations on Article 215 TFEU. Decision 2012/642 and Regulation No 765/2006 define the categories of persons who may be listed, by objective criteria which the Court had already found consistent with legal certainty. Article 5 of Decision 2012/642 and Article 3 of Regulation No 765/2006 provide that the use of frozen funds may be authorised to meet basic needs or certain commitments, and that specific authorisations may be granted permitting the release of funds, other financial assets or other economic resources. Those derogations, together with the criteria, define the scope of the limitation with the clarity the principle of legality requires.
The objective, consolidating and supporting democracy, the rule of law and human rights under Article 21(2)(b) TEU, was not disputed as legitimate. On necessity and proportion, the Court held that targeting large state-owned revenue sources is a rational way to raise the cost of the regime’s conduct, and that the harm to the companies and their workers, however real, does not make the measures unlawful. The third plea was rejected. The actions were dismissed in their entirety. Because there was no partial annulment, the Court did not need to rule on the Council’s alternative request that the effects of Decision 2024/769 be maintained until any partial annulment of the implementing regulation took effect.
The operative parts are short and should be read as such. In each case the Ninth Chamber dismisses the action and orders the applicant to pay the costs. There is no suspension, no reinterpretation of the listing criterion, and no order requiring the Council to rewrite the statement of reasons. A French counterparty who hears that the companies “lost in Luxembourg” should understand the loss in those terms: the 2024 and 2025 maintaining acts survive, the names stay on the lists, and the freeze that those acts maintain continues to bind inside the Union, including in France.
One further procedural fact belongs in the file. The judgments still appeared as pending on the InfoCuria case sheet on the morning after delivery, even though the calendar had listed delivery of judgment for 23 September 2026 at 09:30 in the Fernando Pessoa courtroom, and even though EUR-Lex had published the texts under the ECLI numbers above. Status labels on a case sheet are not the law. The operative part is. Anyone screening MAZ or BelAZ on 24 September 2026 should screen against the published judgments, not against a stale “pending” flag.
II. What a French bank, buyer or creditor must do while the freeze stands
A. Stop the payment, screen the chain, and know which offence actually applies
The EU freeze does not wait for a French decree. Regulation No 765/2006, as maintained by the acts the Court refused to annul, requires that the funds and economic resources of the listed entities be frozen, and that funds and economic resources not be made available to them. That prohibition is directly applicable in France. A Paris bank does not need a ministerial arrêté before it stops a transfer to MAZ or BelAZ. What French law adds is a map of who must organise for that prohibition, who may be told to apply a national freeze as well, and who commits an offence if the national regime is evaded.
The Monetary and Financial Code draws those lines with more care than a screening alert usually shows. Article L. 562-4-1, in the version in force since 26 February 2022, requires the persons mentioned in Article L. 561-2 to put in place internal organisation and procedures for asset freezes. The text, as returned by the official database on 24 September 2026, states: «Les personnes mentionnées à l’article L. 561-2 mettent en place une organisation et des procédures internes pour la mise en œuvre des mesures de gel des avoirs et d’interdiction de mise à disposition ou d’utilisation des fonds ou ressources économiques prévues au présent chapitre, aux articles L. 712-4 et L. 712-10 et par les règlements européens portant mesures restrictives pris en application des articles 75 ou 215 du traité sur le fonctionnement de l’Union européenne, ainsi que l’interdiction de contournement de ces mesures.» That sentence is the bridge between a Luxembourg listing and a French compliance programme. It covers measures in the national chapter, measures in Articles L. 712-4 and L. 712-10, and European regulations carrying restrictive measures adopted under Articles 75 or 215 TFEU, together with the prohibition on circumvention. The Belarus implementing regulations rest on Article 215 TFEU. They are inside that sentence. See article L. 562-4-1 of the Monetary and Financial Code.
Who is a person mentioned in Article L. 561-2? The version applicable on 24 September 2026, which remains applicable until a deferred repeal dated 10 July 2027, begins: «1° Les organismes, institutions et services régis par les dispositions du titre Ier du présent livre, y compris les succursales des établissements de crédit mentionnés à l’article L. 511-22». Credit institutions, and the other categories that follow in that article, are therefore inside the procedural duty of Article L. 562-4-1. A French bank, and a branch in France of an EEA institution in the situations the article describes, cannot treat a Belarus industrial listing as a foreign curiosity. The duty is to have the organisation, the group procedures where Article L. 561-33 applies, and internal controls. The official text is article L. 561-2 of the Monetary and Financial Code.
Article L. 562-4 is a different duty, and it should not be collapsed into the previous one. It provides: «Sont tenus d’appliquer sans délai les mesures de gel et les interdictions de mise à disposition ou d’utilisation prévues au présent chapitre et aux articles L. 712-4 et L. 712-10 et d’en informer immédiatement le ministre chargé de l’économie». The persons bound are any natural person, French or foreign, on the national territory, the persons mentioned in Article L. 561-2, and any other legal person incorporated or established under national law or carrying out an operation on the national territory in the course of its activity, including French companies acting abroad and foreign companies acting in France. The immediate-application duty in that article is worded for measures provided in the chapter and in Articles L. 712-4 and L. 712-10, and it adds an immediate information duty toward the minister responsible for the economy. It is not, in its own words, a restatement of every EU regulation. The EU regulation binds anyway. Article L. 562-4-1 is the provision that names the EU regulations for the internal procedures of obliged entities. Both texts are in force. They do different work. The immediate-application article is article L. 562-4 of the Monetary and Financial Code.
What counts as funds, when a screening hit is debated with a client who says the asset is “only” a deposit or a surrender value? Article L. 562-1, applicable since 15 June 2025, defines the word for the chapter. It states: «2° “ Fonds ” : les actifs financiers et les avantages économiques de toute nature, notamment : a) Le numéraire, les créances en numéraire, les traites, les ordres de paiement et autres instruments ou moyens de paiement». The definition continues, in the same article, through deposits with the persons mentioned in Article L. 562-4, insurance contracts and their surrender value, claims, and financial instruments. A compliance conversation that stops at a current account is too narrow. The definition is in article L. 562-1 of the Monetary and Financial Code.
There is also a national freeze power that can sit beside the EU list. Article L. 562-3 provides: «Le ministre chargé de l’économie peut décider, pour une durée de six mois, renouvelable, le gel des fonds et ressources économiques». The minister may freeze, for six months, renewable, funds and economic resources belonging to, owned, held or controlled by persons who commit, attempt, facilitate or finance actions sanctioned or prohibited by Chapter VII resolutions of the United Nations Charter or by acts adopted under Article 29 TEU or Article 75 TFEU, or who are designated on the basis of those resolutions or acts. The General Court recorded that Decision 2024/769 and Decision 2025/385 have their basis in Article 29 TEU. A designation under those decisions can therefore be the factual premise of a national freeze under Article L. 562-3. That national order is an additional instrument. It is not a condition precedent of the EU freeze. The text is article L. 562-3 of the Monetary and Financial Code.
The national prohibition on making funds available is likewise narrower than the EU regulation, and the difference has to be kept. Article L. 562-5 states: «Il est interdit aux personnes mentionnées à l’article L. 562-4 de mettre à disposition directement ou indirectement, ou d’utiliser des fonds ou ressources économiques au profit des personnes dont les fonds et ressources économiques font l’objet d’une mesure de gel». The prohibition is addressed to the persons mentioned in Article L. 562-4, and it concerns persons whose funds are frozen under the national articles it lists, including Article L. 562-3. It does not, in its own words, restate the EU regulation. A payment to MAZ or BelAZ is prohibited by the regulation the Court has just refused to disturb. It becomes the national prohibition of Article L. 562-5 if, and in so far as, the recipient is a person whose funds are frozen under one of the national articles that sentence names. Treating the two prohibitions as identical is how files get both overcharged and undercharged. The national prohibition is article L. 562-5 of the Monetary and Financial Code.
The criminal provision has to be read with the same restraint. Article L. 574-3, in the version in force since 1 May 2026, states: «Est puni des peines prévues au 1 de l’ article L. 542-1 du code des douanes le fait, pour les personnes mentionnés à l’ article L. 562-4 , leurs dirigeants ou leurs préposés et, pour les personnes faisant l’objet d’une mesure de gel ou d’interdiction prise en application du chapitre II du titre VI du présent livre, de se soustraire aux obligations en résultant ou de faire obstacle à sa mise en oeuvre.». The persons exposed are those mentioned in Article L. 562-4, their directors and employees, and the persons who are themselves subject to a freeze or prohibition taken under Chapter II of Title VI of Book V. The conduct is evading the obligations resulting from that regime, or obstructing its implementation. The article then routes investigation, prosecution and punishment through Titles II and XII of the Customs Code, subject to Articles 453 to 459 of that code. It does not say that every euro paid to a company listed only in an EU annex is, without more, this offence. A prosecutor still has to place the conduct inside the obligations the article names. The text is article L. 574-3 of the Monetary and Financial Code.
The penalty, where the offence is made out, is not a symbolic fine. Article L. 574-3 refers to the penalties in paragraph 1 of Article L. 542-1 of the Customs Code. That paragraph provides that the conduct it describes «est puni de cinq ans d’emprisonnement et d’une amende de deux fois le montant de la somme sur laquelle porte l’infraction.». Confiscation of the sum, of the means of transport used, and of the direct or indirect proceeds, is attached to the same paragraph. Anyone who describes the French exposure as an administrative inconvenience is not reading the statute the criminal court would read. The penalty text is article L. 542-1 of the Customs Code.
The Court of Cassation has already said how that offence is investigated, on facts that must not be confused with Minsk or Zhodino. On 29 November 2023, in appeal No 22-85.867, published in the Bulletin, the criminal chamber dealt with a prosecution for evasion of an asset freeze imposed in the fight against terrorism, under Article L. 562-2, not under a Belarus listing. The defendants were officers of associations dissolved in 2019. Ministerial orders had frozen their bank accounts. The court of appeal in Douai had convicted them. On the competence of judicial customs officers, the Court of Cassation held: «dès lors que les modalités de constatation, de poursuite et de répression du délit de soustraction aux mesures de gel des avoirs dans le cadre de la lutte contre le terrorisme sont prévues par le code des douanes, cette infraction constitue une infraction prévue par le code des douanes au sens du 1° du I de l’article 28-1 du code de procédure pénale.» The judgment is Cass. crim., 29 November 2023, No 22-85.867. The holding is about investigative competence under Article 28-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, because the modalities of finding, prosecuting and punishing the terrorism freeze offence are those of the Customs Code. It is not a holding that MAZ’s French customers have already committed that offence. It does tell a Paris file something useful: if the national freeze offence is engaged, the investigators are not limited to an ordinary police inquiry, and the customs route is the one the Court has confirmed.
The same judgment is a warning about quantum. The criminal chamber quashed, for one defendant only, the confiscation and the customs fine, because the court of appeal had given contradictory reasons on the sums credited during a period when the freeze was lifted and the sums debited during freeze periods. The conviction itself, for the other defendant, stood. A French bank that reconstructs a payment history after a screening failure should expect the court to match dates, credits and debits to the exact periods of the measure. A global figure, untethered from those periods, does not survive.
What, then, should a Paris desk do on the morning after these judgments? Stop. Identify whether the counterparty is MAZ, BelAZ, or a person or entity that owns, holds or controls their funds, or whose funds they own, hold or control. The EU criterion is ownership, holding and control, not only the name on the invoice. A non-listed buyer of dump trucks is not automatically listed. A non-listed company that is paying into an account controlled by BelAZ may be making funds available to a listed person. A French seller who ships parts to MAZ against payment from a third country is in the circumvention question that Article L. 562-4-1 expressly tells obliged entities to organise for. The judgments do not decide that third-country payment. They do decide that the listed manufacturers remain frozen, so the circumvention analysis starts from a live prohibition, not from a hope that Luxembourg has loosened it.
The contrast with the Usmanov and Fridman delisting should be kept in the same sentence, and then left there. A political decision not to renew two individual listings does not move a Belarusian state manufacturer whose judicial challenge has just failed. A bank that unblocks a MAZ account because “Brussels is delisting oligarchs this week” has mixed two regimes, two legal bases, and two outcomes. The individual Russia list and the Belarus industrial list are not interchangeable. Our earlier note explains the delisting track. This note is the track that the General Court closed on 23 September.
B. Do not attach frozen assets, and do not treat the freeze as force majeure
Creditors are the other French audience, and they are often more impatient than banks. A judgment debt, an unpaid invoice, a Paris saisie-attribution: the reflex is to take what is in the account before someone else does. French enforcement law makes that reflex legally powerful, which is exactly why it collides with a freeze. Article L. 211-2 of the Code of Civil Enforcement Procedures provides: «L’acte de saisie emporte, à concurrence des sommes pour lesquelles elle est pratiquée, attribution immédiate au profit du saisissant de la créance saisie, disponible entre les mains du tiers ainsi que de tous ses accessoires.». An attachment does not sit quietly on the account. It immediately attributes the seized claim to the creditor, up to the amount seized, and makes the third party personally debtor of the causes of the seizure within the limit of its own obligation. That is why a freeze and an attachment cannot be sequenced by optimism. The text is article L. 211-2 of the Code of Civil Enforcement Procedures.
The Court of Cassation has already drawn the consequence for a European asset freeze, in a judgment that must be cited for what it decides and not for a regulation it does not mention. On 7 September 2022, in appeal No 19-25.108, published in the Bulletin, the first civil chamber ruled on Regulation (EU) No 2016/44, the Libya measures, and on seizures practised in France on assets of the Libyan Investment Authority and its wholly owned subsidiary. The Court held: «ne peut être diligentée, sur des fonds ou des ressources économiques gelés, aucune mesure d’exécution qui aurait pour effet, non seulement de les faire sortir du patrimoine du débiteur, mais aussi de conférer au créancier poursuivant un simple droit de préférence, sans une autorisation préalable du directeur du Trésor, autorité nationale désignée en application de l’article 11 § 2 du règlement n° 2016/44». The full holding adds that this reading is indispensable to the effectiveness of the restrictive measures, whatever the effect on creditors who had nothing to do with the diversion of public funds under the former Libyan regime. The judgment is Cass. civ. 1re, 7 September 2022, No 19-25.108.
Three limits belong next to that quotation. The regulation in the holding is the Libya regulation, and the national authority named in it is the Director of the Treasury, designated under Article 11(2) of that regulation. The holding covers not only a measure that takes the funds out of the debtor’s estate, but also a measure that merely gives the pursuing creditor a preference. And the Court had the benefit of a preliminary ruling of the Court of Justice of 11 November 2021 in Case C-340/20. A creditor of MAZ or BelAZ cannot paste the name “Director of the Treasury” onto Regulation No 765/2006 and call the point decided. What the creditor can take from the judgment is the structure. Where an EU freeze forbids disposal, and where an authorisation is the only door, a French attachment that attributes the claim immediately is the thing the freeze is designed to prevent. The General Court, in the MAZ judgment, recorded the door that exists in the Belarus regime: Article 5 of Decision 2012/642 and Article 3 of Regulation No 765/2006 allow authorisation to use frozen funds for basic needs or certain commitments, and specific authorisations to release funds and economic resources. The lawful path is that authorisation, addressed to the competent authority designated for that regime, not a bailiff’s act in Paris served on the theory that a preference is harmless.
The listed debtor has a mirror-image temptation. It tells the French creditor that payment is impossible, that the freeze is force majeure, and that legal interest must stop. The plenary assembly of the Court of Cassation has rejected that argument where the freeze hits the debtor because of the debtor’s own activities. On 10 July 2020, in joined appeals No 18-18.542 and No 18-21.814, published in the Bulletin, the plenary assembly ruled on Bank Sepah, designated under Security Council resolution 1747 (2007) and the EU measures that transposed it. The Court held: «Ne constitue pas un cas de force majeure pour celle qui le subit, faute d’extériorité, le gel des avoirs d’une personne ou d’une entité qui est frappée par cette mesure en raison de ses activités.». The judgment is Cass. ass. plén., 10 July 2020, Nos 18-18.542 and 18-21.814.
The facts of that case also show what happens when a listing ends. The Security Council removed Bank Sepah on 17 January 2016. The EU transposition entered into force on 23 January 2016. The creditors then pursued enforcement in France, including attachments in the summer of 2016. A delisting unlocks enforcement. It does not erase the debt, and it does not rewind the interest that ran while the debtor was listed, if the freeze lacked the exteriority that force majeure requires. MAZ and BelAZ have not been delisted. They have just failed to obtain annulment. A French creditor may therefore continue to assert the debt and the running of legal interest, subject to the ordinary rules of the contract and of prescription. What the creditor may not do is collect that debt out of frozen funds in France by an attachment that attributes the claim.
The exteriority limit should be explained to the client in one sentence. Force majeure, in the plenary assembly’s formula, fails because the freeze is not external to the person who is frozen for that person’s own activities. A listed manufacturer cannot say the freeze came from outside its sphere when the listing is founded on its support for the regime, its revenue, and its place in the state economy. A non-listed French buyer, who is not the person frozen, is in a different position. That buyer may have a contractual impossibility, a sanctions clause, or a frustration argument of its own. It does not inherit Bank Sepah’s defeat, and it does not inherit BelAZ’s listing. The contract has to be read. The screening has to be done on the payer, the payee, and the person who controls the account, not on a slogan.
In Paris and the Île-de-France the pieces of that file are concrete. The account is often in a bank whose compliance unit sits in Paris or La Défense. The enforcement act, if someone has already served one, is a saisie-attribution whose immediate attributive effect is Article L. 211-2. The national authorisation, if a derogation is sought, goes to the authority designated for the Belarus regime, with the minister responsible for the economy in the picture wherever Article L. 562-4’s information duty or Article L. 562-3’s national freeze is engaged. A challenge to the EU listing itself is not brought in the Paris administrative court. MAZ and BelAZ have just used the Luxembourg route, under Article 263 TFEU, and lost. A challenge to a separate French ministerial order, if one exists in the individual file, is a different action, before the administrative courts, and it does not suspend the EU regulation. Mixing those forums is a common and expensive mistake.
What to put in the brief, if the hit is real, is equally concrete. The contract, the invoice, and the payment chain. The screening result, with the exact name matched and the aliases rejected. Whether the counterparty is the listed company, a non-listed distributor, or an account the listed company controls. Whether any French attachment has already been served, and on what date, because Article L. 211-2 makes same-day seizures simultaneous and later ones ineffective against an attribution that has already occurred. Whether anyone is asking the bank to “just hold” the funds while also asking it to promise the creditor they are available. A hold that is in truth an attribution is the measure the 2022 judgment forbids in the Libya setting, and that the Belarus authorisation clause is there to channel. Whether the client is the listed person, in which case the Bank Sepah interest point applies, or a third party, in which case it does not. And whether anyone is proposing to route the payment through a non-EU account in order to avoid the freeze. That last proposal is the circumvention question, not a solution.
There is a commercial temptation, after a judgment like this, to say that the companies are finished in the Union and that every Belarusian truck contract is dead. The judgments do not say that. They say these two listed manufacturers failed to annul the acts that keep them frozen. A contract with a non-listed Belarusian buyer, paid from non-listed funds that the listed companies do not own, hold or control, is a different screening question. A contract that delivers goods to MAZ, or that is paid by BelAZ, is not. The Court has also said, in terms, that the measures may be maintained even if they push trade toward Russia. A business plan that treats that economic effect as a legal defence has already been rejected.
Conclusion
The week of 22 September 2026 showed two ways an EU freeze can move. Governments can decline to renew individual names, as they did for Usmanov and Fridman, and lock the rest of a list for three years. A court can refuse to annul maintaining acts, as the Ninth Chamber did on 23 September for MAZ and BelAZ. The second path is the one that still binds a French account. State ownership was not treated as an irrebuttable presumption. Position in the economy, state ownership and revenue, taken together, were enough. Renewal did not make the freeze permanent, and harm to workers did not make it unlawful. The names remain listed.
French law then divides the work. Obliged entities must have procedures for EU regulations adopted under Articles 75 or 215 TFEU, including the prohibition on circumvention. The national immediate-application duty, the national freeze power, and the national offence each have their own words, and those words are narrower than the regulation. A creditor who attaches frozen funds collides with the immediate attributive effect of a saisie-attribution, and with the authorisation logic the Court of Cassation has already applied to a parallel EU freeze. A listed debtor who calls the freeze force majeure collides with the plenary assembly’s ruling in Bank Sepah. None of those French authorities decides the Belarus file by name. All of them decide the moves that a Paris bank or a Paris creditor is tempted to make the day after Luxembourg has said no.
The judgments are ECLI:EU:T:2026:590 and ECLI:EU:T:2026:589. They were delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 23 September 2026. Until a later act removes the names, or a competent authority authorises a release under Article 3 of Regulation No 765/2006 and Article 5 of Decision 2012/642, the freeze stands. The safe French response is to stop, to identify ownership, holding and control, and to use the authorisation door rather than a payment or an attachment.